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This dissertation explores the intersection between rival forms of consciousness in 
Pirin Macedonia: national and local, from the anti-Ottoman Ilinden Uprising in 
Macedonia in 1903 to the end of the Communist “Macedonianization” campaign in 1952. 
Bulgarian, Macedonian and English-language historiographies have each portrayed this 
period as one in which a centralized state extended its power into the region and codified 
a Bulgarian national consciousness among its inhabitants. This dissertation finds that a 
rival, local consciousness existed through this period as well. The inability of the 
Bulgarian state in 1878 to secure the annexation of all geographic Macedonia, however, 
had led in the late nineteenth century to the emergence of a local paramilitary 
organization, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO).  
VMRO is generally portrayed as a nationalist organization. But in leading 
Macedonians within a struggle against first the Ottoman Empire, then against Greece, 
Serbia (later, Yugoslavia) and even factions within Bulgaria, it provided an alternative 
experience of mobilization. The Organization took on functions of the state, able to do 
this as the Bulgarian state was weakened by internal crises and external enemies.  This 
period thus saw a lengthy struggle between VMRO and the central state to consolidate 
 
control over Pirin, a conflict that continued between local elites and the state even after 
the paramilitary organization was driven underground in 1934.  
 The “Macedonian Question” has been portrayed as a wedge issue by which 
external actors — particularly the Communist International, Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany — could seek to divide Southeastern Europe. This dissertation goes farther in 
arguing that Macedonia was a divisive issue within national politics as well. Even in the 
post-1934 Zveno and royal dictatorships, then the Communist-dominated regime after 
1944, Pirin remained a divisive issue and one in which a weak central state was forced to 
find compromise with local interests. The “Macedonianization” campaign that followed 
the Second World War was the vehicle by which Pirin was subordinated to the Bulgarian 
state. As such, the campaign appears less as a Soviet-directed campaign for the benefit of 
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Transliterating Bulgarian and Macedonian sources poses certain challenges, not 
simply in terms of linguistics but in terms of politics. Transliterating a term or 
proper name in a specific fashion can be interpreted as showing preference for 
contemporary national claims: e.g., Makedonija suggests !"#$%&'()", 
Makedoniia suggests !"#$%&'(*. 
 
I use here similar methods of transliteration for Macedonian and Bulgarian. In 
terms of toponyms I transliterate the contemporary language of the contemporary 
state. Wherever possible I use the appropriate historical name unless the place 
name has entered common English usage (e.g., Nevrokop rather than Gotse 
Delchev, Skopje rather than Uskub or Skopiia, and Sofia rather than Sofiia). In 
terms of proper names, for purposes of standardization I use Bulgarian 
transliteration for names before 1948, but use the appropriate transliteration 
when referring to proper names after that period. While imperfect, I find it the 
most reasonable compromise. All transliteration of the titles and authors of non-
English books and articles in Cyrillic follow transliteration as per the language of 
authorship (e.g., Sofija instead of Sofiia when transliterated from a Macedonian 
text, Skopia instead of Skopje when transliterated from a Bulgarian text), except 
where an author has transliterated their own name differently. 
 
Macedonian 
!, " A #, $ Y %, & T 
', ( B ), * K +, , Kj 
-, . V /, 0 L 1, 2 U 
3, 4 G 5, 6 Lj 7, 8 F 
9, : D ;, < M =, > H 
?, @ E A, B N C, D Ts 
E, F Gj G, H Nj I, J Ch 
K, L Zh M, N O O, P J 
Q, R Z S, T P U, V Sh 
S, W Dz X, Y R 
Z, [ I \, ] S 
 
Bulgarian 
!, " A /, 0 L C, D Ts 
', ( B ;, < M I, J Ch 
-, . V A, B N U, V Sh 
3, 4 G  M, N O ^, _ Sht 
9, : D S, T P `, a U 
?, @ E X, Y R b, c Io (but Yo when 
K, L Zh \, ] S beginning a proper name) 
Q, d Z %, & T e, f Ia (but Ya when 
Z, [ I 1, 2 U beginning a proper name) 
g, h I 7, 8 F !, " Ia or E 






List of Figures 
 
Figure 1: The Gotse Delchev Monument, Blagoevgrad........................................ 2 
Figure 2: The vilayets of Macedonia................................................................... 57 
Figure 3: Map of Dialects in Geographic Macedonia.......................................... 61 
Figure 4: The Five Pirin Kazas ........................................................................... 62 
Figure 5: A Pirin Town: Gorna Dzhumaiia in 1903.............................................. 66 
Figure 6: VMRO cheta, c. 1903 ........................................................................ 120 
Figure 7: Soldiers in the Macedonian-Adrianople Corps, 1912 ........................ 148 
Figure 8: Theaters of the First Balkan War, 1912............................................. 150 
Figure 9: New Macedonian Borders after 1919 ................................................ 162 
Figure 10: Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1923 .......................................... 163 
Figure 11: Symbolizing Macedonian Struggle: the 1926 “Ilinden” Calendar..... 224 
Figure 12: Symbolic Ceremonies: the funeral of Simeon Evtimov.................... 225 
Figure 13: Symbols of VMRO: “Chicho” Todor ................................................. 226 
Figure 14: Symbols of VMRO: Cheta Postcard ................................................ 227 
Figure 15: Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1934 .......................................... 244 
Figure 16: Bulgarian Gains in 1941:  
 Axis Occupation Zones in Southeastern Europe ................................... 251 
Figure 17: Bulgarian Troops on Occupation Duty, Vardar Macedonia, 1943.... 253 
Figure 18: Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1943 .......................................... 254 
Figure 19: Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1947 .......................................... 283 
Figure 20: Macedonian Symbols in the Service of Communism ...................... 297 






List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Modern Literary Languages of Southeastern Europe........................ 49 
Table 2: Population in the Pirin Kazas................................................................ 63 
Table 3: Church and School Construction in Pirin .............................................. 89 
Table 4: Volunteers for the Macedonian-Adrianople Corps.............................. 145 
Table 5: VMRO’s Affiliations to Macedonian Organizations ............................. 211 
Table 6: Urban Growth in Pirin, 1923-1934 ...................................................... 219 
Table 7: Bulgaria’s “Foreign Born” Population by Place of Origin, 1920........... 220 
Table 8: Percentage of school-aged children enrolled  
 in primary schools by ethnicity, 1946-47 .................................. 300 






List of Abbreviations  
 
 Original  Translation (if non-English) 
BKP Bulgarska komunisticheska partiia Bulgarian Communist Party 
BRP Bulgarska rabotnicheska partiia Bulgarian Worker’s Party 
    (Name of BKP 1938-48). 
BZNS Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden Siuoz Bulgarian Agrarian National  
    Union 
ELAS Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos Stratos National Popular Liberation  
    Army  
KPM Komunisticka partija na Makedonija Communist Party of Macedonia 
KPY Komunisti+ka partija Jugoslavije Communist Party of Yugoslavia 
MOO Makedonski-odrinski opulchenie Macedonian Volunteer’s Corps 
MVRNZ Ministerstvo na vutreshnite raboti Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
  i narodnoto zdrave    National Health 
NARA National Archives and Records Administration 
NRB Narodna repulika na Bulgariia People’s Republic of Bulgaria 
NRM Narodna republika na Makedonija People’s Republic of Macedonia 
ODAB Okruzhniiat durzhaven arhiv, Blagoevgrad District state archive,  
    Blagoevgrad 
OPAB Okruzhniiat partichen arhiv, Blagoevgrad District party archive,  
    Blagoevgrad 
OF Otechestven front Fatherland Front 
TsDA Tsentralen durzhaven arhiv Central State Archive 
VMRO Vutreshna Makedonska Revolutsionna Internal Macedonian  
  Organizatsiia  Revolutionary Organization 
VMK Vurhoven Makedonski Komitet Supreme Macedonian  











We are suffering from our Balkan [inferiority] complexes 
together. (...) Sofia is sulking over its lost glory, while 
Skopje has doubts about its independent identity - 
hence the swaggering and swashbuckling on both 
sides...  
-- 24 Chasa1 
 
 On September 18, 2004, a minor protest erupted in Blagoevgrad, the 
regional capital of Blagoevgrad province (oblast)2. The oblast constitutes the 
Pirin region, or Pirinski krai,3 that part of geographic Macedonia included within 
the boundaries of the Republic of Bulgaria.4 A delegation from the Republic of 
Macedonia composed of elderly retirees arrived in Blagoevgrad. During a brief 
ceremony in the afternoon, the visiting group laid a wreath of flowers on the 
Gotse Delchev monument (pametnik) in Macedonia Square (Ploshtad 
                                                
1 24 Chasa, May 12, 1997, 12. 
2 There are several possible translations of oblast, overlapping with other 
administrative terms. In this study, oblast is translated as province, okoliia as 
district, okrug as county and obshtina as municipality.  
3 Throughout this study I use Pirin to refer to the region rather than to the 
mountain that gives the region its name. The term is also used interchangeably 
with Pirinski krai (Bulgarian for “Pirin region”) and Pirin Macedonia. 
4 There are few easy definitions for Macedonia, and the term “geographic 
Macedonia” is used for convenience. I follow Duncan Perry and H.R. Wilkinson’s 
formulation that “Macedonia is roughly that territory which lies between the Shar 
and Osogov Mountains in the north, the Pindus mountains, the Bistritsa River… 
and the Aegean Sea in the south, the lower Mesta and the Rhodope Mountains 
in the east, and the Albanian highlands in the west.” Today, these territories lie in 
three states: Bulgaria (“Pirin Macedonia”), Greece (“Aegean Macedonia”) and the 
Republic of Macedonia (“Vardar Macedonia”), as illustrated by Figure 9 on page 
158 of this study. See Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror: The Macedonian 
Liberation Movements, 1893-1903 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 12-
13. See also H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic 





The Gotse Delchev Monument, Blagoevgrad 
 
The Gotse Delchev monument as symbolic space in May 2005. Note 
the memorial wreathes, used to commemorate both anniversaries of 
Macedonian historical events and Bulgarian state holidays.  
Makedoniia). Delchev is a nineteenth-century figure revered as a national hero in 
both Bulgaria and the 
Republic of Macedonia 
for his role (and death at 
a young age) in the fight 
against the Ottoman 
Empire for local 
autonomy and rights. 
Ceremonies at the site 
are common events, and 
usually not controversial. The commemoration on September 18 by non-
Bulgarian citizens proved otherwise. 
Local members of the conservative national political party VMRO-SMD5 
waiting nearby immediately contested the right of the Macedonian delegation to 
make use of the Gotse Delchev monument and the history it represented. 
Mounting the steps underneath the statue and its plinth, VMRO-SMD members 
unfurled Bulgarian and party flags. Members climbed up the steps of the 
                                                
5 “Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization—Union of Macedonian 
Societies” (Vutreshnata makedonska revoliutsionna organizatsiia—Suiuz na 
makedonskite druzhestva or VMRO-SMD). The political party deliberately draws 
upon historical parallels to justify its existence, claiming status as the heir of the 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century revolutionary-cum-terrorist 
organization. Nor is it alone in doing so: there have been more than a dozen 
post-1991 political parties in the Republic of Macedonia using VMRO in their 
names, the most significant being the “IMRO-Democratic Party for Macedonian 
National Unity” (Vnatresna makedonska revolutsionerna organizatsija-
Demokratska partija za makedonsko natsionalno edinstvo or VMRO-DPMNE). 




monument to stamp on, kick and hurl away the offending wreath. They also 
verbally challenged and harassed the visitors despite the presence of a half-
dozen police officers. “Ohrid is ours,” one VMRO-SMD supporter shouted in the 
uproar, “Get out, it belongs to Bulgaria!” A Bulgarian companion and resident of 
the town observing the event with me wryly noted, “Why is someone who lives in 
Blagoevgrad telling someone who lives in Ohrid to leave his home city?”6 
 Such an episode — one of dozens of similar clashes in the Blagoevgrad 
oblast since 1989 — neatly symbolizes a continuing conflict regarding the 
“Macedonian Question:” who are, and what are, the Macedonians? The present 
study examines the process by which the inhabitants of Pirin came to accept a 
local consciousness as synonymous with a larger Bulgarian national 
consciousness. This issue extended beyond questions of provincial identity. The 
Macedonian Question was not simply the focal point of Bulgarian foreign policy 
over the first half of the twentieth century, but also a critical issue in domestic 
politics. Conflicts over how to resolve the status of Macedonia — as either an 
autonomous part of the Ottoman Empire, through union with Bulgaria, or as an 
independent state — led to the creation of rival paramilitary organizations in the 
nineteenth century, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO) 
and the Supreme Macedonian Committee (VMK, or Vhrovisti). These rivals 
combined into a single organization embracing terrorist tactics even before the 
First World War. In a country where the Communist Party was effectively 
                                                
6 A chance stroll meant I happened upon both the preparations for the protest 
and the protest itself, and thus served as an eyewitness. My thanks to Mois 
Moshev for confirming the statements we witnessed, and for his rather ironic 




suppressed after 1923 and where Fascist parties failed to establish a mass 
following, VMRO came out of the war and its aftermath with a mass following. It 
survived as the only effective rival to state power in the interwar period. Its 
suppression became a common goal of the royalist dictatorship of the 1930s and 
the Communist  one that followed after 1944. The creation of the People’s 
Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia after the Second World War also revived 
the transnational dimensions of the Macedonian Question.  
 
Multiple Macedonian Identities: Aegean, Vardar and Pirin Dimensions 
 The explosion of academic work on the former Yugoslavia during and 
following its dissolution — “instant history,” as it has been called7 —extends to 
Macedonia but has scarcely touched the Pirin region. Questions of “identity 
politics” have been addressed in a number of recent works by anthropologists 
that seek to understand the way that the Slavic inhabitants of Macedonia, at least 
those divided between Greece’s Aegean and the former Yugoslavia’s Vardar 
territories, constructed – or reconstructed – their national consciousness.8 The 
very dissolution of Yugoslavia has now served to recast the “Macedonian 
Question” — who are the Macedonians and to what state should they belong? 
                                                
7 Gale Stokes, John Lampe, Dennison Rusinow and Julie Mostov, “Instant 
History: Understanding the Wars of Yugoslav Succession,” Slavic Review 55:1 
(Spring 1996), 136-160.  
8 Major scholarly studies are Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern 
Macedonia and the Uncertainties of Nation (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2003); Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict; Anastasia Karakasidou, Fields 
of Wheat; Hugh Poulton, Who Are the Macedonians? (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1995); and Victor Roudmetoff, Collective Memory, National 
Identity and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question 




The historical development of Macedonian national consciousness is now 
perceived in light of the independence of the Republic of Macedonia since 1991. 
This independence led to discussions within the Republic of Macedonia over the 
precise relationship between Macedonian and Bulgarian identities and renewed 
exchanges with Bulgaria over the relationship between the two langauges.9 Bitter 
antagonism between the Greece and Macedonia in the 1990s over the very use 
of the word “Macedonia” has similarly served to highlight work on the historical 
fate of the ethnic Macedonian community in Greece.10 The Republic’s tragic 
brush with ethnic violence between Macedonians and Albanians in the brief civil 
“near-war” of the summer of 2001, and lingering tensions, resulted in renewed 
attention to nationalism in the republic today.11  
 Such scholarly interest, however, has not extended to a broad 
examination of the central role that Pirin’s experience with VMRO played in the 
                                                
9 For example, the discussion in the Macedonian popular press over the role of 
Metodi Shatorov during the Second World War. A leader of the Macedonian 
Communist Party, Shatorov aligned with the Bulgarian Communists rather than 
Tito’s Yugoslav Communist Party.  
10 The Greek position from 1991 through 2006 has been that no “Macedonian 
nation” exists and that the new state is inhabited by Bulgarians (and Albanians). 
Greece on this basis has contested Macedonia’s right to use symbols such as 
the Star of St. Vergina on the original, 1991 Macedonian flag and to use the 
name “Macedonia,” insisting on the use of “Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia.” Both the star and the name, the argument continues, descend from 
the empire of Alexander the Great, which the Greeks reserve as their own 
heritage. On this issue see Keith Brown, “In the Realm of the Double-Headed 
Eagle: Parapolitics in Macedonia, 1994-9,” in Jane Cowan, ed., Macedonia: the 
Politics of Identity and Difference (London: Pluto, 2000); John Shea, Macedonia 
and Greece: the Struggle to Define a New Balkan Nation (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 1997). 
11 On the conflict of 2001, see John Phillips, Macedonia: Warlords and Rebels in 




political history of the Macedonian Question. The Slav inhabitants12 of 
geographic Macedonia, historically split between three states, divided into 
several groups advocating competing national consciousnesses over the course 
of the twentieth century. Two of these consciousnesses were ultimately adopted 
or co-opted by state authorities. The Republic of Macedonia,13 part of Yugoslavia 
from 1945-1991 and independent thereafter, identifies the “Macedonian Slavs” as 
part of a distinct Macedonian nation. The Bulgarian state has, with the exception 
of the six years following 1946 as detailed in Chapter Seven, supported a 
national consciousness that regards Macedonian Slavs as Bulgarians whose 
families hail from geographic Macedonia and while possessing certain unique 
characteristics in terms of local customs, folklore, history and dialect remain part 
of a larger Bulgarian nation.14 Each of these traditions stresses that it and it alone 
is the legitimate heir of a rich tradition of “Macedonian identity” and “Macedonian 
                                                
12 The terms “Slav inhabitants” is used throughout the manuscript to specify all 
those in the geographic region who possess either a Bulgarian or Macedonian 
identity, and to differentiate them from Greeks, Albanians and others living in the 
region. Although Pomaks are also Slavs, I generally treat them as a separate 
group given the continued significance of their confessional identity. “Slav 
inhabitant” is not used with any intent to stigmatize Macedonian claims to 
nationhood. 
13 One of the dilemmas in the study of Macedonian history is the geographic 
confusion created by the conflicting usage of the term “Macedonia.” I use 
“Republic of Macedonia” throughout this study to refer to the modern state 
founded in 1944 and independent in 1991, and distinguish it from geographic 
Macedonia as a whole.  
14 There are also Slavic Macedonians that adopted Greek or Serb identities, as 
well as sizeable émigré communities. Such groups lie outside the bounds of a 
study on Pirin. See Loren Danforth, The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism 
in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), which 




history.”15 Each claims that the other is mistaken about its professed 
consciousness and that only one real and objective nation can exist for the Slavic 
inhabitants of Macedonia. The other is argued to be simply the product of a 
hundred years of “Greater Bulgarian” cultural imperialism, forced assimilation and 
historical falsification; or, conversely, the end result of fifty years of machinations 
by the Comintern, Titoist propaganda and Yugoslav brainwashing.  
The inhabitants of Pirin Macedonia were confronted with multiple state-
sponsored identities of who they are. It is the state’s interaction with this local 
consciousness that drives this study. Scholars differ, as I will explore in Chapter 
One, over the precise role of the state in fostering national identities in 
Southeastern Europe: does the state “create” nationalism, or does it “fulfill” the 
assertion of ethnic identity? What has been overlooked, I argue, is the relative 
weakness of the state. While the state would ultimately be successful in creating 
key institutions and experiences that foster identity, this required it to overcome 
an historical legacy of local autonomy shaped under the Ottoman Empire. The 
state had to assume control of nation-building. In the case of Pirin Macedonia, it 
did so relatively late, following previous cycles of cultural/religious organization 
and then a paramilitary mobilization within the district. Provincial autonomy 
                                                
15 In reality, the conflict is rather more complex, since there are also Greek claims 
that some “Slavs” in the region are in reality “Slavophone Greeks,” and some 
Slavic inhabitants in present-day Greece did in fact Hellenize and adopt Greek 
identities. Note Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of 
Mutation (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987), Anastasia 
Karakasidou Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood (Chicago: University of Chicago 




persisted, however, and some elements continued even through the authoritarian 
centralizing regimes that held power from the mid-1930s forward.  
The debate over Pirin’s identity is not limited to exchanges between the 
respective Bulgarian and Macedonian national governments and their 
institutions. It also exists as an internal debate within both the Republic of 
Macedonia and Bulgaria.16 VMRO-SMD, the contemporary political party noted in 
the opening, does not simply oppose the construction of history espoused by 
visitors from the Republic of Macedonia. It has repeatedly clashed (occasionally 
violently) with a rival Bulgarian political party local to the Pirin region, OMO-
Ilinden,17 because the latter promotes a Macedonian national identity for the 
inhabitants of Pirin. The Bulgarian state has directly intervened in this conflict. 
OMO-Ilinden has complained of regular interference by state organs (e.g., refusal 
to recognize the group as a political organization, refusal to permit gatherings, 
police harassment). It also maintains that the Bulgarian government tacitly 
tolerates illegal actions undertaken by VMRO-SMD.18 The involvement of the 
central state authorities in a fringe provincial political movement highlights the 
                                                
16 For a more in-depth discussion of the contemporary political debate, see 
Chapter Five, “Bulgaria’s Ethnic Macedonians,” of Robin Brooks’s dissertation: 
“Ethnic Self-Identification, and Nation-Building in Post-Communism” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation: University of California at Berkeley, 2004). Brooks is generally 
sympathetic to OMO-Ilinden’s arguments. There is a much smaller but extant 
political movement in Macedonia that similarly claims a Bulgarian identity for 
itself. 
17 The United Macedonian Organization – Ilinden (Obedinenata makedonska 
organizatsiia – Ilinden, or OMO-Ilinden). Several smaller splinter groups, such as 
OMO-Ilinden-PIRIN and VMRO-Independent-Ilinden also exist.  
18 The complaints are noted in Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Human Rights in 
Bulgaria in 2002 – Annual Report, (Sofia: Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2003) 
and  Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, Human Rights in Bulgaria in 2000 – Annual 




limitations of provincial autonomy, and the continued interest of the state in 
maintaining a monopoly over the shaping of “territorial consciousness.”19  
I argue that the key dispute between these competing definitions of 
“Macedonians” lies in who controls the interpretation of the Pirin’s historical 
symbols: the heroes, events and monuments of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries.20 Gotse Delchev’s monument in Blagoevgrad is a contested 
symbolic space. It is a space, moreover, that is contested on several levels: not 
simply between “Macedonian” and “Bulgarian” historiographical schools, but also 
between “national” and “local” spheres, and “state” and “non-state” spheres. 
Members of the VMRO-SMD party refused to allow a foreign delegation to hold 
services at the Delchev pametnik in part because it is “theirs:” a local space that 
belongs to the people of Blagoevgrad. Paradoxically, though the rival party OMO-
Ilinden is primarily composed of inhabitants from the province and VMRO-SMD is 
a national organization with the bulk of its membership residing outside the 
oblast, the former is perceived as a “foreign-inspired” organization that infringes 
on the symbolic space of the inhabitants of Pirin. VMRO-SMD activists have 
repeatedly refused to allow OMO-Ilinden to make use of certain monuments and 
symbols, such as the one for Gotse Delcev. Other monuments (including some 
                                                
19
 Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative 
Narratives for the Modern Era" American Historical Review 105:3 (June 2000), 
807-831. 
20 I have previously made this same argument in James Frusetta, “Divided 
Heroes, Common Claims: IMRO Between Macedonia and Bulgaria,” in John 
Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds., Ideologies and National Identities: the Case of 
Twentieth-Century Southeastern Europe (Budapest: Central European University 




dedicated to specific Macedonian themes) are seen as part of past state intrusion 
into local history under Communism and have been destroyed or vandalized. 21 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century no less than at the dawn of the 
twentieth, identity is not a simple matter in Pirin Macedonia – something 
symbolized by the fact that many of the aforementioned Bulgarian patriots-cum-
nationalists in the September 2004 clash in Blagoevgrad refer to themselves 
variously as “Macedonians,” “Bulgarians from Macedonia” or “Bulgarians of 
Macedonian descent.”22 “Macedonian” can thus be held to be either synonymous 
or incompatible with “Bulgarian,” depending on one’s perspective. To be 
“Macedonian” has a plethora of different meanings for different people; it is an 
elastic term capable of multiple (and sometimes contradictory) definitions.23 
Bulgarian and Macedonian historiography each hold that the term “Macedonia” 
can have only a single meaning; in the context of this study, I argue that it is both 
a national and a regional term. “Macedonia” and “Macedonians” have been used 
in different ways by the state, by the inhabitants of Pirin, and by the descendants 
of émigrés. Each have promoted their own conception of the term.  
We still need a more sophisticated understanding of the complex 
relationship between local communities and the state in the construction of 
national identities – often maintaining their own symbols and histories in sharp 
                                                
21 The monument to Yane Sandanski, who has fallen out of favor with VMRO-
SMD but is still a hero to OMO-Ilinden, has twice been pushed over and tumbled 
down a hill despite the fact that it weighs well over a ton. 
22 In conversations with local members of VMRO-SMD, the author has heard all 
three terms used to describe the membership. In several cases, the same 
individual used two or three of the terms in self-description. 
23 Jonathan Schwartz, “Macedonia: a Country in Quotation Marks,” Anthropology 




contrast to the “official” histories of identity. The narrative of a Vardar-based 
Macedonian national consciousness, rising from a nineteenth-century cultural 
maturation and Orthodox Slavic-language religious revival through the 
paramilitary struggles of the interwar period, to state sponsorship for Vardar 
Macedonia as a component of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
through, is now well presented in scholarly literature. The narrative of 
Macedonians who assimilated (sometimes forcibly) into a larger Greek identity in 
Aegean Macedonia is also increasingly explored.  
 What has not been discussed in the recent Western scholarly renaissance 
is the parallel historical construction of a conscious Macedonian identity within 
Bulgaria. This is a significant omission that has allowed work on Yugoslav and 
Greek Macedonia to dominate scholarly discourse. An estimated one to 1.6 
million of Bulgaria’s 8 million inhabitants in the early 1990s could claim descent 
from at least one grandparent or great-grandparent originating from geographic 
Macedonia.24 Macedonian folklore and cultural organization are popular among 
this group, and the political strength of VMRO-SMD in the 1990s was drawn 
directly from their ranks. The history of the Macedonian population in Bulgaria is 
also central to the sharp Macedonian-Bulgarian disagreements over question of 
identity, not just during the 1990s but since the creation of the Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia in 1944.25  
                                                
24Janusz Bugajski, Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharp, 
1994), 254. VMRO-SMD’s web site puts the figure at two million. 
25 Relations between the two states are generally good, outside of the issue of 
whether or not a Macedonian nation exists. This has not always been the case, 




This dearth of historical scholarship is even more striking given the 
importance that the “Macedonian Question” played in the past 125 years of 
Bulgarian history, and continues to play in contemporary Bulgarian 
historiography. The Macedonian émigré community of Bulgaria — the vast 
majority of which came to profess a Bulgarian identity — also became an 
influential force throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, while 
similar Thracian and Dobrudzhan movements faded. The position of Macedonian 
émigrés was reinforced when one portion of geographic Macedonia, Pirin, was 
incorporated into Bulgaria in 1912. The group played a disproportionate role in 
Bulgarian politics and society given its organized political influence and the 
number of military officers and political leaders with origins in the region.  
It played a further role, in that Bulgaria was ruled after 1912 by centralizing 
regimes; typical not only for Southeastern Europe, but as Charles Maier has 
argued typical in fact for Europe as a whole.26 The administrative power of the 
state originated from the center, and was extended and expanded to control the 
entire territorial expanse of the state. Yet, significantly, Pirin proved particularly 
resistant to state control; local interests and organizations contested the state, 
and preserved levels of local autonomy not seen elsewhere in Bulgaria. While 
                                                                                                                                            
jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien, 1967-1982 (Munich: Südost-Institut, 
1983). See also James Frusetta, "Divided Heroes.” 
26 On Europe, see Charles Maier, ibid.; on Southeastern Europe, John Lampe, 
Balkans into Southeastern Europe: A Century of War and Transition (New York: 




the state sought to foster a central “territorial consciousness,” 27 rival forms of 
consciousness in the region continued.  
 
Identity between State Centralization and Provincial Autonomy 
Scholars have discussed the question of identity in the region: “Who are 
the Macedonians?” There has not been a similar discussion regarding the 
creation of identity: “Who determined who are the Macedonians?” The present 
study thus considers the “Macedonian Question” — the identity of the Slavic 
inhabitants of Pirin Macedonia — in light of the historical processes and choices 
available to the inhabitants of Pirin as part of an ongoing “negotiation” between 
state and province, centralization and autonomy, and between competing 
definitions of Bulgarstvo and Makedonstvo, “Bulgarian-ness” and “Macedonian-
ness.”  
Macedonian and Bulgarian scholars have addressed the question of 
ethnic or national identity in Pirin. However, as will be discussed in Chapter One, 
the dominant approaches in both historiographies remain largely cast in a 
perennialist or primordialist approach that assigns national consciousness and 
overlooks local identity. The Macedonians of Pirin, the argument goes, were 
recognized as Macedonian or Bulgarian because they have always been 
Macedonian or Bulgarian despite attempts by the rival state to de-nationalize 
                                                
27 Note Maier’s further online comments to the question of territoriality: Charles S. 





them and assimilate them.28 There is little question of local agency for the 
inhabitants of the region: ethnicity is an “inherent” quality, and “you are what you 
are.” This approach carries an implicit political conclusion: if an inherent identity 
exists, then any other expressed identity is automatically incorrect and a mistake 
at best, if not outright falsification.29 A number of Western scholars, on the other 
hand, have argued that identity is “what you make of it,” or rather “what the state 
makes of it” – identity is constructed and created. I seek to steer a middle course, 
ascribing considerable power to the state to shape national consciousness but 
not according it overwhelming authority and power. In the case of Pirin, 
incorporation into a national identity would ultimately require the incorporation of 
key symbols, events and experiences that had been generated within the 
province: “Bulgarian-ness” required the adoption of elements of “Macedonian-
ness.”  
 Of particular importance are the “consolidating” events or symbols shared 
by competing identities. Scholars like Eugen Weber have argued that the shared 
experience of military mobilization and training favors assimilation. This is true, 
                                                
28 There are views of the “ethnic descent” of Macedonians that draw directly on 
either descent from the ancient Macedonians or intermarriage with them by Slavs 
in the sixth and seventh centuries. Similarly, there are some reappraisals of the 
“ethnic descent” of Bulgarians from both Thracians and proto-Bulgarians (e.g., 
Plamen S. Tsvetkov, Slaviani li sa bulgarite? (Sofia: Tangra, 1998). Such views 
have largely receded to the fringes, although national histories in both countries 
generally start with these periods.  
29 I am indebted to Rossitsa Guencheva for conversations with her on precisely 
the subject of current research on identity in Macedonia, to which I return in 
Chapter One. While there are excellent local historians working with much more 
sophisticated approaches, few have worked on Macedonia. Moreover, I argue 
that dominant paradigm in “national history” remains in a perennialist/ 




insofar as the state itself controls the military. The “underground army” of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO)30 organized at the local 
level helped to promote assimilation, but into a sense of regional and local 
consciousness and a demand for local autonomy rather than national 
consciousness and state-building. Moreover, VMRO was politically nationalist but 
lay outside the emerging “alternative ideologies” of the interwar era — Fascism 
and Communism. The absence of either public or internal statements of political 
ideology is striking: VMRO existed to advocate issues of regional interest. The 
process of identity formation was interactive, with competing identities each 
influencing the construction of the other; and at different times over the period. 
Efforts to promote state- and nation-building and local consciousness and 
autonomy waxed and waned, and each would leave lasting marks on the other. 
Only by 1952 had the state firmly taken control over the region, but this came as 
the result of a six-year campaign to definitively establish local identity. 
Despite the emerging strength of a neighboring identity in Vardar 
Macedonia and despite the absence of the kind of forceful assimilation campaign 
that succeeded in transforming identities in Greek Macedonia, a Macedonian 
                                                
30 The evolution of VMRO's acronyms can be confusing. “VMRO” is used 
throughout. Originally, from 1893-1902 the movement was officially "BMORO" 
(Bulgarska Makedonska-odrinska Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia, or “Bulgarian, 
Macedonian and Adrianople Revolutionary Organization”), and from 1902-1905 
"TMORO" (Taina Makedonska-odrinska Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia, or  “Secret 
Macedonian Adrianople Revolutionary Organization”). VMRO was used from 
1905 on. The different names have political resonance, since  BMORO and 
TMORO stress that the movement originally sought autonomy not simply for 
Macedonia, but also for Eastern Thrace; thus it is sometimes used by Bulgarian 
authors to stress a Bulgarian quality to the organization and its goals. I use 
VMRO here throughout both for consistency and because after 1905 the 




national identity failed to gain ascendancy in Pirin. Why? Charles King has 
argued that scholars have generally focused on the “success stories” of national 
identity, tracing how and why successful national identities have been shaped 
over time—but “we know little about nationalisms that failed.”31 This study seeks 
not only to suggest why Macedonian came to be seen as synonymous with 
Bulgarian, but also why a “Macedonian separatist nationalism” failed to thrive 
within Pirin despite the official efforts by the Bulgarian Communist government 
promoting a Macedonian national identity during 1946-1948. 
Central to the experience of Pirin was an on-going process of mutual 
redefinition between a local Macedonian and a national Bulgarian 
consciousness. Liah Greenfeld32 has argued for a “reactive” effect in which later-
emerging national movements consciously used their predecessors as models 
for their own development. The nineteenth-century German national movement, 
she argues, developed in reaction to and with reference to the nationalist ethos 
of the French Revolution. This study draws upon such reaction in focusing on 
competing forms of consciousness. Regional identity in Pirin drew from the 
Bulgarian national movement, which reacted in turn to incorporate local symbols 
and history within a professed Bulgarian national consciousness. The result was 
a regional identity that remained strong enough to persist within Bulgaria 
throughout the first half of the twentieth century, through the experiences of 
state-centralization and socialism. Indeed, this identity has proven strong enough 
                                                
31 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000), 3.  
32 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard 




for the “Macedonian Question” to remain alive, if of considerably reduced 
importance, in public forums in the Republics of both Bulgaria and Macedonia 
today, including within the Blagoevgrad oblast.33 National consciousness in the 
Pirinski krai can and should be seen as a contest between rival national 
movements in which the region’s local inhabitants were able to “negotiate” their 
identity with a state that increasingly sought to define it.34  
Pirin’s status as a borderland lying alongside Yugoslav (Vardar) 
Macedonia and Greek (Aegean) Macedonia is also important.35 In Pirin a very 
real awareness of the “lost” Macedonian lands over the post-1912 border — a 
Macedonia waiting to be liberated from foreign yokes — helped strengthen and 
preserve a distinct identity. As a peripheral and economically backward part of 
the Bulgarian state, the region was subject to an ongoing process of 
centralization that sought to firmly integrate it. Such centralization provoked in 
reaction a sense of local consciousness (what Andrew Rossos has dubbed 
“na!ism” –“us-ism” – in the context of the Republic of Macedonia).36 It also 
                                                
33 Historical columns are regular features in Bulgarian newspapers such as Trud, 
24 Chasa, Struma and the like; discussions of Macedonian history are common. 
The same is true of Macedonian publications such as Nova Makedonija, Glas 
and Makedonsko Vreme. Bulgarian and Macedonian television programs 
similarly debate the same kinds of issues. What is notable is the inclusion of such 
debates about history in relatively mainstream media venues.  
34 Sandi Michele de Oliveira, “Discourses of Identity at the Spanish/Portuguese 
Border: Self-Identification Strategies of Centre and Periphery,” National Identities 
4:3 (2002), 245.  
35 Following the political division of Macedonia, each region is commonly defined 
by its dominant geographical trait: the Aegean coastline, the Pirin mountains and 
the Vardar river valley.  
36 Andrew Rossos, “Macedonianism and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left,” in 




suggests a reappraisal of VMRO’s efforts within Bulgaria. Generally, the 
Organization has been interpreted as a “émigré organization.” While this study 
acknowledges the close ties between VMRO and émigrés in Bulgaria, within Pirin 
itself the Organization acted as the administration of a “state within a state.” It 
thus attempts to reorient on VMRO’s actions within Pirin — where the bulk of its 
membership and power resided — rather than on its relations with émigré groups 
in Sofia.  
 This study further suggests that the construction of identity is a continuous 
process, and that it is accordingly better studied by providing sufficient continuity 
and historical context. Histories of the Pirin region have often focused on sharp 
caesuras or “breaks” in history that delineate different periods. The most 
frequently defined are those of 1903 (the Ilinden Uprising), of 1912-13 (the 
Balkan Wars and the division of geographic Macedonia) and 1944 (the rise to 
power of the Communist Party in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia). It may be more 
profitable to study continuity. While key state policies of the post-war Communist 
government were new (e.g., the prospect of a Balkan Federation), the paradigm 
of centralized rule in the region remained the same as that of the interwar 
governments of Aleksandar Tsankov (1924-1926) or Tsar Boris (1935-1943). I 
organize my chapters chronologically in order to trace the communal experiences 
of Pirin Macedonia from 1912 through the early 1950s, as the region sought to 
negotiate a local consciousness with a centralizing state.   
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When stated in such a fashion, the politics of national consciousness in 
Pirin Macedonia, and Macedonia as a whole — often considered marginal and of 
merely local or regional interest — are brought into dialogue with identity 
questions throughout Europe. The persistence of regional identities even after 
the codification of “national identities” is not limited to Southeastern Europe: we 
see them in the interaction between “provincial” and “national” identities 
throughout Europe. The Macedonian case was a struggle between multiple 
identities played out in the historical circumstances of Southeastern Europe, and 
a borderland between two competing identities. The role of the centralizing state 
places Pirin directly in the midst of the European experience of the twentieth 
century, it hints at the complexities of the twenty-first. The European Union’s use 
of regionalism in the form of the various levels of nomenclature des unités 
territoriales statistiques (NUTS) in development and policy-making suggests that 
the question of the centralizing state versus the provinces is far from settled.37 
What makes Macedonia of broader interest is the historical context: the 
formation of national consciousness took place in a resource-poor, post-imperial 
and competitive environment but prior to the modernizing development stressed 
by “functionalist” theories of national consciousness. The formation of national 
consciousness drew on existing and acceptable symbols and markers that could 
be mobilized by both provincial and state “nation-builders” to support specific 
facets of identity. This study is not, ultimately, intended to establish definitively 
                                                
37 See John Newhouse, “Europe’s Rising Regionalism,” Foreign Affairs 76:1 
(1997), 67-85; Charlemagne, “Europe’s rebellious regions,” The Economist  




the identity of the people of the Pirinski krai — something that only its inhabitants 
can determine, and which in the early twenty-first century is still a fluid process. It 
is intended as an examination of a process, to cast light both on the history of a 
specific province and to find the implications of this history for how we 
understand the formation of identity and national consciousness in general.  
 
Structure 
I address the applicability of the theories of identity formation in Chapter 
One. This chapter engages theories on the role of the state in nation-formation, 
particularly those of Anthony Smith and John Breuilly. Breuilly argues for the key 
use of nationalism by state elites to obtain political support. Smith also argues for 
the role of “experiences of state administration” in the formation of national 
consciousness, but adds the importance of religious organization and military 
organization as additional mechanisms for transforming a local identity into a 
self-professed national consciousness. The chapter appraises the utility of both 
approaches in the context of Southeastern European history in general.  
Chapters Two and Three take us through the Ottoman period from the 
early nineteenth century through 1912, when Pirin was incorporated within 
Bulgaria. Chapter Two focuses on the rise of cultural and religious activity in Pirin 
from the early-nineteenth century beginnings of the “Bulgarian Revival” through 
the creation of the Bulgarian Exarchate Orthodox Church. These were nation-
building “experiences” but both outside the purview of any Bulgarian state. The 




Macedonia, also remained outside of state control. Despite attempts by both the 
Bulgarian government and sympathetic organizations within Bulgaria, the 
Macedonian revolutionary organizations across the pre-1912 border were 
generally autonomous. The existence of these autonomous groups provided a 
precedent for the continued existence of such groups in Pirin after the First World 
War. 
Chapters Four through Seven address the integration of Pirin into 
Bulgaria. Chapter Four focuses on the experience of “common struggle” over 
1912-1923 as the Bulgarian state and the inhabitants of Pirin were involved in 
three wars and a post-war coup d’etat. Here, the “administrative experience” of 
warfare saw the Bulgarian state and army hierarchy place VMRO in an 
increasingly subordinate position. But this organizational change did not negate  
the important symbolic role of the “liberation war” for Macedonia as a shared 
experience. Chapter Five examines the period 1923-1934, when VMRO was able 
to hold and administrate Pirin in its own interests. In the process, Pirin became 
virtually a “state within a state.”  
Chapters Six and Seven address the further process of “state 
centralization.” Chapter Six treats the broad period of 1934-1945, in which a 
succession of governments seek to impose central rule over Pirin. This was 
successful, but only in periods when the state was strong. The stresses of the 
Second World War and the post-war imposition of a Communist regime 
weakened the government sufficiently for some local autonomy to be regained. 




Communist regime imposing a centrally-directed “nationalization” campaign on 
the local population, first to accept an exclusively Macedonian national 
consciousness and then an exclusively Bulgarian one. The later endured with no 
challenge until the post-Commmunist revival of earlier disputes, with which this 
Introduction begins.  
 
Sources 
 Two archives are particularly crucial to this present study of Pirin 
Macedonia. The first is the Central State Archive (Tsentralen durzhaven arhiv, 
hereafter TsDA) in Sofia, Bulgaria; the second is the Provincial State Archive of 
Blagoevgrav (Okruzhen durzhaven arhiv Blagoevgrad, hereafter ODAB) in 
Blagoevgrad, Bulgaria. The TsDA contains not only records of the central 
government, but many of the internal records of IMRO confiscated by the police 
in 1934; such records have been complemented by memoir literature of IMRO 
members, much of it published after 1989 when restrictions on publication eased 
in Bulgaria. The TsDA also now includes the records of the former Central Party 
Archive  (Tsentralen Partien Arhiv). The ODAB contains instructions from the 
central authorities to the province, counties and municipality, records of local 
schools and administrative organs, local police reports, as well as records of 
local organizations such as the Veterans’ Fraternal Organization. As with the 
TsDA, the ODAB now includes the material from the former District and 
Provincial Party Archive of Blagoevgrad (Okruzhen partien archiv Blagoevgrad), 




Unfortunately, one key archive, the internal archive of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and National Health, remains “closed,” requiring selectively-given 
permission from the ministry for its use. Moreover, it lacks public document lists 
(opisi) regarding its contents. I was unsuccessful in securing permission as a 
foreign researcher to use the archive. This archive contains internal police and 
security reports on the region; some of this material was, luckily, also located 
within the Tsentralen partien arhiv of the Communist Party, which was 
subsequently merged with the TsDA and thus available. It also is well 
represented in the work of Bulgarian scholars, and I have correspondingly paid 
careful attention to this resource from secondary works.   
American diplomatic records from 1919-1941 and 1944-1949 have been 
used, although sparingly. The American Legation in Sofia provided routine 
updates on domestic political issues, including a series of dispatches on 
Macedonian organizations. In the post-war period, the legation similarly served to 
provide observations on political events within the country. They provide a useful 
series of reports by “outside observers” not aligned with one of the various 
political factions within Bulgaria.  
Local newspapers were an indispensable source, particularly in providing 
(before 1936) information not derived from state authorities. I have reviewed 
Svoboda ili Smurt and Revoliutsionen list, political papers linked to IMRO, in the 
1920-1934 period. Pirinski glas, Pirinski vesti and Makedonsko Zname (a 
Communist newspaper) all provide a glimpse into the 1930s. The Communist-led 




Although state-run and censored, it provides a week-to-week (later, day-to-day) 
glimpse at evolving state and provincial policies in the region. I have drawn on 
Nova Makedonija (from Skopje) and Rabotnichesko Delo (from Sofia) in the post-
war period to supplement periodicals focused on the Pirin regions in an attempt 
to further illuminate state policies.  
I have also taken full account of Bulgarian and Macedonian scholarly 
literature given the rich historiographical traditions in both countries in pursuing 
the subject. Many of the studies done on Macedonian history are 
methodologically excellent and written with great personal and political passion. 
While I do not agree with all of their conclusions, I have profited greatly from 
these works. I should however note how little scholars in either country have 
considered the role of the state in shaping national consciousness in Pirin. When 
considering the state at all, scholars have focused on the brief period of 1944-48, 
with the dominant historiographical traditions severely criticizing one aspect or 
another of the state’s involvement as “de-nationalization.” I seek to expand the 









Conceptualizing Bulgaria and Macedonia, Nation and State 
 
 “Pirin Macedonia came under Bulgarian occupation in 1913.” 
— www.makedonija.info 
  




The ultimate goal of the nineteenth-century Bulgarian national movement 
known as the National Awakening was the establishment of an inclusive, 
modern nation-state: a Bulgaria for all Bulgarians. The creation of an 
autonomous Principality of Bulgaria in 1879,2 however, did not resolve the 
issues raised by the Awakening: it transformed them. The definition of 
“Bulgarian” was based on common language, religious affiliation and specific 
ethnographic traditions such as folklore and costume. The new state 
encompassed only a fraction of this Bulgarian population so defined. What had 
been a predominantly cultural and religious movement now took a political 
course in which the form and powers of the state and the definition and expanse 
of the nation were contested. Despite seeking a nation-state, the national 
                                                
1 Both quotes are drawn from websites that reflect the significant “web-presence” 
of the Macedonian-Bulgarian debate; in both cases, the history presented well-
reflects the prevalent popular national histories of the two countries. Bill 
Nicholov, “Pirin Macedonia,” Macedonia for the Macedonians, July 29, 2006, 
<http://www.makedonija.info/pirin.html>, “Macedonia is Bulgarian not Greek,” 
Macedoniainfo.com, July 29, 2006, < http://www.macedoniainfo.com/> 
2 Bulgaria became autonomous in 1879, and formally independent only in 1908. 
For de facto purposes, however, it was independent from the Sublime Porte 




movement had not determined what would be the precise relationship between 
state and nation.3 Because the new state did not encompass the entire 
geographic region and population the national movement had defined as 
Bulgarian, national consciousness took on a critical political meaning, one that 
produced “deep anxiety” in the early twentieth century.4 
Nationalism studies have also been transformed over the past twenty 
years, but in the opposite direction. Early studies of nationalism focused on its 
political character and the role of the state.5 But with the expansion of the field in 
the United States and Western Europe over the past two decades, scholars 
began to focus on the cultural and social aspects of nationalism, on the idea of 
the state as a cultural artifact.6 While such scholarship has proved illuminating, 
one result has been an implicit assumption that states help “create” nations — 
with little attention to the actual policies that state institutions have used to 
accomplish the task.  
Surveys of Bulgarian nationalism have noted the use of nationalism as a 
political concept in Bulgaria by successive Bulgarian governments, but they 
focus on the manipulations of political elites rather than on how state institutions 
                                                
3 Curiously, for example, the original 1879 Turnovo constitution of Bulgaria does 
not refer to the Bulgarian nation as such. See Vasil Giozelev, ed. Bulgarskata 
durzhavnost: v aktove i dokumenti (Sofia: Izdatelstvo "Nauka I izkustvo,“ 1981), 
218-226. 
4 Milena Mahon, “The Macedonian Question in Bulgaria” Nations and 
Nationalism 4:3 (1998), 391. 
5 See Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and 
Background (New York: Macmillan, 1944). Kohn’s interest was in explaining 
German nationalism, which he saw as having led to the world wars.   





or policies have actually attempted to define the nation.7 But in Bulgaria itself, 
contemporary national histories are by contrast similar to other national histories 
in Southeastern Europe in treating the establishment of the modern state as the 
climax of centuries-old national history. In Bulgaria, this approach does not 
account well for the continued evolution of both the concepts of “nation” and 
“state” after 1879.8 The relationship between state and nation is assumed in 
both approaches and not explored in depth. 
The present study is a direct examination of the ways that state 
institutions in Bulgaria attempted to directly influence “national consciousness” in 
Pirin Macedonia over the period 1912 (following the region’s incorporation into 
Bulgaria) through 1952 (as the Communist regime solidified the state’s policy 
regarding Macedonian nationality). Three recent works on Southeastern Europe 
have demonstrated the utility of this approach. Irina Livezeanu’s The Cultural 
Politics of Greater Romania examines the role the Romanian Ministry of 
Education played in attempting to use education to forge a cultural “homogeny” 
                                                
7 Maria Todorova, for example, provides an excellent framework of Bulgarian 
nationalist discourse following the creation of the state; Roumen Daskalov has 
addressed aspects of the state in defining the nation. But these are excellent 
studies in “breadth” rather than in “depth.” See Maria Todorova, “The Course 
and Discourses of Bulgarian Nationalism in Peter F. Sugar, ed., Eastern 
European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century (Washington, DC: American 
University Press, 1995) 55-102; Roumen Daskalov. Bulgarskoto obshtestvo, 
1878-1939: Tom I: Durzhava, politika, ikonomika (Sofia: IK "Gutenburg," 2006). 
8 Michael Keating, Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in 
Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland 2nd edition. (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 21; 
see also Roumen Daskalov, “Ideas About, and Reactions to Modernization in 
the Balkans,” East European Quarterly 31:2 (1997). Macedonian histories 
similarly treat Macedonia as the climax of a lengthy national “liberation struggle;” 




between newly-unified Romanian territories following the First World War.9 Keith 
Brown’s The Past in Question explores the differences between state and local 
memories of the past during Communism regarding the Krushevo Republic of 
the Ilinden Uprising.10 Charles King’s The Moldovans looks at a third case, 
where Soviet policies met with limited success in defining a Moldovan nation as 
separate and distinct from a Romanian nation.11 In each case, state institutions 
“intervened” in an attempt to encourage specific forms of national consciousness 
for political goals. Livezeanu describes this as “Gershenkronian nationalism,” a 
political parallel to Alexander Gershenkron’s theories that governments in later-
industrializing countries intervened to promote economic development. In 
Livezeanu’s term, Southeastern European states sought to hasten the rapid 
development of a strong (and acceptable) national consciousness among their 
citizenry.12 
At the same time, this study also examines how national consciousness 
became tied to the territorial borders and administrative frameworks inherent to 
the modern state.13 If the promotion of a homogenous territorial consciousness 
could serve the interests of centralizing state institutions, the promotion of a local 
                                                
9 Irina Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation-
Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918-1930 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1995). 
10 Keith Brown, The Past in Question: Modern Macedonia and the Uncertainties 
of Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 2003). 
11 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia and the Politics of Culture 
(Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000). 
12 Livezeanu, 3. Hans Kohn earlier commented on an East European acceptance 
of nationalism before structural transformation: Kohn, 457.  
13 See Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative 





consciousness could equally well serve the interests of provincial institutions 
which often preferred an established tradition of autonomy to a centrally-
controlled nation-state. The choice of Pirin Macedonia accordingly serves as an 
apt focus of study. The province was unified with Bulgaria later than other 
provinces, had strong connections to bordering regions in other states (Greece 
and Yugoslavia), and saw continuing attempts within the province (including by 
force of arms) to maintain a tradition of local autonomy versus a centralizing 
state. Ultimately, as in Livezeanu’s and Brown’s studies, the institutions of a 
centralized state came to play a predominant role. But these institutions drew 
extensively on events, themes and other “markers” of national consciousness 
that had been developed at the provincial level, in part because the state was 
weak in relation to local forces for much of the period in consideration. What 
emerges is a history in which “local” and “national” definitions of identity 
conflicted and converged. National consciousness was not simply “imposed” on 
Pirin; it was “negotiated.” 
 
Theorizing nation and nationalism 
Nationalism studies have been driven by a desire to explain the perceived 
role and strength of nationalism in modern European history. Of particular 
importance are the relationship between nationalism and the causes of the First 




in the 1990s and contemporary separatist political movements.14 Such studies 
expanded to encompass related themes of national consciousness and nation-
building. The result has been the establishment of two broad scholarly 
approaches to explain the spread and predominance of nationalism.  
“Nationalist” historians themselves have continued to stress a “primordial” 
or “perennial” quality of the nation — nations are natural and have objective 
qualities that allow them to be distinguished from each other. Nations can 
accordingly be traced back far into the past, by tracing these objective qualities 
through history.15 “Classical modernism,” the dominant approach over the past 
twenty years, stresses the modernity of the nation. Nations and nationalism are 
of relatively recent origin — or at least new in terms of the primacy of national 
consciousness compared to other forms of identity — and are related to broader 
forces of modernization that swept through Europe. They are constructed, rather 
than inherent.16 Ernest Gellner, for example, argues that the structural changes 
                                                
14 Thanasis D. Sfikas, “National Movements and Nation-Building in the Balkans, 
1804-1922: Historic Origins, Contemporary Misunderstandings” in Thanasis D. 
Sfikas and Christopher Williams, eds., Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central 
Europe and the Balkans (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1999), 19. See 
also Paschalis Kitromilides, "‘Imagined Communities’ and the Origins of the 
National Question in the Balkans," in Paschalis Kitromilides, Enlightenment, 
Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political Thought of South-
Eastern Europe (Hampshire: Variorum, 1994), 150; Gale Stokes, John Lampe, 
Dennison Rusinow and Julie Mostov, “Instant History: Understanding the Wars 
of Yugoslav Succession,” Slavic Review 55:1 (Spring 1996), 136-160. 
15 For a perennialist example, John Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). Armstrong argues that 
the history of religious institutions, royal dynasties and the existence of historic 
states, among others, are links demonstrating a perennial character to the 
nation.  
16 Generally, these approaches select specific elements of modernization. For 




created by the Industrial Revolution and concurrent urbanization transformed the 
state into a centralized bureaucracy, both creating the conditions for nationalism 
and leading states to increasingly foster national identities (e.g., through 
universal education).17 Benedict Anderson stresses the role of print media and 
mass literacy in helping large social groups “imagine” national identities they 
could never completely experience.18 Eric Hobsbawm argues that it was the 
development of class consciousness in the modern era that made space for 
mass politics and led ruling elites to use nationalism as a means for capturing 
mass support.19 Although these theorists differ on which of the ‘structural 
developments’ was crucial, they agree on the modern origin of nations.  
Despite the scholarly attention paid to the subject, there remains little 
consensus on how to define “the nation.” The term “nation” is not a constant, 
often conflated with “ethnicity” and also often conflated with the “state” itself. 
Some scholars even question whether or not an acceptable definition can be 
agreed upon, since there are no common variables between all of the various 
                                                                                                                                           
Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Roumen Daskalov, “Ideas About, 
and Reactions to Modernization in the Balkans,” Eastern European Quarterly 
31:2 (June 1997). 
17 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 
18 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and 
Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). For the rise of literacy and cultural 
transformation see also Gellner, ibid.  
19 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, 
Reality, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Along this 
line, see also Paul Brass, “Elite Groups, Symbol Manipulation and Ethnic Identity 
among the Muslims of South Asia,” in D. Tayler and M. Yapp (eds), Political 
Identity in South Asia, London: Curzon Press, 1979, 40-41; Paul Brass, Ethnicity 





groups ascribed as being nations.20  Given the ambiguity of the terms, however, 
it is useful to provide from the outset a set of coherent internal definitions as 
used in this study:  
• Nation — a group consciousness that attributes a common administrative 
or legal consciousness to its participants, in addition to defining 
characteristics of ancestry, culture and tradition;  
• Ethnie21 — a term proposed by Anthony Smith for self-professed group 
consciousness based on principles of common kinship, culture, location 
and tradition among its participants; 
• National movement — a group (not necessarily political) endorsing or 
attempting the codification of culture, tradition, language or other aspects 
of the ethnie and that calls for the ethnie’s consolidation into a nation; 
• Nationalism — a political philosophy which holds that the state should be 
synonymous with the nation. 
 
The differentiation Smith draws between ethnie and nation is not 
inconsequential. Scholars face the difficulty of determining the relationship 
between the nineteenth century rise of national movements and the antecedents 
that nationalists claim “proves” the existence of the nation through history. The 
problem becomes one of attempting to distinguish between various “myths” — 
symbols, activities or identities with symbolic meaning for the nation. Some 
classical modernist scholars such as Eric Hosbawm argue that such myths are 
modern re-fabrications.22 The fact that nationalists manipulate these myths does 
not however mean that some connection to the past does not exist.23  
                                                
20 Hobsbawm, 5, 8. 
21 The term is derived from Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origin of Nations (New 
York: Blackwell, 1986), 153-173.  
22 See Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., The Invention of Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
23 Robin Okey, The Habsburg Monarchy c. 1765-1918. Enlightenment to Eclipse 




What is crucial is the degree to which those groups with which they are 
idenfitied recognize these symbols as legitimate. Group elites, the state or 
outsiders can limit options and can prohibit the external recognition or 
celebration of a national consciousness. It is far more difficult to for such elites to 
impose self-recognition.24 Smith’s theories accordingly stress the continuities 
between existing ethnie and the national movements and nations that emerged 
in the modern era. This approach, as discussed below, is adopted here to show 
how late-emerging national movements in Southeastern Europe consciously 
drew on existing ethnie to build new nations. This approach is particularly 
significant for Pirin, where rival national movements sought to use a common set 
of national symbols.25 
 
Theorizing the Role of the State: Western Approaches 
Initially, scholarly approaches on the state’s relationship to nationalism 
were comparative in nature, contrasting Western and Central Europe. In Hans 
Kohn’s work, state and nation were linked: he argued that Western European 
states are defined by a “civil” nationalism comprised of voluntary association. 
Central and Eastern Europe states, in contrast, are defined by “ethnic” 
nationalism that stressed an “organic” character of association.26 Rogers 
                                                
24 Morin, 21.  
25 On this, see James Frusetta, “Divided Heroes, Common Claims: IMRO 
Between Macedonia and Bulgaria,” in John Lampe and Mark Mazower, eds., 
Ideologies and National Identities: the Case of Twentieth-Century Southeastern 
Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003). 
26 Hans Kohn’s work draws this distinction clearly. See also Taras Kuzio, "The 
Myth of the Civic State: A Critical Survey of Hans Kohn’s Framework for 




Brubaker has continued in this tradition, arguing that civic nationalism (as 
typified in France, and by extension Western Europe) is based on a form of 
national consciousness that stresses citizenship and mutually-held values; this is 
contrasted with ethnic nationalism (as typified by Germany, and by extension 
Central and Eastern Europe) in which ethnic origin and common descent are the 
unifying forces, the “nation by blood.”27  
Both those theories stressing that national consciousness is inherent, and 
those stressing it is constructed, provide some role for the state, but generally in 
passing. Nation-building states and nation-building elites take an active interest 
and a direct role in the creation, promotion or destruction of the “symbols” that 
represent national consciousness: language, historical events, heroes, 
ethnographic characteristics, etc.28 In Pirin, for example, “literary Bulgarian,” 
based on eastern Bulgarian dialects, was taught in schools and used in the 
literature of the National Awakening. It thus supplanted the local Western 
Bulgarian dialect. Local costume was placed by ethnographers within a larger 
Bulgarian whole while being replaced simultaneously with modern dress. Local 
folklore was similarly integrated and replaced with a Bulgarian “literary canon.” A 
concept of a “Bulgarian national culture” was thus defined, and local variations in 
                                                
27 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). 
28 The ascribed values are, in fact, symbolic of relationships between social 
groups, of identity, of political values, and thus are a key battleground. Note 
Keith Brown, “In the Realm of the Double-Headed Eagle: Parapolitics in 
Macedonia, 1994-1999,” in Jane K. Cowan, Macedonia: The Politics of Identity 
and Difference (Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000), 122-139. More generally, see 
Paul Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison (Newbury Park, 




Pirin were either assimilated, trivialized or eliminated. Minority populations in the 
region (such as Greeks, Turks and Pomaks — Slavic-speaking Muslims) and 
local identities (particularly those of town and village) were assimilated into the 
new national corpus.29 But structural theories have assumed the state’s direct 
role over a gradual process, rather than directly examining it. 
John Breuilly’s theoretical approach in nationalism studies focuses 
specifically on the state. In his work, nationalism is a “form of politics” created by 
the nineteenth century modernization of states (rather than of society).30 
Emerging state bureaucracies deliberately used emerging national 
consciousness for their own purposes — fostering a common and mutual 
identification among the population at large with the state and political elites, 
concurrently encouraging greater loyalty to the state, allowing for the creation of 
mass conscript armies, easing the acceptance of taxation, and in general 
enhancing the ability of the state to mobilize and direct its citizens.31 Eugen 
Weber’s Peasants into Frenchmen and Peter Sahlins’ Boundaries are among 
the few works to explore these themes directly, the former in chapters 
addressing the active role of the French government in shaping a “French 
                                                
29 Or excluded from it; the local Greek population, particularly predominant in the 
town of Melnik, was deported to Greece during the Greco-Bulgarian Population 
Exchange of 1923. Local Turks, too, have largely been ignored in the 
construction of a Bulgarian identity in the region.  
30 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1982), 9. 
31 See also Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992,” Theory 
and Society 23:1 (February 1994), 131-146; idem, “Reflections on the History of 
European State-making” in Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States 




national consciousness” among the rural peasantry, the latter in examining the 
effect of a mutual Franco-Spanish border running through the Pyrenees.32  
In both cases, however, while the active role of the state is emphasized, 
the actual policies of the state are not. The importance of a more careful 
examination of the state has been emphasized by the recent work of Charles 
King on Moldova regarding failed Soviet efforts in the 1920s through 1930s and 
again in the 1940s to transform a local provincial consciousness into a national 
consciousness. This suggests that the role of state institutions to build nations, 
was circumscribed. “If in fact nations really are invented things,” Charles King 
argues, “then can members of any human group be made to embrace any ethnic 
or national identity…?”33 The answer is clearly no, that state policies intended to 
encourage national consciousness must be seen as  “legitimate” by the group 
they target.34 The most successful state policies are those building upon existing 
characteristics of an ethnie.   
 
Theorizing Nation and State: Indigenous Approaches  
Scholars question whether the “classical modernist” approach can be 
applied objectively outside of Western Europe. Partha Chatterjee argues that the 
classical modernist approach, among others, defines nationalism narrowly and 
                                                
32 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979).  
33 King, 2. 
34 Patrick Hossay, Contentions of Nationhood: Nationalistic Movements, Political 
Conflict, and Social Change in Flanders, Scotland, and French Canada 




privileges the Western European experience.35 Theoretical approaches thus 
shape a “general” theory of nationalism from a small set of cases, and the 
historical experience of individual cases is largely overlooked or ignored.36 The 
civic/ethnic nationalism divide as defined by Kohn and Brubaker has received 
particular criticism as pejorative. Maria Todorova suggests that terms such as 
“nationalist” too easily become political labels used to foster unequal power 
relationships and privilege a West that credits itself as resting on a sense of civic 
identity, rather than national identity.37 
 Within Bulgaria and Macedonia, Western theories emphasizing cultural 
approaches to the study of nationalism have been engaged but unevenly.38 
Historiography per se since 1989 has focused primarily on “objective” qualities of 
nationhood. Ivan Elenkov is an exception in broadly examining the question of 
                                                
35 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), 216. 
36 Sfikas, “National Movements and Nation-Building,” 19. 
37 Maria Todorova, “The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention,” 455.  
38
 Recent work has chiefly served to introduce fundamental theoretical concepts. 
In works on contemporary politics, Orlin Zagorov mentions nationalism theory 
briefly while Dimitur Popov examines national identity with regards to a 
“declining national spirit” in Bulgaria; see Orlin Zagorov, Bulgarskata natsionalna 
ideia (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “Znanie,” 1994); Dimitur Popov, Bulgarskiiat 
natsionalizum (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “Vulkan 4,” 2000). Classical modernism theory 
has been engaged directly in several recent texts. Tomislav Diakov employs 
discourse analysis in analyzing the “Bulgarian national character.” Nikolai Aretov 
examines the relationship between nationalism and national myths in examining 
Bulgarian national literature. Malina Stefanova takes a philosophical approach 
towards national consciousness, including specific discussion on the concept of 
the “national state.” See Tomislav Diakov, Bulgarskiiat harakter (Sofia: 
Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 2001); Nikolai Aretov, 
Natsionalna mitologiia i natsionalna literatura (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “Kralitsa Mab,” 
2006), 8-26; Malina Stefanova, Natsionalna identichnost: Semiotichen rakurs 
kum problema za samorazbiraneto (Sofia: Izdatelsko Amelie, 2000), 88-105. 
Historians have not used nationalism theory to address historical experience of 




nationalism in terms of Bulgarian cultural history in the interwar period.39 With 
regards to Macedonia, the burgeoning national literature in both countries 
debates whether or not a specific national consciousness exists (e.g., are the 
inhabitants of Macedonia part of a Bulgarian or a Macedonian nation?) rather 
than any theoretical approach about how nations came to be. Even the very 
term Macedonia is a source of conflict since its definition shifts in different 
circumstances. The Bulgarian government in 1991 quickly gave official 
recognition to a Macedonian state, but not to a Macedonian language or 
history.40 This is due in part to contemporary political pressures that influence 
the production of history.41 But it is also shaped by the dominant concept of the 
nation, and of national history.  
The thrust of national histories in post-1989 Bulgaria and Macedonia 
contains an implicit rejection of the other country’s codified national history.42 
                                                
39 Ivan Elenkov, Rodno i diasno, (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “LIK,” 1998).  
40 The term has very different connotations in the Republic of Macedonia and 
Bulgaria (and quite different besides in Greece). “Who controls the word 
Macedonia” is at the heart of the issue. Loren Danforth, The Macedonian 
Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1995), 6.  
41 See Stefan Troebst, “IMRO + 100 = FRYOM? The politics of Macedonian 
historiography” in James Pettifer, ed., The New Macedonian Question (New 
York: Palgrave, 2001) for a survey of the major claims. Politics influence the 
production of history in all countries, however, and should not be regarded as 
somehow a peculiarly “Balkan” trait: the Enola Gay controversy in 1993-1995 at 
the U.S. Smithsonian Air and Space Museum shows that American 
historiography can be equally political.  
42 See Kritika i Humanizum for a dissenting view that rejects the concept of 
Bulgarian nationalist history. However, the book the article responds to — Deset 
makedonski luzhi (“Ten Macedonian Lies”) by Bozhidar Dimitrov — was far more 
widely read than the issue of Kritika i Humanizum, underscoring the staying 
power of nationalist history. The Macedonian position is well-presented in Ivan 




National histories in both countries stress a primordialist approach that sees 
nations as unique, “sui generis formations.”43 The basis of national 
consciousness in both historiographic traditions thus lies in the form of 
ethnographic markers argued to provide “objective” measurements by which 
national identities can be defined — traits such as language, cultural practices, 
kinship networks, historical events, the deeds of national heroes, evidence of 
historical self-consciousness (such as the use of the terms “Macedonian” or 
“Bulgarian”), folklore and even physiology. If nations can be defined  by 
“objective” markers, it demonstrates a real and natural quality of such nations, 
demonstrable proof of that nation’s existence. The historical existence of such 
ethnographic markers is presented in order to show the continuity of the nation’s 
existence.  More generally, Southeastern European historiography traces 
modern national consciousness back to the medieval or ancient periods.44  
Given the long period of rule by the Ottoman Empire, this process of 
tracing “perennial” characteristics tends to link modern national states with 
respective medieval empires, sometimes even to the ancient world; but these 
                                                                                                                                           
Vtorata svetska vojna (1912-1941) (Skopje: Institute za natsionalna istorija, 
2000).  
43 Umut Özkirimli Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), 19.  
44  Or several different periods at the same time; Romanian historiography 
stresses the links to the ancient Dacians, to the Roman period (note, for 
example, the use of Roman place names, e.g. Cluj-Napoca) and to medieval 
figures such as Vlad Tepes or Mihail the Brave. See Lucian Boia, History and 




are seen as forming a single unbroken national consciousness over time.45 The 
nation may have slumbered at times during Ottoman rule, but it would be 
awakened through the appropriate national re-awakening; the nation always 
existed, even in periods when it could not manifest itself as openly or as strongly 
due to foreign occupation. Historiographical traditions in Bulgaria and Macedonia 
correspondingly trace their national existence back to the fourteenth century.46 
The historical events from 1878 to 1952 detailed in the succeeding 
chapters are claimed by both Bulgarian and Macedonian national historical 
traditions. But “nationalists” on both sides concur they can only belong to one of 
the two histories, and only a single “historical truth” can exist. As we shall see in 
Chapter Seven, the historiographical traditions became mutually and finally 
exclusive over 1946-1952. Any affirmation of national consciousness for one 
meant, as noted in the Introduction, that the other’s history is simply wrong at 
best, an outright lie at worst.47 Disputes over historiography still take on a bitter 
                                                
45 Roumen Daskalov, Building up a National Identity: The Case of Bulgaria, 
working paper SPS no. 94/11 (Florence, Italy: European University Institute, 
Department of Political and Social Sciences), 4.  
46 For Bulgaria, see Vera Mutafchieva, “The Notion of the Other: The Turk, the 
Jew and the Gypsy,” in Antonina Zhelyazkova, ed., Relations of Compatibility 
and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria (Sofia: 
International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations Foundation, 
1995), 22; for Macedonia, see Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, ed., Documents of the 
Macedonian People for Independence and a Nation-State, Volume 1 (Skopje: 
Kultura, Makedonska Kniga, Medunarodna Politika & Misla, 1985), passim. 
47 It is important to note that there are a number of historians (and, I would 
argue, “ordinary” citizens of both states) willing to recognize the existence of the 
other – e.g., Bulgarians recognizing a modern Macedonian nation, Macedonians 
willing to recognize that there are “Macedonian Bulgarians” who feel part of a 
Bulgarian nation. But even here, there is conflict: unless one believes both 
nations to be relatively recent constructs (which we do see in some cases, such 




tone because it is mutually perceived that the other side is attempting to 
weaken, even destroy contemporary national consciousness and independence. 
Scholarly periodicals such as Makedonski Pregled, Glasnik or Macedonian 
Review commonly use terms like “falsification,” “theft” and “lies;” The popular 
press as represented in mainstream periodicals and publishing houses is even 
more vituperative. One of the more popular recent Bulgarian titles on 
Macedonian history translates into English as Ten Macedonian Lies.48  
 The importance of the state in these historical traditions is thus limited to 
“realizing” the existence of the nation. Bulgarian claims to a 1300-year Bulgarian 
state tradition or  Macedonian claims to a statehood dating back to either the 
Macedonia of Philip and Alexander or (at least) to Samuil’s medieval empire are, 
a priori, arguments that these states represented the nation. Several scholars 
from Bulgaria and Macedonia have recently taken more nuanced views 
regarding the relationship between the nation and state,49 but the process of 
“tracing back” the history of the nation well before than the modern period 
remains academic orthodoxy in the national history of both countries. In the 
predominant indigenous academic tradition, the state’s involvement might 
                                                                                                                                           
in some circles in Bulgaria, “The Macedonians are a nation now, but they 
weren’t fifty years ago, they were Bulgarians then.” 
48 Bozhidar Dimitrov, Deset luzhi na makedonizma (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “ANIKO,” 
2000). Although the work is not scholarly in nature – indeed, it seems 
deliberately inflammatory – Dimitrov himself is the head of the National Museum 
of History. 
49 For a sociological approach, see Ilia Iliev, “On the History of Inventing 
Bulgarian History” (Vienna: IWM Working Paper 5/2000); also Roumen 
Daskalov, The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the 
Bulgarian Revival (New York: CEU Press, 2004).  I thank Rossitsa Guencheva 




realize or falsify but not create or shape; the state’s influence is limited to the 
negative. 
 
The State, Modernization and Nationalism in Southeastern Europe 
Theories of classical modernism argue that structural changes created 
conditions for cultural and political movements that allowed the development of 
national consciousness. In Southeastern Europe, however, such structural 
changes were slower to develop. National movements rose earlier than the 
structural changes (such as industrialization or urbanization) that Ernest Gellner, 
as already noted, posits as the key structural factors that led to the rise of 
national consciousness. In the case of Bulgaria, as will be discussed in Chapter 
Two, the “national movement” was a cultural and religious movement – which 
sought to bring about structural change and viewed national consciousness as a 
modernizing factor. The national movement sought to realize both the state and 
the nation.50  
Nineteenth-century Southeastern European national movements 
generally saw the nation-state as a route to modernization.51 Such 
modernization was not necessarily identical to that framed in classical modernist 
theory. Southeastern European states focused on “end-products” such as 
standing armies, civil bureaucracies, Western-style universities and educational 
systems, modern capitals, modern industry and (nominally) egalitarian and 
                                                
50 E.g., as expressed in Peter F. Sugar, “External and Domestic Roots of 
Eastern European Nationalism,” in Nationalism in Eastern Europe, ed. Peter 
Sugar and Ivo Lederer, 2nd ed. (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1994).  




representative democratic constitutions. As John Allcock has argued in the case 
of Yugoslavia, the result was the central state’s rapid achievement of certain 
aspects of “modernity” but with slow progress in other areas.52 This range of 
areas, he argues, suggests the need for a broader definition of modernization. 
This study accordingly follows Jurgen Habermas’ formulation from The 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
The concept of modernization refers to a bundle of processes that 
are cumulative and mutually reinforcing: to the formation of capital 
and the mobilization of resources. To the development of the 
forces of production and the increase in the productivity of labor; to 
the establishment of centralized political power and the formation 
of national identities. To the proliferation of rights of political 
participation, of urban forms of life, and of formal schooling. To the 
secularization of values and norms.53 
 
This formulation of modernization explicates the fact that, in the Balkan context, 
nationalism was seen as part of an ongoing process of modernization that would 
eventually lead to economic development and other material progress.54 
 State-formation was part of this process. The new independent Balkan 
states created, in Charles Maier’s term, a “territorial consciousness,” borders 
within which the state’s authority was to be paramount and stood for the 
                                                
52 See John Allcock, Explaining Yugoslavia (London: Hurst & Company, 2000) 
for an excellent study on the role of modernization in the Yugoslav context.   
53 See Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987). 
54 Daskalov, “Modernization in the Balkans,” 141-142. Liah Greenfeld, The Spirit 
of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) make the argument that nationalism promotes economic 




“national consciousness” of its inhabitants.55 This contrasted starkly with the 
existing experience within the Ottoman Empire, in which the borders of “political 
space” were not assumed to coincide inherently with ethnic or religious borders; 
the Empire was multiethnic and multi-religious. It also contrasted with the 
Ottoman Empire’s willingness to allow significant local autonomy, more than the 
new independent states were willing to tolerate.  
 
The Provincial Experience: From Ottoman Autonomy to Centralization 
The most significant difference between the formation of national 
consciousness in the Balkans and in Western Europe was the legacy of 
Ottoman rule. England and France each enjoyed hundreds of years of existence 
and continuity or rule in the early modern era, allowing for a gradual 
development of a territorial consciousness, relatively strong central government 
and (ultimately) national consciousness.56 The length and consistency of this 
state apparatus became a basis for the creation of national identities in these 
countries, the state itself a symbol of the emerging nation. The strong central 
state based on territorial and national consciousness that Charles Maier 
describes had an established history and continuity. For the countries of 
Southeastern Europe, however, the early modern period and (in some cases) 
                                                
55 Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative 
Narratives for the Modern Era" American Historical Review 105:3 (June 2000); 
see also Calhoun, 66-85. 
56 Note Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990 – 1992 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1993). The history of Irish, Basque or Breton 





much of the nineteenth century was marked by Ottoman rule.  This shaped both 
national movements and local particularisms. While British or French national 
movements sought to transform existing kingdoms into nation-states, Balkan 
national movements sought to rebel against existing Imperial authority and to 
differentiate each other vis-à-vis rival national movements.  
Ottoman rule was further important in a myth-building fashion for national 
consciousness, providing a ready “other.” Nation-builders in Southeastern 
Europe emphasized claimed historical experiences of the tursko igo (“Turkish 
Yoke”), forced conversion to Islam or the devshirme child-tax and the use of 
retaliatory massacres after Christian uprisings) in order to suggest that Ottoman 
rule was universally harsh and alien. Whatever the actual truth to such claims, 
they were effective in rallying mass support for later national movements. In 
truth, the ruling Ottoman apparatus was alien in language and culture.57 Perhaps 
fundamentally, it was alien in religion as well.58 The Ottomans provided a Other 
against whom an “Us” could be defined: the national identities which coalesced 
in the nineteenth century drew from those who could be defined as not Muslim, 
                                                
57 This allowed Ottoman rule to be defined as “Asiatic,” “non-European.” See 
Milica Baki!-Hayden, “Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of the Former 
Yugoslavia,” Slavic Review 54:4 (Winter 1995). Such terms suggest that 
Ottoman rule was alien and “Other” to the region. In fact, non-Turkish and non-
Muslim groups were sometimes over-represented in the administration of the 
Empire, as the emergence of the Phanariot Greeks into positions of power 
during the eighteenth century attests.  
58 Adrian Hastings has argued for a perennialist view that religion was of central 
importance in all national identities. While agreeing that religious and dynastic 
identities (certainly prevalent in the medieval and early modern periods) could be 
drawn upon as symbols by later national identities, a strict continuity of identity is 
too problematic. See Adrian Hastings, The Construction of Nationhood: 
Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 




as raya (subjects), who generally (with the exception of the Romanians) lacked a 
native aristocracy and who were “second-class” inhabitants of the Empire and in 
certain cases could point to a history of suffering and injustice at the hands of 
the Ottomans.59 This is, indeed, rather more similar to how post-colonial 
nationalisms reacted against the ruling, colonial power than it is to the 
emergence of modern French or English national identities. 
 Yet while its “alien” ruling class allowed for an easy dichotomy of “us” and 
“other,” at the same time the Ottoman Empire allowed broad powers of 
autonomy for local regions and populations. Crucial was the system of millets, 
conferring certain group rights on various religious denominations in the empire. 
The Orthodox Christian population of the Balkans was placed within the rum 
millet;60 other millets would be created for Jews, Armenian Orthodox and Coptic 
Christians. This suited the Ottoman conquerors, who placed the Orthodox 
Church in authority over the Christian population and who could then hold the 
Patriarch of the Church responsible for the behavior of the Empire’s Christian 
                                                
59 In retrospective accounts, another significant “other” would become “the 
Turks,” in other words Turks as an ethnic category. Such a view is anachronistic, 
in that the Ottoman Empire was not specifically a Turkish empire; Southeastern 
European nationalist literature tends to lump Albanians, Kurds, Circassians and 
indigenous Muslims together with Turks, since by the late nineteenth century the 
nexus for identity in the region was increasingly ethnic/national rather than 
confessional, as it had been under the empire. The linkage is so strong, in fact, 
that in the 1990s “Turk” became a common pejorative term in the former 
Yugoslavia for Bosnian Muslims. Such definitions of “Ottomans” or “the Turk” 
ignored or obscured legacies of peaceful coexistence and represent political 
agendas more than historical reality.  
60 E.g., the “Rouman” millet, since the conquered Byzantines in fact referred to 
themselves as “Romans.” The term was extended, however, to refer to all the 
peoples of the region of the Orthodox rite conquered and included within the 




subjects. It also suited the forms of Islamic law practiced within the Empire, 
which tolerated Christian (and Jewish) worship but provided for discriminatory 
taxation and limited certain rights (church construction, military service, etc.). 
Orthodox Christians, in turn, enjoyed continued use of their own laws and 
customs, at least within any intra-Christian social context.  
 The decline of the central power held by the Sublime Porte from the 
seventeenth century through the nineteenth century meant territorial autonomy 
for many provinces as well. While often this meant autonomy for local Ottoman 
pashas, it also allowed for the rise of distinct national movements for and among 
Albanians, Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbs.61 Ethnographers in the region also 
noted various groups such as the Vlachs (migratory pastorialists) and Torbeshi 
and Pomachs (Muslims who were ethnically and linguistically Slavic). These 
were alternately endorsed as their own ethnic groups or were “claimed” by 
ethnographers for their own nation.62  
 Respective national movements defined used “ethnic markers” to defined 
the divisions between these perceived nations. Language in particular proved 
central to the nineteenth century romantic concept of the nation prevalent in 
Southeastern Europe. But this presented certain complications. On the one 
hand, the Albanian, Greek, Hungarian, Romanian and Turkish languages now 
                                                
61 The Romanian principalities remained under the rule of local notables as a 
vassal state rather than under Ottoman pashas. 
62 See H.R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic 
Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: University Press, 1951). When the 
Macedonian national movement emerged is a contentious topic, as is discussed 





presented as “national” languages were clearly distinct from each other. Of 
these only Romanian is close to other Indo-European languages, and Hungarian 
is completely apart, in the Finno-Ugric family. This allowed for easy 
differentiation based on language. Such distinctions did not exist within the 
South Slavic language family, which formed a closely related linguistic 
“spectrum.” Slovene dialects in the west were far removed from the eastern 
Bulgarian dialects, but there were no clearly-defined boundaries between one 
dialect to the next throughout this expanse. Even the modern Slavic literary 
languages (again, see Table One, next page) show great similarity. Ethnologists 
could easily define Slavic-speakers in Macedonia in comparison with Greek- or 
Turkish-speakers. But differentiating between Slavic dialects (or the emerging 
codified national languages) was more difficult.  
In Southeastern Europe, language became the key marker of national 
consciousness. Proponents of national consciousness adopted the formula 
“language = nation = state” because it was useful in readily distinguishing 
differences between ethnic groups long part of a multicultural Ottoman Empire.63 
Stressing divisions between the languages and equating language with national 
consciousness allowed nation-builders to equate all speakers of that language 
as part of that nation, particularly in the period before a unifying state existed.64 
But within the South Slavic branch, the lack of easy dividing lines resulted in 
                                                
63 Tomasz Kamusella, “Language as an Instrument of Nationalism in Central 
Europe,” Nations and Nationalism 7:2 (2001), 239. 




contested zones between emerging national awakening, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Two. 
Table 1 
Modern Literary Languages of Southeastern Europe65 
  you, “to be,”   “I read the book”    
 I plural singular “I am reading.” “I will read the book.” (past tense)  
 
South Slavic languages (east to west) 
Bulgarian a" #$% %&' (" )*+$. (" ,* -./)*+$ 0123$+$. (" )*+/4 0123$+$. 
 az vas sum Az cheta Az shte procheta knigata Az chetoh knigata.    
Macedonian 5$% #$% %6' 7$% )*+$'. 7$% 8e 5$ -./)*+$' 0123$+$.  7$% 5$ )*+$# 0123$+$.  
 jas vas  sym Jas chetam Jas kje ja prochetam knigata. Jas ja chetav knigata 
!tokavian (SC)*  5$ #2 92+2 7$ )2+$'. 7$ :6 -./)2+$+2 0;236. 7$ %$' -./)2+$/ 0;236. 
 ja vi biti  Ja chitam. Ja chu prochitati knjigu Ja sam prochitao knjigu. 
Kajkavian (SC)* ja vi biti Ja chitam. Ja bum prochital knjigu. Prochital sam knjigu.  
Slovene jaz vi obstajam Jaz berem. Bral bom knjigo. Bral sem knigo. 
 
Non-Slavic Southeastern European languages 
Albanian unë ju unë jam Unë lexoj. Unë do ta lexoj librin. Unë lexova librin. 
Greek <=>  <?@   <AµBC  D=> ECBFGHI.  D=> ECGFB?B JK FCFLAK.   MKND=> OB JK ECBFG?I  
       JK FCFLAK. 
 ego esi eimai Ego diavazo. Ego diavasa to vivlio. Ego tha to diavaso  
       to vivlio.  
Romanian eu voi eu sunt Eu citesc Eu am citit cartea. Eu am citi cartea.  
Turkish ben seni ım Ben okuyorum. Kitabı okuyacagim. Kitabı okuyorum. 
* Ptokavian and Kajkavian are two major dialects of Serbo-Croatian. 
 
The inhabitants of Ottoman Southeastern Europe found established 
group identities challenged in the nineteenth century by the rapid emergence of 
independent Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania.66 These four nation-states 
(five, counting Montenegro) actively sought to promulgate national 
consciousness both at home in among what they perceived as co-nationals 
                                                
65 This chart is illustrative rather than definitive as it reflects the contemporary 
“literary” languages. Codification intentionally purged literary languages of 
foreign influence, distancing each language from its neighbors. On the 
importance of language and nationalism in the region see Victor Friedman, 
“Observing the Observers: Language, Ethnicity, and Power in the 1994 
Macedonian Census and Beyond,” in Barnet Rubin, ed., Toward Comprehensive 
Peace in Southeastern Europe: Conflict Prevention in the South Balkans (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), and Keith Hitchins, Orthodoxy and 
Nationality: Andreiu Saguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846-1873 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).  My thanks to Ana Anti!, 
Rumena Buzharovska, Dita Bytyqi, Anca GlonQ, Yildaz Sadakova and Bojan 
Zivani! for their assistance with this table.  
66 The Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Molodva were technically vassal 




remaining under Ottoman rule. The states also appeared quickly, over a period 
of roughly one-hundred years, with Bulgaria the last to gain de facto 
independence in 1878 and progress to full and de jure independence in 1908. 
Unlike the gradual experience of state-building in Great Britain and France, the 
new government imported a model of strong central ministries and a strong 
cabinet with direct rule over the provinces. This was a stronger state than 
specified in the original 1878 Turnovo Constitution of Bulgaria, which had 
reserved considerable autonomy for the provinces.67 As is discussed in Chapter 
Four, the state immediately fought to establish its authority to define the 
“territorial consciousness” of people living within Bulgaria.  
 
State-Building and Nation-Building  
 As noted earlier, national consciousness emerged in Southeastern 
Europe in the nineteenth century earlier than the structural changes that 
classical modernist theory posits. The role of the state in assuming control over 
the definition of national consciousness from the earlier cultural movement was 
the crucial factor. After independence, state institutions were instrumental in 
encouraging and shaping national consciousness. This was part of the state-
making experiment itself, as the centralized state sought to expand its power by 
obtaining mass support and used nationalism as a vehicle for such support.68  
                                                
67 Giozelev, ibid, 219. 
68 For an example of the use of nationalism to obtain popular support, see Gale 
Stokes, Politics as Development: The Emergence of Political Parties in 




 In examining the role of the state in building and shaping national 
consciousness in Pirin, this study follows Anthony Smith’s argument for ethno-
symbolism. National consciousness built upon an existing consciousness, that of 
the ethnie. In the Southeastern Europe of the Ottoman Empire ethnic categories 
were established, if not predominant, and aspects of language, folklore, dress 
and profession (often divided along ethnic lines) resulted in clear group 
boundaries. Smith stresses the role of established “symbols, myths, values and 
memories” in the development of nationalism in transforming existing social 
groups into nations.69  Smith further distinguishes three specific “mobilizing 
mechanisms” by which ethnie were transformed into national, or nation-state 
consciousness. In the case of Pirin, at least, these mobilizations proceeded in a 
rough chronological order:  
• A cultural mobilization between the 1820s to 1893, in which an 
emerging intelligentsia (both secular and religious) arose to lead and 
expand the national movement; 
• A military mobilization, as the local national movement grew politicized 
and turned to revolution through local paramilitary organizations over 
1893 to 1912 and cooperation with the Bulgarian army over 1912-1923; 
and 
• An administrative mobilization that promoted the mass inclusion of the 
Bulgarian inhabitants of Pirin through definitions of territory and 
citizenship.70 
 
                                                
69 See Smith, Ethnic Origin of Nations. 
70 Smith, 154-173. Smith’s concept mobilizing phases is similar to Miroslav 
Hroch’s argument that national consciousness in Eastern Europe was spread by 
the three phases of foundation, populism and mass appeal. But Hroch does not 
specify how educated elites “transmit” the national ideal. See Miroslav Hroch, 
“From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building 





Smith’s emphasis on the role of history and a historical ethnie as the basis of an 
emerging national consciousness is particularly apt. Nationalist movements in 
Southeastern Europe drew heavily on history and historical symbols to explain 
their concept of the nation;71 and they also built upon existing frameworks of 
historical symbols developed by successive phases of the national project.  
Anthropological definitions of ethnicity stress its nature as an identity 
created by interaction within the group as much as between different groups.72 
Both external impositions of nationhood and self-determined national 
consciousness draw on historical justification to guide such interaction. While 
this study agrees that national consciousness remains “plastic” and can be 
molded, it also must be acceptable to those who share this national 
consciousness. Specific ethnographic markers alone are not sufficient: there are 
currently more claimed speakers of the artificial language klingonaase then of 
Navajo (Diné), but whatever objective claim the greater number of klingonaase 
speakers confers, this has not conferred linguistic legitimacy or identity upon 
them. There remains a subjective element of self-definition, and outside 
recognition. 
                                                
71 For the disputed historical symbols between Macedonia and Bulgaria, see 
Jane K. Cowan and Keith Brown, “Macedonian Reflections” in Jane K. Cowan, 
ed., Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference (Sterling, VA: Pluto 
Press, 2000), 7.  
72 For example, see Fredrick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries (Boston: 




 Macedonia was the center of “competing national consciousnesses,” a 
sort of “marketplace of identity”73 in which multiple options were available. The 
present study thus traces the evolution of how a centralizing state increasingly 
sought to mobilize national consciousness within Pirin. Fundamentally, the state 
had to provide an acceptable identity that was understandable to the inhabitants 
of Macedonia, one that embraced symbols and markers that inhabitants found 
meaningful. The state faced competition from groups that favored an 
“autonomous” local consciousness for the region, stressing local Macedonian 
characteristics and by the interwar period claimed state authority for themselves. 
The response, over the course of time, was for the state to acknowledge local 
particularlisms while obtaining as much control over as much of the process of 
nation-building as possible. At the climax of conflict between autonomic and 
centralized identities during the Macedonianization campaigns of the late 1940s, 
the Communist regime was successful in gaining control over both impulses. 
 The origins of this autonomist-centralizing struggle can be seen as early 
as the late nineteenth century. The legacy of Ottoman rule was that Pirin 
received not only substantial autonomy from state authorities in Istanbul, but 
was ethnically and economically “fractured,” both between localities and 
between the town and countryside. It was in this context that the Bulgarian 
National Awakening would attempt to promote a single national consciousness. 
                                                
73 Note Kosaku Yoshino, “Rethinking Theories of Nationalism: Japan’s 
Nationalism in a Marketplace Perspective,” in Kosaku Yoshino, Consuming 
Ethnicity and Nationalism: Asian Experiences (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i 




Within Pirin, Macedonian paramilitary movements and local leaders would 









The Nineteenth-Century National Awakening in Pirin 
 
"…every culture must have its state, preferably its own." 
— Ernest Gellner1 
 
Bulgarian historiography refers to the nineteenth-century Bulgarian 
national movement as the Narodno Vuzrazhdane (National Awakening). The 
term, in common use by the 1850s, embodies the concept that a historically 
extant and continuous Bulgarian national consciousness was revived or reborn in 
the nineteenth century after centuries of slumber under Ottoman rule.2 This idea 
suited the outlook and writings of intellectuals (including Orthodox clergy) within 
the national movement, who sought to “redeem” a historic Bulgarian spirit in 
Pirin, as in all Bulgarian-inhabited lands of the Ottoman Empire.  
Anthony Smith calls such scholarly and ecclesiastical elites a  “priesthood” 
of national consciousness, an intelligentsia serving to promote the cause of the 
                                                
1 Ernest Gellner, “The Coming of Nationalism and Its Interpretation: The Myths of 
Nation and Class,” in Gopal Balakrishnan, ed., Mapping the Nation (New York: 
Verso, 1996), 110.  
2 Roumen Daskalov, The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of 
the Bulgarian Revival (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 1-2, 12. Daskalov argues 
that the term assumed political overtones, equating the slumbering nation with a 
“slumbering” state. Macedonian historiography finds a separate and distinct 
Macedonian Revival, a point of friction with the Bulgarian position. For a 
Macedonian perspective, see Boro Mokrov, “The Struggle for the Macedonian 
Language in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” Macedonian Review 11:2 (1981); 
Blazhe Koneski, Towards the National Renaissance (Skopje: NIP “Nova 
Makedonija,” 1961); Michael Seraphinoff, The Nineteenth Century Macedonian 




nation among a larger ethnic laity.3 In the nineteenth century this movement 
called for Bulgarian-language schools and a Slavic-language rite in religious 
services and administration in place of the use of Greek, the better to encourage 
a Bulgarian consciousness. The Vuzrazhdane mobilized local community leaders 
in the defense of “Bulgarian culture” — financially supporting local schools and 
Orthodox churches and promoting a Bulgarian character in their activities.4 The 
ethnically Greek-dominated hierarchy of the Orthodox Church responded by 
mobilizing their own supporters in the region. The result was a conflict in which 
the unity of local Orthodox Christians shattered along ethnic lines.  
If the twentieth century was the crucial period in which rival versions of the 
nation became a mass political phenomenon in Pirin, the nineteenth century was 
the period in which potential Bulgarian and Macedonian consciousnesses were 
initially defined and debated. This chapter accordingly traces the historical 
background of the “cultural” movement in the nineteenth century, while Chapter 
Three outlines the historical development of the revolutionary, paramilitary 
organizations that emerged in the 1890s from the earlier cultural movement.   
 
Late Ottoman Macedonia  
 
 The Ottoman government, the Sublime Porte (so named for the courtyard 
in the Topkapı Palace where the Sultan and Grand Vizier held administrative 
court sessions) restructured provincial governance in Macedonia as part of the 
                                                
3 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 
157-161. 
4 This fits Hroch’s model of national movements; see Miroslav Hroch, “From 
National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in 





The vilayets of Macedonia, 1864-1912 
 
Clockwise from top, the vilayets of Kosovo (Prishtina), 
Selânik (Salonika) and Monastir (Bitola). 
broad course of reforms that began in 1826 during the reign of Mahmud II 
through the Tanzimat period of 1839 to 1876 and the period of constitutional 
reform from 1876 to 1878.5 In 1858 the Porte expanded the power of the valis 
(provincial governors). These figures would now serve as representatives for the 
ministries of the central government and oversee their province’s politics, 
finances, police and courts.6 In 1864, the Provincial Reform Law further clarified 
the structure of provincial government. A new system of vilayets (provinces) 
replaced the old system of 
eyelets, the administrative 
units each centered on a 
significant metropolitan area.  
 Macedonia itself was 
not defined as province. 
What came to be defined as 
“geographic Macedonia” in 
the later nineteenth century 
would stretch across the 
vilayet of Selânik, centered 
                                                
5 On the reform period, see Kemal Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and 
Political History (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 37-43; Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural 
Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume II: Reform, 
Revolution and Republic: the Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975 (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1977), 71-89; and Roderick Davison, Reform in the 
Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).  




on Salonika7, the vilayet of Monastir,8 centered on the city of the same name, 
and the vilayet of Kosovo, centered on Pristina (see Figure 2, previous page).9  
The Law of 1864 further divided the vilayets into sanjaks (districts), kazas 
(sub-districts), kariyes (large villages, communes or municipal quarters of more 
than fifty households) and nahiyes (smaller villages and hamlets.) The Sublime 
Porte directly appointed governors and officials at the vilayet, sanjak and kaza 
levels, while villages elected their own village headmen. Roderick Davison notes 
that the reform encouraged both local centralization and regional 
decentralization:  
Viewed from Istanbul, [the Provincial Reform Law] represented a 
decentralization of authority wherever the vali could act on his own 
initiative. Viewed from the provinces, this represented considerable 
centralization in the vilayet.10 
 
In the event, local notables were usually able to stymie the effectiveness of the 
vali and limit the power of the reforms to centralize local government, preserving 
local autonomy despite efforts at provincial centralization.11 
The sheer diversity of the Macedonian vilayets aided the preservation of 
autonomy. Geographically, mountain ranges divided the three provinces into a 
series of valleys with markedly different climates, resources and historical 
                                                
7 Thessalonika from 1912. Salonika is used here to refer to the city, but Selânik is 
used to refer to the Ottoman administrative district.  
8 Bitola from 1912.  
9 Simultaneously, the boundaries of the sanjaks within the Macedonian vilayets 
were gerrymandered in such a way as to reinforce the predominance of the 
Muslim population. See Nadine Lange Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 1893-
1908: From Western Sources (Boulder and New York: East European 
Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press, 1998), 14. 
10 Davison, 147. 




patterns of settlement. The region further lacked navigable rivers to readily 
connect these valleys. The Ottoman rail network, even at the end of the 
nineteenth century, did not serve to link the vilayets together, effectively 
connecting only a narrow strip between Skopje, Monastir and Salonika.  
Ethnic variety further divided the vilayets. The diversity of the Macedonian 
vilayets’ two million inhabitants was pronounced even within a multi-ethnic 
empire: the Ottoman census of 1912 found 1,150,000 Slavs, 400,000 Turks, 
300,000 Greeks, 200,000 Vlachs, 120,000 Albanians and 100,000 Jews in 
Macedonia.12 This population was distributed as a hodge-podge throughout the 
region, with the result that only a few sanjaks possessed a pronounced ethnic 
majority. While localities might possess clear majorities, the diversity of the 
districts and provinces hindered the development of an overlapping territorial-
national consciousness of the kind Charles Maier emphasizes as crucial to state 
                                                
12 Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (Westport: 
Greenwood Press, 1980), 12. Demographic statistics for Macedonia, however, 
varied greatly and this can only be considered an approximation at best, since 
Ottoman censuses continued to record religion rather than ethnicity. Such ethnic 
figures were determined either by recording the separate millets, or through 
secondary analysis. Duncan Perry notes the need for caution: for example, that 
in 1918 estimates of Macedonia’s population ranged from a low end of 350,000 
to a high of 2,911,700, an almost logarithmic difference. This new attention to 
ethnic categories moreover neglected confessional differences — roughly 
150,000 of this Slav population were Muslims by confession. See Perry, Politics 
of Terror, 19; also H.R. Wilkinson, Maps & Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic 
Cartography of Macedonia  (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1951). Fikret 
Adanir, “The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912,” in Andreas 
Kapeler, ed., The Formation of National Elites: Comparative Studies on 
Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940 
(Dartmouth: New York University Press and the European Science Foundation, 
1992), 164, breaks population figures down further, excluding the predominantly 
Albanian sanjaks of Kosovo, finding Macedonia to be 52 percent Slav, 22 percent 
Turkish, 10 percent Greek, 6 percent Albanian, 4 percent Vlach, 3 percent 




power. The province further ranged from metropolitan centers such as Salonika 
(the second largest city in the Ottoman Balkans) to rural mountainous regions 
with low population densities.  
Dialectal variations further divided the Slav population of the three 
vilayets. Figure 3, next page, notes the boundaries of dialects spoken in 
geographic Macedonia.13 These blend into Bulgarian dialects in the east and 
Serbian dialects in the north. Pirin was generally unified in terms of dialect. Most 
of the region shares the Maleshevo-Pirin dialect; the exception is the southeast, 
including Nevrokop, which falls within the Seres-Lagadin dialect and is mutually 
intelligible with the former. These two dialects in Macedonia are the closest to the 
Shop dialect of northwestern Bulgaria. Linguistically Pirin thus lay between the 
eastern Slav dialects that served as the basis of the new Bulgarian literary 
language, and the western Slav dialects that would be proposed in the 1860s as 
the basis for separate Macedonian and “Western Bulgarian” languages.14 
 
                                                
13 The boundaries as presented here reflect the position of Macedonian linguists. 
Generally, Bulgarian linguists accept this schema of local dialects. The point of 
conflict remains over the relation between this group of dialects relative to those 
in Bulgaria, and whether dialects in Macedonia form a separate language. My 
thanks to Angel Angelov for fruitful discussions on this topic. 
14 Key dialectical differences between eastern and western dialects included the 
use of the letter !, “yat.” Grammatically, in eastern dialects of Bulgarian it is 
pronounced as ! (“ya”), in the west as e (“eh”). Thus the word for milk varies from 
“mlyako” to “mleko.” Similarly, the word for “what” in the east is kakvo, in the west 
shto (compared to shta in Serbia). The future tense is conjugated with shte in the 
east, kje in parts of the west. In some rural extremes, these dialects were not 
always mutually intelligible. The contemporary Bulgarian position is summarized 
in “A Short Explanation,” Loza 2 (1892), 92-93, reprinted in Dimitur Kosev and 
Hristo Hristov, eds., Documents and Materials on the History of the Bulgarian 





Map of Dialects in Geographic Macedonia 
 
Map by Mois Moshev, based on Blazhe Koneski, A Historical Phonology of the 





The Five Pirin Kazas 
 
The Pirin kazas 
 Pirin paralleled the new pattern for the larger vilayets on a smaller scale in 
terms of administrative divisions. Putting Pirin entirely within the Seres sanjak of 
the Selânik vilayet, the Law of 1864 divided the region into five kazas, each 
centered around a local town: Gorna Dzhumaia, Razlog,15 Melnik, Nevrokop and 
Petrich.16 These kazas differed from each other somewhat in terms of 
geography, demography and economy. The Gorna Dzhumaia kaza, to the 
northwest, was oriented on the Struma valley; so was the Petrich kaza, but the 
latter included a series of plains around the town. The Melnik kaza lay partially in 
the valley and partially in 
the western foothills of the 
Pirin range. Mountainous 
terrain dominated the 
Razlog and Nevrokop 
kazas to the east, where 
the land supported 
scattered pastoralism but 
not intensive agriculture or a dense population. All were similar, however, in 
being relatively rural and sparsely populated.  
                                                
15 While termed Mehomiia under the Ottoman Empire, the inhabitants of the town 
consistently referred to it as Razlog and the term is used throughout in this study.  





Population in the Pirin kazas, c. 189017 
 Slav Greek Jewish Pomak Roma Turkish Vlach Total 
Petrich Kaza 26,243 n/a n/a 1,950 1,750 15,700 n/a 45,643 
 57.5%   4.3% 3.8% 34.4%   
Petrich town 3,749 n/a n/a 325 250 2,650 n/a 6,974 
 53.8%   4.7% 3.6% 38.0%   
Villages 22,494 n/a n/a 1,625 1,500 13,050 n/a 38,669 
 58.2%   4.2% 3.9% 33.8%   
Melnik kaza 15,492 2,050 n/a 1,000 955 5,360 780 25,637 
 40.1% 5.3%  2.6% 2.5% 13.9% 2.0%  
Melnik town* 1,200 2,050 n/a n/a 525 900 30 5,032 
 23.8% 40.7%   10.4% 17.9% 0.6%  
Villages* 14,292 n/a n/a 1,000 430 4,460 750 20,605 
 69.4%   4.9% 2.1% 21.6% 3.6%  
Gorna Dzhumaia kaza 19,112 11 50 3,570 650 4,990 521 28,904 
 66.1% 0.04% 0.2% 12.4% 22.5% 17.3% 1.8%  
G. Dzhumaia town 800 11 50 n/a 50 4,925 65 5,901 
 13.6% 0.2% .9%  .9% 83.5% 1.1%  
Villages 18,312 n/a n/a 3,570 600 65 456 23,003 
 79.6%   15.5% 2.6% 0.3% 2.0%  
Nevrokop kaza 34,312 n/a 72 28,335 2,130 10,605 441 76,395 
 44.9%  0.1% 37.1% 2.8% 13.9% 0.6%  
Nevrokop town 930 n/a 72 n/a 30 5,350 303 6,685 
 13.9%  1.1%  4.5% 80.0% 4.5%  
Villages 33,382 n/a n/a 28,335 2,100 5,255 138 69,710 
 47.9%   40.1% 3.0% 7.5% 0.2%  
Razlog kaza 21,500 n/a n/a 11,500 600 n/a 60 33,550 
 64.1%   34.3% 1.8%  0.2%  
Razlog town* 3,102 n/a n/a 1,500 n/a n/a 30 4,632 
 67.0%   32.4%   0.7%  
Bansko (town)* 5,700 n/a n/a n/a 432 n/a n/a 6,132 
 93.0%    7.1%    
Babek (town)* n/a n/a n/a 6,000 n/a n/a n/a 6,000 
    100%     
Villages* 12,698 n/a n/a 4,000 168 n/a 30 16,786 
 75.7%   23.8% 1.0%  0.2%  
 Slav Greek Jewish Pomak Roma Turkish Vlach Total 
Pirin total 116,659 2,061 122 46,455 6,735 36,735 2,652 209,629 
 55.7% 9.8% 0.1% 22.2% 3.2% 17.5% 1.3%  
* Extrapolated from household estimates. 
                                                
17 Based on figures from Vasil Kunchov, Sbornik: Narodni umotvoreniia, nauka i 
knizhnina, kniga XI (Sofia: Durzhavna pechatnitsa, 1894) reprinted as 
Makedoniia: Etnografiia i statistika (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin 
Drinov,” 1996), 270-271, 284-85, 300-301; and Vasil Kunchov, Sbornik: Narodni 
umotvoreniia, nauka i knizhnina, kniga XIII (Sofia: Durzhavna pechatnitsa, 1896) 
reprinted as Makedoniia: Etnografiia i statistika (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo 
“Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1996), 383-387. For comparison, see the population 




As noted in Table 2, the region’s demographic proportions were generally 
similar to those of the vilayets as a whole. The settlement of Turks in the region 
and the conversion of local inhabitants to Islam (chiefly the Pomaks, ethnic Slav 
Muslims, but also including many Roma) resulted in a region in which Christian 
Slav inhabitants made up between 50-60 percent of the total population, but only 
37 percent of the population of the region’s towns.18 
These ethnic populations were not scattered evenly throughout the 
province. The five towns of Pirin were primarily inhabited by Muslims (usually 
ethnically Turkish) but with Christian Slavic-speakers in separate quarters. 
Villages in the region might be Christian Slavic-speakers, Muslim Turkish-
speakers, or Muslim Slavic-speakers (Pomak). On a broad level, Turks clustered 
to the south, Orthodox Christian Slavs were strongest proportionately in the 
north, Pomaks (Muslim Slavs) were generally limited to the eastern regions of the 
kazas and Greeks were almost solely found in the town of Melnik.19 In the 
eastern Pirin kazas, Christian Bulgarian-speaking villages predominated on the 
                                                
18 Ottoman censuses recorded confession but not ethnicity; figures here draw on 
Vasil Kunchov’s work in the late nineteenth century. Although sympathetic to 
Bulgarian claims, he did compare his findings to Ottoman census data. His ratios 
between ethnicities are similar, but he often finds a larger population, perhaps 
because Ottoman censuses recorded households rather than individuals. On 
bias in census data, see H.R. Wilkinson, Maps & Politics: A Review of the 
Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
1951); also Raina Gavrilova, Bulgarian Urban Culture in the Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries (London: Associated University Presses, 1999), 38. 
19 Contemporary Bulgarian accounts argue that Pomaks, despite differences in 
faith, are ethnically indistinguishable from other Bulgarians. However, from 1878 
to 1905 the censuses conducted by the Bulgarian government listed Pomaks as 
“Turks.” Given the importance of confessional identity in the shaping of a 
Bulgarian national consciousness in the nineteenth century, this arguably 
excluded the Pomaks, who Bulgarian national discourse termed as ethnically 




eastern slopes of the Pirin range, with Muslim Bulgarian-speaking villages further 
east on the western slopes of the Rhodopi Mountains. Turkish-speaking villages 
and towns were located along the river valley that linked Thessalonika and Sofia. 
Greek-speakers were concentrated in the town of Melnik. 
On the local level, the different ethnicities tended to cluster together. 
Although some Pirin villages were mixed in terms of ethnic population, few were 
evenly divided and most possessed a large majority. The rural-urban divide 
further complicated the region’s demographics. Over a third (37.7 percent) of 
Pirin’s Turkish inhabitants lived in towns, as did all of the region’s Greek and 
Jewish population, 22.9 percent of the Vlachs, and 15.6 percent of Roma, all 
ahead of the Bulgarians — and far ahead of the Pomaks, who were 
overwhelmingly rural (99 percent).  
Such regional averages, however, mask the fact that these imbalances 
varied from kaza to kaza. In the Gorna Dzhumaia kaza, for example, the urban 
percentage of the total population (20.4 percent) was not only notably higher than 
average for the region, but the sub-district’s Turkish inhabitants were 
overwhelmingly urban (98.7 percent) and accounted for 80 percent of the town’s 
total population.20 Nevrokop was a similar overwhelmingly Turkish town in an 
area otherwise inhabited by Slav Christians. In Melnik, however, Turks inhabited 
a cluster of villages (83.2 percent rural) around a predominantly Greek town. 
Both the town of Petrich and surrounding villages were relatively mixed between 
                                                
20The Bulgarian component of Gorna Dzhumaia had been larger prior to 1878, 
but many of the town’s inhabitants emigrated to Bulgaria following its 
independence. See Chapter Three for an account of the Gorna Dzhumaia 





A Pirin Town: Gorna Dzhumaia in 1903. 
 
Original from Frederick Moore, The Balkan Trail. New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1906, 242. 
 
Slav and Turkish inhabitants. Razlog, to the northeast, was the other extreme 
with both urban and rural areas dominated by Christian and Muslim Slavs. These 
ethnic communities pursued their own, local autonomy within the kaza in the late 
nineteenth century — particularly village communities which remained by and 
large economically self-sufficient. 
The Pirin kazas were predominantly rural-based economies, more than 
most other kazas in Macedonia.  The urban centers of the Macedonian vilayets 
grew through much of the nineteenth century; in addition to Salonika both 
Monastir (50,000 inhabitants by 1898) and Seres (35,000 in 1906) were 
significant urban areas; smaller towns such as Skopje, Shtip and Strumitsa grew 
into significant regional 
centers as well.21 The towns 
of the Pirin kaza, in contrast, 
remained limited in size. 
They failed to grow beyond 
their roles as locations for 
local crafts guilds and as 
market towns for surrounding 
villages.22 The problem lay in 
recent economic history. The strong Ottoman Empire of the early modern era 
could effectively foster trade, military and other links between localities. In the 
                                                
21 Fikret Adanir, “The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire,” 164. 
22 See Gavrilova, 30-31, for a comparison of the Pirin towns with other towns in 




seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Ottoman Pirin was part of a thriving trade 
in wool, hides and animal skins, exported from the Macedonian lands overland to 
Vienna and Leipzig.23 But as the Empire’s trade routes faced more internal 
disruption in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, localities in peripheral 
areas enjoyed increased economic autonomy as well.  
The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 and Bulgaria’s subsequent 
independence disrupted the regional economy. Salonika’s overland trade to the 
Bulgarian lands24 of the Empire had run along the Struma river and thus through 
the towns of Petrich and Gorna Dzhumaia. Bulgarian independence cut off much 
of the previous trade between the Bulgarian lands and Ottoman centers in 
Salonika and Istanbul.25 The border also divided Gorna Dzhumaia as a center of 
local trade from a number of villages to the north. Dupnitsa subsequently 
emerged as a market town to supply them, to the detriment of the Pirin kazas.26 
Eastern Pirin’s role as a trade route declined, and the region’s economy was 
thereafter exclusively agricultural. Seres emerged as the commercial center for 
Pirin’s foodstuffs and industrial crops, transshipping some of them farther on to 
                                                
23 Bruce McGowan, Economic Life in Ottoman Europe: Taxation, trade and the 
struggle for land, 1600-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 
134. 
24 Administratively, the territory of Bulgaria was divided between the eyalets of 
Rumelia and Silistria. In 1864, territories from both eyalets were subdivided into 
the vilayets of Tuna (northern modern Bulgaria above the Balkan Mountains, 
including the southern Dobrudzha) and Rumelia (southern Bulgaria between the 
Balkan Mountains). The use of the term “Bulgarian lands” is meant to refer to the 
territory encompassed by the vilayets of Tuna and Rumelia.   
25 On the decline of Ottoman-Bulgarian trade following independence, see 
Michael Palariret, The Balkan Economies, c 1800-1914: Evolution without 
Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).  
26 Vasil Sharkov, Grad Gorna Dzhumaia, minalo i dnes (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na 




Ottoman Salonika.27 With the independence of Bulgaria, the region was 
relegated to an economic hinterland of the Aegean coast. By the latter half of the 
nineteenth century the Pirin economy was divided between the eastern mountain 
regions with sustenance farming and pastoralism and a western valley plain of 
chiflik agricultural estates worked by sharecroppers and villages surrounding 
towns such as Gorna Dzhumaia on the Salonika-Sofia trade route. 
Pirin produced annual harvests of nearly 20,000 metric tons of corn, 
13,500 tons each of wheat and rye, as well as smaller amounts of oats, barley, 
millet and rice. Different soil conditions and climate meant that the exact ratios of 
these crops varied between the kazas. Chiflik estates dominated western Pirin 
along the Struma valley, encompassing roughly three-quarters of the arable land 
in the Petrich, Melnik and Gorna Dzhumaia kazas.28 Turks or (more rarely) 
Muslim Slavs owned these large hereditary estates, dividing agricultural land 
along confessional (and ethnic) lines.29 To the east of the Pirin Range, however, 
small peasant farms and communal pastures owned by Christian and Muslim 
                                                
27 Katarjiev, Vreme na zreenje I, 108. 
28 For an overview of local chiflik ownership, see Hristo Hristov, Agrarnite 
otnosheniia v Makedoniia prez XIX V. i nachaloto na XX V. (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na 
Bulgarksata akademiia na naukite, 1964). On the earlier establishment of estates 
in the Struma Valley, see Metodija Sokoloski, “Petrichkata nahija vo XVI vek,” 
Istoriia 16:2 (1980), 23-48. 
29 The pattern of agricultural division was reflected in the later paramilitary 
movements; those areas in the east where the chiflik structure was absent 
proved to be areas of revolutionary fervor in the 1890s. This contradicts 
Bulgarian Marxist historiography that stresses an “anti-feudal” nature to the 
national awakening. The mountainous and poorer areas of eastern Pirin were 
unattractive for large chiflik estates, and saw little Muslim (or Greek) immigration. 
The role of local educated elites in eastern villages and towns was thus “left” to 
the Slav inhabitants relatively uncontested. The question of land reform was of 




Slavs predominated: Razlog, less than 50 kilometers from Gorna Dzhumaia, had 
no chiflik estates in the late nineteenth century.  
Access to commercial markets impacted the pattern of agricultural activity 
as well. Petrich, the closest kaza to the Aegean coast, traded apples and grapes 
to both Salonika and Seres.30 Cattle and sheep were herded in large numbers — 
the region’s more than 300,000 sheep alone represented roughly half the total 
sheep herded in the Seres sanjak — and driven to markets in Seres and 
Salonika. Pirin also saw the cultivation of “industrial” crops, particularly along the 
Struma river valley in the western kazas. Cotton and tobacco were grown 
extensively, the Gorna Dzhumaia kaza alone annually producing roughly 400 
metric tons of cotton and 224 metric tons of tobacco in the late nineteenth 
century as well as 30 tons of flax and hemp. Sesame seeds, poppy seeds and 
opium were cultivated in the Petrich kaza and to a lesser extent in the Melnik 
kaza; far more important in the latter was the 1,100 metric tons of grapes grown 
each year plus nearly 11 metric tons a year of honey.31 Sharecroppers on the 
chiflik estates grew most of these commercial crops, the role taken in the east by 
small peasant farms. Tobacco, cotton, foodstuffs as well as wool and hides were 
traded at local market towns and then transported south to the larger markets of 
the Aegean coast, for further sale either to Istanbul or to be exported abroad.  
Such crops encouraged a limited local development of processing facilities 
— Petrich, for example, was a source of sesame oil not only for Seres but for 
                                                
30 Kunchov, 265. 
31 For local agricultural production and livestock figures, see Kunchov, 265, 273, 




Melnik and villages in the southwestern kazas, while Melnik was the sanjak’s 
center for wine production. Nevrokop emerged as a center for textile 
production.32 Such industries were divided by ethnicity, with Greeks, Jews and 
Turks predominating among the merchants trading in these goods — and among 
other urban professions such as doctors, telegraph operators, clerks, etc.33 A 
Bulgarian merchant class had been established in the nineteenth century, but 
varied in size and influence among the kazas, strongest in eastern predominantly 
Slav settlements like Bansko and Razlog.  
Such minimal urban activity, and the continued concentration of land in 
chiflik estates, could not absorb an increasing surplus of labor in Pirin or in the 
Macedonian lands as a whole. The result was extensive pechalbarstvo — labor 
migration. Thousands of local inhabitants traveled to the Aegean coast, to Thrace 
and to Bulgaria for seasonal work, returning in the autumn.34 The widespread 
export of goods and of labor extended the horizons of peasants trading their 
wares and labor migrants. Export thus encouraged interaction between local 
communities, yet at the same time it limited the overall level of internal trade and 
commercial integration within the Pirin kazas (and of Macedonia more generally). 
Even in terms of trade, local villages frequently traded their products directly to 
outside factors from Seres and Salonika rather than within a network of local 
trade. 
                                                
32 Katarjiev, 94. 
33 See Kunchov, 298; Gavrilova, 134-135. 
34 Kunchov, 297; see also Fikret Adanïr, “The National Question and the Genesis 
and Development of Socialism in the Ottoman Empire: the Case of Macedonia,” 
in Mene Tunçay and Erik Jan Zürcher, Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman 




 By the end of the nineteenth century, Pirin was thus a “fractured” region in 
administrative, ethnic and commercial terms. Local elites accepted the Bulgarian 
Vuzrazhdane in the nineteenth century not simply from the desire to unite into a 
larger national consciousness or for the movement’s promise of practical 
reforms. Rather, local elites used the Awakening to address conflicts within a 
district divided along confessional as well as ethnic lines. And the rise of such 
conflicts was a legacy of the history of the Ottoman state in the preceding 
century.   
 
Ottoman State Structure: The Legacies of Reform and Revolt 
 
 Bulgaria, like other Southeastern European countries, is a post-imperial 
state. The conquest of the medieval Bulgarian kingdoms in the late fourteenth 
century meant nearly five centuries of Ottoman rule. Indigenous histories present 
this period as “frozen history” in which Christians faced a static existence under 
the “turkso igo” or “Turkish Yoke.”35 As argued in Chapter One, the period of 
Ottoman rule produced a “usable past” which national movements drew upon 
extensively in the creation and shaping of identity. Ottoman imperial rule not only 
                                                
35 Leften Stavrianos advances the “frozen development” argument in The 
Balkans Since 1453 (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 13. Yet the 
Balkans were not “frozen.” Indigenous peoples during the Ottoman period saw 
economic, cultural and political development, and Ottoman rule itself became a 
crucial myth in indigenous history. “Frozen time” itself has a crucial symbolic role, 
allowing emergent national movements to stress a perceived cultural stasis, and 
thus continuity, between medieval empires and new, independent states since 
Ottoman occupation. See also Vera Mutafchieva, “The Notion of the Other: The 
Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy,” in Antonina Zhelyazkova, ed., Relations of 
Compatibility and Incompatibility Between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria 
(Sofia: International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations 




served in and of itself as a negative “Other,” but specific imperial problems and 
reforms shaped the conditions under which the Balkan national movements 
would arise.  
This chapter accordingly explores these conditions in light of how both 
Bulgarian and Macedonian historiography portray Ottoman rule. Both traditions 
argue for a nationally-based struggle against an oppressive Ottoman regime. 
While the emergence of national consciousness was central to the nineteenth 
century Awakening and armed resistance, the lengthy experience of autonomy 
and local identity in the Empire is equally important to understanding why it would 
be difficult for the Bulgarian central state to easily obtain control over local 
institutions in Pirin. In approaching the Ottoman Empire the emphasis here is on 
the historiographical traditions of secondary sources.   
 By the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire controlled Southeastern 
Europe as a centralized dynastic state in which the Sultan was able to personally 
direct an efficient military and administration. Practices such as timar estates — 
conquered land held by the Sultan and granted to his followers only temporarily 
for their support — helped the Sultan fund expansionary wars without losing 
control of a growing empire. Moreover, the Sultan’s centralized administration 
was not oppressive. Bulgarian boiars (nobles) were briefly retained as allies and 
vassals even after the conquest.36 In contrast to the conflicts between rival 
                                                
36 Halil Inalcik, Norman Itzkowitz and Colin Imber, trans., The Ottoman Empire: 
The Classical Age, 1300-1600 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 12-13, 14; 
Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 26; Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The 




Balkan kingdoms, the Empire promised stability, lower taxes, and allowed local 
elites to retain property and position.37 Ottoman policy did discriminate against 
Christian subjects. They were required to pay “poll taxes,” provide children under 
the dev!irme levy to supply the Janissary Corps,38 and were restricted from 
wearing certain fabrics, repairing or constructing churches, ringing church bells, 
or bearing arms.39 Such confessionally-based restrictions were, however, more 
tolerant than those of contemporary European states and frequent exemptions to 
restrictions (on church-building, for example), were granted. 
 The eighteenth century, however, revealed weaknesses within the state 
structure of the Empire and the central state began to lose control over the 
provinces. A series of wars with Austria and Russia resulted in large war debts; 
the defeats of 1699, 1718 and 1774 were particularly significant, resulting in the 
loss of large territories and the revenues from those territories. A series of weak 
sultans and viziers acquiesced to the decentralization of power: the Porte, finding 
its own tax system unable to cope with the costs of the wars, turned to “tax 
farming” and sold the rights to collect revenue. The ayans, provincial elites, 
parlayed tax farming into increased control over provincial administration — 
                                                
37 Imber, 186. In the long run, however, retaining position might require 
conversion to Islam.   
38 The dev!irme system “taxed” male children from Christian peasant families. 
These children were trained as soldiers and administrators for the Ottoman 
Empire and converted to Islam. The intent of the system was to provide the 
Sultan with a body of men drawn from outside established interests of the Muslim 
ruling class of the Empire.  
39 Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe (New York: 
Cambridge University press, 2002), 49; Dennis Hupchick, The Bulgarians in the 
Seventeenth Century: Slav Orthodox Society and Culture Under Ottoman Rule 





including local army garrisons. Provincial landowners among the ayans took 
similar advantage of weakened central authority to transform timar land holdings, 
originally granted only temporarily by the Sultan in return for service, into 
hereditary chiflik estates.
40
 At the local level, individuals were able to negotiate 
increased autonomy for villages, town quarters and sub-districts from 
Ottoman authorities. Such individuals gradually evolved a distinct local elite, 
referred to as chorbadzhiia in both Macedonian and Bulgarian historiography. 
The term translates literally as “providers of soup,” referring to their role in 
both charity and patronage.
41
 Drawn from both the Christian and Muslim 
population, the chorbadzhiia portrayed themselves as defenders of the 
peasant population while using their position to play local ayans and Ottoman 
officials against the authority of the central state.  
A weakened Ottoman state responded by recognizing the power of 
rebels against the Sultan and attempting to co-opt them into the 
administration, preferring a generally diminished presence in the provinces to 
open conflict and civil war.
42
 By the end of the eighteenth century, the loss of 
central power had grown great enough that the ayans could act as warlords. 
They fought private wars within the Empire’s borders, such as the conflict in the 
                                                
40 Goffman, 115-116; Leften Stavrianos, “Antecedents to the Balkan 
Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century,” Journal of Modern History 29:4 
(December 1957), 340. 
41 The term itself is Turkish and drawn from the Ottoman Janissary Corps, who 
used it to refer to officers. The soup-pot and the spoon were symbols of the 
Jannissaries.   
42 Karen Barkey, Bandits and Bureaucrats: the Ottoman Route to State 




Bulgarian lands between "smail Pasha of Seres and Osoman Pasvanto#lu in 
Vidin.43 The administrative weakness of the Porte was compounded by 
Ottoman economic decline in the eighteenth century. The Empire went from a 
position of rough equality in trade to an exporter of raw goods and an importer 




For the Bulgarian inhabitants of the Empire, the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century became known as the kurdzhaliistvo — the “time of 
the kurdzhali,” irregular Muslim soldiers who deserted from the Ottoman army 
and turned either to the service of the ayans or to banditry.
45
 Kurdzhali bands 
ravaged Bulgaria from the 1790s through the 1820s, with a few isolated 
groups persisting into the 1840s; and the Christian inhabitants of the Balkans, 
formally forbidden from bearing firearms, suffered particularly from the 
upheaval. Pirin’s trade connections diminished in this period, with much of the 
Christian Slav population retreating to the mountainous areas of the east. The 
failure of Ottoman Authorities to secure order led to growing popular 
                                                
43 Kemal Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History (Leiden: Brill, 
2002), 336-339; Halil "nalcik and Donald Quataert, eds., An Economic and Social 
History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994), 665-666; Trajan Stoianovich, “Land Tenure and Related Sectors of 
the Balkan Economy, 1600-1800,” Journal of Economic History 13:4 (1953), 400-
401. 
44 Kemal Karpat, “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 3 (1972), 245. 
45 Duncan M. Perry, Stefan Stambolov and the Emergence of Modern 
Bulgaria, 1870-1895 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 5. On the 
destruction of provincial order more broadly, see Peter Sugar, Southeastern 
Europe under Ottoman Rule, 1354-1804 (Seattle: University of Washington 




resentment towards the Sublime Porte by both Muslims and non-Muslims in 
the provinces. In the Balkan provinces of the Empire, the decline in the 
authority and prestige of the Porte helped fuel the resulting national 
awakenings. For the peasantry, economic stagnation, corruption and political 
discrimination increasingly characterized life in the Ottoman Balkan provinces. 
Outside of the towns, the Empire was unable to establish order.
46
 
By the early nineteenth century, for most of the Empire’s Balkan 
population, there was little sense of identification with the Sultan’s regime or 
loyalty to the Empire as a whole: rather, the Empire contained “disparate groups 
that were to a large degree self-centered and self-sufficient.”47 In these 
circumstances, provinces of the Empire could break away and form autonomous 
or independent states — as in the case of Serbia, Greece and Egypt in the 
1830s. Despite national historiographies, there was a distinct non-national 
character to these revolts. The Serbian Uprising of 1804 initially (if tactically) 
stressed that the revolutionaries were loyal to the Sultan and that it was in fact a 
revolt against corrupt local Janissary authorities of the pashalik of Belgrade, only 
later using the medieval Serbian state and independence as rallying symbols.48 
The Greek revolt saw the widespread participation by klephts (bandits) that cared 
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less for the formation of a Greek state than for the financial opportunity provided 
by a decade of continued unrest. There were clear continuities, too, between 
Ottoman and autonomous rule. Milo$ Obrenovi% ruled Serbia after 1815 in a 
fashion not dissimilar to the pashas who had ruled before him and served as the 
“Prince of Serbia,” a vassal of the Sultan. The independence of these regions 
signified extremes of the broad trend of autonomy throughout the Empire as 
much as a trend towards “national liberation” in the region. 
The Greek and Serbian cases demonstrated that successful revolution 
and independence from the Empire was possible. Over the nineteenth century 
national movements emerged in both states, gradually emerging to play 
prominent political roles in each state: the Na"ertanije of 1844 in Serbia and the 
Megali Idea in Greece. It required succeeding decades for a Serbian identity to 
take predominant hold over other internal rivalries and identities (such as the 
conflict in Serbia between the rival Karageorgevi% and Obrenovi% dynasties). 
While Greek preponderance in eighteenth-century Ottoman merchant shipping 
and the Orthodox Church had helped to forge common interests among 
commercial and intellectual elites, here a unifying national movement was also 
slow to emerge given local rivalries and significant regional differences.49 Not 
least among these was the fact that Greek dialects were not mutually intelligible. 
In the Bulgarian context, the importance of the Greek and Serbian national 
movements was initially as a model for national independence. By the later 
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nineteenth century, however, both had become rivals to the emergence of a 
separate Bulgarian movement. 
 
The Bulgarian National Awakening 
 
Bulgaria’s close proximity to the center of Ottoman power in Istanbul 
worked against the prospects of obtaining political autonomy in the early 
nineteenth century. Yet a Bulgarian national revival had arguably already begun, 
in a limited fashion, in the late eighteenth century.50 The Istoriia 
slavianobolgarskaiia of Paisii Hilendarski, a monk at Mount Athos (originally from 
Bansko in Pirin), exhorted Bulgarians in the 1760s to embrace their past. 
It is necessary and useful for you to know what is already known about the 
deeds of your fathers, just as all other tribes and peoples know their kin 
and their tongue, they have their history and every literate man knows, 
relates and is proud of his kin and tongue.51 
 
The disruptions of the kurdzhaliistvo limited the spread of any wider national 
movement in the late eighteenth century.52 The restoration of Ottoman authority 
over the 1820s to 1840s was crucial in creating relative stability — and creating 
the economic conditions to support a national movement. The destruction of the 
Janissary Corps and the creation of a new, regular army meant increased 
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security from bandits. It also meant a new market for Southeastern European 
producers of uniform cloth, foodstuffs and iron goods.53 Increased autonomy in 
Wallachia and Moldova in the 1850s further meant that Bulgarian grain received 
preferential treatment in supplying Istanbul.  
The result was the rise of a Bulgarian merchant class, the resulting profits 
used both to expand Bulgarian merchant colonies in cities such as Adrianople, 
Istanbul, Bucharest, Odessa and Smyrna and to begin proto-industrialization in 
the textile industry in upland central Bulgaria. By the mid-nineteenth century 
these centers were important enough in trade between the Ottoman Empire and 
Western Europe that foreign consular offices had been opened not only in 
Salonika, but in Monastir, Ruse, Varna, Burgas, Plovdiv and Sofia as well.54 But 
the rise of this merchant class spread unevenly; strongest in the central Balkan 
mountains, it was slower to emerge farther south and west where established 
Greek merchant communities already existed. In Pirin, the presence of the strong 
Turkish merchant community in Petrich and the Greek merchant community in 
Melnik hindered the rise of a local Slav merchant class.  
 It was in these rising commercial centers and in the Bulgarian merchant 
colony in Istanbul that the Awakening would emerge, as this “merchant class” 
was at the forefront of social changes. On a personal level, this group 
consciously adopted European social mores. One example is the increasing 
private adoption by the urban merchant class of European-style clothing rather 
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than traditional Bulgarian peasant garb of embroidered shirts and (for men) 
vests, loose pants, and a heavy belt or (for women) embroidered skirts.55 This 
group’s public role was, however, more important, as patrons and supporters of 
local education, churches and other aspects of urban life.56 Unlike previous 
schools, in which education had been conducted in Greek, these taught in the 
Bulgarian language. The first opened in Gabrovo in 1835, with the first Bulgarian-
language girl’s school following in 1840, in Pleven. By the 1870s, there were over 
2,000 schools within northern and central Bulgaria and eastern Rumelia, 
although these were often small with 10 to 50 students and a single teacher. A 
second teacher usually taught girls, since education remained segregated by 
sex. In Pirin the first such school opened in 1844 in Gorna Dzhumaia, teaching 
either in local Slav dialect or (later in the century) in the Bulgarian literary 
language based on eastern Bulgarian dialects. 
Even in post-Communist Bulgarian and Macedonian historiography, the 
Marxist framework still sees this period as a reaction to Ottoman “feudalism,” 
particularly the unequal economic conditions between the Christian and Muslim 
peoples in the Empire.57 Rather than constituting an economic rebellion against 
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the Ottoman Empire, however, Ottoman officials welcomed the rise of the 
chorbadzhiia as a Bulgarian commercial class and educated local elites.58 The 
chorbadzhiia served as potential allies in the ongoing reforms of the nineteenth 
century, particularly since the Ottomans promised reforms in the millet system 
(such as the proposed Hatt-i Hümayun of 1856) that would grant non-Muslims 
equal rights within the Empire. For the Porte, the emergence of a Bulgarian 
national movement served as a counterweight to the more substantial threat 
posed by expansionary Serbian and, particularly, Greek national movements. 
Each had begun by the mid-nineteenth century began to claim Ottoman territory 
on the basis of the perceived national consciousness of its inhabitants therein.  
 How was such a tactical alliance was possible? The Bulgarian Awakening 
was a reaction to the perceived dangers of cultural and religious Hellenization 
rather than to Ottoman political rule or economic conditions.59 The goal was to 
establish Bulgarian educational and religious institutions to counter the Greek 
ones already in place. Hildenarski’s work had focused on exactly this point as he 
exhorted “Bulgarians” to obtain a greater knowledge of a Bulgarian language and 
past:  
But there are those who do not like to know about their Bulgarian kin and 
turn to foreign culture and to foreign tongue and do not care for their 
Bulgarian tongue but learn how to read and speak Greek and feel 
ashamed to call themselves Bulgarians. O, you misshapen creature, 
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bereft of reason! Why are you ashamed to call yourself Bulgarian and do 
not read and speak your own language? 60 
 
Greeks predominated within the institutions and hierarchy of the Orthodox 
Christian millet.61 Although autocephalous Slavic-rite Orthodox hierarchies had 
been established in the medieval period, the last such hierarchy — the 
Archbishopric of Ohrid — had been dominated by Greek clergy since the time of 
Ottoman conquest, and was abolished in any case in 1767. By the early 
nineteenth century Greek ritual and liturgical language eclipsed traditional Slav 
rites and the use of Old Church Slavonic in churches throughout the Slav-
inhabited vilayets of the Empire.62 Similarly, Greek predominance in Ottoman 
trade made Greek the language of commercial communication. The emergence 
of a small independent Greece in 1830 raised the prospect of wider political 
claims within the Empire, particularly in the Macedonian lands. Pirin, with an 
established Greek community in Melnik and not far from the larger Greek 
population of the Aegean coastline, emerged as one of the cultural battlegrounds 
between proponents of rival Greek and Bulgarian national movements.  
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 The leaders of the Bulgarian National Awakening specifically warned of 
the dangers of Hellenization and argued against assimilation into a Greek 
national movement. It was in this context that Hilendarski wrote Istoriia 
slavianobolgarskaiia in the 1760s, calling for Bulgarians (unusual in using that 
term, bulgari, rather than a stress on Christian identity or on local identities) to 
take pride in a common historical and cultural heritage and, in particular, their 
Slav language.63 Bulgarian education became the cornerstone of a struggle 
between a largely Greek Orthodox Church and a growing Bulgarian commercial 
class over the role of education. Though Greek-language schools remained 
predominant, even increasing in number, many Orthodox Church schools taught 
at least some material in vernacular Bulgarian at the urging of local communities, 
and secular schools predominantly taught their classes in Bulgarian. By the 
1850s most sizeable Bulgarian communities north of the Balkan mountain range 
possessed a school of some sort. In addition, Bulgarian communities had begun 
by the late 1850s building chitalishta, “reading rooms.” They served not simply as 
libraries but in a broader sense as community education centers by providing 
access to meeting halls, theaters and newspapers. Pirin was part of this broad 
pattern as local elites began to support the construction of new churches and 
schools in the 1840s and 1850s. Such efforts demonstrate that the Slav 
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inhabitants of the region still maintained their own cultural autonomy under 
Ottoman rule.64  
 
The Bulgarian Exarchate 
 
The Awakening, as noted above, was concerned with the cultural 
reorganization of the Orthodox Church to serve the needs of a Bulgarian national 
movement. Domination of the Church by ethnic Greeks both created a vehicle for 
Hellenization and provided economic and political advantages to Greeks. The 
Hatt-i-Sherif proclamation of 1839 that launched the Tanzimat reforms promised 
a measure of equality between Muslims and Christians. The newly-educated 
Bulgarian elite interpreted the Hatt-i-Sherif as offering equality between the 
emerging Greek and Bulgarian national movements within the Orthodox millet.  
Such an interpretation suited not only those opposed to cultural 
Hellenization, but those protesting against the Church’s fiscal and political 
policies. The Phanariot65 domination of ecclesiastical positions in the Church and 
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the corresponding rise of corruption in obtaining positions in the hierarchy meant 
an increased tax burden on Orthodox laity. To recuperate the costs of the 
significant bribes required to initially secure positions, Orthodox clergy increased 
tithes and fees. By the 1820s Church tithes for Bulgarian peasants had risen up 
to twice the level of Ottoman taxation.66 A series of protests erupted sporadically 
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, stretching across the Slav-
inhabited vilayets of the Empire and including Pirin. Initially these were against 
the imposition of high fees by corrupt (Greek) bishops, but by the 1840s had 
come to be phrased as protests against the placement of ethnically Greek 
bishops in Bulgarian-inhabited dioceses.  
By the 1830s the monk Neofit Bozveli of Hilendar characterized Greeks 
as the enemies of the Empire’s Slav inhabitants.67 An active reform movement 
sought to obtain specific “rights” within the Orthodox Church, including the re-
adoption of a Slav liturgy for churches with an ethnically Slav congregation. 
Such reformers succeeded in obtaining a firman in 1849 to open an Orthodox 
church in Constantinople owned by the “Bulgarian nation.” The possibility had 
emerged for the leaders of the National Awakening of securing a Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church through the Sublime Porte. Recent recognition of an Armenian 
Orthodox millet and Protestant Christian millet within the Empire demonstrated 
the willingness of the Ottoman government to reform the existing millet system. 
Considerable internal opposition existed. Much of the Bulgarian clergy might 
oppose Greek dominance of the Church but preferred to hope for internal reform 
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— a faction that included two of the existing four self-professed ethnically 
Bulgarian bishops created by the Patriarch, as well as the head of Rila 
Monastery.68  
The Patriarchate’s refusal to allow further reforms, however, led to an 
open breach between the Patriarch and a growing number of the Slav-inhabited 
diocese in 1860.  By the end of the decade, several Greek bishops had been 
forcibly removed from their sees by their flocks. In 1870 the Porte recognized that 
these divisions could not be easily overcome. Accordingly, overriding the 
objections of the Orthodox Church, the Porte issued a firman in 1870 recognizing 
a Bulgarian Exarchate Church. The Exarchate would remain affiliated (and 
nominally subservient) to the existing Patriarchate. But the firman proposed to 
grant it authority over seventeen dioceses (subsequently reduced to fifteen). 
Chiefly located in the two Bulgarian vilayets of Tuna and Rumelia, the proposed 
transfer would have included Ruse, Silistra, Shumen, Turnovo, Sofia, Vratsa, 
Lovech, Vidin, Nish, Pirot, Kiustendil, Samokov, Veles (in the vilayet of Kosovo), 
plus the non-municipal parts of Varna, Sliven, Sozopol and Plovdiv.69  Antim I 
was designated as the Exarch in March 1872, and promptly declared 
independence from the Orthodox Church of the Patriarch of Constantinople. The 
Patriarchate in turn declared the Exarchate schismatic and broke ties.70 Pirin 
was, however, excluded from the territory of the new Exarchate Church — as 
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Veles was one of the dioceses not transferred, no Macedonian territory would be 
initially included.  
The firman allowed for an additional compromise. If two-thirds of the 
Orthodox Christians in a diocese wished to move from the Patriarchate to the 
Exarchate, the Sublime Porte would grant the transfer.71 Pirin, directly adjacent to 
the new Exarchate diocese in Kiustendil, would see early and consistent 
attempts by the new Bulgarian church to spread its influence, complementing the 
existing efforts of the National Awakening. 
 
The Bulgarian Awakening and the Exarchate in Pirin 
 
 Pirin was part of a broad borderland between predominantly-Slav and 
predominantly-Greek inhabited territories, and the threat of Hellenization was 
well-recognized locally. But local elites also recognized the dilemma of how local 
inhabitants were — or should be — distinguished from a Bulgarian movement 
that was in some ways “foreign” to local inhabitants, being centered on the 
eastern regions of Bulgaria.72 For the Slav population of Ottoman Macedonia, the 
Bulgarian national movement was both inclusive and exclusive. Inclusive, in that 
local intellectuals took part in this broader Bulgarian cultural renaissance. And 
yet, of the 191 individuals that Thomas Meininger records as the “elite” members 
of an emerging “Bulgarian intelligentsia” over the 1840s to 1870s, only six were 
from Vardar Macedonia, four from Aegean Macedonia, and nine from Western 
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Bulgarian regions (including Pirin Macedonia).73 The National Awakening drew 
disproportionately from eastern Bulgaria in defining a Bulgarian national 
consciousness and creating a codified vernacular language. The result was a 
sporadic and uneven emphasis, in both geographic Macedonia and in western 
Bulgaria, on encouraging local dialect and cultural expression. In the 1860s, for 
example, writers originating from western Bulgaria championed a rival literary 
language based on western dialects.  
Although few hailing from Ottoman Macedonia were included among this 
“cultural elite,” the expansion of schools in the region resulted in the healthy 
growth of a local educated elite. Of the leaders of the late-nineteenth century 
national movement in Macedonia, about 80 percent were native to the region (the 
rest generally hailing from Eastern Rumelia), predominantly from towns in the 
Monastir vilayet.74 Pirin was unusual within Ottoman Macedonia since over 80 
percent of the local leaders of the national movement in the Seres sanjak were 
born in villages.75 As in central and northern Bulgaria, schools were opened and 
extended in the Macedonian lands beginning in the 1840s, as noted in Table 3.76 
By 1876, there were a total of 55 Slavic-language schools in the Pirin kazas, with 
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62 teachers and 2,575 registered students. Notably, these schools were 
concentrated in the two eastern kazas, which possessed 33 of these schools, 46 
of the teachers and 1,735 of the students.77  
 
Table 3: 
Church and School Construction in Pirin Towns78 
 Church Construction School construction 
Bansko 1804, 1835, 1862 1857 
Gorna Dzhumaia 1840-44, 1860 1844, 1850, 1854, 1863 
Melnik 1756, 1846, 1869 1872 
Nevrokop 1811, 1865 1847,1853, 1862 
Petrich 1857, 1868 1873 
Razlog 1834 1858, 1870 
 
By the turn of the century in the combined Seres sanjak there were 184 
Bulgarian schools (with a recorded 7,718 students), and an additional 122 
Bulgarian schools (7,621 students) in the other sanjaks of the Selânik vilayet. 
This fell well short of the larger number of Greek schools with a recorded 34,044 
students in the vilayet as a whole.79 Greek-language education continued to 
predominate not only among ethnic Greeks, but among a considerable number of 
the local Slav population. 
The Greek schools highlight the divisive nature of the Awakening in Pirin. 
Slavs were a minority in the ethnically-diverse towns of Pirin. Most of the towns in 
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the region lacked an urban and prosperous class of chorbadzhiia to support 
education in either local dialects or in literary Bulgarian, Razlog and Bansko 
being significant exceptions but small in size. Greek Orthodox hierarchy, both at 
the local level and among their superiors in the provincial centers of Seres and 
Salonika, opposed the opening of such schools and reading rooms.80 In the 
1860s, for example, the opening of a new Bulgarian-language school in 
Nevrokop met with the open opposition of local Greek clergy and community 
figures.81 Such conflict spurred the increased use of local dialects in education 
and religion.82 Unlike more prosperous parts of Ottoman Macedonia, however, 
the Pirin kazas generally required support and assistance in founding schools 
and churches. Such aid was forthcoming from the prosperous upland central 
Bulgarian towns and merchant colonies, but these areas favored an emerging 
eastern dialect of Bulgarian. The resulting dilemma was whether to insist upon 
local vernacular in education and religious life, or to accept the influence of the 
coalescing Bulgarian literary language.83  
Inter-ethnic divisions were one problem; but the Vuzrazhdane posed intra-
ethnic divisions as well. The Awakening increasingly championed a codified, 
literary Bulgarian language in place of existing dialects, and one that served to 
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exclude local language by stressing eastern dialectical forms over those typical 
of western Bulgaria. Moreover, the emergence of the Exarchate and its relations 
with the Bulgarian state after 1878 led to more widespread attempts to 
encourage a Bulgarian national consciousness after independence.84 Local 
educated elites in Pirin and across Macedonia accordingly challenged the 
direction of the new Bulgarian literary language. Such “localist” feelings were a 
common feature of the Awakening, as many localities (in the Bulgarian lands as 
well as in Macedonia) sought to preserve local particularities of speech.85  
What set the western dialects apart was a more active challenge to the 
emerging literary language. Some, such as the Mladinov brothers in the 1850s, 
encouraged a Bulgarian literary language that would draw upon both eastern and 
western dialects. Others, such as Krste Missirkov (albeit inconsistently) 
championed a separate Macedonian language.86 Such efforts would see the 
publishing of several grammatical textbooks based on Macedonian dialects in the 
1850s and 1860s.87 The issue was significant enough to result in active desires 
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for autonomy from the emerging Bulgarian literary language. In the Pirin town of 
Bansko for example, there were open protests in the 1880s that school textbooks 
were in the literary language rather than western dialects.88 Slavic-speaking 
Orthodox Church officials from the region made similar protests that decade 
against the use of vernacular Bulgarian rather than local dialect in administrative 
duties.89 A small but active “Macedonian movement” arose which actively 
opposed some aspects of a Bulgarian Awakening and encouraged local literary 
expression defined in opposition to Bulgarian styles.90   
The potential conflict between “local” and “external” factions in the 
Awakening was complicated by the fact that educated elites originating in 
Macedonia often traveled abroad for education and then remained there, in part 
because job opportunities in Macedonia remained limited. Debates over Pirin’s 
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University of Ss. Kiril and Metodij, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of History 
and Institute for National History, Documents of the Macedonian People for 
Independence and a Nation-State, Vol 1, Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, ed. (Skopje: 
Kultura, Makedonska Kniiga, Medunarodna Politika & Misla, 1985), 237-242; see 





role in a Bulgarian nation often took place between individuals residing in 
Bulgaria, particularly after 1878; increasingly, the cultural movement of the 
Awakening was equated with a political movement. The Macedonian émigré 
population in Bulgaria began to play a key role in promoting an inclusive concept 
of Macedonia within Bulgarian political and cultural circles. Forty-three 
Macedonian émigré associations were founded within Bulgaria, nearly all of 
which addressed the question of Macedonian liberation from Ottoman rule in 
some form.91 Macedonians were greatly overrepresented in certain circles; not 
only did over a quarter of Sofia’s population by 1900 originate from Macedonia, 
but so did 33 percent of military officers, 43 percent of government civil servants, 
and 37 percent of ordained priests.92 This disproportionately large group 
composed a forceful and vocal presence within Bulgaria, generally advocating 
the liberation and inclusion of Ottoman Macedonia into a greater Bulgaria. The 
question, thus, became one of whether or not Macedonia would be 
“incorporated” into a centralizing Bulgarian identity, or whether or not distinct 
Macedonian elements would be incorporated into a broader concept of 
“Bulgarianness.” To existing divisive tensions within Pirin, as for Macedonia in 
general, were added potential rivalries between local elites in Pirin and elites 
among its corresponding émigré community in Bulgaria. These rivalries would 
emerge, already in the later nineteenth century, into open conflict between local 
                                                
91 Perry, Politics of Terror, 172.  





and émigré partisans of separate paramilitary movements, as discussed in 
Chapter Three.   
 The creation of the Exarchate began the transformation of the 
Vuzrazhdane in Macedonia from an locally-oriented and autonomous “national 
movement” to one that was increasingly centrally-directed, first from Istanbul by 
the Exarchate, later from Sofia. School and church construction in the 1840s and 
1850s had generally been at the behest of local elites. This changed when the 
firman of 1870 held out the apparent promise by the Porte of the creation of a 
Bulgarian Orthodox millet within the Empire. As such, while the local use of Slav 
dialects in education and Old Church Slavonic as a liturgical language continued 
to reflect the Awakening as a cultural movement,93 they also provided potential 
support for future political claims to administration over Macedonia. Increasingly, 
local and “foreign” Bulgarian intelligentsia sought to use the church as part of a 
“battle for national sovereignty.”94 In Pirin, the turn to the Exarchate Church and 
increased acceptance of Bulgarian-language schooling was part of a local 
contest for control of the district by local Christian Slav inhabitants in the face of 
dominant Greek and Turkish interests in the towns. The Church itself, backed by 
the Bulgarian state after 1878, sought to extend its influence to incorporate the 
region into its own sphere of control. 
                                                
93 For example, “Dopiska ot Bitolsko,” July 1, 1863, original in Gayda, 
Constantinople, August 10, 1863 [Julian], in Kosev, 200-202. 
94 Yosmao#lu-Turner, 205. These boundaries could be and were crossed over, 
however. Some educated elites in Pirin favored the creation of a Bulgarian 
church and supported its creation in 1870. See Zina Markova, 
“Tsurkovnonatsionalno dvizhenie v iztochna Makedoniia prez 70-te godini na XIX 




The decades following 1878 accordingly witnessed a conflict between 
competing Exarchist and Patriarchist claims to churches in the Macedonian 
vilayets, as local Orthodox populations were encouraged to to take up the church 
issue as part of local disputes. In the 1870s, for example, the kazas of Nevrokop 
and (Greek-dominated) Melnik were split over the desire of local churches to join 
— or exclude — the Exarchate.95 In 1878 in reaction to the creation of an 
independent Bulgaria, the Patriarchate Metropolian  of Melnik was created to 
restore Patriarchal and Greek influence over local churches and schools and 
claimed spiritual leadership over the whole of Pirin.96 Although such conflicts 
were often based on ethnic lines, a considerable number of Slavs remained 
within or reverted to the Patriarchate despite calls for Bulgarian national unity.97 
Such struggles were often bitter at the local level, given that most villages 
possessed only a single church, and both the Exarchate and Patriarchate 
preferred to deny the use of churches under their control for use in rival rites. The 
local Patriarchate hierarchy almost immediately resisted calls within Pirin for the 
building of Slavic-rite churches. In response, local Slav elites called for elections 
to transfer Pirin’s dioceses to the Exarchate Church.98 
The emergence of Bulgaria as an independent state in 1878 complicated 
such local conflicts, as did a shift by Ottoman authorities to favor the Patriarchate 
                                                
95 “Pismo ot Stefan Verkovich,” Nov 12, 1872 in Kosev, 275-276. 
96 Sharkov, 138. Although the Razlog and Gorna Dzhumaia kazas were initially 
excluded, the Metropolitan subsequently and successfully lobbied to have them 
included under his authority. The Nevrokop kaza was placed under the 
Patriarchate Metropolitan of Drama.  
97 See Yosmao#lu-Turner, 147-205. 




against the Bulgarian Exarchate. Conflict intensified in 1890, when Skopje and 
Ohrid were both formally transferred to the Exarchate. The Patriarch ordered 
existing clergy to stop performing services in these dioceses and extended the 
order to other dioceses — including those within Pirin (and the sanjak of Seres 
as a whole). Churches were reopened in Pirin only when the Metropolitan in 
Melnik guaranteed that local churches would not use a “Bulgarian rite.”99 Such 
local conflicts were exacerbated when Nevrokop (in Pirin) and Veles (in the 
Kosovo vilayet, or Vardar Macedonia) were transferred to the Exarchate in 1894 
and Monastir, Strumitsa and Debar in 1898.100 By the end of the century, the 
conflict over the Church had resulted in active ethnic tensions, even sporadic 
physical violence between ethnic Greeks and Bulgarians.101  
 
Culture, Religion and Politics 
 
For the chorbadzhiia, the basis of their power lay in some degree of 
compliance with the Ottoman market and, thence, the Ottoman authorities. While 
this group was crucial in supporting and funding the early National Awakening, 
defining the movement along political lines was problematic in threatening the 
status quo (and thus the socio-economic position of the chorbadzhiia).102 It 
accordingly remained a cultural movement until the latter nineteenth century, 
when new educated elite produced by the schools of the National Awakening 
                                                
99 Yosmao#lu-Turner, 156. 
100 J M. Wagstaff, Greece: Ethnicity and Sovereignty, 1820-1994: Atlas and 
Documents (London: Archive Editions Limited, 2002), 21. 
101 Yosmao#lu-Turner, 157-158; 169. 
102 For a recent and revisionist approach to the chorbazhiia, see Milen Petrov, 
Tanzimat for the Countryside: Midhat Pasha and the Vilayet of Danube, 1864-




assumed leadership over the Awakening. This group comprised the core of a 
new nationalist movement who rejected an Ottoman state that they saw as 
outmoded and foreign. They sought instead to create a new Bulgarian state and 
national discourse, and succeeded in 1878 with the successful creation of an 
autonomous state. Failing to incorporate the furthest possible borders defining a 
Bulgarian nation — the boundaries of the Treaty of San Stefano — Bulgarian 
cultural elites consistently sought to spread the Awakening beyond these new 
borders and incorporate the “lost lands.” Local elites in turn accepted and 
supported the Awakening for their own purposes.  
Until the 1890s, these two groups were broadly willing to cooperate 
together in a “cultural awakening” within Pirin. So, do, did their rivals in the 
Patriarchist Orthodox Church. While disputes did emerge between ethnic groups, 
they were rarely violent and Pirin saw little ethnic conflict.103 This quiet was 
shattered in the 1890s, when a new generation of educated youth emerged, 
frustrated with the limited social progress available to them in the region, and 
with their own potential prospects for advancement.104 The result was a decisive 
shift away from the cultural and religious focus of the Vuzrazhdane — and a turn 
to politics, and to paramilitary violence.  
                                                
103 Krustio Manchev, Istoriiia na balkanskite narodi, XIX-XX V. (Sofia: 
Akeademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1999), 89.  







The Macedonian Revolutionary Organizations, 1893-1912 
 
“Great nations build from the bones of the dead; 
  With mud and straw, blood and sweat.” 
  — David Mustaine1 
 
  
On August 15, 1903, a revolt against the Ottoman Empire erupted within 
the vilayet of Monastir.2 Within four days, open conflict between local guerillas 
and Ottoman forces spread to the vilayets of Salonika and Edirne (Adrianople).3 
The rebels proclaimed that: 
Finally the long expected day of settling our account with our age-old 
enemy has come. … The appointed day on which the people throughout 
Macedonia and Odrin will face openly, with arms in hand the enemy…4 
 
                                                
1David Mustaine and David Ellefson, “Architecture of Aggression,” Countdown to 
Extinction, Capitol, 1992.  
2 The Bulgarian Exarchate Church and government only switched from the Julian 
`to the Gregorian calendar in 1916; on the Bulgarian calendar, the Ilinden 
Uprising took place on August 2, and the parallel Preobrazhenie uprising in 
August 6. The names derive from the holidays they fell on: St. Elijah’s Day 
(Ilinden, in Bulgarian), and the Feast of the Resurrection (Preobrazhenie). 
Bulgarian historiography emphasizes the term “Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising” 
to stress a Bulgarian national character to events otherwise geographically-
dispersed. Macedonian historiography conversely exclusively uses the term 
“Ilinden Uprising,” casting the revolt as a local and distinct event. 
3 Given the large Turkish garrison stationed in the vilayet of Kosovo and the 
limited support for the uprising (chiefly in the Skopje sanjak), the revolutionaries 
had previously decided not to attempt a simultaneous revolt there as well. 
4 “Vuzvanie na glavniia shtab v Bitolskiia revoliutsionen okrug, s koeto se 
provuzglasiava Ilindenskoto vustanie,” July 15, 1903 [Julian], in Dimitur Kosev, 
Hristo Hristov, Nikolai Todorov and Valentin Stankov, eds., Makedoniia: Sbornik 
ot dokumenti i materiali (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata akedameiia na 
naukite), 461-462. 
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The stated goal was to achieve autonomy and local government for the entire 
population of the Macedonian vilayets, but the expected popular uprising failed to 
materialize. According to the records of the revolutionaries, over 26,000 guerillas 
took part in the Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising, the majority (nearly 20,000) in 
the Monastir vilayet.5 These considerable numbers were chiefly drawn from the 
two major Slav paramilitary organizations present in the region.6  
 In the subsequent fighting, the rebels dynamited railways, rail depots, 
telephone and telegraph lines and bridges. Rebel cheti (armed bands) engaged 
local Ottoman army detachments. Although the rebels proclaimed that the 
Uprising was on behalf of all peoples living in Macedonia, cheti also attacked 
Muslim civilians, with thousands fleeing from areas of fighting.  In several Slav-
inhabited areas, such as the Giavato nahiye (in the sanjak of Monastir) and 
Demir Hisar nahiye (in the sanjak of Ohrid), the rebels were able to seize local 
garrisons, eject Ottoman troops and declare an end to Ottoman rule. The most 
renowned success was the Krushevo Republic, which declared outright 
independence and for ten days functioned as its own local government.7 Within 
                                                
5 Bulgarian historiography emphasizes the term “Ilinden-Preobrazhenie Uprising,” 
which highlights the simultaneous uprisings in Macedonia and Thrace. 
Macedonian historiography prefers “Ilinden Uprising,” which emphasizes a 
distinctly Macedonian event. Here, I use the former to refer to the combined 
uprising, and the latter to refer to only that part of the uprising fought in 
Macedonia.  
6 Duncan Perry, The Politics of Terror (Durham: Duke University Press, 1988), 
139. There remains some disagreement over precise figures; 26,500 is given for 
total participation by Todor Petrov, Nelegalnata armiia na VMORO v Makedoniia 
I Odrinsko, 1899-1908 (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2002), 76. 
7 For Krushevo, see Ljuben Lape, “the Krushevo republic,” Macedonian Review 
3:1 (1973). The Krushevo Republic symbolizes the Ilinden Uprising in both 
Bulgarian and particularly Macedonian historiography, despite the fact that the 
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Pirin, fighting broke out across all five of the kazas, but most intensely in the east 
with its predominantly Slav rural and urban population. To the south of Nevrokop, 
telegraph lines were cut and the rebels attacked the Ottoman garrisons in the 
villages of Obidim and Kremen. The Razlog kaza was the scene of particularly 
intense fighting, with nearly a dozen villages declaring for the Uprising.8 
 Within weeks however, Ottoman authorities regained control over the 
province. The rebels fought 239 separate engagements with Ottoman regular 
troops and provincial militia but were increasingly hampered by the 70,000 
refugees (often including neighbors and families) who clogged the roads and 
required protection from Ottoman irregulars, who now sought retribution for 
earlier attacks against Muslim civilians.9 Tens of thousands were displaced when 
Ottoman militia and irregular forces unleashed reprisals directly on villages 
suspected of aiding the rebels: crops and livestock were requisitioned, houses 
and other structures burned.10 Thirty thousand fled to Bulgaria in the weeks after 
                                                                                                                                            
uprising in the village of Klisura was actually more successful, staying in rebel 
hands for some three weeks: Lape, 25. For an analysis of Krushevo’s symbolic 
importance, see Keith Brown, The Past in Question (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), 181-210. 
8 Kostadin Paleshutski, “Ilindensko-Preobrazhenskoto vustanie v serskiia 
revoliutsionen okrug,” Istoricheski Pregled 39:3 (1983), 3-13; Veselin 
Hadzhinikolov, Konstantin Pandev, Iordan Shopov, Georgi Dimitrov, Kostadin 
Paleshutski, Krum Vodenicharov, Liubomir Panaiotov, Stoian Germanov and 
Petur Galchin, eds., Istoriia na Blagoevgradskata okruzhna organizatsiia na BKP 
(Sofia: Partizdat, 1979), 31; Petrov, 65; Ivan Katarjiev, Borba do pobeda (Skopje: 
Misla, 1983), 575-594.  
9 Perry, ibid, 135, 137; Fikret  Adanir, Die Makedonische Frage: Ihre Entstehung 
und Entwicklung bis 1908 (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1979), 179-199.  
10 Krste Bitoski, “The Course of the Ilinden Uprising,” in Borish Vishinski, ed., The 
Epic of Ilinden (Skopje: Macedonian review Editions, 1973), 103; see also “Pismo 
no 534 na glavniia shtab na vtori makedono-odrinski revoliutsionen okrug do 
bulgarskoto pravitelstvo vuv vruzka s polozhenieto na vustanaloto naselenie I 
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the Uprising began. By the end of September, when both fighting and reprisals 
tapered off, in Pirin alone the losses by local Slav inhabitants included 1,090 
houses burned, 290 killed, 50 incidents of rape reported, and 5,772 left as 
refugees.11 In the Razlog kaza, where the fighting in Pirin had reached its highest 
intensity, the villages of Belitsa, Odibim, Kremen, Mehomia and Bachevo were 
completely destroyed.12   
 In less than a generation, what had been a movement encouraging a 
generally cultural mobilization had been superceded by new, revolutionary 
organizations that sought to mobilize militarily the Macedonian vilayets and 
overthrow Ottoman rule within them. This was to be a new, transformative phase 
in the formation of national consciousness, still short of the further phase of state-
building already present in Bulgaria as well as Serbia, Greece and Romania. The 
existing tensions between locally- and externally-directed national mobilizations 
in Pirin would culminate with the creation of rival paramilitary movements and the 
beginning of outright guerilla warfare with Ottoman authorities — as well as 
between and within these paramilitary organizations. 
 
The Forge of Guerilla Resistance 
 The concept of a “common struggle” is a standard device in nationalist 
rhetoric. The French Revolution set the pattern by labeling inter-state conflicts as 
                                                                                                                                            
iskane na pomosht ot strana na Bulgariia,” September 9, 1903 [Julian] in Kosev, 
489-495. 
11 Katarjiev, 593. Figures for Muslim victims in the fighting are not given in 
Macedonia or Bulgarian histories of the Uprising.  
12 ‘Deklaratsiia na bezhantsite ot Razlozhko do okoliiskiia upravitel v Samokov po 
povod pokanata da se vurnat v rodnite si mesta,” September 28, 1903 [Julian] in 
Kosev, 496.  
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national conflicts and using the army as a vehicle for promoting not just a 
revolutionary but also a national consciousness.13 Conflict itself can serve as an 
integrative vehicle for an ethnie, encouraging a “military mobilization” that unites 
all members in the service of the war.  Warfare serves as a rallying point for 
national consciousness in creating a duality of “us” and “the other” (e.g., “the 
enemy”), a duality that can bolster the “us” and “the other” of national 
consciousness.14 This underlies Anthony Smith’s attention to the nationalizing 
capacity of  “military mobilization” as outlined in Chapter One. From 1893-1912 
the practical and symbolic role of paramilitary organizations defining themselves 
variably as Bulgarian in national terms or Macedonian in geographic terms 
served as a vehicle to spread national consciousness in Pirin.15 
 Yet it also served as a point of conflict between proponents of 
centralization and autonomy. Military conflict by the nineteenth century had 
largely become a “monopoly of violence” that reserved armed force to the sole 
purview of the central state. It could thus be legitimately employed only by a 
central state authority as opposed to medieval and early modern “intra-state” 
                                                
13 Charles Tilly, “The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere,” in 
International Review of Social History: Supplement 3, Citizenship, Identity and 
Social History 40 (1995), 229. 
14 See Gerald F. Linderman, The World Within War: The American Experience in 
World War II (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), particularly pages 
263-344; David Grossman, On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill 
in War and Society (Boston: Back Bay Books: 1996), 149-155. 
15 For an introduction to focused studies, see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic 
Origins of Nations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 157-161; idem., “War and 
Ethnicity: the Role of Warfare in the Formation, Self-images and Cohesion of 
Ethnic Communities,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 4:2 (October 1981), 375-397; for 
a broad perspective on the impact of nationalism on conflict, see Barry Posen, 
“Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power,” International Security 18:2 
(1993), 80-124.  
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conflicts waged or organized by members of the aristocracy, towns, religious 
confessions or by mercenaries.16 The “national” aspect of conflict was thus 
increasingly affiliated with a state, and this correlation began to emerge in 
Macedonia as well. Macedonian paramilitary forces were defended as protecting 
the local ethnic Bulgarian population against first an Ottoman threat, later against 
rival ethnic Greek and Serbian guerillas. The rebels justified the Ilinden Uprising 
as creating a Macedonian state, though the ultimate form — independent, united 
with Bulgaria or remaining autonomous in the Ottoman Empire remained unclear 
and controversial, as is discussed below. 
 Historians have argued that demands to unify “state” with “nation” in post-
eighteenth century Europe thus recast warfare and conflict along national terms. 
The creation of a modern military, as noted in Chapter One, could serve as a 
vehicle for cultural assimilation and nation-reification by creating or reinforcing 
national consciousness among the male population through universal 
conscription.17 Similarly, the experience itself of conflict, both on and off the 
battlefield, has been suggested as crucial in the creation of both actual 
experiences and in symbolic narratives that define identity.18 France’s 
                                                
16 See Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, 990-1992 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992); Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992,” 
Theory and Society 23:1 (February 1994), 131-146; and William McNeill, The 
Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society since A.D. 1000 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).  
17 Eugene Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 
1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 292-302. 
18 For accounts of the role war plays in the shaping of identity, see Amir Weiner, 
Making Sense of War: the Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik 
Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002); Peter Fritzsche, 
Germans into Nazis (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 11-82; and 
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revolutionary experience of the “nation at arms” represented the conflation 
between the nation and the state in wartime, and the role of warfare in solidifying 
the concept of the “nation.” This would deepen further in the twentieth century, 
when the logic of total war expanded to include the entirety of the nation’s 
economic resources and every factory worker and farmer ultimately served to 
drive the wartime economy. The entire population of the state would thus be 
drawn upon in the pursuit of the state’s wars, creating a sense of national 
equality and unity. 
 The rise of paramilitary violence in Pirin, however, drew more on bandit 
traditions than on a modern leveé en masse. The distinction between early 
modern and modern warfare was less sharp in Southeastern Europe. The fight of 
cheti (armed bands) against the Ottoman Empire was in many ways an extension 
of the haiduk (bandit) tradition, in which the experience of combat was local and 
personal, “autonomous” from the emerging modern state structures in 
Southeastern Europe.19 As such, the paramilitary mobilization of 1893-1912 was 
as much a divisive experience as an integrative one. The forces of the Bulgarian 
state would not fight in this Macedonian struggle. Instead, independent armed 
groups predominated with certain groups receiving sporadic support by the 
government in Sofia, as detailed below.  
                                                                                                                                            
Avner Ben-Amos, “War Commemoration and the Formation of Israeli National 
Identity,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 31:2 (Winter 2003), 171-195.  
19 The link is consciously evoked in national historiographies. See, for example, 
Nedelcho Dimitrov, Pirinski Haiduti (Blagoevgrad: Okruzhen istoricheski muzei, 
1972).  
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 While many of the local cheti formed in the course of this paramilitary 
struggle served alongside the forces of the Bulgarian state in the wars after 1912, 
the state did not obtain control in a simple, linear process. Émigrés from Ottoman 
Macedonia residing in Bulgaria were eager to harness state power to carry out 
revolution in the Macedonian vilayets — a potential “monopolization of violence” 
that neither haiduti or revolutionary leaders in the provinces necessarily 
welcomed. Already before the Ilinden Uprising, rivalries emerged between 
guerilla factions that supported inclusion into a larger, Bulgarian state — and 
those who favored retaining local autonomy. Over 1893-1912, the result was an 
active attempt by both factions to mobilize support within the region — and to 
frame this “common struggle” within a narrative of national consciousness, if yet 
not fully defined. 
 
The 1890s Generation and the Politicization of the Cultural Awakening  
 
 The events of 1877-78 transformed the nature of the Bulgarian Awakening 
in the Macedonian lands. Russian victory in the war with the Ottoman Empire 
resulted in the creation of an autonomous Principality of Bulgaria — technically 
part of the Ottoman Empire, but effectively an independent state.20 The new state 
encompassed only part of the “Bulgarian lands” given the opposition of rival 
Great Powers to the creation of a powerful Russian “client state” in Southeastern 
Europe. The final borders excluded extensive territories in Eastern Rumelia, 
Thrace and Macedonia, although Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin specified that 
                                                
20 Yet one whose administration was overseen by Russian advisors for almost 
ten years after its foundation. I am indebted to Ilya Vinkovetsky for discussions 
on this subject from his currently published research. 
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the Ottoman Empire must provide for improved conditions and local autonomy in 
these respective vilayets.21 Pirin now bordered on the Principality of Bulgaria, but 
it was not included within the new Bulgarian state, nor was any territory from the 
vilayets. 
 The inhabitants of Pirin felt the effects of exclusion all the more keenly 
given that Russian troops briefly occupied northern Pirin during the war. They 
displaced Turkish rule from parts of the Gorna Dzhumaia and Razlog kazas and 
created expectations of the region’s inclusion in a new state. The withdrawal to 
Bulgaria’s Treaty of Berlin borders in 1878 sparked the short-lived Kresna and 
Razlog Uprisings (the former named for the rebel stronghold in the narrow gorge 
along the Struma River, south of Gorna Dzhumaia).22 Ottoman authorities quickly 
                                                
21 See Richard J. Crampton, Bulgaria 1878-1918. A History (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983), 20-24, for a summary of the diplomatic dispute. The 
expectation that the Macedonia vilayets would be speedily incorporated into the 
new state is highlighted by the fact that the region elected delegates to the initial 
Bulgarian constitutional convention in 1879. See “Pulnomoshtno na bulgari ot 
Makedoniia za uchastie v Uchreditelnoto subranie na Kniazhestvoto,” February 
13, 1879, in Kosev, 358-359.  
San Stefano is generally represented in Bulgarian historiography as a defeat for 
a chance for “national unity,” and in Macedonian historiography as an attempt at 
“foreign and alien [Bulgarian] rule” over Macedonia. For a Bulgarian perspective, 
see Elena Statelova, “Politika na Kniazhestvo Bulgariia i Iztochna Rumeliia po 
natsionalniia vupros i dvizehnieto za obedinenie na bulgarskite zemi,” in 
Nationsonalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na makedonskite i trakiiskite bulgari, 
1878-1944: Tom Purvi, Borbi za zapazvane na edinstvoto na Bulgarskata natsiia 
(Sofia: Makedonski Nauchen instititut and Institut po istori pri BAN, 1994), 90-93. 
For a Macedonian perspective, see Mihailo Apostolski, Velikobugarske pretenzije 
od San Stefana do danas (Beograd: Vuk Karadic, 1978); and Jovan Pavlovski 
and Mishel Pavlovski, Macedonia: Yesterday and Today (Skopje: Mi-An 
Publishing, 1998). My thanks to Nadja Duha!ek for her assistance with the 
Serbian-language Apostolski text. 
22 On the Kresna Uprising, see Katarjiev, Borba do pobeda, 7-9. On the Razlog 
Uprising, see See “Apel na Privremennoto bulgarsko upravlenie, izdaden na Pirin 
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suppressed this rare turn to violence, with many of the participants from Gorna 
Dzhumaia fleeing across the border and settling in the town of Dupnitsa within 
Bulgaria.23 The failure of the uprising contrasted with the apparent gains of the 
ongoing cultural and religious mobilization which are discussed in Chapter Two, 
seemed to improve the lot of local inhabitants through the building of churches 
and schools. Armed revolt, on the other hand, resulted in thousands of local 
inhabitants being left homeless and fleeing across the border to the new state.24 
 The Berlin Congress of 1878 thus recast the “Eastern Question” — what 
would be the fate of the Ottoman Empire? — into the “Macedonian Question,” the 
key Ottoman territory left in Europe. As expressed by Duncan Perry, this breaks 
down further into three related questions: “What territory constituted Macedonia? 
To what states did it belong? And of what nationality were the peoples of that 
land?”25 For a Bulgarian state that believed its own existence answered each of 
these questions, the Treaty of Berlin proved far from popular. Regaining the “lost 
lands” of San Stefano became a cause célèbre for local and émigré Macedonian 
and Thracian groups — such as the Pirin refugees who settled in Dupnitsa — 
                                                                                                                                            
planina, do bulgarite i slavianite da podpomognat vustanieto,” November 10, 
1878 [Julian] in Kosev, 352-353. 
23 Vasil Sharkov, Grad Gorna Dzhumaia, minalo i dnes (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na 
Armeiskiia voenno-izdatelski fond, 1929), 134-136. The former Turkish 
inhabitants of Dupnitsa had already been displaced as refugees, some 
proceeding to settle in Gorna Dzhumaia.  
24 Kemal Karpat has further argued that the fighting in 1877-78 in Pirin helped 
destabilize the local ethnic order. Kemal Karpat, Studies on Ottoman Social and 
Political History (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 369-374.  
25 Perry, Politics of terror, 2.  
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and a continuing problem in Bulgarian foreign policy.26 The selection of Sofia as 
the capital of the new state reflected the belief that Macedonia would inevitably 
be incorporated into an expanded state in which Sofia would then be located in 
the center, rather than in the far west.27  
 International pressure (particularly on the part of Russia), however, 
prohibited any aggressive Bulgarian foreign policy.28  Stefan Stambolov (regent 
from 1886-1887 and prime minister from 1887 to 1894) accordingly endorsed a 
gradualist approach of enhancing Bulgarian claims to Macedonia territory 
through continuing the existing institutions of the National Awakening: schools 
and the expansion of Exarchate.29 Stambolov anticipated that maintaining the 
cultural mobilization of the Slav inhabitants of the Macedonian and Thracian 
vilayets would encourage a Bulgarian national consciousness in the region, lead 
to real improvements in living conditions and provide a foundation for eventual 
Bulgarian annexation.  
                                                
26 Krustio Manchev, Istoriiia na balkanskite narodi, XIX-XX V. (Sofia: 
Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1999), 90-91. 
27  Nearly 30 percent of the population of the capital by 1900 was composed of 
Macedonian-born immigrants. Nadine Lange Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 
1893-1908: From Western Sources. (Boulder: East European Monographs, 
Boulder and Columbia University Press, 1998), 44. 
28 Aggressive Bulgarian policy with regard to Eastern Rumelia (the initial territorial 
priority and unified with Bulgaria in 1885), resulted in sufficient Russian pressure 
to force Bulgaria’s first ruler, Alexander of Battenberg, to abdicate. Perry, Stefan 
Stambolov, 78-79, 85-99; Elena Statelova, Istoriia na Nova Bulgariia, 1878-1944. 
(Sofia: Izdatelska kushta Anubis, 1999), 52-88. 
29 See V. Tankova, “Politika na pravitelstvoto na Stefan Stambolov po 
natsionalniia vupros,” in Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na makedonskite 
i trakiiskite bulgari, 1878-1944: Tom Purvi, Borbi za zapazvane na edinstvoto na 
bulgarskata natsiia (Sofia: Makedonski Nauchen Institut and Institut po istoriia pri 
BAN, 1994), 221-240. 
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 The result was a re-vitalization of the millet system, as confessional 
identities were bolstered by funding for new churches and church/run schools 
from sources outside the vilayets.30 The Bulgarian state actively encouraged the 
use of schools and Exarchate churches to foster a Bulgarian national 
consciousness. This direct state intervention, of a kind previously absent, 
transformed the Vuzrazhdane. Religious affiliation was now increasingly viewed 
as corresponding to a national affiliation. The Exarchate Church’s activities in the 
Macedonian vilayets were expanded, with state assistance.31 But this in turn led 
directly to, as Fikret Adanir calls it, a Kirchenkampf between the Exarchate and 
the Patriarchate as the churches became the proxies during the 1880s for a 
political struggle in Macedonia.32 The newly independent Bulgarian state 
provided material support to Exarchate churches and affiliated schools in 
Macedonia from this time forward.33 Such efforts, too, did little to satisfy the 
demands of those who sought immediate reform in Macedonia and would 
increasingly turn to the potential of violent, revolutionary change. “Revolutionary 
                                                
30 Perry, Politics of Terror, 32-33; Perry, Stefan Stambolov, 152-53, 227-231. 
31 Z. Markova, “Deinostta na Bulgarskata ekzarhiia v Makedoniia i Odrinska 
Trakiia,” in Nationsonalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na makedonskite i trakiiskite 
bulgari, 1878-1944: Tom Purvi, Borbi za zapazvane na edinstvoto na Bulgarskata 
natsiia (Sofia: Makedonski Nauchen instititut and Institut po istori pri BAN, 1994), 
116-150.  
32 Adanir, 100. 
33 Increasingly, schools fell under the jurisdiction of local churches. By 1895, an 
irade of the Porte formally placed most Bulgarian-language schools under the 
supervision of the Exarchate, with a few church-run schools allocated to their 
respective Catholic and Protestant Churches. This underscores the persistence 
of the millet system in Ottoman administration, and the affiliation between 
schools and church. See Ipek Yosmao"lu-Turner, The Priest’s Robe and the 
Rebel’s Rifle: Communical conflict and the Construction of National Identity in 
Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908  (Unpublished Phd Dissertation: Princeton 
University,  2005), 215. 
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nationalism” had overshadowed the role of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1876-
1877, leading to direct conflict with Ottoman authorities, rebellion, and ultimately 
Russian intervention. This same strain of revolutionary nationalism now spread to 
Macedonia, where it too began to overshadow the previously dominant role of 
the Church.  
 Ottoman authorities, fearing Bulgarian expansion, now changed their 
position to support the Patriarchate Church as the lesser danger to continued 
Ottoman rule in Macedonia.34 The ongoing competition resulted in the 
construction of hundreds of new schools and the enrollment of thousands of new 
students, a dramatic increase in scale from the preceding period.35 By the 1890s, 
the Kirchenkampf expanded when both the Serbian and Romanian Orthodox 
Churches entered the fray, each encouraging the opening of schools and 
churches as the basis of their own respective territorial claims.36 By the end of 
the century, the Bulgarian side enjoyed a slight advantage. The three combined 
Macedonian vilayets boasted some 781 Exarchist schools claiming 1,221 
teachers and 39,973 students while the Patriarchate supervised 613 schools 
claiming 951 teachers and 32,476 pupils.37  
 
                                                
34 Yosmao"lu-Turner, 210-217. 
35 On the late, politicized role of the Exarchate-Patriarchate conflict, see  Adanir, 
100-116); Nadine Lange Akhund, The Macedonian Question, 1893-1908: From 
Western Sources  (Boulder: East European Monographs and Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1998), 30-35; Markova, passim.  
36 In addition, small numbers of Protestant churches and schools were opened in 
the vilayets; such churches were generally drawn along linguistic or ethnic lines. 
In Pirin, a small Protestant community emerged in Bansko over the 1880s.   
37 Perry, Politics of Terror, 27-28. 
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The Paramilitary Movements  
 The expansion of the Exarchate in the 1880s remained slow, however, 
and promised few immediate rewards. In the early 1890s, two distinct 
movements emerged that sought to shift away from the Exarchate’s cultural 
expansion to direct mass military action. In place of the scattered violence of 
1878 that had been sparked by immediate concerns, several new revolutionary 
movements emerged in the 1890s. Each, led by an educated elite, sought to 
mobilize Macedonia for revolution. The two largest of these movements were the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, (Vutreshna Makedonska 
Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia, or VMRO) and the Supreme Macedonian 
Committee (Vurhoven Makedonski Komitet, better known as the Vurhovisti or  
“Supremacists”).38 
                                                
38 As noted in the introduction to this study, one of the dilemmas in writing on 
VMRO is in a number of historiographical controversies regarding the name. 
During its formative years, the group changed its name several times: not until 
1897 was the name of the group standardized, as the Bulgarsko-makedonsko-
odrinska revoliutsionna organizatsiia (Bulgarian-Macedonian-Adrianople 
Revolutionary Organization, or BMARO), changed in 1902 to Taina Makedonsko-
odrinksa Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia (Secret Macedonian-Adrianople 
Revolutionary Committee, or SMARO), then to Vutreshna Makedonsko-odrinksa 
Revoliutsionna Organizatsiia (Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary 
Committee, IMARO) then after the war to Vutreshna Makedonska Revoliutsionna 
Organizatsiia (VMRO). The actual use of terminology by members tended to be 
confused, with members sometimes simply referring to the group as “the 
Organization.” As noted, this study uses “VMRO” for the sake of simplicity, 
following Duncan Perry’s own argument for the use of MRO: see Perry, Politics 
of Terror, 41.  
Similarly, the Supreme Macedonian-Adrianople Committee (Vurhovni 
Makedonski-odrinski Komitet, or VMOK) is used by some Bulgarian historians of 
the movement; however, the initial Thracian wing of the group split off fairly early. 
See Svetlozar Eldurov Vurhovniiat Makedono-odrinski Komitet i makedonon-
odrinskata organizatsiia v Bulgariia, 1895-1903 (Sofia: Ivrai, 2003) for an 
example of such use. 
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 It was the cultural movement’s relative success that led to its displacement 
by military mobilization. The expansion of schooling in the Macedonian lands 
created a growing educated elite among local Slav inhabitants, many receiving 
secondary education within the Principality of Bulgaria and thus often 
correspondingly sympathetic to claims to a Bulgarian national consciousness.39 
Smaller numbers were educated in Serbia, Russia and Western Europe. Such 
educated Slavs from Macedonia often emigrated (particularly to Bulgaria), but 
many returned to take up positions as schoolteachers in the expanding school 
system in the region. As a group, these teachers (as well as other professionals) 
were both younger and better educated than either local chorbadzhiia or priests. 
Othodox priests at the village level were, even into the interwar period, minimally 
educated. The young, radicalized products of local schools now turned against 
the existing process of the Awakening.  
 The “generation of the 1890s” was impatient with the pace of Ottoman 
reforms and with the limited socio-economic prospects offered in Macedonia. 
Cultural mobilization created an educated class with increased expectations that 
remained unfulfilled.40 Access to education meant exposure to an existing 
                                                
39 Bulgarian historiography argues that the founders of VMRO were exposed to 
and became an extension of the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition, having learned 
the these ideals in Bulgaria. For example, see Tsocho Biliarski, “Za vliianieto na 
ideite i deloto na Vasil Levski pri suzdavaneto na revoliutsionna organizatsiia na 
Bulgarite v Makedoniia i Odrinksko (1893)” Izvestiia na Durzhavnite Arkhivi 
(1987: 53), 115-126. 
40 Fikret Adanir, “The Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire, 1878-1912,” in 
Andreas Kapeler, ed., The Formation of National Elites: Comparative Studies on 
Governments and Non-Dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850-1940  
(Dartmouth: New York University Press and the European Science Foundation, 
1992), 170-178. 
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revolutionary tradition in Bulgaria, one credited with Bulgaria’s independence 
from Ottoman rule. Ultimately, this generation turned to violence as a means to 
force more immediate change. VMRO was thus formed over 1893-94 by a small 
circle of conspirators within Ottoman Macedonia drawn from local educated 
elites. Of the sixteen members who attended the group’s first congress in 1894, 
fourteen were schoolteachers,41 one was a doctor and one a photographer. All 
native to the region, the core leadership sought to build a broad-based 
organization among both the (limited) educated cadre and also among the 
peasantry. Several of its leading members, including Gotse Delchev (from 
Kukush, in the kaza of the same name near Salonika), drew on socialist or 
anarchist political philosophy, giving the movement a slightly leftist cast.42  
 While Exarchist successes reinforced Bulgarian claims to the Macedonian 
lands, the slow pace of reform and minimal prospects for immediate union with 
Bulgaria frustrated activists living in Sofia.43 The Supremacist movement 
accordingly emerged in 1894-1895 among Macedonian émigrés circles in the 
capital, including a number of Bulgarians of non-Macedonian origin sympathetic 
                                                
41 Schoolteachers were particularly involved in VMRO, and the Ottomans by the 
turn of the century had come to consider schools “nests of bandits.” Yosmao"lu-
Turner, 215; Adanir, “Macedonians in the Ottoman Empire,” 177. In part, this 
reflects the fact that teaching in the region’s numerous Slavic-language schools 
was one of the few careers available to young, educated men.  
42 Perry, Politics of Terror, 37-39, 41-42. Marxist historiography frequently has 
exaggerated the “leftist” nature of the nineteenth-century VMRO. For 
representative examples, see Iordan Vanchev, Apostoli na bulgarskata svoboda 
(Sofia: Narodna Mladezh, 1981) and Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, “Ilinden 1903, “ 
Macedonian Review 13:3 (1983). For Delchev’s own limited engagement of 
socialist themes in his writing, see Liubomir Panaitov and Hristo Hrisov, eds., 
Gotse Delchev: spomeni, dokumenti, materiali (Sofia: Nauka I izkustvo, 1978). 
43 A mass protest in 1895, for example, complained of conditions in Macedonia 
and of Bulgarian policy regarding them. Akhund, 44. 
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to the cause.44 The movement initially drew broadly from emigrants from across 
geographic Macedonia and across the political spectrum, including among its 
wider circle Dimitur Blagoev, the Gorna Dzhumaia-born leader of the “narrow” 
Socialist movement.45 Particularly important were army officers, a relationship 
that expanded over several years and forged close ties between the 
Supremacists and the Bulgarian army.46 Bulgaria commissioned émigrés from 
the Macedonian vilayets in disproportionate numbers. Figures such as Lt. Boris 
Sarafov (born in Libiahovo, Melnik kaza) rallied to the Supremacist cause, their 
involvement in an illegal paramilitary organization tacitly ignored by their 
commanding officers. 250 local civilian organizations with a total of some 60,000 
members were loosely affiliated with the Supremacists, as well as several “secret 
brotherhoods” among the officer corps.47 
 Both VMRO and the Supremacists agreed on the necessity for an uprising 
against Ottoman rule in Macedonia and Eastern Thrace to secure “autonomy” 
within the Ottoman Empire.48 The question of what each group meant by 
                                                
44 Eldurov Vurhovniiat makedono-odrinski komitet, 26; Perry, Politics of Terror., 
44-46, 52-53. 
45 Georgi Purvanov, Bulgarskata sotsialdemokratsiia i Makedonskiiat vupros ot 
kraia na XIX vek do 1918 godina (Sofia: Graifmaks, 1997), 28-35; Fikret Adanïr, 
“The National Question and the Genesis and Development of Socialism in the 
Ottoman Empire: the Case of Macedonia,” in Mene Tunçay and Erik Jan Zürcher, 
Socialism and Nationalism in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923 (London: British 
Academic Press, 1994), 33.  
46 Svetlozar Eldurov, Tainite ofitserski bratstva v osvoboditelnite borbi na 
Makedoniia I odrinsko, 1897-1912 (Sofia: Voenno Izdatelstvo, 2002), 11-16. 
47 Eldurov, Vurhovniiat makedono-odrinski komitet, 11. 
48 As noted above in the introduction, both movements were also interested in the 
question of Ottoman Thrace. This has emerged as a point of contention in 
Macedonian and Bulgarian historiography, the latter emphasizing Thracian 
activities to argue both groups were interested in broad “Bulgarian” rather than 
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autonomy has resulted in significant historiographical controversies over the two 
groups’ ultimate aims, which remain unclear. The more profitable comparison lies 
in how VMRO and the Supremacists sought to realize their goal of reform and 
autonomy for Macedonia.49 The founders of VMRO planned a popular, peasant-
based “revolution” in Macedonia that would force the Ottoman government to 
undertake the reforms they demanded. Open combat with police or Ottoman 
troops was discouraged in favor of preserving the movement’s armed strength 
until sufficient proselytization and organization allowed for a mass revolt across 
the vilayets.50 Accordingly, VMRO divided the three vilayets into “revolutionary 
districts,” appointing a voivoda (leader) for each who was nominally responsible 
                                                                                                                                            
narrow “Macedonian” concerns. See Eldurov, Vurhovniiat makedono-odrinski 
komitet, 29. 
49 Macedonian historiography generally portrays the goal of VMRO as seeking 
autonomy in the path to independent statehood; Bulgarian historiography argues 
that autonomy was, as in the case of Eastern Rumelia, to be a transition to 
eventual unification with Bulgaria. There is generally little attention to the likely 
prospect that the ultimate goals of VMRO may not have been fully considered, or 
may have varied within the organization. For examples of the Macedonian 
position, see Aleksandar Hristov, “Printsipot na avtonomna Makedonija vo 
programata na Vnatreshnata Makedonska Revolutsionerna Organizatsija 
(VMRO),” Glasnik 7:2 (1964), 5-26; Ivan Katarjiev, "I.M.O.R.O.:Part 2,” 
Macedonian Review 20:3 (1990), 144; and Aleksandar T. Hristov, VMRO i 
Makedonskata drzhavnost (istorisko-praven osvrt) (Skopje: Kultura, 1993), 15-
47; the Bulgarian position, Petrov, 9, Statelova Nova Bulgariia, 173-174. See 
also Stephen Fischer-Galati, “The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization: Its significance in ‘Wars of National Liberation,’” East European 
Quarterly, 6:4, 454.   
50 VMRO’s theory of revolution is well articulated in a 1906 article by Hristo 
Matov, one of the organization’s ideologues. See Hristo Matov, “Vustanishki 
deistviia,” in Hristo Matov, Makedonska revoliutsionna sistema; VMRO 
Suchineniia, Tsocho Biliarski, ed., (Sofia: n.p., 2001), 148-192. VMRO’s 
conception of a “broad” revolution is emphasized by Macedonian historiography; 
see Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, "Ilinden 1903," Macedonian Review 13:3 (1983), 
247;  Desanka Miljovska, “The Socio-Economic Conditions of the Ilinden 
Uprising,” in Boris Vishinski, ed., The Epic of Ilinden (Skopje: Macedonian review 
Editions, 1973), 31. 
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to the Central Committee. This loose structure was to be used to train local 
cadres and define the areas of operation for cheti.  
 The Supremacists, for their part, sought to spark sufficient immediate 
conflict in the region that the Great Powers would intervene.51 As such, their 
strategy was to arm and direct military raids into Ottoman territory, the first in 
1895 by four cheti against Melnik. Such raids were intended to attack local 
authorities and notables (both Muslim and Greek). This, it was hoped, would 
demonstrate to the Bulgarian government the weakness of local authorities and 
raise the possibility of forcible military annexation. Alternatively, the Supremacists 
anticipated that such raids, with attendant loss of Muslim civilians, would spark 
Ottoman reprisals such as those of 1876 which prompted Russia to declare war 
on the Porte. Such reprisals would serve as a pretext for the Great Powers to 
intervene directly on the legal basis of the Treaty of Berlin’s Article 23, and grant 
autonomy or outright independence to the region. Despite these differences — 
and rivalry — between the two groups, they overlapped in that some individuals 
joined both organizations. Moreover, both VMRO and the Supremacists were 
willing to enter into tactical alliances and agreements with the other for mutual 
assistance.52  
 Both groups competed to attract a following within the three Macedonian 
vilayets. By 1900, each had secured sufficient funds both within Macedonia and 
                                                
51 Perry, 47. 
52 In terms of rivalry, see Eldurov, Tainite ofitserski bratstva, 128-129. Dame 
Gruev, one of VMRO’s founders, actually welcomed the Supremacist contribution 
since this indicated that Macedonians were “no longer alone;” see the quotation 
in Akhund, 51-52. 
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from émigré circles in Bulgaria to recruit and arm thousands of men. These 
komitadzhi (“committee-men,” e.g., members of the organizations) were 
organized into cheti, although some bands would serve in both organizations at 
one time or another. Both VMRO and the Supremacists characterized 
themselves as Macedonian organizations and portrayed the vilayets as a 
distinctive region belonging to a specific group. Both, for example, adopted the 
political slogan “Macedonia for the Macedonians,” appealing to local sentiment in 
their drive to recruit political support and military participation by local inhabitants. 
Reflecting the unclear nature of national consciousness in the region, however, 
both VMRO and the Supremacists simultaneously emphasized ties to Bulgaria. 
The paramilitary organizations arguably served to militarily mobilize the Slav 
population into a cohesive whole, but did not concretely resolve the question of 
national consciousness. 
 Pirin was of particular importance during this period of organization. The 
Supremacists used the region chiefly as a target for raids against Ottoman 
authority from bases in Bulgaria. They also occasionally slipped cheti through the 
Pirin mountain passes for raids south and west into the heart of the Selânik and 
Monastir vilayets.53 VMRO used it to as a base to smuggle weapons and other 
contraband from bases across the border in Rila, Kiustendil and Dupnitsa. Over 
time, however, VMRO recruited more heavily in the eastern, rural kazas of Pirin. 
The kazas’ predominantly Slav population and mountainous terrain that 
facilitated guerilla warfare clearly bolstered support for the paramilitary 
                                                
53 Eldurov, Tainite ofitserski bratstva, 19-20.  
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movement. Although specific economic complaints are quite rare in the memoir 
literature, it is suggestive that these regions were also those least favored by 
arable land. The desire to claim agricultural holdings held under chifliks by 
Muslim landowners arguably played a part in this disparity as well. The émigré 
population from Pirin in the Bulgarian border town Dupnitsa particularly 
supported the paramilitary movements. By 1900, dozens of émigrés had joined 
either the Supremacists or VMRO, including future leaders of VMRO in Pirin such 
as Yane Sandanski (originally from the village of Vlahi, in the Melnik kaza) and 
Dimo Hadzhidimov (originally from the village of Gorno Brodi, in the Seres kaza 
to the south).54 
 Ottoman crackdowns began in 1897 when the Empire discovered VMRO’s 
activities in the Monastir vilayet following the murders of a Muslim policeman and 
a local prominent civilian.55 Despite police sweeps, from 1893 to 1900 VMRO 
successfully expanded its presence in Pirin and across the three vilayets as a 
whole — still, while recruiting went well among the educated elite and among 
students, it failed to attract much peasant support.56 The Supremacists on the 
other hand continued to recruit chiefly among Macedonian émigrés living in 
Bulgaria, particularly among those serving in the Bulgarian army. Such 
                                                
54 Yane Sanandksi, “Spomeni,” in L. Miletich, ed., Dvizhenieto otsam vardara i 
borbata s vurhovistit (Sofia: Pechatnitsa “P. Glushkov,” 1927), 11-12. Sandanski 
was a proponent of local autonomy within VMRO and an opponent of the 
Supremacists although he had served in the Bulgarian army over 1892-94, the 
usual pattern for members of the latter group. 
55 In August 1902 the Bulgarian consul in Bitola reported over 500 Bulgarians 
were imprisoned there by Ottoman officials. See Statelova, Nova Bulgariia, 172-
173. 
56 Petrov, 27-43. Perry also provides a good critique of why VMRO failed to 
attract peasant support.  
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Supremacist bands often lacked direct connections to the regions in Macedonia 
they operated within and frequently encountered local hostility fed by a 
perception they were “foreign.”57 The result was that VMRO soon established 
predominance in the Macedonian vilayets, fostering “local” cheti (which often still 
ranged over a considerable territory). The Supremacists were a force only in 
those territories, most prominently including Pirin, which they could easily reach 
with “hit-and-run” raids from their bases within Bulgaria.  
 For the individuals who joined either organization, the experience of being 
a member of a cheta was an integrative experience. Cheti often remained 
relatively small. One sample (consisting of 79 cheti operating from Kiustendil 
over the two years 1904-1905) suggests bands averaged between 12 to 13 
members.58 Such cheti usually had a core born in the same kaza (this averaged 
44 percent in the sample examined), with a mixture of members born in towns 
(37 percent) and villages. A significant number of members (18.5 percent) and 
leaders (23.5) of these bands were Bulgarian-born as well.59 Members were 
generally in their mid-20s (the youngest from the sample group was 15, the 
oldest 55) and unmarried. Such experience created a generation of komitadzhii 
                                                
57 Akhund, 48. 
58 Vasil Giozelev, Georgi Markov, Doino Doinov, Luchezar Stoianov, Plamen 
Tsvetkov and Stefan Andreev, eds., Chetite na Vutreshnata makedono-odrinska 
revoliutsionna organizatsiia: Dnevnik i snimki na chetite na VMORO, preminali 
prez Kiustendilskiia punkt 1903-1908 g. (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na Arhivite pri 
Ministerskiia suvet, 2003), 22-62. The volume provides lists of cheti that passed 
through the Bulgarian border town of Kiustendil. The data here reflects all cheti 
that passed through in the years 1904 and 1905. This comes to 81 cheti, but two 
were of such a size (one of one individual, one of two) that they were excluded. 
In all, these cheti included 980 men.  
59 The bands with the greatest diversity, however, were usually “Bulgarian” bands 
composed largely of Bulgarian-born komitadzhii. 
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with the experience of service in a local cheta with a significant proportion of non-
local members and with a mixture of professions and backgrounds. Such a 
process was not dissimilar to that suggested by Eugen Weber for the 
“nationalizing” process of state armies — yet, in this case, the “army” was usually 
recruited by an individual voivoda who was generally autonomous from a 
tenuous command structure.60  
Figure 6 
A VMRO Cheta: the band of voivod Hristo Chernopeev, 1903 
 
Personal collection of author, posterboard print c. 1920-1930. 
 
 Certainly, not all members embraced the revolutionary principles of VMRO 
or the realpolitik of the Supremacists. In the haiduti tradition, many members 
chiefly looked forward to a chance for plunder and financial gain. Yet the cheti 
also arguably served to broaden their members’ horizons. At a time when the 
inhabitants of the Macedonia lands were “enclosed” by Ottoman restrictions and 
                                                
60 Although VMRO did engage in efforts to centrally organize and train its cheti, 
such efforts met with mixed success — particularly given the existing haiduti 
tradition, and the fact that most voivodi could move to the Supremacists if they 
felt their autonomy threatened. On VMRO’s organization of cheti, see Petrov, 27-
44, 117-158 
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travel was limited, joining a cheta meant the ability to strengthen relations with 
komitadzhii from one’s own locality, as well as to establish new relations—with 
other guerillas in the band, with the voivodi (leaders) of the groups (often foreign 
educated), and with members of other bands as the two organizations expanded. 
VMRO in particular established these links through the creation of a “mail 
system” for communication between different bands, the circulation of 
organization newspapers, the levying of taxes on local communities, and the 
creation of a “shadow judicial system” that punished dissenters within VMRO 
and, furthermore, adjudicated civil and criminal cases in local communities.61  
 Despite their leaders’ preference for long-term and comprehensive 
planning, VMRO’s need to secure loyalty, obtain funds and outdo rival bands all 
played a part in forcing the Organization62 into a more active role. In 1900, the 
Gemidzhii — an anarchist group of Macedonians occasionally allied but distinct 
from VMRO and the Supremacists — attempted (unsuccessfully) to blow up the 
Ottoman Bank in Salonika by tunneling underneath and setting off dynamite.63 
                                                
61 Ksente Bogoev, “The Macedonian revolutionary Liberation Organization 
(VMRO) in the Past Hundred Years,” Macedonian  Review 23:2-3 (1993), 118-
128. Bogoev goes so far as to refer to these efforts as a “state within a state.” At 
the very least, they anticipated VMRO’s broader functions in Pirin in the interwar 
period: see Chapter Five. 
62
 This term was used sporadically by VMRO members, as was “the Inner 
Organization.” The latter, chiefly used to distinguish VMRO from the “Supreme 
Organization,” fell into disuse after the Balkan Wars.  
63 Perry, ibid., 100. On April 28-29 1903, they would be successful in sinking the, 
French-owned steamship Guadalquivir in Salonika harbor, several cafes, the 
Ottoman Bank, the post office, the German school and the city’s gas supply; a 
bomb attack was also made on the Constantinople Express in Salonika station. 
See Adanir, 170-174. Such attacks were made in the hope of drawing European 
attention to the plight of Macedonia. For a first-hand account, see Pavel Shatev, 
V Makedoniia pod robstvo (Sofia: Bulgarski Pisatel, 1968).   
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The Supremacists had by this point sent cheti into Pirin for nearly five years, 
raiding as far south as Melnik.64 By 1901, at least six cheti were operating in the 
region, and in October 1902 they attempted to usurp VMRO’s dominant role. 
Four hundred Supremacist komitadzhii were sent into the Serres sanjak in a 
move timed to coincide with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Russo-Ottoman 
Battle of Shipka Pass of 1877. Attempting such an attack on the anniversary was 
calculated to win Bulgarian public support.65 In mid-October 1902, a second 
operation including 18 Supremacist cheti with some 300-400 men fought near 
Gorna Dzhumaia as part of a concerted attempt to seize and hold the town, an 
event subsequently advertised as the Gorna Dzhumaia Uprising.66 Ottoman 
authorities in the region, however, were able to mobilize some 16,000 troops in 
the region and force the guerillas to withdraw.  
 Although a failure, the Supremacist’s Gorna Dzhumaia Uprising posed a 
direct problem for their rival, VMRO. How confrontational should the latter 
organization be? Having enlisted thousands of Macedonians on a platform of 
preparing for revolution, the Central Committee of VMRO found it difficult to 
restrain them. In 1902 a cheta in Pirin led by Hristo Chernopeev (from Strumitsa) 
and Yane Sandanski kidnapped Ellen Stone, an American missionary traveling in 
Macedonia, and held her for ransom for several months in the region of Gorna 
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Dzhumaia.67 If VMRO failed to endorse and carry out such actions, it risked 
losing ground to the Supremacists.   
 The Supremacists confronted their own problems over 1902-1903. The 
organization had long faced domestic opponents within the Bulgarian Army, 
which had grown displeased with the participation of its officers in the 
organization. Over 1901-1902 factions in the Ministry of War including Minister 
Stefan Paprikov ordered officers to refrain from paramilitary activities in 
connection to the two Macedonian organizations.68 In February 1903 a Bulgarian 
government in need of a major foreign loan responded to international pressure 
and began to crack down on VMRO and the Supremacists connections within 
Bulgaria. The police arrested members of the group, confiscated their records, 
and attempted to limit their funding, recruitment and the smuggling of arms 
across the border.69  
 The Macedonian paramilitaries now faced the likelihood of a decline in 
relative power in the near term, dimming their hopes of any large, planned 
uprising. It was this fear that led them to negotiate a fragile agreement of union 
into a single paramilitary movement over 1902-1903 under the name of VMRO. 
Many within VMRO’s original leadership disliked this tentative agreement with the 
Supremacists, whose motives were distrusted. The alliance planned a mass 
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uprising against the Sublime Porte despite significant opposition within VMRO’s 
ranks, who argued that not enough preparation had been made. The combined 
VMRO and Supremacist leaderships saw a revolt as fulfilling their respective 
goals: for the former, a peasant revolution, for the latter the creation of sufficient 
unrest as to secure Great Power attention. 
 
In the Wake of Ilinden  
 
 The Ilinden Uprising failed, as the introduction to this chapter makes clear. 
Despite the savagery of the expected reprisals against the Christian population 
(and earlier attacks on Muslim civilians), the anticipated foreign military 
intervention was not impending. The Great Powers did not involve themselves, 
and pressured Bulgaria to stay neutral as well. Just as important, the course of 
the Uprising revealed cracks in the fragile unity between the Supremacists and 
VMRO.70 In Pirin, open conflict had nearly emerged over coordinating the 
campaign between the local cheti raised by Yane Sandanski and Vurhovist 
bands.71 The failure of the Bulgarian state to intervene even led members of 
VMRO to direct reprisals against the government in Sofia. This included the 
bombing of the ferry SS Vaskapu in which 27 people were killed.72  
 Although the Uprising resulted in no direct military intervention, it did result 
in international pressure on the Ottoman Empire to fulfill the specified reforms 
obligated by Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin. Austria-Hungary sought to forge a 
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concordat with Russia to “manage” Balkan affairs and reduce tensions between 
the two states. Increasing unrest after 1900 culminating in Ilinden led the 
government in St. Petersburg to realize the explosive potential of unrest in 
Macedonia. Accordingly, in October 1903 Emperor Franz Joseph and Tsar 
Nicholas II met at Mürzsteg, near the Habsburg capital of Vienna, to outline a 
new series of reforms intended to reduce tensions in the vilayets (and between 
the two empires).73  
 The Mürzsteg reform program consisted of four major initiatives, to be 
overseen by a joint international military commission.74 The first was the 
reorganization and retraining of the provincial gendarmerie, whose ranks were 
now opened to the Christian population. The gendarmerie would fall under the 
overall command of Italian General Emilio Degiorgis, with local detachments 
supervised directly by a multinational force of military officers drawn primarily 
from Great Britain, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia.75 Second was the 
introduction of Christian “field-guards” to provide protection for local Christian 
populations against banditry. Third, the powers directed that the borders of the 
vilayets, sanjaks and kazas be redrawn to better reflect ethnic and confessional 
differences. Fourth, the valis’ power and authority would be expanded to help 
promote reform at the local level. To pay for these reforms, the three vilayets 
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would be financially reorganized under an International Finance Commission, 
which was charged with overseeing local tax collection and other state 
revenues.76 The region was divided into five zones and each was placed under 
international supervision: the sanjak of Drama to Great Britain, the sanjak of 
Seres to France, the sanjak of Salonica to Russia, the sanjak of Skopje to 
Austria, and the sanjak of Monastir to Italy.77 
 The Mürzsteg reforms were above all dependent on the new, 
internationally trained gendarmerie to create sufficient local security to allow the 
financial and administration reforms to be carried out.78 Despite the commitment 
to train a new gendarmerie to protect against both banditry and ethnic reprisals in 
the region, such security proved elusive. Lacking sufficient Christian volunteers, 
less than ten percent of the new gendarmerie was Greek or Slav in origin. 
Violence in the Macedonian lands actually increased, becoming a several-sided 
conflict between local cheti, Bulgarian Supremacist bands, emerging Greek and 
Serbian guerilla groups and reprisals by both the Ottoman army and local 
irregulars. The Mürzsteg reforms found no favor with local inhabitants, the 
paramilitary movements or Ottoman officials in the vilayets. For local inhabitants 
and officials, the reforms proved ineffectual in improving either economic 
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conditions or physical security.79 For the paramilitaries, success would have been 
worse than failure. If the reforms actually proved effective, they could 
substantially reduce the support within the vilayets to unify part or all of 
Macedonia within a separate state or with “co-nationals” in neighboring Bulgaria, 
Greece or Serbia. The period after 1903, then, did not result in a return to 
general peace in Macedonia but rather crested a general sense of anarchy and a 
series of continuous guerilla conflicts between rival groups. Each of these, and 
their relevance to Pirin, is described briefly below. 
 
Intra-Macedonian Conflict 
 The disaster of Ilinden fragmented the fragile alliance between the 
Supremacists and VMRO. Immediately in the fall of 1903, serious breaks 
emerged between a “left wing” led by Dame Gruev (born in Smilevo in the 
Monastir kaza, and one of VMRO’s original founders) and a “right wing” drawn 
from the Supremacist leadership around General Ivan Tsonchev. This break was 
formalized in 1905 at the Rila Congress, when a unified congress of VMRO and 
the Supremacists met to review the events of the Uprising and to determine the 
future plans of the movement.80   
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 At the  congress, the “left wing”81 of the movement was able to secure a 
majority. Not only did it steer the Organization away from major direct 
confrontations with the Ottoman government, it also sought to reduce the power 
of the Central Committee. This “left wing” of VMRO returned to a policy of 
preparation for a future uprising, reducing the Central Committee to a 
coordinating body and placing most administrative power in the hands of local 
district leaders. Until the expected peasant revolt was prepared, less costly raids 
were now preferred in the interim.82 This provoked members who sympathized 
with the Supremacists to form their own, “right wing,” which grew as moderates 
within the movement (including the followers of Dame Gruev and Hristo 
Tatarchev, two of the original founders) drifted right in response to the left wing’s 
flirtation with socialist ideas. With the active assistance of the Supremacists, this 
right wing vied for control of cheti and the movement in general. Both turned to 
terrorist attacks, retaining hope that international involvement could be obtained. 
In the first of these, Supremacist-backed cheti made a half-dozen attempts in 
June and July 1904 to dynamite freight and passenger trains.  
                                                
81 This terminology derives from the Marxist framework. While it is problematic to 
affiliate VMRO’s “left wing” of 1905 too closely Socialist or Communist ideology, 
members of its inner circle (including both Yane Sandanski, Dimo Hadzhidimov 
and Petur Arsov) advocated a turn to an ill-defined “revolutionary socialism.” 
Some of its surviving membership would play a role in the later creation of the 
Communist VMRO-United movement after 1924.  
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 This division, which greatly weakened the Macedonian movement, 
ensured that large-scale uprisings such as 1902 and 1903 were no longer 
possible. Instead, VMRO cheti increasingly turned to outright terrorist tactics 
against the Ottoman regime and against rival factions. Cheti attacked the 
Kumanov-Skopje train in 1910. Over 1911, they bombed the railway station and 
mosque in Shtip, the city hall in Kichevo, a bank in Salonika and the railway 
station in Veles. Kochana’s marketplace was bombed, and attacks were made on 
the Austro-Hungarian post office and the rail depot in Salonika as well as on the 
city hall in Krushevo. Each attack sparked reprisals by Ottoman officials. Nor 
were such attacks limited to Ottoman territory; in 1915, a bombing attack on a 
Sofia casino killed a family member of the current Bulgarian minister of war.83 
 The division within the Macedonian paramilitary movement thus began the 
fratricidal conflict that would plague it over the following four decades. VMRO 
would further divide into factions based in part on ideology — a left-leading 
“autonomist” faction, and a Bulgarophile right-wing — and in part in terms of 
personality and locality. The two factions almost immediately began a low-key 
civil war that within a decade saw the assassination or death in combat of much 
of the original leadership of VMRO and the Supremacists. Dame Gruev remained 
a moderating figure within the combined paramilitary movement as a whole and 
attempted to reconcile the left and right wings, but he was killed in December 
1906 in a clash with Ottoman forces. 
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 Within Pirin, open conflict erupted between rival cheti over 1904-1906. 
Sandanski, emerging as the leader of the “Seres Group,” oversaw the five kazas 
of Pirin plus those around Seres to the south and held to the “left” VMRO. The 
response of the Supremacists was a major armed incursion in April 1905 that led 
to open fighting with Sandanski’s forces and roughly 25 deaths. In 1907, a Pirin 
cheta led by Todor Panitsa assassinated Boris Sarafov, who had come to the 
region to agitate on behalf of the right-wing. In the post-Ilinden period, Sandanski 
set the precedent for the leader of Pirin’s VMRO to establish personal rule over 
the region, as well as the pattern of fratricidal conflict that would plague the 
movement in Pirin into the interwar years.  
 
Greek and Serbian Paramilitaries 
 
 Following the Ilinden Uprising, both Greek and Serbian paramilitaries now 
contested both Ottoman authorities and the factions of VMRO. Within Pirin, such 
Greek bands were by far the more immediate threat.  A pro-Greek organization 
— the Ethniki Etaireia (National Society) — had already been founded in 1894 in 
Salonika with the intention of promoting Greek cultural and identity in the region. 
As noted in Chapter Two, Greek interests were already in conflict with those of 
the local Slav inhabitants, given the existing clash between the Patriarchate and 
Exarchate over control of Macedonian diocese and education. In the struggles 
between VMRO cheti and Ottoman authorities, the Greek community in Pirin had 
sided with the latter though it took little part in the fighting.  
 After 1894, however, a Greek “revolutionary generation” of the 1890s 
emerged as it did among the Slav inhabitants of the vilayets. The Ethniki Etaireia 
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looked forward to the inclusion of Macedonia within the Greek state. It also 
favored a military solution to realize the Megali Idea and unite Crete, Epirus and 
southern Macedonia with the Greek state. The organization took on an overtly 
military profile as more and more military officers joined, to the point that 80 
percent of the members were officers.84 Proximity to the predominantly Greek-
inhabited regions south of Serres and the existence of Greek communities in 
Serres and Melnik meant the Greek andartes (guerillas) could count on support 
in opposing Bulgarian cheti.  
 A forceful advancement of Greek interests in Macedonia was delayed by 
the military disaster of the 1897 Greco-Turkish War. Attempts by Greece to 
annex Crete, Thessaly and Epirus met with disaster and defeat. Greek efforts in 
Macedonia were thus stymied for the moment; but by 1904-1905, Greek bands 
were again active in Macedonia.85  In 1905, Greek andartes were able to drive 
VMRO cheti out of the region of Salonika and out of most of the southern 
Monastir vilayet. Their numbers swollen to more than 1,500 guerillas, the Greek 
paramilitary bands were able to seize more of Monastir over 1906-1907.86 By 
1906 the andartes had spread in strength to the kazas around Seres and Drama 
to the immediate south of Pirin. Sandanski enforced boycotts against Greek 
merchants who supported Greek armed bands. He also sent cheti both to 
skirmish with the andartes and to conduct reprisals against local Greeks assisting 
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them. Significant fighting erupted over 1906-1908 in the sanjaks of Serres and 
Drama, as Bulgarian cheti and locals clashed with the andartes, especially near 
Melnik with its predominantly ethnically Greek population.87 
 Although Serbia advanced no claims on Pirin and posed no real threat to 
the inhabitants of the region, a Serbian paramilitary group supported by Belgrade 
began to operate in the Kosovo vilayet and northern regions of the Monastir 
vilayet in 1904. Serbian interest in expanding into the Macedonian vilayets was 
less pronounced than the desire for unification with Bosnia. Serbia accordingly 
pursued expansion in Macedonia most strongly in periods when Austro-
Hungarian action in 1878 (the latter’s occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina) and 
1908 (formal annexation) forestalled the prospect of a successful “northern” 
strategy.  
 The Dru!tvo Svetog Sava (Society of Saint Sava), had been founded in 
1886  following Serbia’s defeat in the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885. The Society 
promoted Serbian cultural mobilization and entered the Kirchenkampf in the 
Macedonian lands by funding the building and maintenance of Serbian Orthodox 
Churches in the vilayets (as noted in Chapter Two). The society dissolved within 
a decade; and although a new group was founded, the Politi"ko Prosvetno 
Odelenije (Political-Education Section), it too remained relatively ineffective and 
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opened only a few Serbian schools and churches. These were mostly 
concentrated along the Serbian border in the vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir.  
 The intensifying conflict between Bulgarian and Greek bands in the 
Macedonian lands, however, created a new opportunity. Support grew in the 
Serbian government, particularly among army officers, for the creation of a 
Serbian-backed armed movement to contest for Macedonia. The result was the 
creation in 1904 of a #etnik movement drawn chiefly from local Serbs and pro-
Serbian Macedonians in the Kosovo vilayet and trained by elements of the 
Serbian army. Although certainly the weakest of the foreign-backed groups, the 
#etniks were able to limit VMRO’s activities in the northwest in the Skopje kaza 
and did on occasion arrange tactical alliances with other groups.88 Though this 
posed no threat to Pirin, the emergence of the #etnici forced the weakened 
factions of VMRO to meet this threat, further dispersing their strength.  
 
The Young Turks 
 
 The violence between the rival paramilitaries made it impossible for the 
Mürzsteg reforms to be carried out. The British government took an increasingly 
active diplomatic interest in the program, reinforced by Whitehall’s interest in a 
rapprochement with Russia after 1907. The proposed new reforms threatened to 
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go farther than the Mürzsteg Agreement, first in including additional regions for 
the reform process (adding the several sanjaks of Kosovo excluded from the 
Mürzsteg purview, plus Eastern Thrace and Ioannina) and in specifying further 
autonomy for the provincial governors. The proposal would make the valis 
independent of the Sublime Porte for a period of at least ten years.89 Local 
Turkish officers interpreted this as a pretext for future intervention in the 
Macedonian lands by the Great Powers. Given the history of previous 
interventions by outside states to grant “autonomy” to Ottoman provinces, this 
seemed to threaten the inevitable loss of the last Ottoman territories in Europe.  
 The Committee of Unity and Progress ($ttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), better 
known as the Young Turks, had already evolved from its origins as an émigré 
intellectual circle in 1899 in Paris, into a coalition of like-minded groups led by the 
Ottoman Freedom Society (Osmanli Hürriyet Cemiyeti). By 1906 the Young 
Turks had established relations with other reform-minded groups among the 
Armenians, and had attempted to establish agreements with VMRO. In 1908, 
fearing that Britain and Russia planned to intervene and force a new series of 
reforms on Macedonia, the CUP staged a coup and succeeded in placing a new, 
reformist government in power. Following an unsuccessful counter-coup in April 
1909 by the conservative and religious Muhammadan Union ($ttihad-ı 
Muhammedi), the Young Turks were able to further consolidate their hold on 
power. 
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 Macedonia was the center of CUP strength, and the Young Turks moved 
to secure cooperation in the region by promising economic reforms, stability and 
administrative reforms that would grant legal equality to non-Muslims. As such, 
the Young Turks were successful in forging agreements with “left wing” elements 
of VMRO, including the Serres Group led by Yane Sandanski.90 Such 
cooperation lasted through the period 1908-1912, and included both the 
participation and candidacy in provincial parliamentary elections by members of 
VMRO.91 Sandanski even dispatched cheti under his command to defend the 
Young Turks’ hold on power.92 In return for a promise by the CUP to enact 
reforms granting improved conditions and rights to the non-Muslim population of 
the region and to provide for some measures of local autonomy, Sandanski’s 
faction of VMRO gave support and legitimacy to the Young Turk government — 
even as rival cheti continued to raid into other regions in Macedonia. The 
Supremacists and sympathetic factions within VMRO now targeted the left wing, 
twice attempting to assassinate Sandanski in 1908. 
 In the years leading up to the Young Turk Revolution, the conflict in the 
Macedonian lands had further intensified. Between 1903 to 1908 over 8,000 
people were killed in acts of political violence. 3,500 of these were guerillas, the 
rest civilians killed in assassinations, massacres and in reprisal actions. The level 
of violence was visibly rising from year to year. According to Turkish reports, the 
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number of civilians killed in the vilayets rose from 468 in 1904, 600 in 1905, 
1,108 in 1906 and 849 in 1907.93 One result was a massive flight of Slav 
inhabitants from the province, tens of thousands emigrating to Bulgaria and, over 
the following decade, 40,000 leaving for North America.94 At the same time, the 
Young Turk government encouraged the resettlement of Muslim refugees from 
Bosnia, Romania and Bulgaria in the Macedonian vilayets, diluting the local 
Christian population.95 
 This state of affairs was intolerable for both local revolutionaries and for a 
Bulgarian government with claims on the region. Such levels of emigration would 
eventually strip the province of its Slav population. Pirin fared better then other 
areas, particularly those in the Monastir vilayet. Pirin’s VMRO paramilitary force 
had emerged relatively intact from the Ilinden Uprising and the subsequent 
fighting, and its leadership under Sandanski enjoyed enhanced prestige for its 
role in the Ottoman Macedonian parliament. But as the Young Turks’ program for 
a reformed, modernized, but also centralized Ottoman Empire became clear after 
1910, voivoda under Sandanski began to urge action against the Young Turks. 
Within two years they would take up arms again, but the “local” military 
mobilization in Pirin and throughout the Macedonian lands as a whole now gave 
way to a series of conflicts in which the Slav inhabitants in Pirin rallied to serve 
first alongside, then within the regular army of the Bulgarian state. 
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War, the Bulgarian State and Pirin Macedonia, 1912-1923 
 
“We operate alongside the Bulgarian army —  
not only in its interests, but under the command of its officers” 
—Hristo Matov, 19121 
 
 
 In October 1912, Leon Trotsky, serving as a war correspondent for 
Kievskaya Mysl covering the First Balkan War, interviewed the voivoda Hristo 
Matov. Born in Struga (near Ohrid), Matov had joined VMRO in the early 
1900s and served as one of its ideologists of revolution before gravitating 
towards the right wing of the movement after its split in 1905. As the opening 
quote suggests, Matov confirmed that VMRO cheti throughout the Macedonian 
lands were integrated into the campaign at the service of the Bulgarian army.2  
It would not, of course, serve the cause if we were to raise revolts 
in areas far away from the theater of war: that would only result in 
massacres.  
 
Instead, he explained, the cheti carried out sabotage, “cutting telegraph wires 
wherever possible, tearing up rails, and that sort of thing.” In Pirin, for example, 
local cheti destroyed the bridge in the Kresna defile near Gorna Dzhumaia. In 
areas of active fighting, “the partisan units put themselves directly at the disposal 
of the army commanders,” serving alongside regular military units, providing 
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reconnaissance and “constitut[ing] a constant threat to the Turks’ rear.”3 Matov 
noted in the interview that he supported the war, the Young Turks having failed to 
deliver upon promised reforms despite the cooperation of VMRO in the Seres 
sanjak.4 But, curiously, Matov refused to explain VMRO’s ultimate goal in joining 
the conflict:  
What is it that we want to achieve — autonomy for Macedonia or union 
with Bulgaria? That is a perfectly natural question for you to ask. … Now, 
however, when we are fighting with Serbia and Greece as our allies, I 
must ask permission not to reply to that last question of yours.5 
 
In other words, the paramilitary put aside its own goals in the interests of 
serving the larger, state-led military alliance against the Ottoman Empire — a 
strange turn of events for a movement with a history of individual autonomy 
and a loose adherence to hierarchy and command. Trotsky noted this:  
The war has absorbed the Macedonian revolutionary into itself. It 
has dispatched the “anarchist” [Misel] Gerdzhikov to cut telegraph 
lines, and entrusted the old plotter Georgi Petrov with running the 
supply services of the Macedonian Legion. 
 
He concluded the article by suggesting that VMRO had been absorbed by the 
Bulgarian government wholesale. 6 
 Matov’s interview reflected the transformation of the paramilitary 
movement that had begun in the First Balkan War. Over the long decade from 
1912 to 1923, a series of larger conflicts centered on the Bulgarian state 
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subsumed the ongoing violence inside geographic Macedonia. These 
conflicts began with the First and Second Balkan Wars of 1912-1913, 
continued with Bulgaria’s experience in the First World War during 1915-
1918, and climaxed with the violent coup d’etat against the post-war 
government of Aleksandur Stamboliiski. In each case, the fate of the 
Macedonian lands was at the heart of Bulgaria’s conflicts both figuratively and 
literally. The desire to unify all Macedonian territories within a Bulgarian state 
lay behind the government’s decision to enter each of the three wars — and 
the postwar coup d’etat was triggered, in part, by Stamboliiski’s decision to 
repudiate this policy. In each of the three wars Macedonia became a 
battlefield for the Bulgarian army, and the site of a low-intensity civil war in the 
postwar period of crisis. Pirin was Bulgaria’s only profit from this process, the 
only part of geographic Macedonia it successfully incorporated.  
 Much as the larger Bulgarian context of conflict subsumed that of 
Macedonia lands so too did the Bulgarian state come to subsume the 
Macedonian paramilitaries. The Bulgarian army first attached the cheti as 
auxiliaries of the in 1912, then broke them up and drafted the former guerillas 
directly into the army in 1915. Finally, a new VMRO leadership reconstituted 
them over 1919-1921 as a centralized paramilitary force to contest with the 
regimes of Greece, the Yugoslav Kingdom and the Bulgarian regime of 
Aleksandur Stamboliiski. VMRO would now play an expanded domestic 
political role within Bulgaria. Pirin itself would be absorbed into the Bulgarian 
state in wartime, its resources and manpower drawn upon by central 
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authorities to sustain the effort for “total war.” After 1918, VMRO would move 
to control the region in order to secure a base of operations, financial support 
and a pool of manpower.  
This represented a transition from “military mobilization” to state-
building. The paramilitary cheti of the period 1893 through the campaigns in 
1912 were locally raised and led and largely autonomous in terms of action. 
Divisions persisted within the leaderships of the paramilitary movement, 
continuing even after the merger of the Supremacists with VMRO in 1902. 
The result was a loose hierarchy of command. Over the period 1913-1918 the 
centralized hierarchy of the Bulgarian army replaced the paramilitary’s loose 
framework. The revitalized postwar paramilitary forces in Pirin would 
themselves remain stamped in this new organizational mold.  
Bulgarian historiography refers to the defeats of the Second Balkan 
War and the First World War as “the national catastrophes,” shattering the 
established social and political order in Bulgaria.
7
 In Pirin the wars spanned 
another sort of turning point. Between 1912 and 1918 the shared experience 
of warfare superceded the earlier practice of military mobilization. State 
administration and a centralized hierarchy were first introduced during the 
wars, first paralleling and then subsuming Pirin’s own war effort. This marked 
a gradual transition to the third of Smith’s “nation-building” mechanisms, the 
                                                
7 On the social and cultural impact of the wars, see Evelina Kelbetcheva, 
“Between Apology and Denial: Bulgarian Culture During World War I,” in Aviel 
Roshwald and Richard Stites, eds., European Culture in the Great War: The Arts, 
Entertainment and Propaganda, 1914-1918  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 215-242. 
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experience of centralized administration and state-building.
8
 Such an 
“administrative mobilization” could help encourage a Bulgarian national 
consciousness in the process, but there remained the problem of Pirin’s 
existing regional identity. This chapter accordingly considers this conundrum, 
tracing the interrelationship of the Macedonian movement and the Bulgarian 
state in this period of conflict. It was a relationship that shaped the experience 
of Pirin in the interwar period and thereby posed a fateful contest between 
local autonomy and state centralization. 
 
Bulgaria and the First Balkan War 
 
 The continuing conflict in Macedonia and the suffering of its inhabitants in 
the last prewar decade placed persistent pressure on the Bulgarian government 
to intervene in the region. “For public opinion … Bulgarian foreign policy revolved 
around only one question, Macedonia.”9 The failure of Ilinden had demonstrated 
that the Macedonian armed movement was not strong enough to force an 
Ottoman withdrawal and that no Great Power could be expected to intervene on 
behalf of the Macedonian vilayets’ population. The emergence of a multi-sided 
conflict across the Macedonia lands after 1903, and the subsequent rounds of 
violence and reprisals, only added to the frustration building in Sofia.  
 The Young Turk Revolution, outlined in Chapter Three, reinforced the 
perceived need for an activist foreign policy in Sofia. Just as the CUP staged 
                                                
8 Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1986), 
157-161. 
9 Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars, 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War 
(Oxford: Routledge, 2000), 6.  
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their revolt for fear that the international situation would weaken the Empire’s 
ability to retain Macedonia, interventionists in Bulgaria feared that if the Young 
Turks were successful in their reform program, the Ottoman hold on Macedonia 
would be strengthened and Bulgarian annexation forestalled. In particular, they 
worried that the local Slav population might turn away from union with Bulgaria. 
Even if the initial participation of the Seres Group of VMRO in Young Turks’ 
reforms in the Macedonian vilayets was merely a tactical alliance, it still lent 
credibility and strength to the Ottoman regime.10 The Young Turks continued and 
accelerated the pace of military reform in terms of both training and equipment, 
particularly the addition of imported 75mm cannon and Mauser rifles.11 This 
advance provided incentives for Bulgaria to fight before the reforms could be 
completed. Rising tensions among Albanians over 1910-1911 echoed this 
dilemma. Albanians openly revolted against the Porte and demanded autonomy 
— including regions within the vilayets of Prishtina and Monastir (e.g., Kosovo 
and Vardar Macedonia). If Albanians were successful in obtaining autonomy, this 
would further limit the chances for the existing independent Balkan states to 
expand into Ottoman territory. 
 Finally, the period after 1908 saw crucial divisions emerging among the 
Great Powers. As long as they had continued to “close ranks” and attempt to 
suppress instability in the region, Bulgaria could not press an active foreign 
policy. In September 1908 the Foreign Ministers of Russia and Austria-Hungary, 
                                                
10 Hanio!lu, 246-247, 249. 
11 Edward Erickson, Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912-
1913 (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 13-42, 47.  
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Aleksander Izvolski and Alois Aehrenthal, had met to forge an agreement in 
which Russia would support Austria-Hungary in transforming its occupation of 
Bosnia-Hercegovina into outright annexation. In return, Austria-Hungary would 
support Russia’s efforts to secure full transit rights through the Straits of the 
Bosphorus. Once Austria-Hungary had declared its annexation of Bosnia, this 
support proved illusory. Relations between Vienna and St. Petersburg grew 
tense and close cooperation on Balkan issues ended. In the same month of 
September 1908, the Bulgarian government took advantage of these divisions to 
declare its full independence from the Ottoman Empire.12  
 By 1911, the Bulgarian government began to explore agreements with 
other Balkan states for a pre-emptive war against the Ottomans that would 
secure at least part of Macedonia and thereby win domestic approval. These 
agreements were hastened by Italy’s declaration of war on the Ottoman Empire 
in 1911 and invasion of Tripoli, which defeated Ottoman troops in Libya and 
promised to draw troops and supplies away from the Balkans. In early 1912 
Serbia and Bulgaria negotiated a treaty that provided for mutual military support 
in a war with the Ottomans. Both states could agree on Bulgarian expansion into 
the Pirin kazas and remainder of the northeastern Selânik vilayet and Serbian 
expansion into the Kosovo vilayet. But a sizeable stretch of territory remained 
disputed between the two states in the vilayet of Monastir. Pressured by the 
                                                
12 Despite the creation of the Bulgarian state in 1878, and even following its 
union with Eastern Rumelia in 1885, the Ottoman Empire continued to hold titular 
sovereignty over Bulgaria. The declaration of independence in 1908 was 
symbolic, but advanced diplomatic representation and secured increased 
prestige for the Bulgarian government and monarchy. 
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potentially narrow window of opportunity to attack the Ottoman Empire, the 
Bulgarian government agreed to wait for future arbitration by the Russian tsar.13 
The Bulgarian and Greek governments signed a similar agreement for military 
cooperation in the summer of 1912 but came to no agreement regarding 
territorial division.14 With the conclusion of an alliance between Serbia and 
Montenegro, these various agreements constituted the Balkan League.  
 Bulgaria began to prepare its armed forces for the coming conflict. With 
the reserves called up, its army would total nearly 600,000 (out of an adult male 
population of 1.9 million).15 Leaders within émigré Macedonian circles in Bulgaria 
advanced proposals in the summer of 1912 to raise their own units from among 
the refugees living in Bulgaria. Moreover, they proposed that the army utilize 
VMRO cheti from both the left and right wings of the movement.16 The Bulgarian 
government agreed. Since, however, the main Bulgarian thrust was to take place 
on the eastern Thracian front, the cheti were ordered to cooperate with all three 
of the allied armies fighting in Macedonia. In addition, the Bulgarian Army raised 
a separate force with the cooperation of VMRO leaders.  The Makedonski-
                                                
13 Micho Lalkov, Mezhdu vuztorga i pokrusata: Bulgariia po vreme na voinite, 
1912-1918 g. (Sofia: Slov D, 1993), 13-14. 
14 Hall, 11-13.  
15 Vachkov, 26; Hall, 24.  
16 Dimitar Minchev, “Partizanskite cheti na VMORO v Makedoniia: Makedonskite 
I trakiiskite bulgari v bulgarskata armiia po vreme na voinata,” in Traikov, 348-
350. By 1912 VMRO’s influence in Thrace had faded, and the bulk of its cheti 
were based in the Macedonian lands; only six cheti were active in Thrace during 
the war. Lalkov, 29-30. 
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Debar 1,011 Serres 197 
Nevrokop 715 Salonika 194 
Kuskush 512 Tetovo 171 
Prilep 501 Gorna Dzhumaia 162 
Biotla 457 Strumitsa 143 
Veles 449 Petrich 129 
Shtip 440 Drama 124 
Egri-Palanka 431 Tikvesh 108 
Kostur 409 Enidje-Var 104 
Razlog 359 Gostivar 104 
Kichevo 350 Vodena 79 
Krushevo 250 Doiran 73 
Gevgeli 246 Resen 47 
Melnik 240 Struga 40 
Demir Hisar* 234 Kaylare 36 
Skopje 207 Pehchevo 16 
Kochani 203 Negotin 12 
Kumanovo 202 Zunha 4 
odrinski Opulchenie (Macedonian-Adrianople17 Volunteers, or MOO) — would be 
organized by the Bulgarian Army and fight alongside its existing units.   
 
Co-Belligerent Auxiliaries in the Balkan Wars 
 
 The Makedonski-odrinski Opulchenie possessed distinctive characteristics 
in terms of organization, equipment and utilization. MOO’s membership was 
recruited from émigrés and refugees from Macedonia and organized as a 
separate unit.18  
Table 4 
Volunteers for the Macedonian-Adrianople Corps by Kaza of Birth19 










                                                
17 English translations for MOO, like BMARO and TMARO (noted in Chapter 
Three) use Adrianople rather than Edirne. This convention is followed here. 
18 Although most of the volunteers were of Slav Macedonian origin, there were 
two notable exceptions. Nearly all the officers were drawn from volunteers 
serving in the regular army, including many originating from elsewhere in 
Bulgaria; and Armenians from Lozengrad were recruited and served in the 12th 
Lozengradksa battalion.  
19 As provided in text in M. Voynov and L. Panayotov, eds.,  Documents and 
Materials on the History of the Bulgarian People (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na 
bulgarskata akadaemiia na naukite, 1969), 382-383. 
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Three brigades totaling 14,670 men were raised in all. Of these recruits, roughly 
18 percent originated from the Pirin region (see Table Four), many likely crossing 
the border into Bulgaria to join the units. The MOO followed the Bulgarian army’s 
recruitment system, basing units on the German model of geographic origin. 
Volunteers were assigned to units by their birthplace. Six battalions were 
authorized on September 25, 1912: the 1st Debar, 2nd Skopje, 3rd Solun 
(Salonika), 4th Bitola (Monastir), and the 5th and 6th Odrin (Edirne). A further six 
battalions were raised in October 1912: the 7th Kumanovo, 8th Kosturia, 9th 
Belesh, 10th Prilep, 11th Seres and 12th Lozengrad. Effectively, this meant that 
the volunteers could associate their battalion with existing local Macedonian 
identities. One recruiting statement, for example, stressed: 
Every Macedonian living in Ruse, capable of [bearing] arms, 
get ready to begin. Expect the moment for embarkation…20 
 
The MOO corps was a Macedonian unit serving within the Bulgarian army, and 
was announced as such.21 
 The Bulgarian army assigned distinctive uniforms and outfitting to the 
Volunteers. By 1900, the Bulgarian army had established its own standard set of 
uniforms and insignia, although supply shortages meant that older uniform 
elements were sometimes retained until old stocks were exhausted or new ones 
arrived. The general staff assigned each branch of the army — cavalry, artillery, 
                                                
20 Todor Bogdanov, ed., Natsionanlnoosvoboditelnite borbi na bulgarite ot 
Makdoniia i odrinkska Trakiia prez Balkanskata voina, 1912-1913 (Sofia: Iz-vo 
“Sv. Georgi Podebonosets,” 1994), 51. 
21 On the connection between the army and MOO, see Svetlozar Eldurov, 
“Makedono-odrinskoto dvizhenie v Bulgariia i ofitserskite bratsva v Bulgarskata 
armiia v navecherieto na Balkanskata voina (ion-avgust 1912 g.),” Izvestiia na 
durzhavnite arhivi 61 (1991). 
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engineers, etc — standardized insignia and shoulder boards. The only significant 
variation to this pattern were the special uniform elements allowed to the nine 
regiments (of 36 total) named in honor of members of the royal family — but this 
was limited to color combinations for the uniform piping and shoulder boards.22  
 Volunteers’ uniforms were unusual for deviating from this pattern. That this 
decision was deliberate is suggested by the need for advance planning to 
procure, manufacture and distribute uniforms before the First Balkan War began. 
Unlike the red piping and shoulder boards used by regular and reserve infantry, 
the Volunteers were issued green ones — a choice intended to link them with the 
Bulgarian volunteers who served with the Russian Army in the war of 1877-78. 
The service cap was different as well, resembling a peasant’s fur shapka. Instead 
of the standard royal seal the army issued a new crest. Here, the rampant lion 
symbolic of Bulgaria at war held a flag emblazoned with “MOO” and trampling a 
crescent and star underfoot, symbolizing the enemy Ottoman Empire.23 
Volunteers also generally wore tzarvuli, the traditional sandals of Christian Slav 
                                                
22 Normally the key variation was the color of shoulder boards, which 
distinguished the branch (e.g., red for infantry and cavalry, black for artillery and 
support services). Red pipings were standard for all branches. However, units 
named for members of the royal family used other color schemes: Her Royal 
Highness Princess Maria Louisa Sax-Coburg-Gota’s 8th Infantry Regiment wore 
light blue shoulder boards and red pipings, while His Royal Highness Karl 
Edward Duke of Sax-Coburg-Gota’s 22nd Infantry Regiment wore red shoulder 
boards and white pipings. Named regiments also wore crests with embroidered 
monograms. Alexander Vachkov, The Balkan War, 1912-1913 (Sofia: Anzhela, 
2005), 20. 
23 Vachkov, 71, 84. 
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peasantry still characteristic across the Macedonia lands at that time, rather than 
the stipulated boots, as can be seen in Figure 7.24 
Figure 7 
Soldiers in the Macedonian-Adrianople Corps  
 
Undated photograph, personal collection of the author. 
 
 While the Bulgarian army had issued their distinctive uniform, the 
Volunteers themselves chose distinctive battalion flags with meanings tied to 
local identity. Each battalion possessed its own unique design and symbolic 
references. Such symbols included religious figures such as the icons of Saints 
Cyril and Methodius on the flag of the 11th Seres battalion, references to the 
Bulgarian state such as the Bulgarian tricolor and seal used on the flag of the 4th 
Bitola battalion, and references to VMRO such as the use of the slogan 
“Svoboda ili smurt” — “Freedom or Death.” Individual companies usually added 
                                                
24 Although the use of traditional footwear by MOO was distinctive, some serving 
soldiers in the Bulgarian army during the Balkan Wars also wore the tzarvuli due 
to shortages in boot procurement, as a cursory examination of photographs of 
the conflict reveals.  
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additional references — for example, embroidering the name of the town that the 
company had been recruited from. The Pirin kazas were represented by for the 
companies from Razlog, Gorna Dzhumaia and Nevrokop.25 
In addition to the MOO, the Bulgarian government with the assistance of 
VMRO recruited approximately 2,000 komitadzhii to serve as irregular forces 
during the fighting. Providing their own clothes and arms, the komitadzhii were 
not intended for use as regular troops, although provisions were made to attach 
cheti to regular units for scouting and reconnaissance. The cheti were allowed 
independent actions such as sabotage, interdicting Ottoman supply routes, 
harassing of small Ottoman units and garrisons and intercepting of enemy 
communications. VMRO remained responsible for their organization, forming 
them into some 54 cheti.26 
 
The Balkan Wars and Macedonia  
 Bulgaria entered the First Balkan War on October 17, 1912 to widespread 
domestic approval.27 Two weeks before the campaign, for example, the 
newspaper Bulgariia exhorted: 
                                                
25 Note the photographs and color plates in Ivan Ivanov, Bulgarski voini znamena 
i flagove (Sofia: Sv. Georgi Pobedonosets, 1998).  
26 Todor Bogdanov, ed., Natsionanlnoosvoboditelnite borbi na bulgarite ot 
Makdoniia i odrinkska Trakiia prez Balkanskata voina, 1912-1913 (Sofia: Iz-vo 
“Sv. Georgi Podebonosets,” 1994), 110; Petur Petrov, ed., Makedoniia: Istoriia i 
politicheska sudba, 1912-1941 (Sofia: Izdatelstvo “Znanie” OOD, 1998), 14-15; 
Hristo Matov quoted in Trotsky, 233. 
27 A crowd of some 50,000 had demonstrated in favor of war with the Ottomans. 
“Entusiazm’t v stolitsata: Vcherashnata grandiozna mainfestatsiia 
vuodushevlenieto,” originally in Mir #33660, Sept 20, 1912, in Pasha Kishkilova, 
ed., Balkanskite voini po stranitsite na bulgarskiiat pechat, 1912-1913. (Sofia: 
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Figure 8 
Theaters of the First Balkan War, 1912 
 
To arms, Bulgaria! To crush the enemy of centuries and to make 
Macedonia a seat of civilization, prosperity and peace!28 
 
Although public support was for a war that would secure Macedonia’s union with 
Bulgaria, the government’s war aims were directed towards annexation of the 
vilayet of Edirne and, ultimately, of Istanbul itself.  
 Given the considerable Ottoman effort at fortifying the city of Edirne since 
1908, a campaign there would require a significant military force29 The army’s 
general staff under General Mikhail Savov, supported by Tsar Ferdinand, thus 
resolved to focus 
Bulgaria’s military 
strength on this thrust 
into Eastern Thrace. 
This would be the 
chief theater of war, 
accompanied by a 
smaller campaign into 
the Rhodopi 
Mountains in Western 
Thrace, the intent 
being to outflank the Ottoman 2nd Macedonian Army and prevent Ottoman forces 
                                                                                                                                            
Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1999), 26-28. 
28 “Chastut udari! Manifestut podpisan, nastupvaneto na Bulgarskite voiski,” 
originally in Bulgariia #170, Oct. 5, 1912, in Kishkilova, 39. 
29 Erickson, 78-79. The Ottoman Army anticipated precisely this Bulgarian 
strategy and prepared its defensive strategies in the 1910 and 1912 Eastern 
Army Plans accordingly.  
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in Eastern Thrace and Macedonia from linking up. The general staff assigned the 
Macedonian-Adrianople Volunteer Corps to this attack into Western Thrace. 
MOO, raised and recruited for the liberation of its members’ homelands, would 
not actually serve on the Macedonian front. Arguably, the light arms and 
generally poor training of the MOO corps meant it was better deployed in 
garrison duties through the Rhodopi Mountains.30 As deployed, the MOO forces 
were better suited to government-orchestrated (and in some cases local and 
spontaneous) attempts to forcibly “de-Islamicize” the Pomak population of the 
region.31  
 In the vilayets of Monastir and Kosovo the Bulgarian army surrendered the 
initiative to the Serbian 2nd Army. Relying on the 1912 agreement with Serbia to 
secure future gains in the Monastir vilayet, the Bulgarian army spent most of its 
energy on the Eastern Thracian front. Flush with success in conquering Edirne, 
the army attempted to press on to Istanbul but was stopped by November 17-22 
at Chataldzha. After bitter fighting and heavy casualties, the result was a 
stalemate leading to successive but short-lived ceasefires in December and 
January 1913. Desultory combat continued afterward until the Ottomans sought 
an armistice on May 30, 1913.  
 In the Macedonian lands, agreements between Serbia and Bulgaria called 
for a broad Serbian thrust southwards directly against the Ottoman 2nd 
                                                
30 Hall, 24. 
31 On the de-Islamization campaign, see Velichko Georgiev and Staiko Trifanov, 
eds., Pokrustvaneto na bulgarite mohamedani, 1912-1913: Dokumenti (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1995).  
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Macedonian Army.32 Although the planned concentration against Eastern Thrace 
led the Bulgarian general staff to deny Serbian requests for a significant 
Bulgarian force, it did place the 7th Rila Division under Serbian command. This 
division was deployed in the eastern end of the theater and given orders to move 
south to protect the flank of the Serbian forces — and to liberate the Pirin kazas. 
Facing the Balkan League’s forces was the Ottoman 2nd Army, drawn from both 
Ottoman regular units as well as militia raised in the Macedonian vilayets. Like 
the Balkan League’s order of battle, the majority of Turkish forces were deployed 
to the west in the Kosovo and Monastir vilayets. Protecting the Ottomans’ own 
eastern flank was the U"truma (Struma) Corps, placed in the Kresna Gap of the 
Struma River valley but with a significant militia force garrisoned in Nevrokop.33  
 In the subsequent campaign, the Bulgarian 7th Rila took the initiative, 
crossing the border into Pirin on October 18 and seizing Gorna Dzhumaia. It then 
closed in on Kresna by October. A separate attack pushed against Nevrokop. 
The town fell by October 28, prompting a general Ottoman retreat from the Pirin 
kazas to Serres by November 1. The poorly handled retreat divided Ottoman 
forces, allowing the 7th Rila Division to break through Ottoman lines and advance 
towards Salonika.34 Serbian forces, however, fought the larger and more 
significant series of engagements against the main Ottoman force. Slowly driving 
the Ottoman 2nd Army back, the Serbians reached Skopje on October 26, Bitola 
on November 19 and Ohrid on November 22, securing not only the entire 
                                                
32 Erickson, 163-205. 
33 Erickson, 195. 
34 Erickson, 201-202. 
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disputed zone but territory in the eastern Monastir vilayet originally allocated to 
Bulgaria. The Bulgarian army correspondingly occupied outright only a small part 
of the Macedonian lands: the Pirin kazas formed its core, with a small fringe of 
territory to the west (including Strumitsa and Shtip) and most of the remaining 
Seres sanjak to the south of Pirin.  
 The Bulgarians similarly failed to reach Salonika, the chief prize in the 
geographic Macedonia. The Greek high command surprised the Ottoman 
defenders on the Thessalian Front by allocating all seven divisions of the Greek 
army to an attack towards Salonika, which surrendered on terms on October 26, 
1912. Negotiations with the Greek government allowed for a token Bulgarian 
force to participate in the occupation of Salonika, but the small detachment was 
overawed by Greek forces in the city. 
 VMRO cooperated in establishing of the new civil-military administration in 
Pirin Macedonia. A Bulgarian military government quickly displaced Ottoman 
authorities in territory occupied during the war.35 The Bulgarian army established 
a new system of four okrugi (provinces): Drama, Seres, Shtip and Solun. The 
army further established okolii (districts) as well. Pirin fell under the Seres okrug, 
the army established okolii for Petrich, Melnik, Gorna Dzhumaia, Razlog and 
Nevrokop, continuing the administrative traditions of the former Ottoman kazas. 
Interim administrators were appointed and included members of VMRO.36 The 
                                                
35 Momchil Ionov and Radka Khandzhieva, “Svidetelstvo za bulgarskata 
voennoadministrativna vlast v Makedoniia prez Balkanskata voina 1912-1913 
godina,”  Voenno-istoricheski sbornik  57:2 (1988), 82-83. 
36 Note the autobiographical comments in this regard as regards Anton Dimitrov, 
“Spomeni,” in Vutreshnata makedono-Odrinska revoliotsionna organizatsiia: Prez 
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Bulgarian government, for example, appointed Yane Sandanski (who continued 
as leader of VMRO in the Pirin region) to the position of mayor of Melnik.37 The 
result was the steady expansion of the Bulgarian state authority across wartime 
Pirin, in cooperation with local paramilitary forces.  
 
Inter-allied Tensions and the Second Balkan War 
 Victorious on the battlefield, the Balkan League was now confronted with 
how to divide the spoils. Bulgaria faced challenges from Greece and Serbia over 
the disposition of Macedonia, and Romania now requested compensation in the 
Dobrudzha, bordering the Black Sea. Bulgarian forces had garrisoned towns in 
the new okolii of Pirin and elsewhere in the former sanjak of Serres. Bulgaria’s 
focus on the campaign around Edirne, as noted, allowed Greek forces to press 
farther north than anticipated. The two states now clashed over claims to the 
former vilayet of Selânik. Bulgaria claimed territory as far south as Salonika, and 
Greece claimed territory as far north as Melnik.  
 Intervention by Italy and Austria-Hungary unexpectedly added to the 
conflict between Bulgaria and Serbia. In the pre-war agreements, Serbia and 
Montenegro would divide the vilayet of Shkodër and Greece would absorb the 
vilayet of Janinë, despite ethnic Albanian majorities in both provinces. Rome and 
Vienna insisted on the creation of an independent Albanian state encompassing 
the territory of most of the two vilayets, eliminating Serbia and Greece’s territorial 
                                                                                                                                            
pogleda na neinite osnovateli, edited by Todor Petrov and Tsocho Biliarski 
(Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2002), 189; also Petrov, 16.  
37 Georgi Genov, “Bulgarskoto voenno gubernatorstvo v Makedoniia (Noemvri 
1912-Iuni 1913 g.),” Istoricheski Pregled 41:7 (1985), 40. 
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gains there. Accordingly, both Serbia and Greece states sought territorial 
compensation elsewhere, in territory in the vilayets of Monastir and Selânik 
originally claimed by Bulgaria. In addition, although Romania had not participated 
in the First Balkan War, its government demanded territory in the Dobruzhda at 
the expense of Bulgaria in consideration for its wartime neutrality.38  
 Greek and Serbian administration of the Macedonian territory they 
occupied soon prompted accusations that both governments ignored the 
contributions of local cheti and instead sought to eliminate them as military and 
political forces.39 Moreover, local resentments rose in the face of forced 
requisitions by Serbian and Greek troops to cover occupation costs, and 
accusations of crimes against the civilian population.40 VMRO began to agitate 
against both the Serbian and Greek civil-military administration in the region, 
launching sporadic acts of violence against occupation officials and troops in the 
summer of 1912. This agitation also swung public opinion in Bulgaria away from 
its former allies in the Balkan League. 
 This impasse over the fate of the Macedonian lands led directly to the 
Second Balkan War (called the Inter-allied War in Bulgarian historiography) from 
June 19, 1913 to August 1913. Bulgaria began the war with a surprise attack on 
                                                
38 Hall, Balkan Wars 88-89. 
39 See Petrov, 24-28; also Matov’s account in his memoirs, 138-139;   
40 The damaging impact of the Serbian administration in Vardar Macedonia has 
been a focus for Macedonian historiography after 1991. See Gligor Todorovski, 
Makedonija po rasparchuvanjeto 1912/13-1915 (Skopje: Matitsa Makedonska, 
1995). The traditional Bulgarian view is reflected in Petrov, 39-51.  
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Serbian and Greek units, but its forces were soon pushed back.41 Both Greece 
and Serbia then launched counter attacks, forcing Bulgarian retreats from most 
of the Macedonian territory it controlled.42 Bulgarian positions in Salonika, Shtip 
and Seres were overrun, and Greek troops entered the Pirin kazas, pushing the 
front lines as far north as Gorna Dzhumaia. A strong defense then turned back 
the Greek advance, and retreating Greek forces in Pirin were subsequently 
defeated at Kresna Gorge, suffering nearly 10,000 casualties. The entry of 
Romania and then the Ottoman Empire in July dashed any remaining Bulgarian 
hopes for victory, as they opened new fronts against Bulgaria in Dobrudzha and 
Eastern Thrace, respectively. 
 Following this sound defeat, the Treaty of Bucharest of 1913 left Bulgaria 
with minimal territorial gains, to be subsequently referred to as the first “national 
catastrophe.”43 At the cost of the southern Dobrudzha, Bulgaria retained western 
Thrace but only a fraction of the Macedonian lands. The partition of Macedonia 
by surrounding states in 1913 now replaced the previous division of Macedonia 
between the three vilayets. The Serbian territories would be referred to as Vardar 
Macedonia, Greek territories as Aegean Macedonia, and the limited Bulgarian 
territory as Pirin Macedonia, consisting of the five Ottoman Pirin kazas plus the 
town and the hinterland of Strumitsa. The Ministry of Internal Affairs reorganized 
the region as the Strumitsa okrug, with five districts. Although Melnik and Petrich 
                                                
41 In popular Bulgarian historiography, the attack is justified by the “conspiracy 
against Bulgaria” by Greece and Serbia. Note Petrov’s use of the term, 19.  
42 Montenegro entered the war in support of Serbia, but its forces were not in a 
position to take an active part in the fighting.  
43 As in Lakov, 65. 
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were unified in a single okoliia, much of the old kaza organization was retained 
when the Bulgarian government organized the districts around Strumitsa, Petrich, 
Gorna Dzhumaia, Razlog and Nevrokop. Pirin was now a region encompassing 
five towns, 237 villages and a total of 155,598 people, a fraction of the vilayets’ 
combined population of 2.2 million.44  
 
The First World War  
 At the outbreak of the First World War in August 1914, Bulgaria remained 
neutral. Both the Central Powers and the Entente courted Bulgaria, which played 
each side off against the other for the first year of the war. In January 1915, the 
Central Committee of VMRO sent a “diplomatic” mission abroad, to see whether 
either alliance would be willing to arbitrate the issue of the contested territory or 
the status of the Slav inhabitants under Greek and Serbian rule.45 Ultimately the 
Central Powers’ promise to grant all Macedonian territory and moderate financial 
credits brought Bulgaria into the war.46 On September 6, 1915, Tsar Ferdinand, 
supported by the Liberal Party government, signed an alliance and military 
convention with the Central Powers.47 With German assistance, the Bulgarian 
army mobilized for war. 
 Unlike the Balkan Wars, mobilization in 1915 saw the creation of a regular 
“Macedonian” army division raised from the inhabitants of the Pirin region, 
refugees from Greek- and Serbian-held Macedonia, and the existing cadres of 
                                                
44 Glavna direktsiya na statistika, Statisticheski godishnik na Bulgarskoto 
Tsarstvo (Sofia: Glavna direktsiya na statistika, 1924), 36-37.  
45 Petrov, 51. 
46 Hall, Bulgaria’s Road, 285-308. 
47 Stavrianos, 561.  
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VMRO.48 The 11th Macedonian-Adrianople Infantry Division included 18 infantry 
battalions, an artillery regiment, and attached cavalry squadrons. Nearly 35,000 
Macedonians served in it, nearly 6,000 of these raised from the Pirin District that 
was now, as it had not been in the Balkan Wars, subject to the draft. A further 
11,000 from Pirin would serve in other army units, such as the Planinska 
(Mountain) Division.49 Also unlike the Balkan Wars, the 11th Macedonian-
Adrianople Division was more effectively trained than the Macedonian-Adrianople 
Volunteers had been. The result was that the 11th Macedonian was used in 
combat rather than in occupation duties. They took part in the campaign against 
Serbia in 1915, fighting across Vardar (Serbian) Macedonia.50 In addition, 
following its occupation of Vardar (Serbian) Macedonia in 1915 Bulgaria would 
recruit heavily from among the ranks of now-disbanded Serbian army units raised 
by forcible draft among the local population.51 36,000 soldiers from Macedonia 
                                                
48 The inclusion of refugees also served political goals. The 11th Division was 
intended to demonstrate that Slav Macedonians outside Bulgaria were willing to 
fight against Greece and Serbia.  
49 Petrov gives a figure of 148,000 “Macedonian Bulgarians” out of 900,000 
mobilized: this figure likely includes all Bulgarian citizens who claimed 
Macedonian antecedents. Dimitar Minchev suggests a figure of 134,000, 
including 17,000 from Pirin; see Petrov, 53, Dimitar Minchev, Uchastieto na 
naselenieto ot Makedoniia v bulgarskata armiia prez Purvata svetovna voina, 
1914-1918 g. (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Otbranata “Sv. Georgi Pobdonosets, 1994), 
50 Dimitar Minchev, “Bulgarskite ot makedoniiia i armiite na Serbiia, Grtsiia i 
Bulgariia (1915-1918), Istoricheski Prelged 45:5 (1989).  
51
 In 1914-1915, Serbia ordered the mobilization of 60,000 men of military age in 
Vardar; 44,500 responded, while 11,000 fled to Bulgaria. See Minchev, 
Uchastieto na naselenieto ot Makedoniia, 1.  
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who had been initially drafted into the Serbian army in 1914 subsequently served 
in the Bulgarian army.52  
 Following the defeat of Serbia in 1915, Bulgaria’s active participation in 
the war was limited to the occupation/liberation of Vardar Macedonia and to 
securing defensive lines in Aegean Macedonia. Substantial French and British 
forces landed in Salonika in October 1915 with the intention of aiding Serbia. 
Although the expeditionary force’s own disconnected organization and the Greek 
government’s disunity prevented it from rendering timely assistance, the 
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force remained in Salonika for the rest of the war. 
A limited campaign in 1916 pushed Bulgarian lines back near Seres and a joint 
Serbian and French force recaptured Bitola in 1917. But a major campaign was 
delayed until mid-1918.53  
 If the population of Pirin saw no conflict within the region’s borders and 
witnessed only relatively stalemate on the Salonika Front between late 1915 and 
early 1918, it retained a sense of wartime struggle. Pirin’s location made it crucial 
to the Bulgarian government’s efforts to maintain supplies and move troops to the 
Salonika front and to provide a defensive frontier. As the months passed into 
years, the Bulgarian state expanded its power to meet wartime needs. Economic 
                                                
52 This figure includes former prisoners of war in Austria-Hungary who were 
released to the Bulgarian Army. Minchev, 25. 
53 Still the best introduction to the campaign is Alan Palmer, The Gardeners of 
Salonika (London: Andre Deutsch, 1965). For a Bulgarian perspective, see 
Georgi Markov, Goliamata voina i Bulgarskata strazha mezdu Sredna Evropa I 
Orienta, 1916-1919 g. (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo “Prof. marin Drinov,” 
2006), 18, 121. 
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requisitioning extended across the country, Pirin now included.54 So, too, did 
“cultural requisitioning.” The government sought to construct a “cultural policy” 
that would reinforce and support its efforts.55 This included encouraging books 
and articles that supported Bulgaria’s claims on the entirety of the Macedonian 
lands.56 Correspondingly, such measures gradually reduced Pirin’s autonomy, 
with VMRO suffering in particular. Yane Sandanski, the most autonomist-minded 
of the movement’s leaders, was assassinated by rivals in 1915 shortly before 
Bulgaria’s entry into the war.57 After 1915, the movement was effectively co-
opted into the Bulgarian war effort, with members either recalled to service in the 
army or drafted into military or government service.58 The Bulgarian army 
recalled officers such as Aleksandur Protogerov and Todor Aleksandrov (born in 
                                                
54 See Ljuben Berov, “The Bulgarian Economy During World War I,” 170-183. 
Bela K. Király, Nádor F. Dreisziger, Albert A. Nofi, eds., East Central European 
Society in World War I (Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs and Columbia 
University Press, 1985). 
55 Rumiana Koneva, Goliamata sreshta na bulgarskakiia narod: Kulturata I 
predizvikatelstvata na voinite 1912-1918 g. (Sofia: Akademichno izdatelstvo 
“Prof. Marin Drinov,” 1995), 17-40, 61-62. 
56 Velichko Georgiev, Bulgarskata inteligentsiia I natsionanlanata kauza v purvata 
svetovna voina: Suiozut na bulgarskite ucheni, pisateli i hudozhnitsi (1917-1918 
g.) (Sofia: Makedonski nauchen institut, 2000), 53-75. 
57 Sandanski’s death remains a point of historiographical dispute. Historians in 
Communist Bulgaria and Macedonia argued that his death was planned by the 
Bulgarian government, which disliked his (claimed) Socialist beliefs or his 
reputed involvement in a plot to assassinate Tsar Ferdinand. The topic still 
awaits a fresh re-evaluation by scholars, but arguably the ongoing series of 
assassination and counter-assassination between the rival wings of the 
organization played a predominant role. Favorable Communist portrayals of 
Sandanski have now resulted in a contemporary ambivalence regarding his 
historical role in Bulgaria. On this, see James Frusetta, “Divided Heroes, 
Common Claims: IMRO Between Macedonia and Bulgaria,” in John Lampe and 
Mark Mazower, eds., Ideologies and National Identities: the Case of Twentieth-
Century Southeastern Europe (Budapest: Central European University Press, 
2003), 110-130. 
58 Purchlichev, 106-107. 
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Shtip) who had left the army to become leaders of cheti (Protogerov and 
Aleksandrov having emerged as leaders in the right wing of the movement by 
1910). Dimitur Vlahov, an ideologue of the movement’s left wing and later leader 
of VMRO’s postwar communist wing, accepted a position in the Bulgarian 
administration over Kosovo in 1915. Their wartime experience would be put to 
good use in the interwar period, as we shall see in Chapter Five. Protogerov and 
Aleksandrov, who both served as generals during the war and would assume 
control over VMRO in 1918, were particularly affected by the experience of 
serving within the rigid wartime hierarchy of the Bulgarian army.59 The larger 
Bulgarian war effort absorbed and transformed both VMRO and Pirin.  
 By 1918 three exhausting years of mobilization in a war economy and the 
defense of the Salonika Front in Aegean Macedonia sapped Bulgaria’s economic 
health, political morale and military strength. The major Entente campaign 
unleashed that August succeeded in shattering Bulgarian lines — and with it, the 
Bulgarian government. French, British, Serbian and Greek forces broke through 
on the Salonika Front over September 14-26, threatening an advance into Pirin 
Macedonia and Kiustendil to the north. The Bulgarian government called for an 
armistice on September 28, 1918, and asked to begin peace talks. The defeat, 
compounded with the privations of the First World War became another “national 
catastrophe,” as the 1913 defeat in the Second Balkan War was already 
remembered. The resulting social upheaval continued the sense of crisis and 
conflict into the next decade. 
                                                
59 On this, see Todor Aleksandrov, Dnevnik i korespondentsiia ot purvata 
svetovna voina, 1915-1918 g. (Stara Zagora: Izdatelstvo “Znanie” OOD, n.d.), 24. 
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Figure 9 
Macedonian Borders after 1919 
 
 
The Shared Experience of Suffering 
 Bulgaria’s participation in the three wars of 1912-1918 came at 
devastating cost. At the Treaty of Nieully in 1919, Bulgaria was assessed 
reparations totaling 2.25 
billion gold francs, at 5 
percent annual interest. 
This figure was twice 
the Bulgarian national 
income of 1911, 
although payable over 
60 years. The initial 
required payment of 
105 million francs 
prompted the 
government to renege on war debts and further devalue the leva, which fell to 3 
percent of its pre-war parity with the gold franc.60 Bulgaria faced the further loss 
of the Strumitsa okoliia to the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
(hereafter, referred to as the Yugoslav Kingdom), and the loss of Western Thrace 
to Greece. The present borders of Pirin, Vardar and Aegean Macedonia were 
now established. Bulgaria retained some 10 percent of Macedonia, the Yugoslav 
                                                
60 Dimitur Kosev, Vunshnata politika na bulgariya pri upravlenieto na Andrei 
Lyapchev, 1926-1931 (Sofia: Iz-vo  “Prof. Marin Drinov, 1995).  
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Kingdom 38 percent, and Greece 52 percent (see Figure 9 and Figure 10, next 
page).61  
Figure 10 
 Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1923  
The Petrich Department (Pirin) following the loss of Strumitsa  
after the First World War  
 
Based on Bulgarskata akademia na naukite: Geografski institut, Atlas Narodna Republika Bulgariia (Sofia: 
Glavno upravlenie po geodeziia i kartografiia pri ministerstvoto na akrhitektura i blagoustroistvoto, 1973), 7. 
 
The Bulgarian “home front” saw considerable wartime privation in economic 
terms. The Balkan Wars alone resulted in state expenditures of some 1.3 billion 
francs, with a roughly equal additional debt (even after German assistance) for 
the First World War.62 Despite some attempts to regularize and nationalize the 
                                                
61 Elena Statelova, Istoriia na Nova bulgariia, 1878-1944. (Sofia: Izdatelska 
kushta Anubis, 1999), 337-338; Stefan Radulov, “Makedonksiiat I trakiiskiiat 
vupros na Parizhkata mirna konferentsiia, 1919 g.,” in Dobrin Michev, ed., 
Osvoboditelnite borbi sled purvata svetovna voina, 1919-1944 (Sofia: 
Macedonski nauchen institut and Bulgarskata akademiia na naukite, 2003); 
Rothschild, 326. Given the short duration of Strumitsa’s inclusion in Bulgaria and 
its previous position in the Monastir vilayet, I do not treat it here as a part of Pirin.  
62 Hall, Balkan Wars, 138; Hew Strachan, The First World War (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 955.   
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economy, industrial and agricultural production declined during the war due to 
the transfer of labor to the front. The economic infrastructure was severely 
overreached, particularly the rail network. Blockade of its Aegean coastline by 
the British navy and the needs of the Central Powers meant Bulgaria was unable 
to obtain replacement parts for imported machinery. A lack of credit hurt 
agriculture, and by 1919 the numbers of Bulgarian livestock and farm machinery 
had fallen by a third from the 1915 level.63 Extensive food rationing had been 
imposed during the war, due not simply to diminished production but because of 
the extensive requisitioning by Austrian and German agents and soldiers in the 
field. The inflation rate doubled in the last year of the war, far exceeding the 
increase in wages.64 Food shortages, combined with wartime pressures, 
weakened the population so that cholera and typhus epidemics swept the 
country. Then the great influenza epidemic of 1918 left some 150,000 civilians 
dead in its wake.  
 In Pirin, comparable losses came atop of the damages of the Balkan 
Wars, both of which had been fought across the province. Some 112,000 
refugees had poured into Bulgaria in 1913 through Pirin.65 Most had fled the 
destruction of towns such as Kukush and Serres in what became Greek or 
Serbian territory. But the fighting in 1913 had also done significant damage to 
Pirin, with Melnik and Gorna Dzhumaia suffering in particular.66 VMRO 
                                                
63 Berov, 170-183.  
64 Strachan, 955. 
65 Todorovski, 86-87. 
66 Ivan Katarjiev, ed., Predavnitsite na Makedonskoto delo (TsK na VMRO(Ob)) 
(Skopje: Kultura: 1983), 76-78. 
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established close links with a number of these refugee groups, championing their 
cause to the Bulgarian government.67 The Bulgarian government had begun 
efforts in 1913 to rebuild Pirin’s damaged towns and villages and spur agricultural 
development, but reconstruction was far from finished when conflict began again 
in 1915.68  
  Bad as the economic losses had been, the military losses were worse. 
Roughly 32,000 were killed in combat and 34,000 by disease with 110,000 
wounded in the two Balkan Wars. A further 101,224 dead and 144,026 wounded 
followed in the First World War.69 Nearly one in five adult males between the 
ages of 20 and 50 was killed between 1912 and 1918. The Macedonian 
Volunteer and 12th Macedonian Division’s own casualties reached this level; 
MOO alone suffered 720 dead and 3,300 wounded and missing in the Balkan 
Wars. In addition to the military casualties, a significant number of civilians were 
displaced or driven from their homes. Defeat in 1918 resulted in a new wave of 
refugees (many of whom, having fled in 1913, returned to homes in Vardar over 
1915-1918).70  
 Nearly 20,000 refugees in all would settle in Pirin, the second largest total 
in absolute numbers in Bulgaria. Many sought consciously to stay near Aegean 
                                                
67 Matov, 141-142. 
68 Hadzhinikolov, Veselin, et. al., Istoriia na Blagoevgradskata okruzhna 
organizatsiia na BKP (Sofia: Partzdat, 1979), 62-63. 
69 Hall, 135 (for Balkan Wars) and Rothschild, 325. There is substantial disparity 
in casualty figures, however. Rothschild, 325, gives a figure of 53,825 killed and 
wounded in the Balkan Wars, and Vachkov gives a figure of 82,574 killed and 
69,673 wounded in the two wars.  
70 Over 1913-1920, the total number of refugees reached 175,542 according to 
the Bulgarian census of 1920. However, some of these individuals had been 
refugees in both 1912-13 and 1918. See TsDA, fond 176, opis 5, a.e. 480, l. 15.  
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and Vardar Macedonia, hoping to return to their home towns and villages.71 That 
this sacrifice had been made apparently in vain added to widespread discontent 
with the existing political parties. So did woeful living conditions. Tens of 
thousands of refugees were left without adequate shelter in the winter of 1918 or 
were forced to sleep in livestock pens or barns.72 
 These losses helped to shape both a “narrative of Bulgarian suffering” and 
a “narrative of Macedonian suffering.” The former reflected a broad 
transformation and radicalization within Bulgarian society. The effect of the war 
had been to expose a significant number of Bulgarians to the horrors of warfare. 
But the war also stoked a sense of anger and radicalism that would polarize post-
war politics.73 The Macedonian narrative stressed the loss of Vardar and Aegean 
lands plus the perceived cruelty inflicted by the rival neighbor states. Repression 
now continued across the border in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The 
Yugoslav Kingdom and Greece now enacted new administrative measures to 
eliminate political dissent and ethnic separatism.74 Refugee organizations 
emerging in Bulgaria after 1918 fostered this narrative of suffering, which proved 
an effective rallying cry. The sheer number of immigrants from the Macedonian 
                                                
71 Only Burgas had a larger number of refugees. Georgi Dimitrov, Nastaniavane i 
ozemliavane na bulgarskite bezhantsi, 1919-1939 (Blagoevgrad: n.p., 1985).  
72 The result was a lingering feeling of animosity between refugees and the 
government’s Refugee Settlement Commission; see TsDA, fond 176, opis 4, a.e. 
795, l 1-2. 
73 Radulov, 13-14. See the arguments in Ivan Elenkov, Rodno i diasno (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo “LIK,” 1998), particularly 32-39; also see Koneva, 148-162, on the 
cultural impact of the war.  
74 Petrov, 67-88, presents the Bulgarian view. A recent Serbian view reassessing 
interwar policy in Vardar Macedonia is Vladan Ivanovi#, Jugoslovenska dr!ava i 
ju!na Srbija, 1918-1929 (Beograd: INIS, 2002), particularly 147-226. My thanks 
to Nadja Duha$ek for her assistance with the Serbian-language text.  
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lands made such organizations politically powerful and most maintained 
significant ties in membership to the pre-war paramilitary organizations.75 A 
considerable number of these refugees, particularly from Greece, subsequently 
resettled in Pirin, as will be addressed in Chapter Five.76 
 Crucial to the creation of this narrative was the conduct of the various 
combatants during the Balkan Wars. All of the armies engaged during the two 
wars had histories of attacking civilian populations and of mistreating prisoners. 
While the Bulgarian army and local cheti committed atrocities themselves, 77 
Bulgarian overextension and then the continued retreats of the Second Balkan 
War meant that Greek and Serbian forces (sometimes allied with local Muslims) 
had more frequent opportunities to attack civilians. For Macedonia as a whole, 
there are numerous accounts of atrocities carried out against civilians, 
particularly in Aegean Macedonia. The Greek offensive through Pirin during the 
Second Balkan War resulted in widespread devastation. In the words of one 
Greek soldier, “…from Serres to the frontier, we have burnt all the Bulgarian 
villages.”78 Both armies reportedly killed prisoners and the wounded, Greek 
soldiers privately confessed to attacking local Slav inhabitants. Accounts of 
atrocities in Pirin were unusually detailed, as illustrated not only by subsequent 
                                                
75 Aleksander Grebenarov and Trendafil Mitev, “Bezhanskite I emigrantskite 
organizatsiia na makedonskite i trakiiski bulgari (1919-1924 g.),” in Michev, 47-
51. 
76 Dimitur Tiulekov, Obrecheno rodoliobie: VMRO v Pirinsko, 1919-1934 
(Blagoevgrad: Makedonski nauchen institut, 2001), 10. 
77 For example, both pogroms and organized executions of local Muslim and 
Greeks in Strumitsa, Kukush and Serres, accompanied by rape, pillage and 
extortion. See Carnegie Endowment, The Other Balkan Wars (Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993), 73-75, 99.  
78 Carnegie Endowment, 308. 
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testimony made to the Carnegie Commission but also from Greek soldiers’ mail 
home seized by the Bulgarian army from a Greek supply train. Both victims and 
soldiers detailed repeated incidents of rape, looting, and the burning of villages. 
The Greek letters further recorded the murder of prisoners of war and massacres 
of refugees.79 The scope of the destruction is summarized in a list, stated to be 
incomplete, of 42 Pirin villages burned by the Greek army.80 The shared 
experience of suffering in both Pirin and the pre-1912 Bulgarian lands created 
some sense of unity.  
 
The Shared Experience of Combat 
 A shared feeling of comradeship paralleled this shared feeling of loss. The 
inhabitants of Pirin, serving as volunteers or drafted, fought alongside the 
Bulgarian army. The cohesive effect of service in VMRO cheti, the MOO Corps 
and the 12th Macedonian Division emerges from the records of the veterans units 
formed during the interwar period. This can be seen in the membership records 
for the Makedono-Odrinsko opulchensko druzhestvo: (Macedonian-Adrianople 
Volunteers Society).81 The Volunteers Society was not founded until 1934, 
partially through government initiatives in Pirin as detailed in Chapter Six. The 
                                                
79 Selected soldiers’ letters are translated and reproduced by the Carnegie 
Commission: see Carnegie, 307-314. Particularly striking is the statement of 
Spiliotopoulous Philippos regarding the murder of prisoners of war (ibid., 307-
308), and of E.N. Loghaidis, noting “…refugees from Koukouch and Lahna. The 
guns mowed them down on the road.” (ibid, 313).  
80 Carnegie, 314-316. The villages are individually named; Sixteen in the Melnik 
district and fourteen in the Petrich district, both in southern Pirin, but seven 
villages in the Nevrokop district (as well as part of the town of Nevrokop itself), 
four in the Gorna Dzhumaia district and one in the Razlog district were also 
burned.   
81 ODAB, Fond 314K, opis 4, a.e. 1-148.  
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membership applications required the candidate to state birthplace, occupation, 
birth year, education and army service, allowing for a reasonable survey to be 
made of Society’s composition.82 The overall picture is one of an organization 
united across social boundaries.  
 The applications suggest, unsurprisingly, that the veterans were effectively 
drawn from the same generation — this one coming after the 1890s generation 
that fought the Ilinden Uprising. Members still ranged broadly in age, the 
youngest being 14 at the outbreak of the First Balkan War (and 36 when the 
society was founded), and the oldest 56 at the outbreak of the war (78 in 1934). 
But even taking casualties during the war and deaths due to old age into 
consideration, the age distribution breaks down into a much narrower pattern: 58 
percent of the Society’s members had been born between 1882 and 1892. They 
were thus 20 to 29 years old in 1912 (32 to 44 in 1934).83 Nearly 11 percent of 
the total membership was born in 1882 alone, and more members were born 
each year between 1880 and 1890 than any year before or after. Despite the 
presence of older veterans (many of whom had previously fought with VMRO) 
and younger volunteers, the Volunteers’ Society reflects the fact that the 
Macedonian struggle was in many ways a “generational event.” 
                                                
82 Some of the applications are partially incomplete: for example, a.e. 80, the 
application membership for Dimitur Donev Radiech, lists no date of birth while 
listing the remaining information—and the numbers used here correspondingly 
vary slightly. 
83 With regards to the remaining membership, based on the total applications in 
included in the fond, eleven percent had been born in or before 1872 (more than 
40 years old in 1912), twenty-seven percent were born over 1873-1881 (31 to 39 
years old in 1912), and only nine percent were born between 1883 to 1898 (14 to 
19).   
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 More suggestive of a yet uncertain national consciousness in the region is 
the information regarding birthplace and social background. State-sponsored 
mobilization proved to be a unifying force across social boundaries. Service in 
the wars crossed the rural-urban divide of the pre-1912 period, even though 83 
percent of the membership listed a village as their place of origin. Far more 
significant is the distribution by birthplace. Although 46 percent were born in the 
Pirin region, 28 percent were immigrants from Aegean Macedonia and 21 
percent from Vardar Macedonia.84 No single locality predominated; the largest 
concentrations were of eight immigrants from the town of Kukush (in Aegean 
Macedonia), four immigrants from Strumitsa (part of Pirin between 1913-1918), 
three natives of the town of Gorna Dzhumaia and three natives of the nearby 
village of Razdezh. In terms of education, only two of the applicants had attended 
gymnasium or university. But 37 of 120 applicants had completed secondary 
school, with a further 30 recording some secondary education. Twelve (generally 
older) stated that they were either illiterate, “unschooled,” or had no formal 
education.85 The armed struggle was a cohesive experience across the 
Macedonian lands, and a unifying event that brought immigrants and the Pirin-
born together after the war. These were also men from a broadly similar social 
background, most of whom lacked close pre-war educational or urban exposure 
to a Bulgarian national consciousness. Their service in the Bulgarian army during 
                                                
84 In addition, one listed a birthplace in northern Bulgaria and two listed 
birthplaces in Serbia. Such loss of birthplace among immigrant soldiers reflects 
the link with the refugee movement in encouraging a broad sense of 
“Macedonian” unity, through shared suffering.  
85 Information from applications in ODAB, Fond 314K, opis 4, a.e. 1-148. 
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the war years of 1915-1918 was thus their first prolonged experience with Sofia’s 
state- and nation-building efforts. While educated elites had embraced the 
national cause in the past, the rural majority now embraced it during the war 
years.86  
. This snapshot of men who served in the Volunteers and the 12th 
Macedonian infantry portrays both units as inclusive bodies that brought 
disparate men together from throughout the Macedonia lands. In 1912, much of 
Macedonia was relatively isolated. Although a small number of Macedonians 
were able to obtain foreign educations, and certain regions (such as the Salonika 
hinterland, or the Salonika-Veles-Skopje-Belgrade train corridor) were more open 
to the outside world, the majority of the Macedonian vilayets remained relatively 
closed both by Ottoman policies and by geographic isolation.  
 Pirin was connected to Bulgaria only by a road link between Dupnitsa and 
Gorna Dzhumaia, and the region was internally served by a road link that 
followed the Struma river south from Gorrna Dzhumaia. For villages isolated from 
each other, the mobilizing experience of struggle through VMRO, MOO and the 
12th Infantry created a unifying consciousness of comradeship that the Bulgarian 
state, defeated both in 1913 and 1918, shared — but failed to capture for itself 
alone. This question of a yet divided national consciousness would be recast in 
                                                
86 This can be contrasted with the situation in post-war Greece, which lacked a 
similar “integrative event” to unite native Greeks and immigrants from Bulgaria 
and Asia Minor. It also suggests that educated émigrés from Macedonia were 
more likely to settle in Sofia, Plovdiv, Ruse or other cities in Bulgaria, suggesting 
the need for additional research on the social divisions between émigré 
settlement in Bulgaria. 
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1918-1923, when the movement demanded separate recognition in the context 
of domestic civil upheaval.  
 
Struggle at Home: the Macedonian Movement and Aleksander Stamboliiski  
 In the closing stages of the First World War, morale in the Bulgarian army 
collapsed in the face of the Entente offensive on the Salonika Front. Worse, 
signs of discontent in the army heralded the possibility of revolution.87 Two 
regiments mutinied on September 16, and revolutionary Soviets were established 
in three towns on September 23. Agitation culminated with the outbreak of the 
Radomir Rebellion on September 27. Aleksandar Stamboliiski, leader of the 
Bulgarski Zemedelski Naroden Siuoz (BZNS, or Bulgarian Agricultural National 
Union) and the most prominent figure in the opposition to the war, now joined the 
rebellious army units in Radomir and demanded political change in the country 
 Although army units loyal to the government quickly dispersed the 
Radomir Rebellion and forced Stamboliiski into hiding, the old political order was 
now clearly in retreat. Tsar Ferdinand abdicated on October 4, 1918, giving way 
to his son Boris III. By the summer of 1919, domestic unrest forced Boris to call 
for new elections. Stamboliiski, now pardoned for his part in the 1918 army 
mutinies, entered the election at the head of the Agrarian Union. It won a plurality 
of votes that allowed him to take power as prime minister in a coalition with left-
wing parties (although not including the Bulgarian Communist Party). A second 
election, in March 1920, brought the BZNS sufficient seats in parliament for 
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Stamboliiski to dispense with the coalition and undertake a radical shift in 
domestic and foreign policy. Characterizing the Neiully treaty as a “corpse 
drowning the entire Bulgarian nation in mourning,” 88 Stamboliiski sought a 
foreign policy of accommodation with the Yugoslav Kingdom and Greece. 
 In domestic policy, Stamboliiski sought nothing less than the complete 
reorientation of Bulgarian administration, politics and economics to serve the 
needs and desires of Bulgaria’s peasant majority. His first priority was however to 
secure enough domestic and international stability to carry out necessary 
reforms. Stamboliiski sought not just to reduce the past influence of the 
Macedonian paramilitary movement within Bulgaria. He proved willing to accept 
the surrender of the “lost Macedonian lands” to Greece and the Yugoslav 
Kingdom in return for cooperation with Athens and Belgrade in reducing 
Bulgarian reparations and ending Bulgaria’s diplomatic isolation in the region. 
This brought him into direct conflict with a reorganized and still armed 
Macedonian paramilitary movement.89 
 As part of the Bulgarian army, the 12th Macedonian Division had been 
demobilized in 1918 at Gorna Dzhumaia, in Pirin. It was from among these 
veterans that now demobilized Bulgarian army Generals Todor Aleksandrov and 
Aleksandar Protogerov began to recruit men to re-found VMRO, only weeks after 
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Party,” September 30, 1919, in Voinov, Documents, 418. 
89 Georgi Markov, Kambanite biiat sami, reprinted in Pokusheniia, nasilie i politika 
v Bulgariia, 1878-1947 (Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2003), 157-159. 
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the war ended.90 The organization of a new VMRO had begun barely a month 
after Bulgaria left the war with an eye to shaping post-war policy on the lost lands 
of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.91 The formation of a new organization, and of 
armed cheti, accelerated in 1919 when the terms of the Neuilly Treaty became 
known.92 The treaty lead as well to open cooperation with émigré groups within 
Bulgaria. Decrying efforts by the governments of Greece and Yugoslav Kingdom 
to “Hellenize” and “Serbianize” the inhabitants of Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, 
Aleksandrov launched a new guerilla campaign.93  
 In loose cooperation with émigré and refugee groups, VMRO also began 
to campaign politically for the creation of an “autonomous” Macedonia that would 
re-unify the Macedonian territories now split between Bulgaria, Greece and the 
newly-founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. This program reflected 
an arguably accurate assessment of the limited power and willingness of the 
Bulgarian state to champion the Macedonian cause after the First World War. 
VMRO now called for a return to the strategy of seeking autonomy. In the short 
run, the organization appealed to the League of Nations that Vardar, Pirin and 
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Aegean Macedonia be unified and granted autonomy under a mandate.94 One 
group of émigrés from Macedonia even approached the United States to ask if it 
would be willing to assume a mandate over Macedonia and Thrace.95 Ultimately, 
however, it was the movement’s own growing paramilitary power that would 
enable it, as Chapter Five details, to rule Pirin autonomously. 
 Aleksandrov was able to raise an army of 9,100 men between 1919 and 
1923, concentrated in Gorna Dzhumaia (3,000), Petrich (2,100) and Nevrokop 
(1,800). A further 1,675 guerillas operated in Vardar Macedonia, with aid and 
assistance smuggled across the border.96 Solicitations from the Macedonian 
émigré community in Bulgaria and “taxes” requisitioned by VMRO in Pirin 
financed the process. All of this recalled the prewar experience of military 
mobilization. But Aleksandrov’s own experience in a military hierarchy between 
1912-1918, as noted above, led him to reform VMRO’s organization. Before 
1912, the mobilization of cheti by locality encouraged the formation of loose, 
geographically-based “groups.” The new VMRO arguably borrowed from 
Aleksandrov’s military service in the Bulgarian army to create regular formations 
(while retaining the name cheta) and centralized command.97 What distinguishing 
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this postwar mobilization was not only its basing inside Bulgaria,98 but how it 
drew upon the experience of service with and within the Bulgarian Army over 
1912-1918. 
 As early as November 1918, Stamboliiksi had endorsed the arrest of 
leaders of the Macedonian paramilitary and political organizations. After taking 
power, he consistently tried to suppress VMRO, perceiving the movement as a 
direct threat to the stability of the government. In 1921 Stamboliiski’s government 
attempted to disarm the growing paramilitary wing of VMRO forcibly, leading to 
open conflict.99 Minister for War Alexander Dimitrov offered a reward for the 
death or capture of VMRO leaders and embarked on a purge of VMRO 
sympathizers from the army and border guards. As government forces attempted 
to arrest or eliminate VMRO members, VMRO turned to terrorist acts against the 
government. Dimitrov himself was ambushed on October 22 and, along with two 
companions, was shot and then hacked to death by bayonets.100  
 Over 1921 and 1923, VMRO was effectively able to undermine and 
assume the role of local government in Pirin, primarily because of the profound 
military weakness of Stamboliiski’s regime.101 VMRO, at its height, could boast of 
over 9,000 komitadzhii; government forces, in turn, had been limited by the 
                                                
98 This is similar to the Supremacist’s tendency, before 1904, to stage raids out of 
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Treaty of Neuilly to 20,000 soldiers and a combined force of gendarmes, border 
guards and municipal police forces not to exceed 10,000.102 Much of this armed 
force in turn had previously been sympathetic to VMRO’s aims, and were 
alarmed by Stamboliiski’s use of his own paramilitary force, the Orange Guard 
(Oranzheva gvardiia), and his organizing of a draft to provide “labor battalions” 
outside of the army’s control.103 Arguably, Bulgarian government forces under 
Stamboliiski’s command were not only insufficient in number to confront VMRO 
but unwilling to do so.  
 Internationally, the increasing power of VMRO threatened to destabilize 
Bulgaria’s relations with Serbia and Greece as cheti raided into both countries, 
assassinating local officials and ambushing police and soldiers. In June 1922 a 
joint note from Greece, Romania and the Yugoslav Kingdom warned Stamboliiski 
that unless Bulgaria acted to suppress VMRO, they would occupy Bulgaria and 
suppress the paramilitary movement directly.104 The situation worsened on 
September 4, 1922, when VMRO not only dispatched 1,000 komitadzhii on a raid 
into Vardar Macedonia, but took over the town of Kiustendil within Bulgaria. This 
                                                
102 See Articles 66 and 69 of the Treaty of Neiully. “Treaty of Peace Between the 
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104 Bell, 201.  
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forcible occupation was a direct challenge to the state authority of the 
Stamobiliiski regime105  
  In 1923, Stamboliiski attempted to solve the problem of hostile 
neighboring states and a hostile paramilitary group at home simultaneously. He 
signed Treaty of Ni% with the Yugoslav Kingdom in order to create a common 
security border between the two states. Its terms provided for a 200 meter 
cleared zone, joint border patrols and mutual rights to pursue guerillas across the 
border. Stamboliiski also announced a new purge to remove VMRO-
sympathizers from the government, as well as the creation of a special police 
force  to eliminate VMRO.106  
 Wider, political opposition to Stamboliiski had already emerged, 
encouraged by his autocratic style of rule. In 1922, the Bulgarian right had 
coalesced into an opposition coalition, the National Alliance (Natsionalen suiuz). 
Stamboliiski responded by arresting its leadership. By mid-1923, the Natsionalen 
suiuz, the Military League (Voenen suiuz, a “non-political” party composed of 
Bulgarian army officers founded in 1919 to resist the Neuilly Treaty’s restrictions 
on the Bulgarian Army) came together with veterans groups and elements of the 
active Bulgarian army to form an underground conservative opposition to 
Stamboliiski. Negotiations were opened with VMRO in 1923 to include the 
organization — and its paramilitary wing — in a conspiracy against the regime.107   
                                                
105 Gotsev, “Vuzobnoviavane,” 103-104. 
106 On the stepped up campaign, see Gotsev, “Vuzobnoviavane,” 103-104; Bell, 
203-204. 
107 Tiulekov, 23-24. 
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 On June 11, 1923, military officers belonging to the Military League, 
VMRO members and “volunteers” from several veterans groups moved to take 
control of Sofia, the capital.108 A mixed group seized Stamboliiski himself on June 
13 and proceeded to torture him, stab him nearly sixty times and cut off his right 
hand (the hand which had signed the Treaty of Ni%). A VMRO member finally 
decapitated him after the ordeal.109 With Stamboliiski’s murder, VMRO forged a 
working partnership with the other groups in the coup d’etat. VMRO offered this 
not for reasons of political ideology, as a tactical alliance. The wartime years of 
frustrated struggle would now be transformed into open political control of the 
Pirin district within Bulgaria. And VMRO, eschewing public declarations of 
political ideology, now proved willing to work with any political grouping — not 
only the conservatives of the 1923 coup but, potentially, Communists and 
Fascists as well — to secure the supported needed to advance its agenda of 
redrawing the borders of Macedonia along the lines it defined.  
 
Conflict and Consciousness 
 The armed struggle of 1912-1923 transformed Pirin through its 
incorporation into a larger, longer struggle. The region’s participation in the 
Balkan and First World Wars and postwar internal conflict still left in place — 
arguably, even reinforced — two rival narratives of national consciousness, 
Macedonian and Bulgarian versions whose compatibility remained unsettled. 
                                                
108 On the coup, see Statelova, Nova istorii, 390-395. A relatively first-hand 
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These narratives were adopted in the subsequent interwar period by, 
respectively, those favoring local autonomy and those favoring integration into 
the Bulgarian state. VMRO, the Volunteers and the Macedonian Division had 
each fought distinctive campaigns during the wartime and immediate postwar 
periods which could be understood within a context that emphasized a broader 
Bulgarian interpretation or a narrative of a Macedonian struggle.  
 In a practical sense, the events of 1912-23 also transformed the loose 
paramilitary structure of VMRO into a more centralized organization. At the same 
time, however, these events revealed the continued existence of old fault lines, 
e.g., the continuance of “autonomist” and “unification” wings of the Macedonian 
movement. In the post-1923 period VMRO would embark on establishing its own 
administrative regime within the Pirin district that served to, as detailed in 
Chapter Five, outweigh the authority of the Bulgarian state itself. Yet in this 
period conflict within the movement also emerged clearly. Even as VMRO sought 
autonomy from the Bulgarian state to administer its own Pirin statelet, factions 
within VMRO sought their own autonomy from Aleksandrov’s centralizing 








A State Within a State: Pirin, 1923-1934 
 
 
 On October 22, 1925, advance units of the Greek 6th Division crossed the 
border into Pirin with orders to secure the frontier between Greece and Bulgaria. 
The remainder of the 3rd and 4th Corps mobilized to render support if necessary. 
An incident the week before between Bulgarian and Greek border guards had 
resulted in the fatal shooting of a Greek soldier and was the immediate trigger for 
the incursion. But it was the persistent cross-border raids by a revitalized Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (Vutreshna Makedonska Revoliutsionna 
Organizatsiia, or VMRO) that encouraged the Greek Ministry of War’s decision to 
invade.  
VMRO used its Pirin “state within a state” as a base for launching cross-
border raids into Greece and the Yugoslav Kingdom. A successful Greek 
campaign could eliminate VMRO outright, destroy its ability to stage cross-border 
invasions or at least pressure the Bulgarian government to crackdown on the 
paramilitary.1 In the following three days Greek forces occupied ten villages 
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inside the border and penetrated to a depth of ten kilometers. Several hundred 
infantry, supported by artillery and observation aircraft, proceeded to lay siege to 
the town of Petrich, the provincial capital and headquarters of VMRO. 
 The Bulgarian government mobilized troops of the 7th Rila Division in 
response, dispatching them south to Petrich. An active defense had already been 
put in place, however. Nearly 450 komitadzhii of VMRO took up positions around 
and in the town, outnumbering the Bulgarian troops present. As the Greeks 
shelled and then assaulted the town, the Bulgarian government protested to the 
League of Nations. The League agreed to mediate, and on October 30 Greek 
troops began to withdraw back across the border; the combined losses of both 
sides were roughly 50 dead. International mediation brought Bulgaria a 
diplomatic victory, as the League found the Greek incursion illegal and levied a 
fine of some 24 million leva (equivalent to $220,000 at the time). VMRO itself 
won a substantial propaganda victory for its defense of the city and subsequent 
role in rebuilding its damaged areas.2 
 The incident in 1925 highlights VMRO’s predominant position in Pirin.  
From 1923 until 1934, VMRO provided a parallel organizational structure — “a 
state within a state” — that rivaled or surpassed that of the central government. 
From 1923 to 1934, successive central governments in Sofia chose not to 
                                                                                                                                            
attempt to put pressure on the Bulgarian government, to force Sofia to restrict the 
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dispute VMRO’s influence and power within Pirin. Although the government was 
nominally sovereign, in fact the province gained the autonomy that local elites 
had demanded in the past. This represents a deviation from Charles Maier’s 
European structural narrative for the continued expansion, strengthening and 
centralization of state power, as noted in Chapter One.3 For late-coming and 
weak Southeastern European states, their powers in the interwar period were 
indeed used to press for the extension of schooling, military service, the 
development of economic infrastructure and expanded state employment. The 
Bulgarian government had begun what Anthony Smith calls an “administrative 
mobilization” of the province in 1912, encouraging a national consciousness 
synonymous with the state.4 Now, however, VMRO supplanted the rule of Sofia 
and assumed control over this mobilization. VMRO’s rule over the region allowed 
it, in cooperation with allied Macedonian organizations, to offer alternative 
narratives, symbols, myths and experiences, as discussed below.  
 These offerings reinforced a local consciousness already partially forged 
in the resistance efforts of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century. Aspects of identity normally state controlled were, instead, under local 
control. To be Bulgarian in Pirin between 1923-1934 was to be a Macedonian 
Bulgarian, to feel the influence of Macedonian organizations in daily life and to 
serve and be served by a local regime that was, for a decade, defined in practice 
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as a Macedonian state in Bulgaria. VMRO ruled Pirin; and it justified this rule by 
stressing its role as defender of not only of the inhabitants of Pirin. The 1925 
incident demonstrated the organization’s commitment and effectiveness to the 
Slav inhabitants of Aegean and Vardar Macedonia as well. 
 
VMRO: Defending Macedonia 
 The three professed goals of the postwar VMRO were to assist 
Macedonian refugees settling in Bulgaria, to contest Greek and Serbian control 
over Aegean and Vardar Macedonia, and to encourage a political climate within 
Bulgaria receptive to the first two goals.5 Aleksandur Protogerov, one of the three 
leaders of the Central Committee of VMRO in the immediate post-war period, 
argued that in pursuing these goals VMRO did not oppose the government, but 
served common interests.6 In other words, it undertook policies that the 
government should be carrying out. After all, its participation in the coup of 1923 
had been to secure a government friendly to VMRO’s goals.7  
 The assumption of control over Pirin in 1923 was justified as part of 
VMRO’s struggle to liberate Aegean and Vardar Macedonia. Bases in the region 
were necessary to allow cross-border attacks into Greece and Yugoslavia. 
Moreover, VMRO could count upon some donations from the hundreds of 
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thousands of war refugees who settled postwar in Bulgaria and from the existing 
prewar émigré Macedonian community. But Pirin (as discussed below) provided 
an additional, steady source of financial support and recruitment that the 
organization could control directly to raise detachments and fund these forces. 
VMRO’s “state within a state,” was justified as an emergency measure necessary 
for the liberation of Macedonia. What it was not — at least initially — was a 
formal attempt to create an “autonomous” Macedonian region within Bulgaria 
such as many in the Seres group had anticipated before the Balkan Wars.8  
 The reinvigorated VMRO divided Pirin into military districts just as the pre-
war organization had done, each district again hosting a number of cheti led by a 
voivoda. What was now different was a far more systematic organization. Formal 
structures for military training and inspection were created for the first time. 
Military inspectors began making regular reports for the organization’s Central 
Committee. “Censuses” were taken at the local and village level, to assess the 
training of local komitadzhii, to inventory and inspect weapons, and to assess the 
effectiveness of officers and non-commissioned officers.9 Districts were divided 
into military sub-districts, each with their own local commanders. The Petrich 
district, for example, was divided into seven sub-districts with 62 voivoidi and 449 
komitadzhii.10 This allowed for better organization and training, as well as 
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logistics — the Central Committee supplying cartridges, grenades and uniforms 
for the active guerillas.11 These seven sub-districts also created the basis for 
further administrative efforts in Pirin.  
 Cheti were formed in preparation for carrying out armed incursions. As 
noted in Chapter Four, VMRO was already sending cheti into Vardar and Aegean 
Macedonia by 1920. These incursions were aimed at undermining Greek and 
Serbian rule over their respective Macedonian territories. Attacks on Serbian and 
Greek border guards, even military units, peaked in the mid-1920s. Such raids 
were serious enough to provoke the Greek incursion in 1925, and a second 
border conflict which occurred in 1931. The raids into Vardar Macedonia 
prompted the Yugoslav Kingdom in 1927 to close its border with Bulgaria in 
protest.12 While such cross-border terrorist attacks achieved little in military 
terms, they affirmed VMRO’s continuing and active role as defender of 
Macedonian rights in the face of the Bulgarian state’s passivity. 
 In addition to supporting cross-border guerillas, VMRO took an active 
interest in forming local militias of the sort that rallied to Petrich’s defense in 
1925.13 These bands, too, were regularly inspected, armed and organized, and in 
much greater numbers than the active chetnitsi. The Petrich sub-district 
registered nearly 4,000 militia members, while Gorna Dzhumaia boasted over 
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6,000 militiamen, compared to 523 active chetnitsi from the district.14 Such 
militias comprised up to the quarter of adult men in the district. To service and 
support this force, VMRO developed its own provincial administration, which a 
Bulgarian state constrained by crisis was not able to contest.   
 
The Weak Central State: the Economic Crises of 1923-1934 
 As noted in Chapter Three, the Bulgarian state created in 1878 was highly 
centralized. The Bulgarian constitution stipulated a constitutional monarchy with 
a strong parliament (Subranie) elected by universal manhood suffrage. The 
Prince (Tsar from 1908) remained head of state, with the right to conduct 
“agreements with neighboring powers,” appoint ministers to the cabinet, suspend 
civil liberties and call elections.15 But the position of prime minister held 
substantial powers as did the cabinet, generally appointed from among the 
members of the Subranie. The crisis of 1919 weakened the position of the 
monarch, now Ferdinand’s 29-year-old son Boris, allowing the rise of Alexandur 
Stamboliiski as Chapter Four details. Following his overthrow in 1923, political 
power would be concentrated in the hands of the political elite centered in Sofia 
(including Tsar Boris) as it had been before 1918.16  
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 The ministries maintained firm control over the day-to-day matters of the 
government, with their central bureaucracies in Sofia directing officials in the rest 
of the country.17 Provincial offices were merely the extensions of the central 
authorities; regional and local governments lacked autonomous or independent 
jurisdiction. The 1879 Veliko Turnovo Constitution had reserved considerable 
powers of self-government for the provinces, but these measures (among others) 
were already undermined by the 1880s.18  
 Several ministries were particularly important. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and National Health (Ministerstvoto na vutreshnite raboti i narodnoto 
zdrave, or MVRNZ) controlled the police, domestic intelligence and the 
monitoring of national and local political affairs and administration.19 The Ministry 
of Education (Ministerstvoto na obrazovanieto, or MO) was a centralized body 
that set and inspected the curricula of local schools.20 The Ministry of Trade and 
Agriculture (Ministerstvoto na turgoviiata i zemedelieto, or MTZ) held a monopoly 
on the sale of certain goods (for tax purposes). From Stamboliiski’s regime 
forward, It also maintained a considerable staff of agronomists and veterinarians 
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in the interests of improving national agricultural production. The Ministry of 
Public Buildings, Roads and Communications (Ministerstvoto na obshtestvenite 
sgradi, putishtata i suobshteniiata, or MOSPS) operated the state’s monopolies 
on telegraph and telephone lines and on the operation of railroads.21  
 All of these ministries, as detailed below, were active in Pirin. But the 
latter’s “shadow government” took over elements of their powers. The state 
could, and did, expand rail lines, dictate national school curricula or demand a 
formal hiring process for government employees. But VMRO influenced the hiring 
of local government employees, distributed “local funds” to communities in the 
region for schools and public works and directly pressured the local 
representatives of the central ministries.  VMRO’s strength came in the midst of 
political and economic crises that beset the Bulgarian government in the 1920s, 
and formed the conditions in which VMRO was able to establish its own 
administration in Pirin.  
The fall of Stamboliiski in 1923, as discussed in Chapter Four, crystallized 
the dilemmas Bulgarian political leaders would face in the interwar period. These 
included the lack of political consensus, an isolated political elite and an 
electorate chiefly composed of a peasantry with little inclination to participate in 
politics (at least following the overthrow of the Agrarian regime that represented 
them). The coup that unseated Stamboliiski did briefly mobilize broad support 
from across the political spectrum. Those few groups not directly participating 
with the Democratic Harmony bloc (Demokratichen Sgovor, hereafter Sgovor) 
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still refused to help the Agrarians resist the coup.22 Such unity did not last. The 
interwar period saw political leaders from Aleksandur Tsankov to Tsar Boris 
foster divisions between political parties to prevent the emergence of successful 
coalitions in opposition, rather than attempt to build a single ruling coalition. This 
division contributed to a feeling of political stagnation and alienation. Though 
Stamboliiski may have been autocratic, he had enjoyed mass support in 
democratic elections. Successive regimes never obtained the same levels of 
popularity.23 VMRO is thus unusual as an organization with significant mass 
support in Bulgaria, albeit limited to émigrés and the inhabitants of Pirin.  
Aleksandur Tsankov, prime minister from 1923 to 1926, continued some 
of Stamboliiski’s reforms as well as wartime policies of government 
rationalization and economic intervention.24 Within four months the new regime 
was confronted by the September Uprising led by the Bulgarian Communist Party 
(Bulgarska Komunisticeska Partiia, or BKP), a rebellion stronger in the provinces 
than in urban and industrializing Sofia. The army and VMRO were called upon to 
                                                
22 The National Liberals, Social Democrats and Communists all refused to 
cooperate. The National Liberals would, however, participate in Tsankov’s 
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23 The electoral turnouts in Bulgaria, always higher than 80 percent in the interwar 
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by law. Moreover, “electoral machines” were crucial in bringing voters to the 
polls. The two most successful machines, in fact, were in Petrich (run by VMRO), 
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tolerance of  local Islamic belief. See Kostadinova, 41-70. 
24 In this light, see Aleksandur Tsankov, Bulgariia v burno vreme: spomeni (Sofia: 




eliminate the uprising, which lasted only a few weeks in isolated areas.25 The 
turmoil gave Tsankov the pretext to declare martial law, crack down on political 
opposition within Bulgaria and ban the Communist Party on April 1, 1924. 
Bulgarian politics became polarized between the left and the right, with 
simultaneous (if limited) “red” and “white” terrors against a backdrop of a 
dissatisfied and disinterested “green” peasantry. The Agrarian Party itself split 
into factions following Stamboliiski’s death, and was unable to provide a viable 
alternative. 
Political violence escalated with the Communist assassination of 
parliament member General Kosta Georgiev on April 14, 1925 and the attempt 
during Georgiev’s funeral to kill Tsar Boris by means of dynamite planted in the 
dome of Sveti Nedelia Cathedral in Sofia. Although Boris left early and was 
unharmed, the explosion killed 128 in the mourning party, including three 
members of parliament, fourteen generals and both the mayor and chief of police 
of Sofia. A further 323 present were wounded. 26 Acting on public indignation 
over the scope of the bombing and the fact that the assassins had chosen a 
                                                
25 The Uprising was due, in part, to the urging of Moscow. The BKP’s refused to 
rally to Stamboliiski’s aid only to see the Agrarian regime replaced with a 
conservative one. The Communist Uprising was, ironically, stronger in rural areas 
where elements of the peasantry supported it than it was in Sofia, where the 
Bulgarian working class was concentrated.  To add to the poor planning of the 
uprising, an agreement brokered with Todor Aleksandrov had guaranteed that 
VMRO would not intervene, but also that the Communists would not undertake 
any revolutionary activities in Pirin. When the Uprising spread into the province, 
Aleksandrov intervened on the side of Tsankov’s government.  
26 Georgi Markov, Pokusheniia, nasilie i politika v Bulgariia, 1878-1947 (Sofiia: 
Voenno izdatelstvo, 2003), 221-228; Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of 
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religious site for the attack, the government’s response was a new wave of 
political crackdowns.  
Tsankov was already seeking to expand state power and to intervene 
broadly in political, economic and social affairs within Bulgaria, with the goal of 
reshaping both the country and the Bulgarian nation itself.27 This goal 
consciously continued the state’s wartime policies between 1915-1918 and 
reflected a belief in the need to renew the state’s authority. To do so, Tsankov 
resolved to eliminate any opposition. He thus sought to eradicate the Communist 
Party, which was now declared illegal, driven underground (as were its youth and 
trade union wings), crippled by thousands of arrests and the killing of perhaps 
5,000 of its membership from 1923 to 1925. This same state apparatus of 
repression was also increasingly used to target the non-Communist opposition as 
well, for example the use of police to disrupt political rallies and crackdowns on 
political publications.28 VMRO was spared such measures. Tsankov needed to 
maintain good relations with the paramilitary force that had proven invaluable in 
the coup of June and Communist counter-coup of September 1923.29 But 
Tsankov’s use of “white terror” provoked international criticism that barred 
Bulgaria’s access to desperately needed loans from the League of Nations for 
refugee resettlement. On January 4, 1926, Tsankov and his cabinet resigned.30 
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Svogor formed a new cabinet around Andrei Liapchev, soon confirmed in 
office by the parliamentary elections of 1927. Liapchev now eased police 
repression, while keeping the portfolio of minister of internal affairs for himself 
and continuing Tsankov’s use of the police against political rivals, if at a reduced 
level. The formation of an opposing “Iron Block” (Zhelezen blok) of Socialist, 
Communist and Agrarian interests confirmed the political division within the 
country and continued a sense of crisis. VMRO’s continuing cross-border terrorist 
attacks in particular hindered the government’s attempts to improve relations with 
either Great Britain and France or the Yugoslav Kingdom and Greece.31  
It was in these circumstances that the Great Depression descended on 
Bulgaria in 1929. The country’s economy had remained primarily agrarian, 
exporting cereals and industrial crops with limited industrial manufacturing for 
domestic purposes. The sharp drop in world agricultural prices devastated this 
economy.32 Liapchev responded by continuing and expanding state intervention 
in the economy.33 The government had already revised tariffs upwards several 
times in the 1920s. By 1931 it would raise them further on foodstuffs (duties of 
114 percent), semi-manufactured goods (72.5 percent) and manufactured goods 
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Drinov,” 1995.) 
32 In the 1926 census, the total number of active workers in mining, industry, 
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(110 percent).34 Industrial concerns had already received tax-free privileges in 
1925, as well as state subsidies on energy and railroad rates, the free use of 
state land and sales to the government at preferential rates. These benefits 
would be expanded during the Depression to protect other domestic producers. 
This sort of intervention helped Bulgaria achieve significant industrial growth 
even during the Depression, particularly in Sofia.35 Domestic industrial producers 
of consumer goods were largely able to displace imported goods entirely.36  
These limited economic successes could not overcome the stagnation of 
the agricultural sector. Accounting for the majority of Bulgarian exports by volume 
and by value, its value plummeted after 1929. Markets in foreign countries were 
closed as governments raised tariff barriers and enacted preferential legislation 
for domestic producers.37 State intervention had from 1923-1929 focused chiefly 
on industry, viewed across the political spectrum as the necessary factor for 
modernization of the economy. The state’s response to agricultural crisis in 1929 
was to step in. The limited agricultural reforms inherited from Stamboliiski’s 
regime were expanded and Liapchev created Hraniznos in 1930, a state-run 
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cereal monopoly, in an attempt to stabilize the market and arrange export 
sales.38  
This helped to modernize agriculture, which saw improvements both in 
production and (in 1934) greater access to credit. Such efforts did not alleviate 
the worst effects of the Depression in the villages, either in Pirin or throughout 
Bulgaria.39 Industrial growth came at the expense of the villages as rising costs of 
domestic semi-manufactured and manufactured goods (already more expensive 
than the imports they displaced) were passed on to Bulgarian consumers. “Price 
scissors,” as agricultural products decreased in value but the cost of goods 
stayed stable or increased, reduced the real income of the peasantry by 50 
percent within a decade.40 Pirin, dependent on an export-oriented tobacco crop, 
was among those areas worst hit by the economic depression. In such conditions 
it is not surprising that the government suffered from a crisis of public confidence. 
Bulgarian Communists, now known as the Bulgarian Worker’s Party (BRP) after 
1928, enjoyed a rapid expansion and weakened Liapchev’s position further by 
fomenting a series of strikes in 1930-31. Within Pirin, Communist agitation 
among tobacco workers achieved notable success. The Communists also made 
steady electoral gains (through front parties) in the provincial elections of 
November 1930 and municipal elections of February 1931.41 With the public 
                                                
38 Lampe and Jackson, 435. 
39 Statelova, Istoriia na Nova Bulgariia, 463.  
40 Lampe and Jackson, 450. See also Berend, 255-6.   
41 On this, see Joseph Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and 




increasingly viewing the regime as unstable, Liapchev’s cabinet resigned on April 
21.42 
 The state of crisis encouraged the formation of the “People’s Bloc” 
(Naroden Blok), a broad coalition including the Democratic Party, Radical 
Democrats, both wings of the Agrarians and part of the National Liberals. The 
Bloc campaigned on a “manifesto for the Bulgarian people” stressing both 
internal and external reconciliation and stability.43 While successful in obtaining 
broad popular support and brokering a ruling coalition between the centrist 
parties in Bulgaria, the Bloc faced three significant challenges. The first was the 
BKP, which eclipsed the fading Social Democrats and dominated the political 
landscape on the left. The Bloc continued Tsankov and Liapchev’s tactics, 
declaring Communist front organizations illegal and using the police to disrupt the 
Communists.44 If broadly successful, such actions continued to maintain a sense 
of division between the moderate parties and the left.  
 
The Weak Central State: VMRO and Political Violence, 1924-1934 
 Successive Bulgarian governments also were undermined by the 
continuation of political violence after 1923. This trend was dominated by the rise 
of violence within VMRO, as factions turned to assassination and reprisals in an 
internal struggle for power. The Organization directed its interwar violence 
abroad, against Serbian and Greek troops, police and government officials or in 
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fraternal struggles within VMRO itself. Bombings and attacks by machine gun 
also caused civilian casualties.  The frequency of killings, even on the streets of 
Sofia, fostered a sense that the government tacitly permitted such violence. Such 
speculation was encouraged by Prime Minister Liapchev’s own Macedonian 
origin: he was born in Resen, in Vardar Macedonia. Alternatively, the government 
might not be complicit in ongoing violence but simply weak, lacking sufficient 
power to intervene.45 
 The sharp “civil war” within VMRO in 1924-25 and the killings that followed 
were sparked by the assassination of Todor Aleksandrov on August 30, 1924, 
but ultimately derived from the issue of autonomy within Bulgaria. The motivation 
for Aleksandrov’s murder has never been firmly established. The two most likely, 
and inter-compatible, motivations were continuing rivalry between VMRO’s top 
leaders and Aleksandrov’s hesitant agreement in May 1924 to cooperate with 
Communist groups in exchange for aid from the Soviet Union.46 In the fall and 
winter of 1923 Aleksandrov negotiated with the Bulgarian Communist Party and 
the Comintern for aid and assistance.47 From Aleksandrov’s point of view, this 
was not a commitment to Commmunist ideals. Rather, Soviet support would 
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ensure VMRO independence from the Bulgarian government and allow the 
movement to operate even in the face of Sofia’s disapproval.  
 The Comintern, for its part, saw the Macedonian Question as one of 
several minority problems in Eastern Europe that could potentially serve as 
“wedge issues” in local politics, and had already begun to pressure both the 
Greek and Yugoslav parties to acknowledge the right to an independent 
Macedonian state.48 An agreement was made between the Central Committee 
(Aleksandrov, Protogerov and Peter Chaulev) in April 1924 and announced 
publicly on May 6. Criticism by both the Bulgarian government and from within 
VMRO led Aleksandrov to repudiate the agreement (and may have been a factor 
in his assassination in August of that year.)49  
 Aleksandrov himself viewed the matter as a means by which to obtain a 
reliable source of arms and financial support, but the agreement angered anti-
Communists within the movement and damaged relations with the government in 
Sofia. Elements of the Organization’s “left wing” (including Dimitur Vlahov) would 
now formally secede in 1925 and form VMRO- Obedineta (“United”), a pro-
Communist splinter organization that was intended to serve as the leader of a 
                                                
48 While the Communist Party of Yugoslavia agreed to Macedonian autonomy, 
this was pro forma support until 1928, when Sima Markovi! was replaced as 
secretary general of the party. Also note that Comintern support for Macedonian 
autonomy was uneven, and at times a “pro-Bulgarian” line was supported in 
order to provide domestic support for the BKP, the largest communist party in 
Southeastern Europe. See Jane Degras, ed., The Communist International 1919-
1943: Documents. (New York: Frank Cass, 1971), 185.   




popular front within Macedonia.50 Marxist Bulgarian and Macedonian 
historiography argues that he was murdered on behalf of the central government, 
while post-1989 national histories suggest that Communists were responsible.51 
Whoever was responsible for his assassination, Aleksandrov’s death 
launched a spiral of reprisal and counter reprisal that greatly weakened the unity 
of the movement. Aleksandrov’s personal secretary Ivan Mihailov, previously his 
army aide-de-camp during the First World War, now claimed the vacant seat on 
the Central Committee and took control of the Organization, displacing the 
remaining two members, Petur Chaulev and General Aleksandur Protogerov. 
Mihailov’s assumption of power included giving orders to eliminate internal 
opposition. On September 12, 1924, VMRO members assassinated the 
organization’s regional deputy, Aleko Vassilev and his assistant, Lt. Col. 
Atanasov.52 Both had close ties to Protogerov, a member of the Central 
Committee since the Organization’s re-founding in 1918 and who had 
accordingly expected to be Aleksandrov’s heir. Much of the existing local 
leadership was eliminated as well, including the district leaders in Nevrokop and 
Petrich. This rivalry over the leadership of the movement triggered the outbreak 
of violence between “Mihailovist” and “Protogerovist” factions. Although in 1925-
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26 most of Protogerov’s sympathizers were driven out of Pirin, fighting continued 
albeit at a lower intensity even after the murder of Protogerov in 1928.53 Each 
assassination fed the cycle of reprisals and efforts to eliminate members of rival 
factions. Aleskandrov’s death was followed by 193 assassinations in 1924, and 
Protogerov’s murder in 1928 triggered 225 more.54In 1932 alone, there were 33 
assassinations or attempted assassinations by the two factions, most taking 
place in Sofia since the Organization under Mihailov had secured Pirin. Such 
assassinations commonly took the form of shootings in cafes and on city streets, 
including the use of sub-machine guns from moving vehicles.  
As noted above, Liapchev’s regime did little to stem the resort to violence. 
Although his successors in the National Bloc made sporadic attempts to do so 
they were largely unsuccessful as well, in part because Prime Minister 
Aleksandur Malinov believed the government lacked sufficient popular support to 
address the economic crisis, suppress the Communists and disarm VMRO’s 
paramilitary forces.55 VMRO’s predominance continued to limit Bulgarian foreign 
policy. The People’s Bloc maintained a revisionist foreign policy agenda 
acceptable to Macedonian émigrés and VMRO assassins. Frustrated by Sofia’s 
apparent complicity with the paramilitary group, Greece, Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia signed the Balkan Entente on Feburary 9, 1934, an alliance 
deliberately envisioned to constrain a potentially expansionist Bulgaria. Finally, 
the Bloc attempted to improve the Bulgarian economy through active state 
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intervention. In this too, however, it was unsuccessful, lacking sufficient domestic 
or foreign sources of capital to revitalize the economy.56  
 The period 1923-1934 was, then, a period in which continual political crisis 
and, after 1929, economic crisis encouraged a series of attempts by national 
political parties to solve crises by expanding state power. And, throughout this 
period, the problem of Pirin was a public and notable example of crisis. Not only 
was Pirin effectively ruled by VMRO, but its own crisis of leadership within Pirin 
prompted a rise in political violence that became a national issue. The central 
state lacked the power to displace VMRO despite its internal divisions. At best, 
Sofia pursued cohabitation in the province by maintaining the presence of the 
central ministries.  
 
State Ministries in Pirin 
 The position of the central state in Pirin may be tracked by its role in 
provincial infrastructure and education. In both cases, the ministries maintained 
large and extensive structures that expanded from the First World War forward. 
In both areas state actions supported a Bulgarian national consciousness in the 
region. Improvements in infrastructure helped to tie Pirin to a Bulgarian national 
network of communications, travel and trade; educational curricula were 
deliberately designed to create a “Bulgarian spirit.” The ministries’ various 
policies did indeed carry the potential to integrate Pirin’s population with the rest 
of Bulgaria. They failed in this because VMRO’s dominance within the province 
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extended to the creation of  its own “alternate” administration and institutions. But 
the ministries’ policies over 1912-1934 served as a precursor for later and more 
intensive integrative efforts.  
 By 1912 the local transportation network had barely developed beyond an 
unpaved road running north-south from Dupnitsa through Gorna Dzhumaja and 
Sveti Vrach to Thrace and the Aegean coast. This was sufficient to export Pirin’s 
tobacco, grain and other agricultural goods to Salonika and to allow the Ottoman 
army to move military forces. Other areas, particularly the eastern kazas of 
Razlog and Nevrokop relied on unimproved trails maintained by local 
communities. Unification with Bulgaria spurred belated improvements as the 
region was re-oriented northwards and integrated into the Bulgarian state and 
economy. Many initial improvements, particularly in terms of communications, 
were aimed at meeting the needs of the military, particularly as Bulgaria’s entry 
into the First World War approached in 1914-1915. Rail lines during the war 
years were laid west from Kiustendil to Skopje and Bitola, facilitating the 
movement of military supplies and presumed Pirin’s postwar unification with 
Vardar Macedonia. Direct telegraph lines were built by 1915 to connect the 
province to Dupnitsa and link thirteen telegraph stations (including Petrich, 
Gordna Dzhumaia, Nevrokop and Melnik) in a network reaching towards the front 
lines in Vardar and the Seres front.57  
 Over 1923-1934, the Ministry of Public Buildings, Roads and 
Communications undertook a further expansion and modernization of Pirin’s 
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infrastructure. This included the extension of the state’s railway network into 
Pirin, with two main connections. A north-south line followed the River Struma, 
running south from Dupnitsa to Gorna Dzhumaia then through Krupnik and Sv. 
Vrach to link to a Greek line to Thessalonika at the border. Local lines built during 
the First World War to facilitate resupply of the Salonika Front were replaced with 
a permanent civilian line, then further expanded and improved in the mid-1930s.58 
A second route built in the late 1920s through the eastern parts of the province 
from Pazardzhik (near Razlog) to Nevrokop, with a branch line built in 1940-41 to 
service Bansko.59 This Pirin trackage represents roughly 20 percent of the 760 
kilometers of new rail lines built in Bulgaria between 1921 and 1939.60 In addition, 
the ministry improved the major north-south road in the province, although much 
of the road network remained under the aegis of local communities. 
 In terms of communications, the ministry expanded the PTT, the state-run 
post, telegraph and telephone network in the province. Telegraph lines were 
established to link all of the region’s towns to the Bulgarian network, and by the 
1930s all of the larger villages as well. Telegraph and telephone stations were 
built throughout the district, and the existing stations were improved and 
expanded.61 Telephone service followed even more quickly, and by the mid 
1930s telephone lines were laid to all of the towns and most larger villages, 
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usually in the form of public pay phones housed at the central post offices.62 In 
1915 Pirin (excluding territory subsequently lost to the Yugoslav Kingdom) 
possessed a single large 24-hour PTT office (in Gorna Dzhumaia), two standard 
offices (in Petrich and Nevrokop), and nine “limited hours” offices. By 1929, this 
network had been expanded to include six 24-hour “regional” and “district” offices 
in Petrich, Gorna Dzhumaia, Razlog, Sv. Vrach and Nevrokop (all offering 
twenty-four hour telephone and telegraph service), twelve full-service post-
telephone-telegraph stations, and 88 village “telephone and postal service posts.” 
Roughly 75 of these PTT offices were new construction, representing a 
significant expansion of the network in Pirin over a fifteen-year period.63 Such 
improvements helped integrate the region with the rest of Bulgaria by facilitating 
travel and communications. 
 Despite this very real expansion of state-run rail and PTT in the provinces, 
these new links did not completely blanket the region. Few railroad spurs were 
built from the main lines and the impact of the railroad was thus mixed. Villagers 
on the Struma Valley floor, including the tobacco-growing area in the southwest, 
generally possessed good road access to towns or villages with rail access. 
Villagers in the mountains on the west and east of Pirin, however, had to travel 
over the poor local roads to take agricultural production to a railhead. While the 
towns (and villages along the rail lines between them) were connected to the 
national network, much of the rural population would thus remain disconnected 
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until local roads could be improved to allow easy access to railheads. In addition, 
the topography of Pirin Macedonia — bisected by Mt. Pirin — meant that the 
Gorna Dzhumaia-Petrich railroad and telegraph/telephone line was not 
connected to the Razlog-Nevrokop line at the provincial level. Train travel or 
communications required a circuitous route outside provincial boundaries.64 The 
state may have linked Pirin to the Bulgarian rail and communications network, 
but it did not connect the western and eastern halves of Pirin.  
 Education provided a second example of limited state success. The 
Ministry of Education formally directed local schools throughout the country. 
Curricula were set in Sofia, stipulating not only the subjects to be taught but 
paying crucial attention to how issues of national consciousness were to be 
presented. One letter from the Ministry of Education to local high school 
headmasters is particularly instructive. It stipulates that one of the functions of 
education is to instill a sense of rodinoznanie, national history.65 
… the school program of every good modern state pays special 
attention to the subject of national history. … make the teenage 
Bulgarian well aware of his own motherland, to be full of love for 
it, to be faithful to it and useful to his family through this love. 66 
 
The local school was organized, ideally, on the French model. It was to be 
extension of the central government in fostering a sense of national loyalty and 
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identity. Prior to 1912, local clergy and gymnasium-educated school teachers ran 
Pirin’s schools, overseen by town or village councils. Religion could overshadow 
issues of national consciousness, as raised by the village priest or the town’s 
Orthodox hierarchy. In 1911, for example, the municipality of Bansko demanded 
that children from Protestant families be banned from attending the local school 
run by the Bulgarian Exarchate. The town raised further complaints in the early 
1920s with regards to whether Jewish students should be allowed to attend 
public schools.67 The interwar Ministry of Education was able, at least, to 
overcome the Exarchate’s influence over education in Pirin by centralizing school 
curricula and focused on education as a vehicle of Bulgarian national 
consciousness rather than Orthodox confessional consciousness. 
 Centralization of curricula, however, did not mean corresponding control 
over other aspects of local education, much of which VMRO proved able to 
usurp. The ministry did conduct inspections of local schools and reviewed the 
qualifications of teachers.68 The central government also provided for some 
funding for the building of primary schools and gymnasiums in the region.69 But 
the state’s power was circumscribed by the fact that teachers were hired and 
paid at the local level. This contrasts with the policies of other states in the 
region, as Irina Livezeanu has shown in the case of interwar Romania. Its 
Ministry of Education took pains to insure that teachers from regions of disputed 
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provided at school. 
68 TsDA, Fond 177K, opis 3, a.e. 33; a.e. 125; a.e. 152; a.e. 190; Fond 177K, 
opis 1, a.e. 439, 607.  




national consciousness — e.g., Bessarabia, Dobrudzha — were transferred to 
other regions, and that teachers from the Regat (pre-1913 Romania) were 
assigned to these schools.70 Although teachers from “Old Bulgaria” came to 
teach in Pirin, the state did not (or could not) intervene to stop the hiring of either 
teachers native to the region or from the refugee population.  
 State contributions to education were relatively minor, with most money 
raised by the local village or municipality. This inability of the central government 
to financially support local state organs effectively was a source of local 
complaint. In a 1930 letter from the board of the Nevrokop Gymnasium to the 
Ministry of the Education, the board complained about this limited funding. “Our 
town, which primarily consists of refugees, is not able to maintain the 
pedagogical school with municipal means.”71 For a state burdened with a large 
refugee population and reparations, shifting part of this cost to local government 
was a practical solution. But it meant the state was not well-equipped to contest 
foundations, local groups or others who contributed money — particularly 
Macedonian organizations linked to VMRO, as well as the organization itself —
 and expected their own interests to be reflected in education.  
 The nation-building role of the state in Pirin’s railways, communications 
and education was thus constrained. State intervention in other areas of the 
province achieved even less, compounded by the economic crisis already noted. 
Administrative payroll costs alone came to a range of 35-44 percent of the annual 
                                                
70 See Livezeanu, Cultural Politics in Greater Romania, 72-77, 107-109, 119-120, 
173-174. 




state budget by the end of the 1920s.72 The state’s limited postwar income 
moreover now needed to cover reparation payments, provide aid to a 
considerable number of war widows, invalids and military pensioners and rebuild 
a strained economy.  
 The central state thus could contribute relatively little financially to local 
administrative organs, and Pirin was no exception.73 State economic policy over 
the 1920s, for example, brought little improvement to Pirin. Despite the opening 
of a coal mine near the village of Brezhani and lumber mill in the village of 
Yakoruda, industry remained limited in the early 1920s. The chief industrial 
employer was the tobacco drying and “pre-production” centers built in 1914 in 
Gorna Dzhaumaia and Petrich, employing roughly 1,100 workers. Over-reliance 
on tobacco as the province’s industrial crop proved disastrous. A drop in 
international prices in 1921, followed by a severe drought in 1927 and then the 
Depression crippled the local tobacco industry.74 The province’s dependence on 
agriculture can be seen in the records of the Blagoevgrad Macedonian-
Adrianople Volunteer’s Society (introduced in Chapter Four), almost half of whom 
worked directly in agriculture.75 
                                                
72 Daskalov, 390. 
73 VMRO’s own policies exacerbated the situation. As VMRO took advantage of 
local revenues for its own clientalist network and excluded national political 
parties, logically, central authorities and political figures might dedicate limited 
financial resources to other parts of Bulgaria.  
74 Ivan Katarjiev, Istorija na makedonskiot narod: Makedonija megju Balkanskite i 
Vtorata svetska vojna (1912-1941) (Skopje: Institut za natsionalna istorija, 2000), 
227.  
75 In the application files, 46 percent of the members list agriculture as 
occupation. Of the remainder, 18 percent listed “blue collar” occupations (as  




 A similar story of relative failure in Pirin was the state’s effort to improve 
local health and hygiene. Rates of malarial infection in Pirin, particularly in 
Petrich, were at twice the levels of Bulgaria as a whole. The Ministry of Heath did 
seek to eliminate malaria from the province and by the late 1920s had come to 
distribute large amounts of quinine locally. But 106 people still died of malaria in 
1928, and over half the 18,000 people tested that year were found to be 
infected.76 Tuberculosis remained a significant problem as well. Although state 
programs reduced the impact of the disease slightly, in the mid-1920s it 
remained responsible for between 10 percent (in Razlog) to 18 percent 
(Nevrokop) of total deaths.77 In terms of local hygiene and other infrastructure the 
state lacked the resources to fund sanitation projects or drain marshy areas that 
would resolve the problems.  
 Formally, the province of Pirin continued to be governed by Bulgarian law. 
The ministries in Sofia continued to send orders to their local organs in Pirin. But 
it was members of VMRO who acted to carry out the central state’s orders, 
interpreting such orders as they saw fit. The result was the creation of an 
autonomous “virtual” regime in the province.  
                                                                                                                                            
(professions ranging from butcher, mason, miller, merchant and cobbler to 
photographer and mechanic), seven percent listed service trades (the list 
includes carriage driver, coffee maker, gardener, innkeeper, pubkeeper and taxi 
driver) and twelve percent “white collar” professions (teller, clerk, “city official,” 
“office worker” and in one case, landlord). Two members stated they were 
unemployed, one that he was pensioned and one that he was an invalid. 
Although the role of agriculture seems diminished, this is a high proportion for a 
town where fields would be located a considerable distance from urban 
residences.  
76 Vasil Sharkov, Grad Gorna Dzhumaia – minalo i dnes (Sofia: Pechatnitsa na 
Armeiskiia voenno-izdatelski fond, 1930), 168-176. 




VMRO’s Shadow Government 
 Even foreign diplomatic representatives in Sofia reported to their home 
governments regarding the VMRO’s creation of a “state within a state.” 
Effectively, the organization was able to visibly wrest control of a province from 
the central government — an ominous precedent and one that undermined 
successive regimes.78 Following the coup d’etat of 1923, the Central Committee 
of VMRO first under Todor Aleksandrov and then under Ivan Mihailov established 
control over the region’s political and economic life, collaborating with allied 
Macedonian organizations to provide social services. As VMRO now defined it, 
the organization’s responsibility for the “defense” of Macedonian interests now 
extended to the defense of their economic and cultural interests as well.79 VMRO 
expanded to create its own somewhat informal regime in the province. In 
addition, existing contacts between VMRO and émigré groups by the mid-1920s 
led to the former assuming leadership — definitively at the local level and 
predominantly at the national level — over the broad “Macedonian movement.” 
These groups are listed on Table 5 (next page): 
                                                
78 See, for example, Henry W. Shoemaker, Sofia, to Department of State, 
Washington D.C., 5 January, 1933, dispatch [strictly confidential]  #582, 6,  
Department of State, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria, 1910-
1944,  Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D.C., cited here from 
the National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1982 edition, microform #1207, 21 
reels. 
79 Katarjiev, Istorija na makedonskiot narod, 369-370, gives a fresh revisionist 
Macedonian examination of VMRO’s policies in Pirin. This marks a departure 
from historiography that stressed the organization as illegitimate and favored the 





VMRO’s Affiliations to Macedonian Organizations80 
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80 To determine VMRO’s relative involvement for those groups whose records 
were not examined directly, the opisi, annotated document lists, of the ODAB 
were consulted, since VMRO’s involvement is invariably noted. For a rough 
introduction to the opisi available, see Kunka Dasheva, Nikola Tsvetanov and 
Strahil Tochev, Putevoditel po arhivnite fondove, 1805-1944 (Sofia: Nauka i 





 Assuming control required VMRO to consider not simply paramilitary 
issues but also political, economic and “social welfare” affairs. In 1923, Todor 
Aleksandrov stated that VMRO had created a “non-partisan regime” in the 
district.81 The organization represented the will of Macedonian Bulgarians, and 
other political parties were unnecessary. Anarchist and Communist activists were 
seen as particularly divisive, and after open fighting broke out with Communist 
insurgents in Razlog in 1923, VMRO’s relations with the Bulgarian Communist 
Party were poor.82 
 While rejecting participation in the existing political parties, VMRO 
continued to hold elections in the district in two different forms. One was for 
representation within the organization itself. Delegates were selected in local, 
internal elections for representation within congresses and regional 
representation.83 This supplemented (but did not entirely replace) the tradition of 
individual cheti selecting their own leaders or choosing a leader to follow. 
Regular regional and national congresses of the Organization offered a forum in 
which elected delegates could critique or shape policy, and provided the 
experience of a more formal administrative style.84  
 National elections were still held in the region, and voter participation in 
the May 1927 and June 1931 Subranie elections was high. But VMRO controlled 
                                                
81 TsDA, Fond 1932K, opis 1, a.e. 103., 1-10; DAB, Fond 1320, opis 2, a.e. 55, 
34. 
82 Katardzhiev, Vreme na zreenje , 180-181. 
83 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 73-74. 
84 For example, the protocol and resolution in TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 23, 




these elections, selecting which candidates would be allowed to stand.85 
Agreements with the national political parties entered these candidates on 
electoral lists, but they were effectively VMRO’s own delegates to the 
parliament.86 National elections were thus subverted by local agendas; in 1927, 
VMRO proceeded to establish its own parliamentary front, the Macedonian 
Parliamentary Group (Makedonskata parlamentarna grupa). VMRO picked who 
would stand from the Group in elections, and every valid ballot cast in Pirin that 
year was recorded as cast for members of the group. 87  The mandate of the 
group was, expressly, to voice VMRO’s (and Macedonia’s) concerns within the 
parliament.88  
 Relations with local administrative leaders were even closer. Generally, 
mayors of villages and towns and administrators of local districts were expected 
to be on friendly terms with VMRO, and many were drawn from the movement 
itself. The line between local government and VMRO was, in fact, often blurred. 
                                                
85 TsDA, Fond 173, opis 5, a.e. 502, l. 232-234. 
86 While striking, VMRO’s control over local elections was not an isolated event in 
Bulgaria but may also be viewed as a rather extreme form of political corruption. 
Note Daskalov, 177-178. Local autonomy in exchange for patronage occurred 
elsewhere, notably in the Rhodopi mountains where after 1913 local elites traded 
their political support (and the inhabitants’ votes) to the dominant political party in 
power in exchange for a relaxation of the Bulgarianization campaign. The 
contemporary Movement for Rights and Freedoms is generally considered to 
play a similar role in mobilizing Bulgaria’s Turkish minority; the party has been a 
member of every coalition government in the post-Communist period. 
87 Dimitur Tiulekov, “ Makedonskata parlamentarna grupa, 1927-1934” in 
Nationsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na makedonskite i trakiiskite bulgari, 
1878-1944: Tom IV, Osvoboditelnite borbi sled purvata svetovna voina, 1919-
1944 (Sofia: Makedonski nauchen institute, 2003), 264. On the election, see 
Kostadinova, 64. Kostadinova notes that this meant that 3.3 percent of all ballots 
cast in Bulgaria were effectively controlled by VMRO. 




The Organization undertook administrative projects on its own initiative, for 
example surveying local living conditions and recommending communities in 
need of aid.89 Generally, though, the organization itself did not take on all 
responsibilities of formal rule — and indeed, its members were often not well 
prepared to be local administrators. VMRO’s internal regulations suggest a 
certain lack of professionalism. One memo from 1927 stresses that to preserve 
secrecy, members should cease discussing “Organizational affairs” in cafes and 
should attempt meetings in more formal circumstances.90 VMRO accordingly left 
most of the day-to-day administration of Pirin to the established organs of the 
central government.  
 Prepared or not, VMRO did take complete charge of one function: the 
collection of taxes and the disbursement of revenues. Just as the Organization 
challenged the state’s monopoly on armed force, so too it usurped the state’s 
monopoly over taxation. VMRO claimed the right to levy taxes and “forced 
contributions” throughout Pirin.91 A formal tax system for specific goods was 
quickly developed. Pirin’s tobacco industry was particularly important in terms of 
raising revenue,92 but taxes were levied as well on animal hides, wood, horses 
and mules, livestock (particularly livestock imported from Greece and Serbia) and 
a two percent “sales tax” was imposed on various manufactured goods.93 This 
                                                
89 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2., a.e. 17, l. 140-141. 
90 TsDA, Fond 396, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 92.  
91 TsDA Fond 1932, op 3, a.e. 146, l. 6-10 
92 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 257.  




reflects a relatively sophisticated system by which industry, commerce and 
imports were all taxed — a system comparable to that of the Bulgarian state.  
 Complicating matters was VMRO’s normal avoidance of the term 
“taxation” (danutsi) in their financial records. The largest “voluntary donations” 
within the Pirin region to VMRO in 1926 all come, suspiciously, from tobacco 
businessmen.94 The Organization’s financial records note a variety of funding 
sources, including membership dues, gifts, “fines,” “transit fees” and bequests.95 
In some cases, cafes, stores or local industries were operated by VMRO or with 
investment from the Organization. Donations and taxes were levied from 
throughout the region, with local district leaders reporting income received. 96 
Although villages contributed, towns such as Nevrokop, Gorna Dzhumaia, 
Petrich, Melnik and Sv. Vrach provided the largest sums. In the Petrich district, 
for example, 44 percent of contributions and taxes collected came from the 
                                                
94 Panaiot Rainov, at 300,000 and Panaiot Tasev, at 200,000. TsDA, Fond 396K, 
opis 2., a.e. 17, l. 162a-163a. Of the list of 52 greatest contributions of 10,000 or 
more leva, 20 occupations are listed. this includes three tobacco businessmen, 
six businessmen in unspecified trades, one engineer,  two pubkeepers, two 
manufacturers, one dentist, one butcher, one landowner, one “garderner” and 
one lawyer. The three tobacco businessmen “donated” over eight times the 
average for other or unnamed professions, and represented over a third of the 
total value of “donations” over 10,000 for the year. 
95 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 1, l. 1-23. 
96 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 156-163a. Some individual donations 
were quite large, such as the 1925 donations of 150,000 leva by Dr. Konstantin 
Despotov (of Melnik), 50,000 leva by Konstantin Karaianev (of Sveti Vrach), and 
40,000 leva by Georgi Dotskov (of Vrania). Whether these were voluntary or 




municipality of Petrich, the rest from the villages, a sum disproportionate to the 
district’s urban-rural population ratio.97  
 The collection of taxes, donations and other income represented a 
considerable financial potential, and one that VMRO exploited. In 1925 alone, for 
example, the VMRO district leader of Nevrokop raised 5,200,446 leva; Sv. Vrach 
raised 7,895,533 leva; Gorna Dzhumaia, 4,000,000; Petrich 239,977; and 
Razlog, 831,640 leva, for a total of some 18,157,596 leva — not including 
donations or aid-in-kind from Macedonian organizations within Pirin98 or 
elsewhere in the country.99 Such levies were in addition to state taxes and tariffs 
on goods. While most of this money was to be used to continue the 
Organization’s armed struggle, an appreciable amount was also returned to the 
community.  
 A significant aspect of VMRO’s “administrative mobilization” of Pirin was 
its financial support for local communities within the district.100 Funds were 
provided to refugee families, local governments, foundations and sometimes for 
specific projects. No doubt, clientelism played a significant role in such 
allocations (and one that the organization did not record in its financial accounts). 
But the organization did fund real improvements. VMRO funds helped establish 
                                                
97 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 167. TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 
168 (Nevrokop), l. 169 (Voden), l. 174-176 (Razlog district) 
98 The Macedonian Charity Brotherhood in Nevrokop, for example, held a fund 
raising dinner and sold badges for the “Day of Macedonia,” the money to be used 
“benefit the Macedonian cause.” ODAB Fond 123K, opis 1, a.e. 1. L. 3. The 
student society at the Nevrokop Pedagogical School similarly raised money to be 
used for “propaganda abroad.” ODAB Fond 123K, opis 1, a.e. 1, l. 23. 
99 On VMRO’s funding outside of Pirin, see Tiulekov, 130. 




both a hospital in Sv. Vrach101 and the first electric plants in Bansko and Gorna 
Dzhumaia.102 Internal records of the organization stress the need for voivoda to 
pay attention to “village economic politics”103 and that assistance should be given 
to local communities when needed. Following the 1925 Petrich incident, for 
example, local voivodi directed VMRO members to refuse government offers of 
financial compensation for their role in defending the town. Instead, the money 
was donated towards the construction of a new school for the town. 
 Schools were recipients of similar aid. Here, regional commanders carried 
their administrative policies further, undertaking their own inspections of schools 
and teachers in the region. In some cases, VMRO members sought chiefly to 
determine which communities were in need of additional instructors and 
funding.104 The Organization often provided support for local reading rooms and 
libraries,105 both in terms of financial aid and also donations of the books and 
pamphlets published by affiliated Macedonian groups such as the Macedonian 
Scientific Institute in Sofia. This included copies of the Organization’s 
newspapers, Svoboda ili smurt and Revoliutsonen list. Just as important, 
however, was the information it collected about the political reliability of teachers. 
Organization leaders filed reports detailing the names of teachers in local 
schools, their place of birth, where they currently taught and their participation in 
                                                
101 ODAB, Fond 26K, opis 1., a.e. 14, l 28.  
102 On Bansko, see ODAB, Fond 26K, opis 1, a.e. 13, l 40-41.  On Gorna 
Dzhumaia, see Boris Keremidchiev, Niakoga v Gorna Dzhumaia (Blagoevgrad: 
Pirin-Print, 1994), 55-56. 
103 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 25. 
104 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2., a.e. 17, l. 108-109. 




political activities.106 While the Ministry of Education retained formal oversight of 
Pirin’s schools, VMRO influenced practical decisions within the province.  
 
The Popular Reception  
 VMRO was thus able to act successfully “as a state” for defense, taxation 
and in providing funding for local services — in each case, to a greater extent 
than the central government of Bulgaria itself. And popular opinion seemed to 
accept this predominance, until the violence between Mihailov’s Central 
Committee and competing factions spun out of control in the early 1930s.107 
 VMRO could expect a sympathetic hearing from the large refugee 
population within Bulgaria. Although Sofia and other large towns (Plovdiv, Varna, 
Burgas) proved the most popular destination for refugees, sizeable numbers did 
settle within Pirin. Over 1919-1921 alone, 484 refugee families totaling 1,954 
people settled in the district center of Gorna Dzhumaia.108 Twenty thousand 
refugees settled in the region by December 1923, including 4,788 in Nevrokop, 
3,564 in Melnik and 2,968 in Gorna Dzhumaia. In all, refugees now made up a 
fifth of the region’s population of 202,000.  
                                                
106 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 29-44. Not all district heads provided 
information in the same format, and different letters have slightly different 
formats. VMRO’s function in this respect would be continued by the Ministry of 
Education after 1934, as discussed in Chapter Six. 
107 Determining public opinion is constrained by that same rise in violence, 
however. Vocal public criticism of VMRO in the 1920s could result in reprisals. In 
the 1930s, in turn, the state censored public commentary on VMRO’s former rule 
of the province.  




 These refugees were disproportionately urban dwellers, changing the 
demographic character of Pirin. Information from the national census notes that 
in Bulgaria as a whole, 76 percent of refugees from Vardar Macedonia now 
settled in Bulgarian cities and towns, as did 56 percent of refugees from Aegean 
Macedonia. This compares to refugees from the Northern Dobrudzha (65 
percent), Southern Dobrudzha (49 percent), East Thrace (41 percent), West 
Thrace (40 percent) and the “West Lands” (35 percent). Such figures for 
urbanization are much higher than that of the native born population at only 19 
percent.109 Melnik was almost completely resettled by refugees. Its Greek 
population fled during the period 1913-1918 or was deported after the war as part 
of the Greco-Bulgarian Population Exchange negotiated through the League of 
Nations.110 Petrich, Gorna Dzhumaia, Sv. Vrach, Nevrokop all saw an influx of 
population that led to steady urban growth throughout the period (see Table 6). 
Table 6 
Urban Growth in Pirin, 1923-1934111 
 Urban area  Population 
  1890 1920 1926 1934  
 Bansko 5,700 4,532 5,062 5,540  
 Gorna Dzhumaia  ~800 7,009 9,384 9,974 
 Melnik  ~1,200    721    722    521 
 Nevrokop  ~930 6,156 7,165 8,767 
 Petrich 3,749 7,169 8,380  10,120 
 Razlog 3,102    452    492    532 
 Sv. Vrach    n/a 1,533 2,780 4,703 
 Iakoruda  ~3,650 3,800 4,150 4,572 
 
                                                
109 Compiled from the 1920 census data in TsDA Fond 453K, opis 2, a.e. 5. 
110 On the exchange, see Victor Roudmetof, Collective Memory, National Identity 
and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria and the Macedonian Question (Westport: 
Praeger, 2002), 97. 
111 Figures derived from TsDA Fond 453K, opis 2, passim and the respective 
volumes of the Statisticheski godishnik na Bulgarskoto Tsarstvo.  Earlier figures 






Bulgaria’s “Foreign Born” Population by Place of Origin, 1920112 
 Birth place in: Number:   
 Aegean Macedonia 68,843 
 Eastern Thrace 60,582 
 Western Thrace 38,333 
 Vardar Macedonia 19,798 
 Southern Dobrudzha 18,767   
 “West Lands” 14,632 
 Northern Dobrudzha 3,838 
 Total “Foreign Born Population” 224,793 
 Ethnic Bulgarian Population 4,218,615 
 Total Population (including Turks, Greeks, 
                              Jews and Roma) 5,423,408 
 
 VMRO’s territorial revisionism was deliberately intended to appeal to these 
émigrés now settled within Bulgaria. Over five percent of Bulgaria’s “ethnically 
Bulgarian” population (as recorded by census) was foreign-born; the locations of 
origin are listed on Table 7. 
 Accordingly, VMRO’s agenda was to appeal not just to Pirin’s inhabitants 
but also to Macedonian émigrés outside of the region and to find common cause 
with the Dobrudzhan and Thracian refugee groups as well.113 The Organization’s 
newspapers reflected this broader appeal, and it promoted public meetings to 
protest Greek and Serbian rule over Macedonia.114  
                                                
112 Based on the data in TsDA, Fond 453, opis 2, a.e. 18, l. 1-21. 
113 VMRO’s agenda of territorial revisionism per se generally found a receptive 
audience, but there was also some degree of rivalry and disunity over which 
revisionist agenda to push first. Thracian and Dobrudzhan refugee organizations 
sometimes sought priority for their own claims, particularly because such claims 
were simpler: e.g., the Dobrudzha was disputed only with Romania, whereas 
Macedonia was disputed with both Greece and the Yugoslav Kingdom. Refugees 
from the West Lands (in the Yugoslav Kingdom), in contrast, generally were in 
agreement with VMRO’s agenda.  




 Bulgaria’s Macedonian émigrés founded dozens of other charity 
foundations, fraternal organizations and cultural institutions. They gradually 
coalesced into a movement around VMRO. The Organization’s own members 
often belonged to these other Macedonian groups, which in turn frequently 
received funding and support from VMRO. The Organization of Macedonian 
Students, for example, promoted ties with university students studying in Sofia, 
holding student congresses in Gorna Dzhumaia. The Macedonian Youth 
Organization had large chapters in Nevrokop, Gorna Dzhumaia, Bansko, Petrich, 
Razlog, Sv. Vrach, Simitli, Dobrinishte, Belitsa and Yakoruda, with a number of 
smaller groups in villages.115 Each of the towns had at least one large “cultural” 
organization, such as the “Gotse Delchev” Macedonian Charity Cultural-
Educational Brotherhood in Razlog. Such groups served as liaisons with VMRO, 
directing requests for aid to regional leaders of the Organization and often 
working with such figures to determine how aid should be allocated.116 In Pirin, 
such groups provided links between both émigrés and the indigenous population 
and between villages and towns. Each organization held regional congresses, 
encouraged the exchange of information and travel between communities and 
stressed a common Macedonian heritage.  
VMRO provided financial support for such organizations when needed and 
received contributions in return when possible. The organization also provided 
                                                
115 Dimitur Gotsev, Mladezhkite natsionalno-osvoboditelni organizatsiia na 
makedonskite bulgari, 1919-1941 (Sofia: Izdatelstvo na Bulgarskata akademiia 
na naukite, 1988), 210-234.  




direct aid to villages and towns.117 Generally, this was provided through direct 
contacts between VMRO members and local elites. The latter usually included 
the mayor and members of governing councils, but might also include local 
business elites, members of foundations, and the local priest.118  
Such aid was sufficient until 1929 to maintain an apparently high level of 
popular approval. The Depression as it affected Pirin, however, raised dissident 
voices. As tobacco prices fell and foreign tariffs restricted Bulgarian exports, 
agricultural centers in Pirin suffered throughout the 1930s.119 Although improved 
methods spread modernization through other areas of Bulgarian agriculture, 
tobacco production remained relatively backward into the 1930s.120 This issue, 
taken up left-wing Macedonian organizations now growing in strength once more 
(the Communist newspaper Makedonsko zname, for example, was founded in 
the mid-1930s) helped to deepen the rifts between the left- and right-wings over 
1930-1933, as Ivan Mihailov’s organization was now accused of corruption and 
failing to address the needs of Pirin’s inhabitants. This did not discredit all of the 
Organization’s works, let alone its symbolic standing. Aleksandrov was well 
remembered and a popular figure, for example, as was the “old” VMRO of the 
                                                
117 Dimitur Tiulekov, “Vutreshnata makedonska revoliutsionna organizatsiia 
mezhdu ubiistvata na Todor Aleksandrov i Aleksandur Protogerov,” in 
Natsionalno-osvoboditelnoto dvizhenie na makedonskite i trakiiskite bulgari, 
1878-1944: Tom IV, Osvoboditelnite borbi sled purvata svetovna voina, 1919-
1944 (Sofia: Makedonski nauchen institut, 2003). 
118 ODAB, Fond 63K, a.e. 32, Protocol #205.  
119 Note the comments in K.R., “Petrichata na rabota bu poleto,” Makedonski 
Vesti, July 1, 1936; also letter by Boris Kostadinov, Kromidovo, “Hliabut v 
petrichko,” Makedonski Vesti July 15, 1936, page 4, and Vasil Nikolov, “Kak 
teche Zhivotut v Gorna Dzhumaiia,” Makedonski Vesti, August 5, 1936, 1.  
120 For an overview, see Anastas Beshkov, "Tobacco in Bulgaria," Economic 




early 1920s. This period of autonomy was marked by the creation of symbols 
with “Macedonian feeling” that promoted a feeling of regional consciousness. 
These symbols would outlast the Organization’s regime in the district, and even 
the centralizing and authoritarian regimes of the 1930s and 1940s would seek a 
way to integrate them into Sofia’s efforts at state- and nation-building. 
 
Competing symbols and Contested Consciousness 
 In 1930, the public primary school in the village of Padezh was renamed in 
honor of Todor Aleksandrov, as was the local Orthodox Church. In response to 
state inquiries as to why the village took such actions, the local priest responded 
both that Aleksandrov was a hero to the people of the village—and that the 
Organization had provided funding for the school and church, financially 
supporting the community.121 
 VMRO’s deliberate use and creation of “state unifying symbols” and 
experiences shows boundaries where the state and the Organization’s own 
regime overlapped. As noted in Chapter One, Anthony Smith argues that the 
“key experiences” shape the development of national consciousness. He lists:  
• Inclusive definition of the collective group, name and homeland; 
• Promotion of shared memories and symbols; 
• A concept of group inclusion with “common rights and duties;”  
• Promotion of a public culture; and 
• A public belief in group solidarity.122 
                                                
121 ODAB, Fond 63K, a.e. 32, Protocol #276. 
122 Smith, The Antiquity of Nations, 18; Smith, “War and Ethnicity: the Role of  
Warfare in the Formation, Self-image and Cohesion of Ethnic Communities,” 





Symbolizing Macedonian Struggle: 
The 1926 “Ilinden” Calendar 
 
 
“Kalendar Ilinden,” (Sofia: Ilinden, 1925) 
 
In each respect, VMRO’s regime in Pirin was able to take the place of the state in 
creating experiences and symbols that bound the inhabitants of Pirin together. 
Specifically, it pursued the myth of “Macedonian suffering” as raised in Chapter 
Four. In this narrative, Bulgaria’s Macedonians were a group unified not simply 
by local dialect or geography, but their 
participation in a struggle to build a unified 
homeland. Such stories of suffering and 
resistance were reflected in popular 
representations of the Macedonian 
movement: for example, the calendars 
published by the “Ilinden” émigré society in 
the 1920s (see Figure 11). The theme of 
struggle is reflected in the chains 
surrounding the map of Macedonia, which 
the uniformed guerilla is bursting asunder 
— thus fitting the slogan above the map of 
“Undivided Macedonia.” The 
Organization’s own history played a prominent role in this myth, justifying its 
stewardship of the Macedonian movement in Bulgaria in general and its rule over 
Pirin in specific. 
 It was the legacy of conflict that helped create a sense of community for 
Macedonian Bulgarians. One example is the public veneration of VMRO’s “cult of 





Symbolic Ceremonies: the funeral of Simeon Evtimov 
 
 
Source: Svoboda ili smurt 9:140 (January 1933), 2  
of the Balkan and First World Wars. Public funeral processions for slain VMRO 
members played a similar role.123 Simeon Evtimov’s funeral on January 8, 1933 
following his death by natural causes is illustrative. Evtimov, a member of 
Mihailov’s inner circle and a VMRO member since before the First World War, 
received an expansive funeral in Sofia. Hundreds of mourners attended, as 
depicted in Figure 12, accompanied by a flag-bearing honor guard from the 
movement’s military wing. The coffin was flanked during the ceremony by six-foot 
wreaths of flowers and young women in folk costume native to Macedonia. An 
even larger memorial 
service was held 
separately in Gorna 
Dzhumaia.124 Svoboda ili 
smurt and Revoliutsionen 
list in particular devoted 
considerable space to 
obituaries and 
biographies, interspacing 
VMRO members recently slain with articles on past heroes such as Dame Gruev, 
Gotse Delchev and (after 1924) Todor Aleksandrov.125  
                                                
123 ODAB, Fond 123K, opis 1, a.e. 3, 1925. 
124 On the funeral, see Svoboda ili smurt, 9:140 (January 1933), 1-12. 
125 It is unusual to see an issue without an article along these lines. By the late 
1920s, however, articles on slain VMRO members grew even more frequent. The 
entire issue of Svoboda ili Smurt 6:130 (September 1931), for example, 
contained articles not only on Aleksandrov, but on ordinary members who had 





Symbols of VMRO:  
“Chicho” Todor 
 
Image here from cover of Todor  
Alexandrov, Dnevnik i Korespondentsiia 
ot Purvata Svetona Voina 1915-1918g  
(Sofia: Izdatelstvo Znani OOD,  n.d.). 
 Such public displays of solidarity helped reinforce a sense of community, 
and a sense of commitment to the Macedonian struggle. Aleksandrov, before his 
death, had deliberately fostered a populist image. Prints of his color oil portrait 
(see Figure 13) were distributed for use in local VMRO offices and for the homes 
of members.126 Wearing a field uniform, 
holding a rifle, and without insignia, the 
portrait shows him standing as a symbol of 
all VMRO paramilitary fighters. 
Aleksandrov moreover insisted in 
meetings with peasants and VMRO rank-
and-file on being addressed as “Todor” or 
“Chicho” (“Uncle”).127 Part of this strategy 
was a conscious attempt to maintain close 
connections with émigrés and the 
Macedonians of Pirin. This is similarly 
reflected in slogans of the movement, 
which sought to portray VMRO as synonymous with the Macedonian people: 
 Long live VMRO! 
 Long live a free, unified and undivided Macedonia! 
 Long live Todor Aleksandrov! 
 Death to the enemies of the Organization! 128 
                                                                                                                                            
Polski, Georgi Spanchevski, Milan Hristov Stanimirov and Dobri Ivanov Bitel. 
Svoboda ili smurt 9:142 (June 1933) has obituaries on every odd-numbered page 
from 7 through 15.  
126 The same portrait is frequently hung in the offices of the contemporary 
VMRO-SMD political party noted in the introduction.  
127 TsDA, Fond 1909, opis 2, a.e. 44, l. 1-2. 





Songs, poetry and fiction were created in the same vein, stressing the role 
of VMRO as an organization and of its memberships in defending the people of 
Pirin and in fighting to achieve the re-unification of Macedonia. Artwork was 
commissioned to visualize the Macedonian struggle, as in the “Ilinden” calendar 
depicted in Figure 10. Just as photographic portraits taken before the First World 
War celebrated and memorialized both cheti individual members as symbolic of 
the paramilitary struggle against Ottoman rule and rival Greek and Serbian 
guerillas, similar photographs now portrayed the post-war bands.129  Figure 14 
can be compared to Figure 6 (Chapter Three, page 120) in order to see how 
VMRO had changed from its rough guerilla origins before the First World War. 
Interwar photographs of cheti now more portrayed them more like regular 
soldiers with standardized uniforms and weapons. Such photographs  
Figure 14 
Interwar Postcard of a VMRO cheta 
 
Card circa 1930, personal collection of author 
                                                




were not only frequently published in VMRO publications but were now also 
distributed as prints or as postcards, as shown in Figure 13. Dozens of similar 
cards can be found in Fonds 1909 and 396K of the TsDA.  
 VMRO already possessed its own flag as well, which was now flown 
prominently at rallies and ceremonies. The organization now transformed the 
“skull and pistol” symbols of the late nineteenth century into administrative tools. 
Rubber stamps and seals were created, for example, depicting a skull and 
crossbones with “Vutreshna makedonska revoliutsionna organizatsiia” (Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) running along the top border and 
“Svoboda ili smurtu” (Freedom or Death) along the bottom.130   
 VMRO’s use of historical symbols or local customs reinforced them as 
expressions of identity. Such traditions were also cushioned by the failure of the 
central state apparatus to expand into the region. One example of such was the 
persistence of local dialect. Unlike Pomaks — whose dialect was sometimes 
officially referred to as “pomashki” Bulgarian131 — the central government did not 
specifically recognize the Slavic dialect in Pirin. Provincial school reports suggest 
that the Pirin dialect was maintained throughout the interwar period.132 Local 
schools had high numbers of failing grades in literary Bulgarian grammar and 
composition classes. At the Nevrokop coeducational gymnasium, for example, in 
1923 significant numbers of students failed their grammar and composition 
                                                
130 Impressions of this stamp can be found at F 370, opis 6, a.e. 356, l. 99. 
131 For example, on language-based central returns in 1920. See F 453, opis 2, 
a.e. 18, passim. 
132 In addition, letters and petitions in ODAB in the period frequently display 




course. In the first semester this included two-thirds of the first year students, 
over a third of the second year and half the third year; in the second semester, 
this included over half of the first and second years and twelve of thirteen 
students in the third year.133 In 1924, the trend continued with over half of the first 
class and second class and two-thirds of the third class failing.134 The school itself 
suggested this was due to a past “irregular period of education” that had failed to 
prepare students.135 But such failure rates did not appear in courses on other 
subjects.  
 The creation of new symbols and the retaining of regional particularlisms 
highlight a sense of confusion over national consciousness. VMRO itself added 
to this confusion with, by the late 1920s, the frequent use of the term 
“Makedonskite bulgari,” or “Macedonian Bulgarians.”136 Even as VMRO engaged 
in state-making, this administrative mobilization failed to resolve completely the 
question of national consciousness. 
 
VMRO Descending: Factional Disputes and the End of Autonomy  
 If VMRO was successful in creating symbols and assuming state 
funcitons, it was less successful in maintaining internal harmony. As noted in 
                                                
133 ODAB Fond 164K, opis 1, a.e. 1, 1922, Protocol #1, Protocol #15.  
134 ODAB Fond 164K, opis 1, a.e. 1, 1924, Protocol #5. 
135 ODAB Fond 164K, opis 1, a.e. 1, 1922, Protocol #1. 
136 The term can be seen in VMRO’s perodiocals; see, for example, Svoboda ili 
smurt, August 1, 1929, 5:98, page 13; also Revoliutsonen list, November 1933, 
page 2. Yet earlier that year, Svoboda ili smurt had used the expression 
““Macedonians for the Bulgarian state,” suggesting internal inconsistency or  





Chapter Two, since its founding the Macedonian paramilitary movement had 
been subject to factionalization: initially between Supremacists and VMRO, then 
(following their union in 1902) between left and right wings in the movement. 
Individual cheti, too, were generally loyal to their band leader rather than to an 
abstract hierarchy. This tendency continued when VMRO was rebuilt after the 
First World War, when (as noted in Chapter Four) elements of Yane Sandanski’s 
“Seres group” sided with Stamboliiski’s government against Todor Aleksandrov’s 
VMRO. Finally, as noted above, an open break emerged in the post-war 
Organization when Ivan Mihailov took up power following Aleksandrov’s 
assassination. Open violence broke out in 1924-1925, subsiding to sporadic 
fighting between factions dedicated to Mihailov and Aleksandur Protogerov.  
 Within the mainstream VMRO led by Mihailov, the result was an increased 
atmosphere of paranoia and a hunt for internal enemies. Mihailov cracked down 
on Communist organizations in Pirin, particularly after Dimitur Vlahov and other 
left-wing members broke away from the organization and founded VMRO-
Obedinie (VMRO-United). Their small numbers were forced first out of Pirin to 
Sofia and then out of Bulgaria altogether to Vienna. Mihailov nonetheless blamed 
the Communists for Aleksandrov’s assassination and pursued them ruthlessly.137  
                                                
137 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 86. See also Makedoniia, issue 45 of 
December 3, 1926, page 1, for typical anti-communist rhetoric. On May 9, 1925 
Mihailov’s lover, Mencha Karnicheva, assassinated Todor Panitsa in a Viennese 
theater. Mihailov later married her, and she was famed as the “Joan of Arc” of the 
interwar VMRO.  
Pro-Communist accounts of the conflict from the Macedonian perspective are 
given in Ivan Katarjiev, Pirin se budi i buni (Skopje: Misla, 1983), 188-256, and in 
Michael Michael A. Radin, VMRO and the Macedonian Question, 1893-1934 




Faced with significant dissent within the Macedonian movement, the 
response of the Mihailov group was to sanction violence against all dissident 
factions on the pretext of “reacting to attacks” by these groups.138 The Central 
Committee off VMRO became increasingly worried about local non-communist 
rivals, and members were ordered to be vigilant against for local rivals.139 
Mihailov ordered attacks and assassinations against any possible rival.  
As the rift between the two wings of VMRO continued, however, Mihailov 
“exported” violence form Pirin to the rest of Bulgaria. His ability to dominate 
VMRO, and the Organization’s own regime in Pirin forced dissidents within the 
movement to flee either abroad (particularly to Vienna) or to Sofia. The result 
was an escalation of conflict in which VMRO gunmen from each wing were 
dispatched to undertake assassinations within the capital, members of the 
parliament included.140 As killings in Sofia grew more frequent and more apt to 
take place in the open, sympathies for the Organization on the national level 
declined.141 By the early 1930s, open violence between the two groups created 
                                                                                                                                            
A more balanced if sympathetic approach is Andrew Rossos, “Macedonianism 
and Macedonian Nationalism on the Left,” in Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, 
eds.,  National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). A more general approach covering both the 
left and the right is Tsvetlana Micheva, “Ideino razvitie na VMRO sled Purvata 
svetovna voina (1919-1944): Chast purva, 1919-1928 g.,” Istoricheski Pregled 
57:3-4 (2001), 78-91. 
138 TsDA, fond 396, opis 1, a.e. 2, l 50-76. 
139 TsDA, Fond 396K, opis 2, a.e. 17, l. 117-119.  
140 Shoemaker, Sofia, February 15, 1933 dispatch #603, RIAB 10/44, 3. 
141 The American Legation records for Bulgaria are particularly useful, as outside 
observers chronicling the rise and extent of VMRO-involved assassinations and 
violence. A number of dispatches dealt either with a specific act of assassination, 
or chronicled recent events: these include (all by Henry W. Henry W. Shoemaker, 




popular dissatisfaction with Mihailov in Pirin.142 Socialist and Communist agitation 
in the province surged following the slump of the tobacco industry. Although 
Mihailov persecuted unions as they formed, VMRO failed to offer any alternative.  
By the early 1930s, such violence targeted even government authorities. 
On January 27, 1933, four members of the gendarmerie were escorting a train 
carrying three prisoners accused of robbing and shooting a local schoolteacher in 
Pirin. Near Belitsa the train was stopped and boarded by a local VMRO cheta. 
The gendarmes were forcibly disarmed and the prisoners kidnapped, given a 
summary trial and then shot at the train station.143 VMRO’s ability to subvert free 
elections in Pirin in the late 1920s without government reprisal raised similar 
concerns.144 Autonomy for Pirin had emerged as an open challenge to Sofia’s 
ability to maintain order. But the open conflict between Mihailovist and other 
factions served to weaken the movement sufficiently that by the early 1930s the 
Bulgarian army officers aligned with the Zveno group felt confident enough to 
declare VMRO illegal as part of the coup of 1934. 
                                                                                                                                            
March 10, 1930, #1613; December 18, 1930, #168; February 21, 1931, #196; 
July 24, 1931, #264; July 13, 1932, #469; May 20, 1933, #663; June 23, #692, 
1933.  RIAB 10/44. See also Markov, 256-265. 
142 Foreign diplomats commented widely on the increasing trend of violence in 
the later years. See, for example, Henry W. Shoemaker, Sofia to the Department 
of State, Washington D.C., 20 May, 1933, dispatch #663, 2 - 3. RIAB 10/44; 
Henry W. Shoemaker, Sofia to the Department of State, Washington D.C., 23 
June, 1933, dispatch #692, 1. RIAB 10/44; and Henry W. Shoemaker, Sofia, to 
the Department of State, Washington D.C., 25 June, 1933, telegram. RIAB 
10/44. 
143 Shoemaker, Sofia, February 15, 1933 dispatch #603, RIAB 10/44, 4. 
144 For a generally sympathetic survey of the work of the Macedonian 
Parliamentary Group, see Dimitur Tiolekov, “Deinostta na makedonskata 
parlamentarna grupa v XXII i XXIII obiknoveno Narodno subranie (1927 – 1934 




 The weak presence of the Bulgarian state in the Pirin region limited the 
state’s ability to promote its preferred, uniform Bulgarian identity, the Bulgarian 
anguage included. True, the central government was able to extend 
infrastructure and formal government rule throughout the region during 1923-
1934. But VMRO, in its role as the “local regime,” assumed much of the state’s 
role in identity-building; the central state could not obtain or maintain its 
monopoly there. In education and local administration in particular, the 
Organization subverted formal government to its own ends. Schools and 
municipal and village governments accepted the patronage of VMRO leaders, 
who successfully portrayed the organization as attentive to the social welfare of 
the district’s inhabitants. By 1933, the organization apparently went so far as to 
flirt with the concept of creating its own independent Macedonian state.145 Only in 
1934 did the state act to drive VMRO underground and begin its own policy of 
centralization, a policy that was to continue through the assumption of power by 
the Fatherland Front and the early Communist period.  
                                                
145 The idea of a “Macedonian state” is raised briefly in the account of the 1933 
General Congress of the organization. See Svoboda ili Smurt, February 1933, 







Establishing Central Control, 1934-1945 
 
 
“…the government [intends] to put an end to the extra-legal rule of the 
Macedonian organizations in [Petrich]…” 
— Frederick Sterling, US charge d’affairs, Sofia, 19341 
 
 
 In May 1934 the Ministry of War and Ministry of Internal affairs dispatched 
units of the Bulgarian army and gendarmerie to Pirin under orders to dismantle 
VMRO, arrest its supporters and establish government control over the province. 
Pirin was occupied without significant conflict between the troops and VMRO 
cheti, at least in part because the movement’s internal conflicts had weakened its 
local support and diminished its paramilitary forces. The leader of the 
Organization’s Central Committee, Ivan Mihailov, now fled into exile in Fascist 
Italy. Police dragnets swept up much of the remaining leadership. After decades 
of paramilitary dominance over the region, the government restored central 
control within a few weeks.  
What the US legation found remarkable at the time was the apparent ease 
of the operation. A coup d’etat on May 19 by the Military League (Voenen suiuz) 
and the People’s Union “Link” (Naroden suiuz zveno, hereafter referred to as 
Zveno), overthrew the existing government and took power. Where the Liapchev 
                                                
1 Frederick A. Sterling, Sofia to the Department of State, Washington D.C., June 
11, 1934, #23, 3, Records Relating to the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria 1910-1944, 
Record Group 59, National Archives, Washington D.C., cited here from the 





and Naroden Blok regimes had previously been unable to stem the tide of 
Macedonian violence in the face of VMRO’s military and political power, the new 
government — ruling by dictatorial “emergency decree” — established control 
over Pirin quickly and with little open violence.2 
 In the history of Pirin itself, the coup of 1934 has been variously portrayed 
as a betrayal of VMRO, an attempt to subjugate the region’s Macedonian 
population, or as a campaign to eliminate outright a destabilizing criminal 
organization.3 It is more accurate to say that the seizure of power was an 
attempt, continued by successive regimes, to assert the state’s control over Pirin. 
Zveno’s campaign in Pirin was also part of a larger effort to create a non-party 
regime that would control political life in the country under the direction of the 
central government and ministries in Sofia. The coup was successful in 
launching a period of continued centralization and authoritarianism. 
Administrative, economic and political functions in Pirin were increasingly 
brought under the direction of Sofia. Each of the regimes that followed in the 
ensuing “decade of centralization” continued the process.4 
 This political direction was not confined to the Bulgarian government’s 
tightening of control over Pirin or even over the country as a whole. In the 
Southeastern European states central power had expanded at the expense of 
the provinces since independence. Both Stefan Stambolov in the 1880s and King 
                                                
2 Sterling, ibid, 4.  
3 See, respectively, Tiulekov, Obrecheno Rodoliubie, passim, for a pro-VMRO 
perspective; Vasil Jotevski, 26, on subjugation; finally, note the dispatches of  
Frederick A. Sterling, Sofia to the Department of State, Washington D.C., May 
22, 1934 letter [confidential], RIAB 10/44, 3. 




Ferdinand in the 1890s and after 1908 had attempted to concentrate power in a 
central Bulgarian government directed by the cabinet of ministers. But the role of 
elected parliaments had persisted across the region, buoyed by liberal 
constitutions enacted after the First World War. Then the economic depression 
confronted them all with the political instability and sense of crisis that had 
already opened the way for VMRO in Bulgaria during the 1920s. Each 
Southeastern European state sought to solve this crisis by a turn to authoritarian 
dictatorship, setting parliaments aside and accelerating the pace of 
centralization.5 What distinguished the Southeastern European experience from 
that of Italy and Germany was that these dictatorships did not profess to seek 
revolutionary change but a continued, a basically conservative attempt to 
consolidate and establish the centralization of power. 6 
In similar fashion, historians have focused on how the coup of September 
9, 1944 brought the Communist Bulgarian Workers’ Party (Bulgarska 
                                                
5 For a survey of these trends in interwar Southeastern Europe in each country, 
see Joseph Rothschild, East Central Europe between the Two World Wars 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983). A recent synthetic approach is 
John Lampe, The Balkans into Southeastern Europe (New York: Palgrave, 
2006), 79-97.  
6 However the Fascists or NSDAP felt regarding the power and authority of the 
regimes they opposed after the First World War, they remained strong, 
centralized states. Centralization was less a matter of centralizing government 
structure — with the exception of the deliberate undermining of the power of the 
Länder in Germany in 1934 — but rather the consolidation of power in the hands 
of the party and dictator.  
Christian Nielssen makes a similar argument with regards to Yugoslavia, where 
the establishment of a dictatorship by King Aleksandar was an attempt to create 
central power more than an attempt at either personal control or “Greater 
Serbianism.” See Christian Nielssen, “One State, One Nation, One King: The 
Dictatorship of King Aleksander and His Yugoslav Project, 1929-1935” 




rabotnicheska partiia, hereafter BRP)7 to power at the head of the Fatherland 
Front, and established dictatorial Communist control over Pirin (as with other 
parts of Bulgaria).8 As discussed below, the Fatherland Front ceded 
considerable autonomy to local party organizations in Pirin and elsewhere in its 
period of initial weakness at the end of the Second World War. In Pirin, thus, the 
establishment of centralized control after 1946 appears as a continuation of 
earlier policies by the dictatorial regimes of Zveno and Tsar Boris to establish 
administrative control. Focusing on the “ultimate” goals of the Communists by 
both Marxist and revisionist historiography hides real continuities in how power 
was actually used following Zveno coup. 
In Pirin from 1934 forward the state now sought in unprecedented ways to 
foster a single Bulgarian consciousness. Whereas from 1923 to 1934 VMRO had 
controlled what Anthony Smith terms the “experience of administrative 
mobilization,” the state would now shape the symbols and memories integral to 
local identity — and recast them in such fashion as to encourage a common 
Bulgarian national consciousness.9  
 
                                                
7 Driven underground, the Bulgarian Communist Party used a variety of “front” 
names to continue to operate in politics. Technically, the party was called the 
Bulgarskata Rabotnicheska Partiia (Komunisti) from 1938-1948. This study uses 
“Bulgarian Workers’ Party” and “Communists” interchangeably, except in citation 
or giving formal titles where the contemporary name is given.  
8 Bulgarskata Komunisticheska Partiia, Istoriia na BKP v Blagoevgradska oblast 
(Blagoevgrad: Partizan, 1983), 3. 
9 This argument mirrors those in Macedonian historiography on the role of the 
state regarding “denationalization” state campaigns in Pirin: e.g., Vasil Jotevski 
Natsionalnata afirmatsija na makedontsite vo pirinskiot del na Makedonija, 1944-
1948 (Skopje: Institut za natsionalna istorija, 1996), 1-33. However, this study 




The Coup of 1934 and the Tsarist Dictatorship of 1935 
 As argued in Chapter Five, systemic state weakness had helped VMRO 
obtain administrative autonomy over Pirin after 1923. This same weakness of the 
state (and the concurrent political and economic causes) fostered a sense of 
crisis that led to the coup of May 19, 1934. In principle, the League claimed 
legitimacy for its actions through invoking article 43 of the 1879 Turnovo 
constitution. This article gave the Tsar the authority to form an emergency 
government in circumstances when parliament could not address external or 
internal threats to the existence of the state.10 The Military League announced a 
non-political “government of the ministries” under a prime minister with 
emergency powers. 
 The League seized power in cooperation with Zveno, a small cross-party 
political group drawing members from the military and several of the major 
political parties.11 Zveno was a movement founded in 1930 that drew from both 
political and military circles with the proposition that mass party politics had failed 
to solve Bulgaria’s problems.12 The Zveno cabinet created under the 
conservative political figure Prime Minister Kimon Stoianov drew members with 
backgrounds as diverse as serving Army officers in the Military League, the 
                                                
10 Vasil Giozelev, ed., Bulgarskata durzhavnost v aktove i dokumenti (Sofia: 
Izdatelstvo “Nauka i izkustvo,” 1981), 223. 
11 Confusingly, it was possible for an individual to be a member of both Zveno 
and the League at the same time, such as General Petur Zlatev. Bulgarian 
historiography usually treats Zveno as the dominant group, but the defection by 
the League ultimately led to the government’s demise. Note Milen Kumanov and 
Tania Nikolova, Politicheski Partii, 102-103.  
12 Daskalov, 234-235. For an overview, see Milen Kumanov and Tania Nikolova, 
Politicheski partii, organizatsii i dvizheniia v Bulgariia i tehnite lideri, 1879-1999 




Radical Party, the Democratic Party, the Agrarians, Aleksandur Tsankov’s 
National Socialist Society and the Sgovor coalition of 1923.13 
In response to the economic and political crisis in the country, Zveno 
proclaimed an étatist agenda that drew inspiration from Italian corporatism. State 
management of the economy, politics and society was to be the solution to 
Bulgaria’s current crisis. Such an approach would “direct the spiritual and 
intellectual life of the country towards union and renovation for the benefit of the 
nation and of the state” and “organiz[e] the citizens into an ideologically 
homogenous national group.”14 The Zveno government enacted enabling 
legislation in each of these three areas. In politics, for example, the Law for the 
Dissolution of Political Party Organizations (Zakon za razturiane na partiino-
politicheskite organizatsii) of June 14, 1934 formally dissolved all political parties. 
In three separate articles, the law restricted political organization, publishing and 
newspapers, and gave the MVRNZ (Ministry of Internal Affairs and National 
Health) police powers over all groups of a political character.15  A separate 
announcement on June 19 formally nationalized the property of all former 
political parties for state use.16 
                                                
13 See Tasho Tashev, Ministrite na Bulgariia, 1879-1999  (Sofia: Akademichno 
izdatelstvo “Prof. Marin Drinov” and Izdalelstvo na Ministerstvo na otbranata “Sv. 
Georgi Pobedonosets,” 1999). 
14 Cited from the translated attachment of Zveno’s proclamations on taking power 
in Shoemaker, Sofia to Washington D.C., dispatch #23, June 11, 1934. RIAB 
10/44.  
15 Zakon za razturiane na partiino-politcheskite organizatsii na 14 Iuni, 1934; 
Bulgarskata durzhavnost, 314.  
16 “Iz naredba za otnemane v polza na durzhavata imotite na nelegalnite 




Zveno similarly attempted to rationalize state structure. The existing 16 
administrative provinces of Bulgaria were reorganized into seven new provinces 
with the aim of reducing local political networks. This would, as noted below, be 
used to divide the existing Petrich oblast between new provinces centered on 
Sofia and Plovdiv. Village communes were similarly combined into a smaller 
number of larger units. The central ministries would now appoint local 
administrators directly from the capital. To this end an accompanying purge fired 
a third of the country’s civil servants, allowing the ministries to replace those 
insufficiently subordinate to control from Sofia.  
These measures set the stage for Zveno’s intervention into the economy. 
While every post-war Bulgarian government had favored state intervention, 
Zveno went farther in drawing on (if not replicating precisely) Italian Fascist 
economic experiments. The various economic ministries were combined into one 
body, with similar mergers between state and private banks. The experiment with 
corporatism culminated in the government’s creation of the Bulgarian Workers’ 
Union (Bulgarski rabotnicheski suiuz), a body in which citizens would be divided 
into “estates” in imitation of the Italian system.17 Zveno extended state power into 
the social sphere through the creation on June 9 of the Directorate for Social 
Renewal (Direktoriia na obshestvenata obnova). Its responsibility was the 
fostering of “national spirit” through the censorship of the press, publications, 
theater, cinema and public gatherings. These measures accompanied Zveno’s 
efforts to eliminate the threat of political disorder. Not only were the Communist 
                                                





Party and VMRO declared illegal, but so were all political parties as well as any 
other public organization that failed to meet with Zveno’s approval.  
Given the small membership of Zveno, however, its government lacked a 
base of popular support and largely failed to secure one — the reason power 
had to be seized through a coup backed by the military. Conflicts within Zveno 
and the Military League of leading officers over the new reforms resulted in the 
fall of Stoianov’s government within six months. Tsar Boris readily approved the 
new government headed by the Military League’s General Petur Zlatev in 
January 1935.  Zveno’s crucial military support now passed to the Tsar, allowing 
him to control the installation of two more governments in April and November 
1935.18 The government of Prime Minister Georgi Kioseivanov in November 
marks the final transition to a “royal dictatorship” in which Boris used his personal 
influence to install and control otherwise weak governments that ruled by decree.  
The more ambitious corporatist plans of Zveno were now sidelined. Boris’ 
dictatorship was conservative, stressing the maintenance of existing elites, 
economic models and traditions. The minor Fascist movements of the extreme 
right, such as the Ratnitsi, were outlawed in April 1939. The royalist dictatorship, 
like the dictatorships of King Aleksandur in Yugoslavia, King Carol in Romania 
and of General Metaxas in Greece, were fundamentally attempts to secure 
domestic stability favorable to the elites within and surrounding the royal court. At 
most, Boris initiated a limited rearmanent of the Bulgarian army and flirted with 
the idea of attempting to regain some of the territories lost in the Balkan and First 
                                                




World Wars. Boris continued the initiatives attempts to bring the provinces under 
central control, to promote propaganda instilling national spirit (now featuring a 
sense of loyalty to the monarch himself) and to use police powers to suppress 
any opposition.  
 
Establishing Centralized Control over Pirin 
 Zveno had expressed dissatisfaction with VMRO’s hold over Pirin prior to 
the coup of 1934.19 VMRO’s role in Bulgarian political affairs had limited the 
government’s freedom to improve relations with Greece and Yugoslavia. Worse, 
its control over Pirin both weakened the government’s authority and provided it 
with a base from which its paramilitary forces could intervene against the 
government, as they had in 1923. VMRO’s earlier flirtation with the Comintern 
and with an autonomous Macedonia posed its own potential problems. These 
resurfaced with rumors that delegates at VMRO’s 1933 General Congress in 
Gorna Dzhumaiia considered declaring for a unified Macedonia independent of 
Bulgaria.20  
 Immediately after taking power, Zveno and the Military League dispatched 
both army and gendarmerie units to Pirin to confiscate weapons and to begin the 
process of dismantling VMRO.21 The move was surprisingly effective. The 
dominant wing of the movement behind Ivan Mihailov fled into exile or went 
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underground as the government proceeded with widespread arrests.22 The 
smaller, rival “Protogerov” wing composed of those opposing Mihailov’s 
leadership of the movement officially dissolved itself. The small communist 
VMRO-United (Obedenie) faction went underground as well, with much of the 
leadership going abroad. No large-scale armed opposition was reported, but the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs directed both national and local police to monitor any 
subversive behavior in Pirin. VMRO was now on the same level as the 
Communists. The state apparatus used to repress the BKP since 1923, as noted 
in Chapter Five, was now extended to cover the Macedonian movement.23 Both 
groups would be subject to continual police monitoring from 1934-1944.24  
The government’s campaign of 1934 resulted in the arrest of hundreds of 
VMRO members and supporters. The resulting interrogation and investigation 
provided the police with leads on numerous murders, assassinations, bombings 
and other acts committed by members of the movement.25 Government seizure 
of the movement’s bank accounts, records and arms caches crippled its ability to 
resist. Such caches included 15 machine guns, nearly 11,000 rifles, over 
700,000 rounds of ammunition and 8,000 hand grenades.26 The Organization’s 
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records revealed who had been part of its administration of the province,27 
allowing Sofia to purge local government offices in Pirin of VMRO-sympathizers. 
Sporadic violence continued into the late 1930s, such as the assassination of 
General Iordan Peev in Sofia, targeted for his role in the crackdown. But VMRO 
had lost its power to run Pirin as an autonomous unit.28 
Figure 15  
Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1934: 
The former Petrich oblast is divided between new Sofia and Plovdiv oblasts;  
the four okolii are noted. 
 
Based on Bulgarskata akademia na naukite: Geografski institut, Atlas Narodna Republika Bulgariia (Sofia: 
Glavno upravlenie po geodeziia i kartografiia pri ministerstvoto na akrhitektura i blagoustroistvoto, 1973), 7 ; 
and “Karta Bulgariia novo administrativno delenie, novo naimonovaniia na selishtata,” (Sofia: Pechatnitsa 
“Stopansko razvitie,” 1934), enclosed map. 
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28 It did not, however, lose its power to destabilize international affairs, as the 
assassination of Yugoslav King Alexandur and French Foreign Minister Louis 
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 With the gendarmerie and army providing security, the government soon 
took steps to re-establish administrative control over the district. In June, as part 
of government’s rationalization of Bulgaria, the borders of the Petrich oblast were 
redrawn. The okolii (districts) of Gorna Dzhumaiia, Petrich and Sandanski areas 
were transferred to the Sofia oblast, those of Razlog and Nevrokop to the Plovdiv 
district: see Figure 15. This was done deliberately to divide the region, further 
weakening local political groups and institutions. With administrative positions 
now firmly under control of the central authorities, local civil servants, educators 
and others were evaluated and monitored. Functions that had been left to local 
authorities were restored to the purview of the central government.  
This included the creation and promotion of symbols relevant to national 
consciousness. The Macedonian-Adrianople Volunteers’ Society noted in 
Chapter Three was founded in 1934 specifically to replace VMRO and émigré 
associations. While a local Macedonian consciousness in Pirin would be 
tolerated, Sofia sought to link its history to that of a Bulgarian national 
consciousness and the Bulgarian state. For example, in 1937 a monument was 
dedicated in Sveti Vrach to the Bulgarian Second Army’s campaigns in the First 
World War. The ceremony made no mention of the role of VMRO paramilitary 
units. The minister of war and members of the general staff were the most 
prominent attendees, the event covered by the popular press both nationally and 
in Pirin.29 Additional military monuments were erected around the region to 
memorialize individual or group heroics and sacrifice in the “Macedonian 
                                                




Liberation Struggle,” Balkan Wars and First World Wars.30 Unlike the 1920s, as 
noted in Chapter Five, when VMRO had been left to erect local monuments and 
ceremonies and thus shape local memories in Pirin, the government now took 
the leading role.  
 The Law for the Dissolution of Political Party Organizations had rendered 
the majority of Macedonian organizations and periodicals illegal, both within and 
outside Pirin. The Macedonian youth, women and student organizations were 
closed down.31 Only the Macedonian Scientific Institute (Makedonskiiat nauchen 
institut, or MNI) in Sofia was allowed to remain open without interruption through 
the purge.32 A new series of student and cultural organizations were permitted, 
often founded in cooperation with the MNI, but with careful government 
supervision. Within Pirin controls were even stricter, although strikes over the 
wages of tobacco workers raised the specter of illegal union activity.33  
Youth and cultural organizations were organized through the government 
and monitored for any political activity. VMRO’s newspaper offices were closed. 
Not until 1935, after the royal dictatorship was imposed, were new papers 
allowed to publish in the district, and then under censorship. Pirinski Glas, one of 
two new papers, stated from its first issue that its goal was to foster “a Bulgarian 
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spirit.”34 Tsar Boris’ picture dominated the first issue’s front page and was 
regularly featured afterwards, suggesting the paper’s purpose was as much to 
foster loyalty to the Tsar and the dynasty as it was to the nation.  
 Pirinski glas sought to shape memory and identity in forms prescribed by 
the central government. Themes common in Svoboda ili smurt or Revolutsionen 
list continued. The new newspaper featured articles on local history, including 
the activities of VMRO before the First World War, as well as prominent VMRO 
members of the late nineteenth century.35 Such historical presentations were, 
however, usually linked to Bulgarian history in general, or accompanied by 
specific articles on figures such as the nineteenth century Bulgarian hero Vasil 
Levski.36 Articles stressed the pace of modernization and the progress of Pirin 
under the new regime.37 While Pirin Macedonia could retain its unique history 
and local identities, it would be the central government that would define this 
history and national consciousness. Such definitions were still unfinished in the 
1940s, when the government was faced not only with the question of firmly 
incorporating Pirin into a Bulgarian national consciousness, but incorporating 
Vardar and Aegean Macedonia as well. For the fourth time in less than 30 years, 
the country entered war in an attempt to unify all of geographic Macedonia into a 
Bulgarian state.  
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Bulgaria’s Road to the Second World War 
 Although Tsar Boris’ government maintained claims to regaining the 
extensive territorial losses inflicted by the peace treaties of 1913 and 1919, it 
was reluctant to engage in aggressive diplomacy before the Second World War 
to revise Bulgaria’s territorial losses from the Balkan and First World Wars. The 
Balkan Entente, signed in 1934 between Greece, Romania, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia reinforced Bulgaria’s isolation. Bulgaria was similarly caught between 
the Great Powers, as Germany, Great Britain and the Soviet Union each took an 
active interest in the orientation of Bulgaria’s foreign policy.38 Tsar Boris’ first 
response was to declare neutrality in 1939 at the outbreak of the war and 
attempt to steer a course around the conflict. Fearing both Communist and 
Fascist political rivals at home, Boris attempted to avoid close entanglement with 
either Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.  
 Nazi efforts proved sufficient to pull Bulgaria into a pro-German position 
by 1941.39 “Clearing arrangements” between the two countries were the only 
profitable way to export Bulgaria’s agricultural goods. By 1939 this resulted in 
sufficient leverage to entangle Bulgaria firmly within the Nazi economic sphere. 
The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of that August increased the pressure, as Germany 
and the Soviet Union agreed to divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. 
Soviet suggestions of a closer alliance with Bulgaria in early 1940 could only be 
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countered by turning to the Germans or the British, with the latter unwilling (or 
unable) to counterbalance the Soviets. It was, however, the events of the 
summer of 1940 that proved crucial. The speed and apparent ease of Germany’s 
victory over France in May 1940 made clear the Reich’s military supremacy. A 
German-sponsored round of diplomacy in August resulted in the September 7 
Treaty of Craiova by which Bulgaria regained the southern Dobrudzha from 
Romania. It suggested that alliance with Germany could potentially reap further 
revisions in Bulgarian borders.  
Accordingly, on March 1, 1941, Bulgaria joined the Tripartite Pact as an 
ally of Germany. The agreement promised still greater German access to 
agricultural supplies and immediate transit rights for the Wehrmacht across the 
country. Bulgaria still refrained from providing troops for combat in German 
military campaigns, though under pressure from Berlin it would make what the 
Tsar saw as token declarations of war on the United States and United Kingdom 
in December 1941 — while refraining from any declaration of war on the Soviet 
Union, which maintained diplomatic relations with Bulgaria until 1944. Bulgarian 
troops did not actively participate in the German Operation Punishment against 
Yugoslavia and Operation Marita against Greece on April 6, 1941. In an 
agreement reached over April 18-20, however, Nazi representatives did invite 
the Bulgarian Army to contribute to occupation duties (see Figure 16, next page) 
in both Vardar and Aegean Macedonia.  
These zones of occupation initially included Yugoslavia’s Vardar 




German conquest of Greece, it would also include and Greece’s territories in 
Western Thrace and eastern Aegean Macedonia (between the Mesta and 
Struma rivers).40 Two Bulgarian divisions (including the 7th Rila Division) were 
immediately dispatched to Vardar to take up occupation duties after the 
government announced a formal declaration of a “state of war” within the 
occupied zones on April 24. Their mission in 1941 was chiefly to maintain local 
order and to supplement the limited number of troops the Germans could leave 
to guard the Belgrade-Thessaloniki rail line and Thessaloniki itself. Bulgarian 
occupation troops did not serve under German commanders or count in the 




World War Two as a Struggle Between Centralization and Decentralization 
 Throughout the occupation, Bulgaria was able to unify all three regions of 
Macedonia administratively for the first time since the brief and narrower 
mandate of 1912. For the Bulgarian government, occupation was a vehicle by 
which Macedonia could be defined as Bulgarian and unified with the Bulgarian 
state, allowing for a definitive state-sponsored solution to the unification of most 
of the Macedonian lands with Bulgaria. But emerging conflicts within these 
occupied regions meant that rival theories of reunification would emerge as well. 
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Although the Second World War did not directly affect Pirin to any large 
measure, the conflict in geographic Macedonia shaped Pirin’s political culture.  
 Just as the Bulgarian government sought to impose administrative control 
over Pirin after 1934 its authorities in Sofia now discouraged local autonomous 
groups in occupied Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. Shortly after occupation 
sympathetic locals had begun establishing Bulgarian Central Action Committees 
(Bulgarski tsentralni aktsionni komiteti) in Vardar to represent the local 
Macedonian population’s interests to German, Italian and Bulgarian occupation 
authorities.41 Such institutions initially filled the administrative vacuum created 
when the predominantly ethnically Serbian authorities of the Yugoslav 
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government in Vardar fled or were arrested by the Germans. Already, by July 7, 
1941 the newly appointed district governor from Bulgaria declared that the action 
committees were to be dissolved and replaced by officials formally appointed by 
Sofia.42  
  The new regional government established in Vardar Macedonia,  
integrated as the Skopje oblast in 1943, was the same sort of regime installed in 
Pirin in 1934. It centralized and expanded schools, local administration, state 
theaters and publications. But in failing even to inquire about local interests, 
these institutions were met with increasing hostility by the local population. 
Macedonian historiography still considers the period to be an outright 
“Bulgarianization campaign.”43 It may just as well be regarded as a 
“centralization campaign” in which the government in Sofia attempted to 
establish control over local governance in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia. The 
lasting symbol of this campaign has been the presence of Bulgarian occupation 
forces (see Figure 17, next page) rather than gains in social welfare.  
 Given the needs of the wartime state, administrative control increased 
over time throughout Bulgaria and the occupied lands. The Law for Requisitions, 
passed in March 23, 1939, authorized the government to commandeer material
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Aspects of Centralization: 
Bulgarian Troops on Occupation Duty, Vardar Macedonia, 1943 
 
Photo from personal collection; original marked  
Kriegsbericthter Ardt, Serie 1567a 
 
necessary for the war. Pirin was called upon to support an economy brought 
increasingly under army control.44 The Law for Urban Mobilization of May 4, 
1940 similarly allowed the government to intake adult men over 16 for military 
service.45 The Bulgarian government integrated Pirin into the war economy on a 
general level, but its strategic importance prompted additional consideration. 
Pirin lay across routes to the occupied territories in both Vardar and Aegean 
Macedonia, and the easiest rail and road corridor to Western Thrace. Local rail 
lines saw increasing use by the army, and new military lines were built from 
Gorna Dzhumaiia to Kochani, in Vardar. The existing rail line to Aegean 
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Macedonia was expanded to handle additional traffic, with new links being added 
between Aegean and Vardar Macedonia at Demirhisar.46  
Figure 18 
Bulgarian Administrative Borders, 1943 
A Pirin province is restored in the Gorna Dzhumaia oblast, and a Skopje oblast is 
created. (Shaded territories are acquisitions during the war). 
  
Based on Bulgarskata akademia na naukite: Geografski institut, Atlas Narodna Republika Bulgariia (Sofia: 
Glavno upravlenie po geodeziia i kartografiia pri ministerstvoto na akrhitektura i blagoustroistvoto, 1973), 7. 
 
Military needs during the war not only furthered centralization but also 
created links between Pirin and the occupied territories. The region’s location on 
the pre-1941 border served to make it the initial site for POW camps.47 Later in 
the war, sporadic Allied bombing attacks against the rail lines brought the war 
directly to Pirin. The chief local consequence of the later war years, however, 
was to require an again weakening state to redefine its relations with the 
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provinces. On September 28, 1943, Protocol 136 of the Council of Ministers 
recreated a Pirin district in the form of the Gorna Dzhumaia oblast (see Figure 18 
for the new administrative borders).  
Significantly, powers over local administration were devolved to the 
district. Its district administration now supervised local mayors directly, and 
directed local functions such as social welfare. The central government did, 
however, keep direct control over local police. However, in return the district was 
also required to administer the military rationing (Izdruzhka po voenni prichini) 
and undertake requisitions at the behest of the central government.48 De-
centralization became a late wartime necessity for a state increasingly weakened 
by the decline in German fortunes. This weakness, in turn, invited the renewed 
rise of autonomist groups.  
 
VMRO and the War  
 The Bulgarian occupation of Vardar and Aegean Macedonia reinvigorated 
the flagging Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Though the 
government had considered VMRO to be a rival in Pirin, the group was also 
initially an ally in attracting support in the occupied regions in Macedonia and 
Thrace. Accordingly, members of the Organization were allowed by the 
government to establish chapters in the occupied territories beginning in 1941.49 
It was moderately successful in doing so, although the total number of members 
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recruited remained in the thousands.50 In part, this reflected continuing rivalries 
between factions of VMRO, but more important was the status of the territory 
which was instead provided an “over-centralized” administrative regime 
controlled directly by the ministries.51 VMRO members cooperating within the 
government’s administration of these territories were permissible, but neither 
local nor “Bulgarian” autonomous groups were tolerated in occupied Macedonia 
by the government. 
 As the war progressed, however, such groups discovered they might well 
win support elsewhere among the Axis powers. In 1941 Ante Paveli", poglavnik 
of the Independent State of Croatia, had already approached Ivan Mihailov in the 
latter’s exile in Fascist Italy to inquire if he could recruit Macedonians for 
Croatian military units.52 These initial discussions came to nothing, but by 1943 
the Axis raised paramilitary units from local populations in the Balkans, including 
in the Macedonian lands. First the Italians, then the Germans cooperated with 
VMRO in organizing the units, chiefly in Aegean Macedonia.53 Mihailov himself 
received permission to raise two or three battalions under the operational 
command of the SS. Other local independent Macedonian “security” units were 
formed, nominally to ensure local order and the defense of villages or regions 
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against Communist Partisans. They also served to free up scarce German troops 
for other duties, and limit the area of operations for Partisans.54  
The Bulgarian government agreed to German mobilization of VMRO units 
only reluctantly given its already limited manpower and declining authority in the 
occupied regions.55 This reluctance makes further sense when we consider that 
Mihailov agitated locally for and attempted to negotiate with the Germans an 
agreement to create an independent Macedonian state.56 
 
The Wartime Communist Struggle over Macedonia 
 Just as wartime needs helped to reinvigorate VMRO in Macedonia, these 
same demands helped to reinvigorate the local Communist movement. As the 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union recast the war as a struggle between Fascism 
and Communism, the Bulgarian Communist Party enjoyed renewed prestige 
among opponents to Boris’ dictatorship in Bulgaria and in Bulgarian-occupied 
zones of Macedonia. Local Party organizations in Aegean, Pirin and Vardar 
Macedonia began to raise guerilla units following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet 
Union on June 22, 1941. This led in 1941 to early confrontations between the 
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Bulgarian and Yugoslav party organizations. Both parties agreed on the need to 
create and lead a powerful Communist organization within Macedonia, but 
disagreed on who would control it.57  
Under the new leadership of Josip Broz Tito, the Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia (KPJ) authorized the creation of an ambiguously subordinate 
Communist Party of Macedonia (KPM) in 1937. The question that emerged in the 
first year of the war was whether this organization, in territory now controlled by 
the Bulgarian government, should fall under the control of the Bulgariann 
Worker’s Party. The internal composition of the KPM complicated the issue, 
since its 300 members and 400 affiliates in the youth movement were divided 
between a “Bulgarophile” branch led by Metodija Shatorov Sharlo and a “Titoist” 
branch led by Lazar Kolishevski. Sharlo, as leader of the KPM, officially switched 
the party’s allegiance from the KPJ to the BRP in the summer of 1941, setting off 
a local struggle for power.58 Kolishevski, however, was arrested and imprisoned 
by Bulgarian authorities, leaving the regional organization outside of Tito’s 
effective control. The Yugoslav and Bulgarian Parties clashed on the issue of 
authority over the KPM over the next two years, ultimately appealing to the 
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Differences had emerged between Sharlo and Tito in 1940, principally that 
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Comintern (and through it, Joseph Stalin) to make a decision. Even with Stalin’s 
order in 1941 that the Macedonian Party should revert to the KPJ, local 
resistance forced Tito to dispatch Svetozar Vumanovi"-Tempo, one of his inner 
circle, to reassert central control. Only in 1943 did Tempo finally eliminate 
Sharlo’s faction from the local party, with Sharo assassinated in 1944.  
Decisive in Tempo’s ability to seize control over the movement was the 
relative weakness of the BRP during the Second World War. Bulgarian 
Communists found few Bulgarians interested in waging a partisan war “at home.” 
Although the Bulgarian government’s wartime policies caused economic 
privation, the country did not suffer from a foreign occupation as did Greece and 
Yugoslavia. The eastern districts of Pirin (the stronghold of past VMRO activity, 
as noted in Chapter Two) were thus unusual in seeing the creation of a partisan 
detachment in July 1941, in Razlog.59 While the KPJ seized control of local 
resistance groups and conducted a major partisan campaign in Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Serbia over 1941-1943, Bulgarian partisan strength even by early 
1944 remained limited to just over 2300 members. Only 60 percent of them were 
party members or affiliates.60  
Pirin contributed a meager 100 members to this strength, although by 
September 1944 as the Red Army entered Bulgaria additional units were being 
raised.61 The offer by the Bulgarian Communists to create a “special zone” in 
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Pirin and along the border with Yugoslavia to facilitate cooperation between the 
two counties’ partisan groups was arguably an attempt to secure Bulgarian 
participation in a successful Yugoslav partisan struggle. In Vardar Macedonia by 
early 1944, Tempo had raised a somewhat more substantial force of over a 
thousand, but still small compared to the KPJ’s strength in Serbia, Montenegro 
and Bosnia.62 The reason for his success lay in the KPJ’s recasting of the 
Macedonian question, the wartime creation of the People’s Republic of 
Macedonia. The inhabitants of Vardar (and, to some extent, Aegean and Pirin) 
Macedonia were now promised an equal state within a postwar Communist 
Yugoslav or Balkan Federation. 
 Over the course of 1943-1944, the KPJ pressed the BRP over claims to 
Pirin Macedonia, “capitalizing on Bulgaria’s weak diplomatic position and the 
internal weakness of the Bulgarian party.”63 However, both governments still 
lacked firm control over their respective Macedonian territories and hoped that 
the issue might be resolved later as part of a possible plan for a Balkan 
Federation. As a result, the BRP accepted the future “unification of Macedonia” 
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in principle and agreed to join in planning for a future transfer. But any change in 
territorial borders was postponed.64  
 This agreement suited the Yugoslav Party, allowing it to strengthen its 
own position on Macedonia. The KPJ’s growing confidence during the Second 
World War was the result of its Partisan struggle expanding long before the Red 
Army arrived and then moving on to Hungary in Fall 1944. Tito seized upon this 
as evidence that Yugoslavia had liberated itself from German rule and had taken 
power through its own efforts. The size and success of the Partisans arguably 
encouraged the KPJ’s advocacy of an enlarged Macedonia it could incorporate. 
Initially, however, the reality of the KPJ’s limited power on the ground in Vardar 
Macedonia made advocating unification with Pirin and Aegean Macedonia the 
best way of gaining wider support in the region.  
 
Communist Redefinitions: The People’s Republic of Macedonia  
Macedonian Communist Party membership in Yugoslav Macedonia had 
been tiny at the beginning of the Second World War (less than 500 members in 
late 1943). Riven by the factional disputes noted above, partisan activity began 
in earnest only in 1943, lagging behind  other regions of Yugoslavia.65 The ability 
of the KPJ to consolidate its power rapidly in post-war Vardar Macedonia was 
directly due to the party’s willingness to create a broader autonomous state 
within a Yugoslav federal structure: the People’s Republic of Macedonia 
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(Norodna Republika Makedonija, or NRM).66 Scholars such as Evangelos Kofos 
have argued that Tito envisioned the Republic of Macedonia primarily as a 
vehicle by which Yugoslavia could attempt to annex Aegean and Pirin 
Macedonia.67 Arguably such motives were a consideration for the Central 
Committee of the KPJ, but the new state was a means by which Belgrade could 
obtain mass support in Vardar given its historic weakness in the area. Despite 
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia’s enhanced international reputation after the 
Partisan war of 1941-1945, Belgrade was forced to negotiate its position at the 
local level, offering recognition of a Macedonian national consciousness in 
exchange for the province’s acceptance of the new Communist regime.68 
In November 1942, the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of 
Yugslavia  (Antifa!isti"ko Vije#e Narodnog Oslobo$enja Jugoslavije, or AVNOJ) 
assembly met to establish the political platform of the Communist-led resistance 
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in Yugoslavia. One of the points announced was the planned recognition of a 
separate Macedonian republic.69 If initially the Yugoslav People’s Republic of 
Macedonia was envisioned as a vehicle by which Yugoslavia could attempt to 
annex Aegean and Pirin Macedonia, it rapidly grew into a reliable pillar of the 
new Communist Yugoslavia.  
Details of the new republic were clarified at the Anti-Fascist Assembly of 
the National Liberation of Macedonia (Antifashistiko sobranie na narodnoto 
osloboduvane na Makedonija, or ASNOM) held on the forty-first anniversary of 
the Ilinden Uprising: August 2, 1944. The assembly not only echoed the 1924 
Comintern platform for an independent Macedonia and the promises for 
federalism of the earlier national Anti-Fascist Liberation Movement for 
Yugoslavia assemblies, it placed them within the context of a new Macedonian 
history.70 The Partisan struggle was the “Second Ilinden” against foreign 
oppression, and the new state the culmination of decades of revolutionary 
struggle against foreign imperialism (particularly “greater-Bulgarian chauvinism”). 
The assembly proposed a series of “Macedonianization” measures without 
addressing the nature of any new state or its relation to a future, federal 
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Yugoslavia.71 The “cultural front” was instead awarded the central position in the 
KPM’s consolidation of power; it provided a vehicle for acceptance of the NRM 
by providing it with an ethnic affiliation.72  
Vardar Macedonia was, for the first time, to be a government “for” its 
inhabitants — and to be administered by them. Broad autonomy would be 
granted so long as the party apparatus and state apparatus in the NRM 
supported the policies of the Central Committee in Belgrade. The Macedonian 
Communists used this autonomy to undertake a “cultural program” to codify and 
promulgate a definitive Macedonian national consciousness. This would be an 
inspiration for the BKP’s later cultural politics in Pirin, as detailed in Chapter 
Seven. Central to the reforms in Yugoslavia was the codification of a 
Macedonian literary language, to be developed by the Commission for Language 
and Orthography with extensive political input from the KPM.73 Nova Makedonija, 
a weekly (later, daily) newspaper was launched on October 29, 1944 with the 
motto, “Death to Fascism — Freedom for the People.” This standard Partisan 
slogan was arguably intended here to endorse a nationalistic ethos as well as 
revolutionary enthusiasm, since “narod” carries the connotation of both “nation” 
and “people.”74 Circulation of the paper remained low, in part due to low adult 
literacy, but steadily rose into the late 1940s. Literacy rates were a particular 
problem in Vardar and Aegean Macedonia since Slav Macedonians had 
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sometimes been excluded from the educational systems of the interwar period 
or, more often, their parents had refused to allow them to attend “Greek” or 
“Serb” schools. The cultural campaign addressed this problem with an adult 
literacy campaign and also through other cultural venues: the opening of a 
Macedonian National Theater company in Skopje in April 3, 1945, the 1946 
opening of “Radio Skopje” and the showing of the first films subtitled or dubbed 
in Macedonian in that year.75  
The local party organization’s successes in sponsoring cultural activities 
were offset by lingering conflicts between Skopje and Belgrade. As the KPM 
steadily grew in membership, expanding from 300 in 1941 to over 6,000 by the 
beginning of 1946, it began to flirt with asserting independent statehood. As with 
the earlier dispute between Tito and Shatarov in 1943, conflicts emerged over 
“Macedonian separatism.” By late 1944, the first president of ASNOM, Metodi 
Andonov (“Chento”) was criticizing the KPJ’s policies on several accounts. He 
not only argued for more autonomy in key cultural areas, including the 
orthography of the new language, but also a separate media. He sought the 
creation of a Macedonian Telegraph Agency separate from TANJUG (the 
Telegraph Agency of New Yugoslavia, or Telegrafska Agentsija Nove 
Jugoslavije), which functioned as the Partisans’ news service.76  
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Chento went even further in seeking control over the Macedonian partisan 
brigades, arguing that they should be used to seize control over Macedonian-
inhabited areas in Aegean Macedonia instead of against the retreating German 
army. He argued for a drive south to liberate Thessaloniki, rather than north to 
liberate the Srem just west of Belgrade or Slovenia. When Tito insisted on the 
later, he attempted to organize his own military campaign using local partisan 
detachments. A number of prominent Macedonian Communists followed his line.  
“Separatist” sentiment was significant enough that the “Gotse Delchev” brigade 
rioted in November-December 1944 when ordered north to Srem. Non-
Macedonian units were brought into Skopje to suppress the rioters.77  
Collaborators with Bulgarian occupation forces in Vardar Macedonia 
raised another problem, since many of them had contacts with the interwar 
VMRO. The first trials began in May 1945, but local “pro-Bulgarian” groups or 
conspiracies were discovered over the next two years throughout the NRM.78 
The Central Committee of the KPM used its broad autonomy over local police to 
eliminate the remaining pro-Bulgarian organizations and circles in the country 
through a purge of the Party and hundreds of arrests.79 
By the end of 1946, however, Tito and Macedonian Communists loyal to 
him had largely overcome these problems. Chento was eased out of power from 
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1944-1946. In January 1945 much of his authority as President of ASNOM was 
transferred to his deputy, Lazar Kolishevski, who had proven his loyal to Tito 
during the earlier infighting with Shatarov. In March 1946, the Central Committee 
of the KPJ removed Chento from office. In his subsequent trial he was sentenced 
to eleven years of hard labor. Kolishevski now sent many of the “separatist” 
political faction to posts elsewhere in the reconstituted Yugoslavia, outside of 
Vardar.80 The continued expansion of the KPM (doubling to 11,570 members by 
the end of 194681) further diluted the influence of Chento’s group. With the 
leadership of the People’s Republic of Macedonia now willing supporters of the 
Tito’s Yugoslavia and with the state-defined Macedonian national consciousness 
popularly received in much of the country, the KPM now turned to the question of 
unifying Macedonia. 
On this issue the Central Committee of the KPJ supported the NRM in 
negotiations with the Greek Communist Party (Kommunistiko Komma Elladas, or 
KKE) and Bulgarian Worker’s Party to unify Aegean and Pirin Macedonian. An 
agreement had already been forged between the KPJ and BRP for collaborative 
work in the future, and for a settlement of the Macedonian question.82 On 
September 20, 1944 the BKP and Macedonian Communist Party had opened 
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negotiations in Sofia.83 The MKP began radio broadcasts into Bulgaria 
encouraging “the Macedonians in the Bulgarian part of Macedonia” to form local 
committees, partisan units and to anticipate their role within a future federal 
state.84 Tito had taken the initiative in a period of late wartime strength to assist 
in the definition of a Macedonian national consciousness centered in Vardar 
Macedonia. Now, the new Communist regime in Bulgaria would deal with the 
same questions from its period of late-war and postwar weakness.  
 
The Fatherland Front Coup of 1944  
 As early as December 1941, Bulgarian Communists had sought to bring 
together a popular front against the government.85 Effective measures by the 
political police against Communist party members, the arrest of its agents 
smuggled in from the Soviet Union and the potential for German victory limited 
the appeal of such a strategy. Not until the clear reversal of German military 
fortunes in Africa and on the Eastern Front in late 1942 did others among the still 
underground political parties respond. In August 1943 the Communists (who 
officially remained under the title of Bulgarian Workers’ Party, or BRP), the left 
wing of the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats and Zveno joined in the 
Fatherland Front (Otechestven front, or OF), led by the former Zveno Prime 
Minister Kimon Stoianov. The death of Tsar Boris just two weeks later on August 
28, 1943 created a political vacuum. It was filled only partially by the 
                                                
83 Jotevski, 64. 
84 TsDA, fond 1b, op 7, a.e. 215, l 1-4. 
85 Bell, 66. However, a fourth Communist was included as a minister without 




establishment of a tripartite regency consisting of Prince Kiril (Boris’ brother), 
former Prime Minister Bogdan Filov (who resigned to accept the regency) and 
Minister of War General Nikola Mihov, who presided over a series of short-lived 
puppet prime ministers over 1943-1944. 
By 1944, with the Germans clearly in retreat and American bombing raids 
against Sofia in full swing, public opinion had begun to shift. The Fatherland 
Front began to draw significant support for its opposition to both the royal 
dictatorship (now run by the regents) and to Nazi Germany. In early August the 
Bulgarian government had already begun attempts to emphasize Bulgarian 
neutrality in the war between Germany and the Soviet Union. A coup d’etat in 
Bucharest on August 23 signaled the collapse of the German’s front in Romania 
and triggered an immediate political crisis in Sofia. The government of Ivan 
Bagrianov, the most recent of the weak prime ministers of the royal dictatorship, 
now resigned in favor of the right-wing Agrarian leader Kostantin Muraviev.86 
Despite Muraviev’s last-minute attempts to come to terms with Moscow, the 
Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria on September 5.87 This declaration, and 
the subsequent Soviet invasion prompted the Fatherland Front to act, and on 
September 9 it seized power in a bloodless coup led by supporters of Zveno.88 
 While the Front was a Communist-inspired organization, it was not yet 
Communist-dominated. The cabinet announced on September 9 numbered only 
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three Communist-held ministries, but these included the Ministries of Internal 
Affairs and National Health and Justice.89 From this base, the BRP’s strategy 
was to consolidate power and expand the party to the point that its coalition 
partners could be dispensed with. Serving this goal was the rapid growth in 
membership. By January 1945, the BRP reaching a quarter of a million party 
members. While retaining the multi-party Fatherland Front at the national level, 
the Communists moved to quickly secure control at the local level. By the 
beginning of 1945, over three-quarters of the cities and villagers had Communist 
mayors.90 Local police by this point had also come under the party’s control. The 
old force had been disbanded on September 10, 1944, and in succeeding 
months a new People’s Militia (Narodna militsiia) was recruited from party 
members.91 Outside of Sofia and other major cities, this militia usually remained 
under the control of the local party apparatus, but the Central Committee in Sofia 
retained control over the gendarmerie. These police forces would be used in 
domestic purges that killed 7,000 in 1944 alone. With the passage of the Law for 
the Protection of National Power (Zakon za zashtita na narodnata vlast) on 
March 7, 1945, police repression at both the local and national levels would 
become more systematic.92  Although Bulgarian historiography definitely dates 
Communist control in Bulgaria from Sept 9, 1944, it seems more accurate to say 
that this was the beginning of an increasing and unrelenting growth of 
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Communist influence throughout the country that would, by the late 1940s, 
merge almost seamlessly with the onset of Bulgaria’s own version a Stalinist 
regime.  
Any Communist seizure of complete power required first the conclusion of 
the Second World War, in which the Bulgarian army now fought alongside the 
Soviet Red Army against Nazi Germany. An Allied Control Committee (ACC) 
composed of American, British and Soviet representatives officially administered 
Bulgaria. The BRP accordingly planned to wait until international recognition was 
obtained for the Front government and the ACC was disbanded before taking 
complete control. There was little immediate attempt to eliminate outright non-
Communist allies throughout 1944 and 1945. Rather, the Communists sought to 
secure power-bases within the ministry of the interior and in local administration, 
removing civil servants from opposition parties and replacing them with reliable 
party cadres.93 Not until March 1946 did the Party begin to exclude non-
Communists systematically from the government. By this point the Party had 
secured both sufficient popular support and control over the administrative 
apparatus (including electoral apparatus) to ensure its victory in the 
parliamentary elections held later that year on October 27.94 In the interim, the 
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Central Committee of the BRP was forced to wait until it could seize complete 
control. This not only preserved a dwindling autonomy for rival political parties 
within Bulgaria, but allowed local Communist organizations to remain outside of 
the control of the Central Party. Communists in Pirin would, as local elites before 
them, use this opportunity to undertake their own autonomous initiatives in Pirin. 
 
The Fatherland Front in Pirin: Decentralizing Power  
 The BRP in 1944 quickly moved to take control over the formal channels 
of administrative power it inherited from the wartime government. At the same 
time, however, the rapid expansion of the party and the creation of thousands of 
local “Fatherland Front” councils served to decentralize power.95 Party 
membership in Pirin went from 7,308 at the end of 1944 to 13,639 at the 
beginning of 1946, with a majority of the new enrollees being peasants.96 In Pirin 
as in other districts, a Regional Fatherland Front Committee was established 
following the coup of September 9.97 Such regional committees enjoyed control 
over the local mechanisms of repression. In Pirin, the first labor and interrogation 
camps (trudovozpitatelni lagari) were set up in December 1944, housing both 
political prisoners and social undesirables. The first camp was opened in Sv. 
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Vrach, housing nearly 800 political prisoners (chiefly ex-policemen, officers and 
local administrators) who were put to hard labor repairing local railways.98  
For Pirin, the role of the Regional Fatherland Front Committee was 
complicated by the question of its relation to the new, neighboring Yugoslav 
People’s Republic of Macedonia. For the BRP to make a concrete decision on 
this question of Macedonian identity would be to create a precedent for the 
cession of the province to Yugoslavia (see Chapter Seven). It was, instead, the 
local party that was allowed to forge ahead in the issue. The provincial Front 
Committee’s interest in the topic can be seen in the local resolutions of the First 
[Gorna Dzhumaia] Conference of the BRP of October 22-23, 1944. Several key 
articles established the Party organization’s post-war position on Macedonia:  
The Gorna Dzhumaia Region, which consists of the Gorna Dzhumaiia, 
Razlog, Nevrokop, Sveti Vrach and Petrich Districts, is geographically, 
economically and ethnographically an inseparable part of Macedonia.99 
 
The resolution continued by stressing both the possibility of a future Balkan 
Federation incorporating Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the “conjoining of the 
Gorna Dzhumaiia region to the Macedonian state.”100 Negotiations had already 
raised such a possibility and (as we shall see in Chapter Seven) the status of 
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such a bilateral or multilateral arrangement would prove critical for Pirin.101 In the 
immediate future, however,  
As long as the Gorna Dzhumaia region administratively belongs to 
Bulgaria, the Regional Committee of the Party will maintain organizational 
links and will receive directives form the Central Committee of the 
Bulgarian Workers’ Party… but will have autonomous rights to all the 
questions that concern the Macedonian issues. 
 
The Regional Committee will maintain close relations with the Communist 
Party of Macedonia for coordinated activity in connection with all 
questions that concern the unification and construction of the Macedonian 
state and for the preparations for the conjoining of the Regional Party 
Organization to the Communist Party of Macedonia.102 
 
This proclamation effectively reserved broad rights of autonomy for the local 
party. This was all the more important because opposition to the accords 
between the CPY and BRP had not only emerged among émigré organizations 
in Bulgaria103 but also criticism of the national Party’s policies on Macedonia 
within the district Fatherland Front committee.104 
 Key functions were still reserved for the central government, the most 
important being that of the reconstituted Communist-controlled gendarmerie. 
Elements of VMRO remained in Pirin, some of them quite actively hostile to the 
BRP. The Party was able to crack down on VMRO’s upper hierarchy effectively, 
and considered it to be no threat to the new regime in Sofia.105 But in rural areas 
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of Pirin, isolated cheti could be effective. In two separate actions in June 1946, 
for instance, a VMRO cheta killed two Communists in Sv. Vrach, and ambushed 
14 more on the road between Sv. Vrach and Sofia. The immediate response was 
a police crackdown that arrested VMRO activists, and the assassination of a 
local figure thought to be a potential leader of VMRO bands.106 The regional 
Front Committee still noted in its annual report in 1946 that “Mihailovism” 
remained a significant local force limiting “the consolidation of the new people’s 
authority.”107 
 Beyond this, however, the newly created Regional Fatherland Front 
Committees were actually more radical in advancing both total Communist 
control and “social justice” in the period of consolidation than the national party. 
Radicalism was the norm for most of the local committees in Bulgaria, who 
sought to carry out their own local revolutionary programs in politics, society and 
the economy.108 The government in Sofia was forced to specifically remind local 
committees in Pirin in 1946 that non-Communist but legal organizations could 
participate in local Fatherland Front committees.109 What also set Pirin apart was 
the continuing question of identity in the region.  
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Decentralizing Identity in Pirin After 1944  
 The domestic struggle to solidify Communist power allowed for 
decentralization of the local organs of the Fatherland Front. So, too, the BRP’s 
“international struggle” to establish its place in the hierarchy of the Cominform 
meant the decentralization of national consciousness in Pirin. By October 1944 
the party had openly exhorted Macedonians “to struggle” in order to gain 
independence.110 True, the party’s recognition was often couched in broader 
terms reflecting the larger wartime struggle against fascism. Georgi Dimitrov111, 
the dominant figure within the BRP’s Central Committee, followed this lead in a 
speech to the Subranie in 1945:   
The struggle of the Macedonian people for freedom was the anvil on 
which the Macedonian nationality was forged and the Macedonian state 
built. The decisive movement in that struggle was the fact that the 
liberation struggle of the Macedonian people was integrated with the 
struggle of the Balkan peoples under the leadership of the progressive 
forces against the German occupiers and against fascism and their 
Balkan lackeys.112 
 
As directed by the BRP, the regional committee began to undertake direct, 
bilateral negotiations with officials in the People’s Republic of Macedonia in 
Yugoslavia. Although these contacts, and the agreements that sprang from 
them, were reported to the BRP, the initiative to make such contacts devolved to 
the local level. The local committee shaped and reinterpreted such issues along 
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traditional lines, drawing direct reference to Pirin’s revolutionary past under 
VMRO through to the contemporary conflict.   
In our Pirin region the FF as a people’s democratic movement becomes a 
natural successor to the deeds of the true Macedonian liberation 
movement activists such as Gotse Delchev and Yane Sandanski.113 
 
Pirinkso Delo, the Communist newspaper founded in the area in 1945, became 
the central forum for the Regional Fatherland Front Committee’s distribution of 
the new, acceptable versions of history. Much like Pirinski Glas, it sought to mix 
loyalty to the efforts of the new regime, articles on Bulgarian events with a 
commentary that related both to the history of the Macedonian movement. At the 
same time, as a local organ Pirinsko Delo also focused to some extent on the 
district itself apart from the policies of the BRP and MKP.  
 This was not, however, to last. By the fall of 1946 the BRP had clarified its 
position: a Macedonian nation existed, but only as the People’s Republic of 
Macedonia within the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The reunification 
of this nation would be done by the auspices of Yugoslavia’s PRM, and the Pirin 
Regional Fatherland Front Committee would be required to collaborate in this 
project of nation-reunification.114 
 Pirinsko Delo publicly verified this. In the December 30, 1946 issue it 
carried an announcement to “district leaders, village mayors and census 
personnel” that:  
Since the population of the Gorna Dzhumaiia region is primarily of 
Macedonian origin, you should explain to this population that they have 
the absolute freedom of declaring their nationality and origin openly and 
                                                
113 ODAB F 108, opis 1, a.e., 3, 12. 




without any coercion, just as they feel in their own hearts and souls as 
faithful children of their homeland.115 
 
With the firm establishment of Communist rule in Bulgaria, the BRP was now 
willing to take steps to direct the course of state administration in Pirin. But to do 
this, it was forced to accede to a Yugoslav-sponsored, rival national 
consciousness — a Macedonian consciousness attractive and appealing to the 
inhabitants of Pirin. 
 
Centralization Advancing and Retreating 
 The period 1934-1946 reflects a growing sense of etatism among 
Bulgaria’s political leadership. But both late in the wartime regime and initially 
under the Communists, Pirin was a problem. The district had not only “escaped” 
control of the central government, it had done so in an open and frequently 
confrontational fashion. Successive regimes had realized the need to “intervene” 
in Pirin — but only the authoritarian regimes ushered in by the 1934 Zveno coup 
were successful in doing so. They were successful less due to ideological 
persuasion than to their relative willingness to embrace state intervention. 
Despite the celebrated caesura of September 9, 1944, both the strengths and 
weaknesses of Communist and non-Communist authoritarian regimes are 
remarkably similar. In both cases, the state sought to expand its administrative 
apparatus in the region and extend central control, but periods of state weakness 
                                                





(1941-1944, and then 1944-45) forced the state to cede some power and 
autonomy back to the district.   
 In this context, then, as the Bulgarian Workers’ Party consolidated its hold 
on power within Bulgaria over the course of 1946 and strengthened the potential 
power of the central government, the BRP’s ability to intervene in local affairs 
increased. But at the same time, Bulgarian Communists faced a dilemma. 
Wartime negotiation had established a “deliberate uncertainty” over the future of 
Macedonia, allowing both groups to assume they would unify Macedonia in the 
future.  As Chapter Seven demonstrates, a stronger Yugoslav Communist Party 
by war’s end and an existing struggle between Sofia and Belgrade regarding 
control over Macedonia led to conflict between the two parties. From a position 
of relative weakness versus the KPJ, the BRP in mid 1946 acceded to the KPJ 
and KPM’s demands that Pirin receive an education campaign like that ongoing 
in the People’s Republic of Macedonia to instill a Macedonian national 
consciousness definitively in the region. But while temporarily admitting defeat 
on the question of nation-building, the BRP would retain control over state-
building. It would be the Bulgarian Workers’ Party’s firm administrative control 
over Pirin that would serve as the vehicle to shape and then reshape a 










“There are not three Macedonias. There is only one Macedonia and its major 
part is represented by the established Macedonian People’s Republic.” 
—Georgi Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria and  





 On December 16, 1949, a firing squad shot Traicho Kostov. Until the 
beginning of the year he had served as First Deputy Prime Minister and Political 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Now, 
however, a tribunal found him guilty of “anti-party activity.” His position and party 
membership had already been stripped from him after the Plenum June 11-12 
when fellow member of the Central Committee, Vassil Kolarov, accused him of 
nationalism, anti-Soviet sentiment and factionalism.  Prominent in the formal 
indictments laid against Kostov in hi subsequent December trial was the charge 
of conspiracy to allow Yugoslavia to annex the Pirin region.2 Kostov was accused 
of conspiring with Edvard Kardelj, a Yugoslav ideologue, confidant of Tito and 
now Foreign Minister in 1948, to create for a federation that would allow 
                                                
1 Georgi Dimitrov, quoted in Milena Mahon, “The Macedonian Question in 
Bulgaria,” Nations and Nationalism 4:3 (July 1998), 393.  
2 “Iz obvinitelniia akt na Glavna prokuratura na Narodna republika Bulgariia 
sreshtu Traicho Kostov, Ivan Stefanov, Nikola Pavlov, Nikola Nachev, Boris 
Hristov, Tsonio Tsonchev, Ivan Gevrenov, Ivan Tutev, Blagoi Hadzhipanzov, 
Vasil Ivanovski i Iliia Baialtseliev,” November 28, 1949, in Liubomir Ognainov, ed. 
Borbi i chistki v BKP (1948-1953) (Sofia: Glavno upravlenie na arhivite pri 
ministerskiia suvet, 2001), 193-195. See also in the same volume, “Doklad na 
sekretaria na TsK na BKP Vulko Chervenkov pred plenum na Tsentralniia 
komitet za izvodite ot protsesa sreshtu ‘grupata’ na Traicho Kostov,” January 16-
17, 1950, 208-212.  
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Yugoslavia to swallow Bulgaria, starting with Pirin. The terms of this Balkan 
Federation, the charges read, had been drafted by American intelligence agents 
in league with a special emissary of Hitler.3 Despite his protestations of 
innocence, Kostov was found guilty and sentenced to death.4 
 The rationale for Kostov’s trial and execution were complex and, as is 
explored below, revolved around a succession crisis within the Bulgarian 
Communist Party and a larger series of purges in 1949-1951 that accompanied 
the transition to Stalinism. But the inclusion of charges relating to Pirin, no matter 
how ridiculous on the surface, was deliberate. His trial reflected the complete 
rejection of a Macedonian national consciousness by the Bulgarian state and 
Communist Party. And yet, three years earlier both state and party had endorsed 
cultural politics in Pirin that sought to foster a sense of “Macedonianism.” What 
had changed?  
 The attempt by the post-war Communist government to shape identity in 
Pirin was the climax of the consolidation of Sofia’s central authority over the 
region. This chapter traces the history of these two stages of the 
Macedonianization cultural campaign in the years 1946-1952. In its first stage, 
Sofia took control of the local autonomy that had reemerged during the Second 
                                                
3
 Adam Ulam, Titoism and the Cominform (London: Oxford Univeristy Press, 
1952), 90. See also Beljanovski, 234-236. The accusation that Kostov spied for 
American Minister Donald Heath led to the US withdrawing the minister and 
refusing to appoint another diplomatic envoy of this rank until 1960, in protest of 
the charge. 
4 Kostov was tried with 10 other Communist Party officials, but only he received 
the death penalty. His refusal to agree to a public confession of his crimes (he 
renounced an initial confession) may have led to his death sentence, as the other 
nine officials were given lighter sentences. All were quietly rehabilitated in 1956. 
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World War. This phase, from 1946-1948, saw the Bulgarian Worker’s Party 
(BRP) initially agree and collude with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) 
to foster a Macedonian national consciousness in Pirin. In negotiations between 
the two states, Bulgaria agreed that Pirin would be eventually transferred to the 
Yugoslav People’s Republic of Macedonia (NRM). This planned transfer placed 
Pirin in the center of Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations for a decade, uniquely among 
Bulgarian provinces.5 This policy of broad “cultural autonomy” for the district was 
unique in the country, and led in 1947 to a centrally-directed campaign to 
encourage a Macedonian identity. During this initial period the BRP entrenched 
its power in the region and carried out its transition to a Soviet-style system of 
state enterprise and collectivized farms. Conflicts over details of the new cultural 
policies emerged not only between Sofia and Skopje but also between Sofia and 
local Pirin Communist organizations.  
The BRP was forced by wartime circumstances, as noted in Chapter Six, 
to cede broad administrative autonomy over policies in Pirin to local 
administrative bodies over 1944-1946. This de-centralization was reversed by 
1948; in 1947, the central government took the step of eliminating provincial 
government entirely, restructuring local government through smaller districts 
(okolii), a structure maintained through 1949 (see Figure 19, next page). The 
Tito-Stalin Split in 1948 meant that the Central Committee of the BKP now shifted 
course with regards to the Macedonian question. The split triggered the second 
stage   of   the   Macedonianization  campaign,  wherein  the  Central  Committee 
                                                
5 The southern Dobrudzha was the focus for Bulgarian foreign policy, but in a 




Bulgarian Administrative Borders,1947 
Restructuring of the government leads to the elimination of provincial government 
(the oblasti), and restructuring of local government at the district level (okolii). 
Only the Pirin okolii are labled here.  
 
Based on Bulgarskata akademia na naukite: Geografski institut, Atlas Narodna Republika Bulgariia (Sofia: 
Glavno upravlenie po geodeziia i kartografiia pri ministerstvoto na akrhitektura i blagoustroistvoto, 1973), 7. 
 
extinguished local autonomy in Pirin. In 1949 the Bulgarian Communist Party6 
intervened to end any autonomous representation in Pirin that might threaten the 
central government’s monopoly of power. 
Cultural politics in Pirin thus took a new course in 1948, one that portrayed 
the Slav inhabitants of Pirin and any local Macedonian consciousness as part of 
a larger Bulgarian national identity and appropriated local symbols and history for 
inclusion in the latter. Sofia brought the Macedonianization campaign in its new 
form under direct control. The region’s local officials were purged and its 
                                                
6 The Bulgarian Workers Party was, following its merger with the Bulgarian 
Workers Socialist Party in 1948, titled the Bulgarian Communist Party once more. 
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institutions faced full-scale Stalinization under Vulko Chervenkov. Pirin 
Macedonians were now portrayed as part of a larger Bulgarian national 
consciousness. The state tolerated a local Macedonian consciousness, but any 
state sponsorship of Macedonian consciousness ended. By the 1950s the 
Bulgarian government would moved to the position that all of Pirin embodied a 
strictly Bulgarian national consciousness and that a Macedonian national 
consciousness did not exist.  
The role of Moscow in the cultural campaign in Pirin unifies 
histioriographies in both Macedonia and Bulgaria following the caesura of 1989-
91. Macedonian histories generally agree that Stalin’s break with Tito in 1948 led 
to Soviet sabotage of the Balkan Federation and the end of a campaign of 
national cultural liberation in Pirin.7 Bulgarian histories broadly concur that Josef 
Stalin forced the “de-nationalizing” program upon Bulgaria.8  That Moscow and 
international affairs played a decisive role in shaping the campaign is generally 
accepted.9 In acknowledging their importance, however, histories of the 
                                                
7 Beljanovski, for example, argues that to 1948 the Bulgarian approach was 
“nauchna” (scientific), while the post-1948 period was one of “negiranjeto” 
(denial). While correct in reproaching the reluctance of Bulgarian scholars to 
engage the campaign objectively, it assumes that the NRM’s campaign was 
fundamentally correct — and that the Bulgarian government recognized it as 
such until 1948. See Novitsa Beljanovski, Makedonija vo jugoslavensko-
bugarskite obnosi, 1944-1953 (Skopje: Institut za natsionalna istorija, 1998), 278.   
8 For example, see Veselin Angelov, Hronika na edno natsionalno predatelstvo: 
Opitite za nasilstveno denatsionanalizarane na Pirinska Makedoniia (1944 – 
1949 g.) (Blagoevgrad: Universitetsko izdatelstvo "Neofil Rilski,“ 1999).  
9 An extreme example of the latter approach can be found in Macedonicus, Stalin 
and the Macedonian Question (St. Louis: Pearlstone, 1948), 63. Macedonicus 
was in fact Ivan Mihailov, writing from exile in Italy. The international aspect of 
the Macedonianization campaign is generally accepted, though not always the 
interpretation of the campaign as directed solely by Stalin. See Evangelos Kofos, 
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Macedonianization campaign have generally overlooked the Bulgarian 
Communist Party’s actual administration of the campaign. This is particularly true 
with regards to its other interests in the region, especially its use for educational, 
economic and cadre development. In addition, the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948 did 
not result in the immediate cession of the cultural politics of 1946-1948. Instead, 
it provided a pretext for Sofia to eliminate Yugoslav influence in internal affairs 
while continuing the campaign in a new form for over half a decade.   
From start to finish, however, both stages of the Macedonianization 
campaign demonstrated an unprecedented intervention by state institutions in 
addressing issues of “Macedonian identity.” Although the central government had 
sought as early as 1934 to integrate Pirin administratively and affirm a Bulgarian 
national consciousness, the events of 1946-1952 put the BKP in a position to 
complete the task. Local history would no longer be left to the interpretation of 
local organizations and individuals, but would be required to fit a “party line.” In 
Yugoslavia’s Vardar Macedonia, Stefan Troebst argues that the “cultural front” 
provided a successful vehicle from which a new separate entity – the People’s 
Republic of Macedonia — derived its legitimacy.10 In Pirin, the “cultural front” was 
                                                                                                                                            
Nationalism and Communism in Macedonia: Civil Convlict, Politics of Mutation, 
National Identity (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), and Beljanovski, 
Makedonija, 102-119, 191-248. A moderate view is Milena Mahon, “The 
Macedonian Question in Bulgaria,” Nations and Nationalism 4:3 (1998), 393. 
10 Troebst, Stefan. “Yugoslav Macedonia, 1943-1953: Building the Party, the 
State and the Nation,” in Melissa Bokovoy, Jill Irvine and Carol Lilly, eds., State-
Society Relations in Yugoslavia, 1945-1992 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1997), 244. Indeed, although the Communist past remains a flashpoint in 
contemporary politics in the Republic of Macedonia, the legacy of the NRM as a 
Macedonian state is still valued.  
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the vehicle by which the BKP was able to establish definitely first the presence of 
the Bulgarian state, and then a Bulgarian national consciousness.  
 
Consolidating Communist Rule and the Macedonian Question 
Over the fall of 1946 and spring of 1947, the Bulgarian Worker’s Party 
(BRP) consolidated its hold on power, eliminating the need to share power in a 
coalition through the Fatherland Front. Two events in September signified the 
Party’s growing political power. The first was a referendum on September 8, 
1946, asking if a republic should replace the existing Kingdom of Bulgaria. Nearly 
92 percent of the eligible voters turned out, and nearly 96 percent voted in favor 
of a republic, an impressive demonstration of the Communist’s ability to mobilize 
and direct the public.11 The following month, the elections of October 27 saw a 
similarly high level of voter turnout providing a majority not only to the Fatherland 
Front (70 percent) but also to the BRP. It received approximately 55 percent of 
the vote nationwide.12 An open opposition was still tolerated after the election, as 
required by the terms of the Allied Control Commission.13  
The signing of the Peace Treaty of 1947 on February 10 in Paris opened 
the way to dispensing with this coalition. The treaty abrogated the Allied Control 
Commission and provided the BRP with British and American recognition for the 
                                                
11 Kalinova, 68. 
12 Kostadinova, 96-97. Kostadinova notes that the weakest district for the 
opposition parties was Gorna Dzhumaia. Michael Boll emphasizes that in the 
elections, the opposition parties emerged as the second largest bloc with 28 
percent of the votes, and that the American legation saw this as evidence that 
the opposition could survive. Boll, Cold War, 182-183.  
13 Oren, Revolution, 94.  
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Communist-dominated Fatherland Front government, although it placed de jure 
limitations on Bulgaria’s sovereignty.14 This included Part III of the Treaty, 
restricting the government’s military forces, but to British and American eyes the 
significant clause was in Article 3 of Part III, which required the Fatherland Front 
to acknowledge and defend “basic freedoms” in the country. By accepting these 
constraints the BRP secured the dissolution of the Commission, thus depriving 
both the United States and United Kingdom of a vehicle or legal pretext for 
intervening in Bulgarian internal affairs.15 Both countries had anticipated that the 
Treaty would require the Communists to allow free and multi-party elections. But 
the limitations in the peace treaty proved largely unenforceable by either the 
United States or United Kingdom, even in terms of the disarmament clauses.16 
Although the Soviets retained the de facto power to intervene directly in 
Bulgarian administrative matters,17 the BRP could claim final control over state 
institutions by the spring of 1947. It moved quickly to eliminate the remaining 
power of the opposition parties. 
In Pirin, the party had acted in 1944-1945 to put parallel Communist and 
Fatherland Front committees in place over the political and police apparatus and 
                                                
14 Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria: February 10, 1947. Cited from Charles Bevan, 
ed., Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 
1776-1949 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1968). 
15 Boll, Cold War, 184.  
16 See Georgi Dimitrov, diary entry for December 7, 1948, in Banac, Diary, 452-
453, regarding Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation on rearmament.  
17 For example, demanding that Foreign Minister Petko Sainov, a career diplomat 
and academic, be removed in 1946 because “we do not trust him” for his 
bourgeois tendencies. See Molotov, telegram of March 15, 1946 to Georgi 
Dimitrov in Banac, Dimitrov, 397-398. Sainov resigned on March 31 and returned 
to academia. 
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eliminate VMRO elements. But much of this apparatus remained relatively 
autonomous, with local organs taking their own initiatives, as happened 
throughout Bulgaria in this initial postwar period. Beginning in mid-1946 the 
Central Committee of the BRP began to bring provincial government under its 
control. In Pirin, the vehicle by which the central government would do this was 
through the “cultural autonomy” granted to the region as part of negotiations with 
Yugoslavia.   
 
Belgrade’s Federation and Sofia’s Pirin 
Already in November and December 1944, the Yugoslav and Bulgarian 
Communist leaderships had entered negotiations on the form of a future Balkan 
Federation. The Yugoslavs proposed a federal state of seven republics (including 
a Bulgarian Republic), while the Bulgarians proposed a “bilateral” joint state 
between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.18 These ambitious proposals were deferred 
until the Second World War had ended.19 Both Parties did agree to certain key 
principles including a customs union and the transfer of Pirin to the new People’s 
Republic of Macedonia. Georgi Dimitrov recorded in his diaries that: 
                                                
18 On the negotiations, see Tsola Dragoicheva, Povelia na dulga: spomeni i 
razmisli, Stefan Zhelev, ed. (Sofia: Partizdat, 1979), 350-370. Dragoicheva was a 
member of the Central Committee of the BRP/BKP from 1936 to 1948 and a 
member of the Polituro from 1940 to 1948, and was directly involved in the 
negotiations. This, and other Macedonian-related material from her memoirs was 
translated and published as Tsola Dragoicheva, Macedonia, Not a Cause of 
Discord but a Factor of Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation: Recollections 
and Reflections (Sofia: Sofia Press, 1979). A direct Macedonian response can be 
found in Van!o Apostolski, Tsola Dragoicheva and her Memoirs Based on 
Greater Bulgarian Nationalist Positions (Belgrade: Jugoslovenska stvarnost, 
1979). 
19 Dimitrov, diary entry of October 27, 1944, in Banac, Dimitrov,341.  
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Bulgaria agrees to the annexation of the Macedonian territories belonging 
to it since 1913 to Macedonia within the limits of Yugoslavia if its 
population desires it.20 
 
In a future federation, this was envisioned to be a united Macedonian republic  
that would potentially include Aegean Macedonia, equal to other constituent 
republics.  
The Central Committee of the BRP was concerned that this policy allowed 
both the Yugoslav central government and the leaders of the new Macedonian 
Republic to criticize or openly interfere with Bulgarian policy in Pirin. Agreement 
was, however, deemed necessary to ensure a future federation.21 Over 1946-
1947, Dimitrov, now Prime Minister as well as leader of the Central Committee, 
continued to support a unified Macedonia.22 Pirinsko Delo, the state newspaper 
for the Pirin region, published the text of a telegram from Lazar Kolishevski on its 
first page that promised the future inclusion of Pirin within the NRM.23 By the 
spring of 1947, the paper announced that “fraternal union” between Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia was eminent, and that Pirin would soon be joined directly to the 
People’s Republic of Macedonia.24  
 Pirinsko Delo was correct. Both Communist parties, having completed the 
domestic assumption of power, could now return to ambitious foreign policy goals 
such as the Balkan Federation. In the summer of 1947 negotiations were 
                                                
20 Dimitrov, diary entry of December 21, 1944 in Banac, Dimitrov, 347-348. In 
return, Bulgaria would receive the western enclaves lost to Yugoslavia in 1919.  
Note the entries of April 15, 1946 (402-403) and June 7, 1946 (405-406). 
21 TsDA, Fond 1b, opis 6, a.e. 15.   
22
 As noted in Chapter Six, Dimitrov’s parents emigrated from Pirin and he 
himself was of Macedonian origin. 
23 Pirinsko Delo, January 6, 1947, 1. 
24 Pirinsko Delo, March 24, 1947, 4. 
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reopened on both the federation and the transfer of Pirin. These culminated in 
Tito and Dimitrov signing the Bled Agreement on August 2 and the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance on November 27. The first treaty 
put forward a common line on Macedonian issues to further the cause of cultural 
union between Pirin and the NRM.25 The Treaty of Friendship, in Tito’s words, 
“brought the two countries so closely together that a federation would only be a 
formality.”26 The two agreements proved the high point of the federalization 
project. 
 The BRP agreed to take a “Macedonian course” in Pirin as part of its 
pursuit of a Balkan Federation. This policy stated that Pirin was a Macedonian 
region inhabited by Macedonians. What remained was for the state to ensure 
that this policy, negotiated between the governments of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, 
was carried out within Pirin by the local party organizations and state institutions.  
 
Defining “Macedonia” in Pirin 
 In August 1946 at its Tenth Plenum, the Central Committee of the BRP 
announced a policy of “cultural rapproachement” between Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia in Pirin.27 Specifically, this meant that local administration must now 
adopt certain practices of the NRM.  Pirinsko Delo would adopt “the Macedonian 
                                                
25 Banac, Dimitrov, 420. 
26 Kofost, 161. 
27 See “Pismo na Hristo Kalaidzhiev do Vulko Chervenkov s harakteristika na 
politikata na KWP(k) po makedonskiia vupros v Pirinska Makedoniia…,” “Doklad 
na Georgi Dimitrov pred X razshiren plenum na TsK na BRP(k)…” and “Reshenie 
na X razshiren plenum na TsK na KWP(k) po makedonskiia vupros,” Vasil 
Giozelev et. al., eds., Makedonskiiat Vupros, 87-91.  
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style,” the newly codified Macedonian language and orthography. School and 
language policies would change, and local officials would work with those in 
Skopje.28 The Central Committee communicated the new policies to local 
committees and organizations, and assigned them the practical task of 
implementing them.29  
 The ultimate goal of the campaign was openly stated: to prepare Pirin for 
union with the People’s Republic of Macedonia (NRM). Pirinsko Delo, for 
example, on October 14 featured not only a prominent photograph of NRM 
Premier Lazar Kolishevski on the front page, but also reported on the events 
locally and in Skopje commemorating the “national holiday” of October 11, the 
anniversary of the NRM’s founding.30 The provincial BRP began a campaign to 
establish October 11 as a “national holiday” within Pirin as well.31 One internal 
memorandum encouraged local leaders to recognize that “October 11 is the 
brightest and greatest date of our Macedonian nation.”32 Pirin was an inseparable 
part of the new Macedonian republic and of the Macedonian nation. The policy of 
the BRP was to ensure that this was expressed by not only the party’s 
membership, but by the population of Pirin as well.  
The census of 1946 was crucial to demonstrating mass “objective support” 
for the Central Committee’s position on Pirin’s ethnic composition. In June, 
Ordinance 1597 stipulated that local authorities collect statistics to show the unity 
                                                
28 “Pismo na Hristo Kalaidzhiev,” in Giozelev, 88-89; also TsDA, Fond 1b, opois 
1, a.e. 9, l 132-134.  
29 TsPA, Fond 1, opis 13. 
30 Pirinsko Delo, October 14, 1946, 1.  
31 Angelov, 191-192. 
32 ODAB, Fond 108, opis1., a.e. 12, l 98.  
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of Pirin Macedonia with Vardar.33 Such directives are, Bulgarian historians have 
long argued, proof that the campaign was “falsified” by the Communist regime. 
This position argues that the 1946 census was “an administrative formality” at 
most, the Central Committee having pre-determined the desired results.34 Of the 
252,575 people registered by the census as residents of Pirin, 160,651 (63.6 
percent) listed their ethnicity as “Macedonian,” 54,425 (21.6 percent) as 
“Bulgarian” and 28,924 (11.5 percent) as “Pomaks.”35 This provided the clear 
majority that justified the cultural campaigns. But despite the directives and the 
results of the census, some uncertainty may still be discerned. The census 
forms36 contained questions on both ethnicity and “mother tongue.” Although a 
majority listed Macedonian as their ethnicity, only 28,611 listed “Macedonian” as 
their native language.37 Most of those who listed Macedonian as their native 
language lived in rural areas, suggesting that the urban-rural divide, as noted in 
Chapter Two, continued. Greater access to state-sponsored education over 
1913-1934 combined with more active state promulgation of a Bulgarian national 
consciousness over 1934-1944 achieved some success in urban areas.38  
                                                
33 ODAB, Fond 59K, opis 1, a.e. 50.  
34 Georgi V. Dimitrov, ‘Za taka narechenata ‘kulturna avtonomiia’ v 
blagoevgradski okrug, 1946-1948 g.’ Istoricheski Pregled 35:6 (1979), 75. 
35 Glavna direktsiya na statistika, Statisticheski godishnik na Bulgarskoto 
Tsarstvo (Sofia, Glavna direktsiya na statistika, 1947). For a critical view, see 
Angelov, 143. 
36 A copy of the 1956 census form and instructions, which remained similar to 
that of 1946, is available online. IPUMS-International, “Bulgaria 1956 Population 
and Housing Census,” European Census Forms, n.d., November 2004 
<www.ipums.umn.edu/international /world_census_forms/Europe/Bulgar56.pdf> 
37 Angelov, 152. 
38 ODAB: Fond 1K, opis 1, ae 39, 81-82; OPA, Fond 1, opis 1, a.e. 3, l 8-20. 
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This self-identified Macedonian population varied in strength from area to 
area. Census percentages, verified by reports of the provincial school inspector, 
suggested that Petrich (an okoliia bordering on the new People’s Republic of 
Macedonia) was “85-90 percent” Macedonian in terms of population, Sveti Vrach 
80-85 percent, Nevrokop 60-65 percent, Razlog 55-60 percent and Gorna 
Dzhumaia 45-50 percent.39 The eastern rural areas that had sought autonomy in 
the past were now less likely to express a local, autonomous Macedonian identity 
compared to Petrich and Sv. Vrach — towns closer the new Macedonian 
republic.40  
 Internal correspondence reveals a degree of uncertainly within the 
provincial apparatus how to define a “Macedonian.”41 The disparity between the 
ethnic and linguistic categories suggests lingering confusion. One official bluntly 
argued that “The people don’t make a differentiation between Macedonian and 
Bulgarian.”42 The goal now set by the Bulgarian Communists was to clarify what it 
was to be Macedonian, much as the KPM was clarifying it in the People’s 
Republic of Macedonia. Policies would be put in place to validate the “orthodox 
line” as set forth by the Central Committee of the BKP, and Sofia would 
supervise this campaign more closely.   
 
 
                                                
39 Jotevski, 108-109.  
40
 Gorna Dzhumaia also bordered the NRM, but the town had the largest 
proportion of residents born in Bulgaria outside of Pirin. 
41 Angelov, 139-141. 
42 ODAB Fond 7K, opis 1, a.e. 2, l. 115-116. 
 294 
The 1947 Macedonianization Campaign in Pirin 
 The Central Committees of the Bulgarian Worker’s Party and the 
Macedonian Communist Party intensified their efforts in 1947, beginning a more 
aggressive Macedonianization campaign in Pirin. Its aim was to eliminate the 
region’s ambivalent attitude with regards to national consciousness and establish 
a common Macedonian identity between Pirin and Vardar, smoothing the 
eventual union of the two territories. As a result, the Dimitrov-led leadership in 
Sofia fostered a series of programs in Pirin to promote a “progressive” 
Macedonian spirit. These programs were to be carried out by both local Party 
organizations or by state institutions, in conjunction with Skopje but ultimately at 
the instruction of Sofia.  
The campaign to create a “progressive Macedonian spirit” was multi-
faceted. Pirinsko Delo and local organizations promoted a variety of “educational 
and cultural platforms,” including adult literacy, literacy and equal rights for 
women and ethnic tolerance towards Roma, Turks and Pomaks.43 The 
Communist government issued periodicals, literature and set up other facilities to 
advance a Macedonian consciousness. The cultural campaign encouraged Pirin 
to embrace a newly defined Macedonian language and heritage. The state 
apparatus was seeking, in other words, to ensure that the realities of expression 
matched what had been determined by the 1946 census.  
                                                
43 All three of these campaigns were emphasized between 1946 and the mid-
1950s, with periodic articles in Pirinsko Delo exhorting future progress and 
recording progress to date.  
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 Sofia’s efforts to transform national consciousness Pirin drew heavily upon 
the NRM’s earlier cultural campaign in Vardar Macedonia during 1944-1946. The 
Macedonian republic had already established a body of literature, if still small, in 
a newly codified Macedonian literary language. Works on communist theory had 
also already been translated. Both could easily be imported to Pirin. The first 
area of the “cultural front” became new bookstores, starting with Makedonska 
kniga (“Macedonian Book”) in Gorna Dzhumaia. It opened in 1947 on the major 
Communist holiday of May 1.44 Although interest in them was initially weak,45 
additional bookstores were opened — as well as a series of “Macedonian 
reading rooms” across Pirin.46 The latter were often created through the addition 
of Macedonian-language works to each local chitalna (as a reading room was 
now referred to, instead of the Bulgarian chitalishte). The rural majority thus 
received increasing access to this new Macedonian literature although the total 
number of Macedonian-language volumes in the reading rooms remained low.47 
To complement the book campaign, in 1948 officials in Skopje and Blagoevgrad 
arranged for a tour of authors from the People’s Republic of Macedonian writing 
in the Macedonian literary language that was now to extend to Pirin.48 They 
                                                
44 Pirinsko Delo, May 5, 1947, 4.  
45 Angelov, 175, cites TsPA Fond 1, opis6, a.e. 246, l. 6, a report from the local 
BRP committee stating that the bookstore was poorly attended following its 
opening.  
46 Jotevski, 115.  
47 Pirinsko Delo, Dec 7, 1947, 3, ran an article on the reading room in Shtip (in 
the NRM), and role of Macedonian authors and books on it. This was intended as 
a “call to arms” for the villages and towns in Pirin.  
48 Pirinsko Delo, April 26, 1948, 1. 
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arranged a total of 34 lectures and discussions, all to encourage the reading and 
sales of literary works.49 
 In August 1946, the local Communist leadership in Pirin followed the NRM 
in using film and radio to complement literature. The first Macedonian-subtitled 
film was shown that month, Borbata na jugoslavskite partizani (The Struggle of 
the Yugoslav Partisans).50 More far-reaching was a directive that the larger towns 
put up loudspeakers to broadcast Radio Skopje for those inhabitants who lacked 
their own home radios.51 This effort would now be extended in 1947, with the 
active use of mass media in the province to encourage the new language and 
national consciousness. Pirinsko Delo had already adopted a “Macedonian line” 
in 1946. Now, over 1947-1948, it increased the number of articles emphasizing 
the Macedonian nature of the local population. The article “Makedonskata 
natsionalnost” on July 21, 1947 was typical of the approach. It emphasized a 
Macedonian historical tradition that linked the “revolutionary” struggles of 
progressive members of VMRO in the nineteenth century to the struggle against 
Fascism and to the contemporary attempt to build both a progressive state and to 
create a unified Macedonia.52 Articles in Pirinsko Delo and Nova Makedonia 
repeatedly praised historical figures with “Macedonian credentials” (such as 
Dame Gruev, Gotse Delchev and Yane Sandanski) while seeking to establish 
proper “revolutionary credentials” for them, as seen in Figure 20. 
  
                                                
49 Mitrev, Pirin, 72. 
50 Mitrev, Pirin, 74. 
51 ODAB, Fond 1b, opis 1., a.e., 9, l 132-134.  
52 Pirinsko Delo, July 21, 1947, 4. 
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Figure 20: 
Macedonian Symbols in the Service of Communism: 
“33 Years from the Death of Yane Sandanski” 
 
Front cover of Nova Makedonija, April 22, 1948 
 
As had VMRO and the dictatorships of Zveno and Tsar Boris before them, the 
Communists now sought to use Macedonian symbols. Now, however, these 
became part of the foundation of a national consciousness by supplying the 
heroes for a new national pantheon, an appropriate history justifying the new 
nation (and Communist regime) and a source of state symbols such as postage 
stamps, a new national anthem and toponyms.  
On September 2, 1947 Pirinsko Delo took the further step of printing a 
limited amount of material in Macedonian (although initially using the Bulgarian 
Cyrillic alphabet). The Central Committee of the BRP had specifically authorized 
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and required this step in order to encourage the use of the new language, 
although compromising on the use of the new orthography until supplies of the 
new typeset could be arranged. A weekly “Vremeto od Vardarska Makedonija” 
(“The News from Macedonia”) feature was launched.53 This was followed in June 
1947 by the first feature-length articles in Macedonian, and from July 28, 1947 
onwards four pages each issue were published entirely in Macedonian.54 The 
newspaper’s status as the premier local publication distributed throughout the 
region meant that thousands of readers were now presented with the opportunity 
to learn the Macedonian literary language.  
 The provincial Central Committee began planning for a state-sponsored 
“Provincial Macedonian National Theater” company in late 1946. 55 The theater 
was finally opened on November 7, 1947, providing a venue dedicated to plays 
on Macedonian themes and in the Macedonian language. It also would facilitate 
visits by acting companies from the People’s Republic of Macedonia.56 The 
theater was intended to be a vehicle for promoting Macedonian heritage. Pirinsko 
Delo reported that with its opening, “All of the Pirin region of Macedonia 
celebrates a great cultural victory: the opening of the provincial Macedonian  
National Theater.”57 An article in Nova Makedonija the following year noted that 
the theater was important in creating a “Macedonian spirit in Pirin.”58 In reality the 
                                                
53 Pirinsko Delo, September 2, 1947, 8.  
54 Pirinsko Delo, May 5, 1947, 4.  
55 Note Pirinsko Delo, January 20, 1947, 3, on the public announcement of plans 
for the theater.  
56 Joevtski, 118. 
57 The opening speech reported in Pirinsko Delo, November 10, 1947, 10.  
58 Nova Makedonija, May 24, 1948, 4. 
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actual repertoire was more varied than narrowly “Macedonian themes,” and not 
limited to ethnic or political themes.59 This variety helped it obtain some wider 
popularity. The company made three tours during 1947-1948 in Pirin, traveling to 
the six towns plus large villages such as Belitsa and Sklave. A further tour was 
made to Bulgarian cities outside of Pirin.60  
 
Educating Bulgaria’s Macedonians 
 The major element of the Macedonianization campaign was its 
educational program. In August 1947, the Communist-controlled Bulgarian 
Subranie passed a law requiring that the Macedonian literary language and 
Macedonian national history be taught as compulsory subjects in schools in 
Pirin.61 The provincial committee of the BRP accordingly removed its existing 
school inspector for demonstrating too much of a “Bulgarian spirit” and appointed 
a new one who would work towards preparing “local Macedonian cadres” for the 
task.62 The intention was to inspire a spirit of “Macedonian nationality” among the 
young.  
 In this endeavor, provincial and local school authorities were not only 
obliged to satisfy Sofia’s directives, but also those from Skopje. The NRM took 
                                                
59 Mitrev provides a list of the first productions; while the opening Pechalbari was 
a Macedonian drama on emigrant workers, ensuing productions included “Gde-to 
v Moskve” (“Somewhere in Moscow,” a Russian comedy), “Narodni Poslanik” 
(“The People’s Messenger,” a Serbian comedy), “Deep are the Roots” (an 
American drama) and “Melkaya burjuaziya” (“Petty Bourgeois,” a Russian 
drama.) Mitrev, 69-70. 
60 Nova Makedonija, July 24, 1948, 6. Also Mitrev, 70. 
61 Mitrev, 72. 
62 ODAB, Fond 1b, opis 6, a.e. 364. 
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an active part in shaping the new curriculum, providing not only materials but 
also teachers. Ninety-three instructors were sent to Pirin and divided among 
several programs. This policy merged with the ongoing expansion of the district’s 
schools to result in almost universal school attendance for primary-school 
children in the province for those from self-identified “Macedonian” and 
“Bulgarian” families. With the exception of Gorna Dzhumaia, high attendance 
figures were recorded for other ethnic groups as well (see Table 8). 
 
Table 8 
Percentage of school-aged children enrolled in primary schools by ethnicity, 1946-4763 
Town Ethnic group 
 
 
Teachers from the Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were appointed by 
the Central Committee of the KPM, in consultation with the Pirin Communist 
leadership, to schools in Razlog, Bansko, Petrich, Sveti Vrach, Nevrokop and 
Gorna Dzhumaia as well as to a newly-established pedagogical school in Gorna 
Dzhumaia.65 Additional teachers were later added for the villages, beginning with 
Koprivlen, Eleshnitsa, Breznitsa and Satovcha.66 For more advanced studies, 
                                                
63 Mitrev, Pirinskija, 189; Jotevski, 156-159. Both base their figures on Dokumenti 
na oblastniia uchilishten Inspektorat na Pirinska Makedoniia ot 1946-47 g., Arhiv 
na Makedonija, Fond Ministerstvo za prosveta na NRM-Skopje, dokumenti za 
Pirinska Makedonija 1944-1953. 
64 E.g., Pomak.  
65 Pirinsko Delo, December 15, 1947, 1.  
66 Angelov, 209. 
 






Dzhumaia 90.82% 86.34% 14.29% 47.83% 100.00% 87.07% 
Nevrokop 94.15% 98.73% 87.33% 92.24% 100% 86.01% 
Petrich 91.09% 98.40% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Razlog 98.36% 100.00% n/a 96.12% n/a 75.35% 
Sv. Vrach 90.21% 94.48% n/a 80.69% n/a n/a 
Total 92.4% 96.55% 82.90% 83.01% 100% 82.70% 
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148 students were placed in secondary schools in the NRM, and 149 students 
received scholarships to attend Skopje University.67 Adult learning courses in the 
Macedonian language and culture were established in Gorna Dzhumaia (16 
courses), Nevrokop (five), Petrich (four), Sveti Vrach (three), Razlog (two), 
Bansko (one) as well as in several of the larger villages.68 
 Skopje’s influence extended to curriculum and textbooks, as local schools 
were directed by Sofia to teach a “Macedonian” line. For example, the geography 
curriculum should stress explicitly that, “In Pirin Macedonia live mostly 
Macedonians.”69 Textbooks were edited to emphasize elements in Macedonian 
history. In the third form, for example, the medieval Second Bulgarian Empire of 
Tsar Samuil was to be characterized as a “state of the Macedonian Slavs” and 
any references to it being Bulgarian were removed. Similarly in the seventh form 
Saints Kliment and Naum, medieval figures involved in spreading Orthodox 
Slavic-language education in the First Bulgarian Empire, were no longer to be 
referred to as Bulgarians in textbooks; nor were the Miladinov brothers, who had 
encouraged Slavic-language education in Macedonia in the nineteenth century.
70
 
The nineteenth century VMRO was now to be regarded as a specifically ethnic-
Macedonian revolutionary organization and a precursor to the current national 
liberation efforts. 71 
                                                
67 Mitrev, 72. 
68 Mitrev, 74. 
69 ODAB, Fond 86K, opis 1, a.e. 4, l. 83, 85.   
70 Angelov, 185-186. 
71 Frequent articles in Pirinsko Delo followed Nova Makedonija’s line in stressing 
the “revolutionary” continuity between VMRO in the nineteenth century, the 
Communist VMRO faction of the 1920s and the contemporary Communist 
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Instructions distributed by the provincial school inspector indicated which 
Macedonian literature was to be read in addition to Bulgarian literature. In a 
similar fashion, Macedonian songs were to be sung, and Macedonian radio 
broadcasts were to be made available to students. In addition, alongside the 
portraits of Stalin, Dimitrov and Tito, one of Lazar Kolishevski was to be hung in 
classrooms.72 Through such efforts at the schools, a new generation could be 
educated in Pirin that would embrace a Macedonian national consciousness. 
This campaign, however, met with the resistance of the older generation who 
began to contest a centrally defined and imposed identity. 
  
Local resistance and acceptance 
The policies of the Central Committee of both the Bulgarian Worker’s 
Party and the Communist Party of Macedonia sparked local opposition in Pirin 
almost from the beginning.73 Part of the resistance came from the gradually 
diminishing ranks of former elements of VMRO and other opposition groups. But 
local Communist Party and Fatherland Front officials were soon complaining 
against the new course. In response to the declaration at the Tenth Plenum, the 
county Party organization in Sveti Vrach protested openly, “This is not the 
                                                                                                                                            
parties. The inclusion of Pirin in the NRM was inferred to be the natural result of 
VMRO’s struggles to liberate Macedonia. 
72 ODAB, Fond 232, opis 1, a.e. 12, l 151.  
73 It also sparked opposition within the central party apparatus in Sofia; 
Rabotnichesko Delo on October 9, 1947, criticized opposition within government 
ministries to the Macedonianization campaign, referring to it as “Bulgarian super-
chauvinism.” 
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time.”74 The Fatherland Front city committee75 in Gorna Dzhumaia in 1947 
similarly suggested that it was a “mistake” for the provincial committee to claim 
that local inhabitants were Macedonians.76 One member of the county committee 
in Petrich said: 
With affection to the party organization, I say as a party member: the 
directive of the party to write Macedonia on this question [on nationality], 
cannot be logical.77 
 
Such internal arguments mirrored registered complaints and informants about 
opposition to the identity campaign. For people in Pirin who had previously 
accepted specific state institutions, the government’s new policies caused 
confusion. As a mill worker from Razlog complained: 
But why do they get us to write [that we are] Macedonians and to study 
Macedonian, when we fought for Bulgaria, for Bulgarian schools?”78 
 
Bulgarian scholars have emphasized complaints within the local party as 
demonstrating the perceived national identity of local inhabitants.79  
Another reason for such complaints was the concern of local party 
members that the “Macedonianization campaign” threatened to alienate the 
people of Pirin from the new Communist government. This could overturn 
previous attempts to centralize local power in the hands of the Bulgarian 
Worker’s Party. Continued activity by local elements of VMRO, who agitated 
                                                
74 OPA, Fond 6, opis 1, a.e. 29, l. 22. 
75 The Fatherland Front organizations were maintained even after the complete 
Communist seizure of power, continuing as late as 1989 when Communist rule 
was overturned.  
76 ODAB, Fond 109K, opis 1, a.e. 20, l. 161. 
77 ODAB Fond 7K, opis 1, a.e. 2, l 124. 
78 Cited in Angelov, 141; the original is OPA Fond 4, opis 1, a.e. 2, l. 37.  
79 See, for example, Angelov. 
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against the Macedonianization campaign, might serve as rallying points against 
Communist rule.80 Georgi Hadzhidimov, the Secretary of the County Committee 
of the BRP in Razlog reported that locally “the Communists are Macedonians, 
but the Zvenoists, Agrarians and Mihailovisti are Bulgarians.”81 Local teachers 
complained of the “anti-Bulgarian aspect” of the educational campaign.82 Some 
of the local courses to teach Macedonian faltered for lack of interest on the part 
of teachers and school administrators.83 Worries about disinterest were sufficient 
for the provincial committee to order that local organizations gather information 
about individuals with “fears of unification with Macedonia.”84 The local sector 
chief of  Durzhavna Sigurnost (State Security) in 1948 issued an alarming report 
that indicated a significant number of “bandits” and “associates” (91 in all) were 
resisting the BRP’s policies in the region.85 Such internal problems were 
complicated by the very division of the Communist world itself into factions in 
1948.  
 
Pirin Between Two States: the Tito-Stalin Split  
 Relations with Yugoslavia shaped Bulgaria’s cultural policies in Pirin. 
Pursuing better bilateral relations with Yugoslavia, Prime Minister Dimitrov 
                                                
80 Note Angelov, 187-188, on VMRO activities in the province after the war.  
81 Angelov, 146.  
82 ODAB, Fond 570K, opis 1, a.e. 10, l. 108. 
83 ODAB, Fond 231K, opis 3, a.e. 2, l. 21.  
84 ODAB, Fond 1K, opis 1, a.e. 20, l. 10. 
85 The report, “Doklad na Ivan Gulev, April 23, 1948” is reproduced in full in 
Vesselin Angelov, Otlichen bulgarin s imeto Gerasim: Stranitsi ot vuoruzhenata 
suprotiva streshtu komunisticheskiia rezhim v Pirinska Makedoniia (Sofia: n.p., 
2002), 160-169; the original is archived as Archiv na Ministerstvo na vutresnite 
raboti, D. 357, tom 4, l. 125-129.   
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acceded to the Yugoslav line on Pirin. This direction ended in 1948 as a result of 
the “Tito-Stalin” split and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet Bloc and 
the Cominform. This Communist Information Bureau had been founded in 1947 
to organize a combined international policy for the various national Communist 
parties, but now became a means of encouraging Tito’s overthrow.86 Josef Stalin 
now ordered the Bulgarian authorities to join the “anti-Tito” bloc and apply 
pressure in order to bring about an internal coup in Yugoslavia.   
 Stalin had long shown irritation with Tito’s independence. The latter’s 
foreign policy included an aggressive tendency to confront the West, despite 
Stalin’s insistence on “veto power” over Yugoslav foreign policy in March 1945.87 
Tito followed his own course in post-war negotiations over the status of Trieste 
and disputed US over-flights of Yugoslav territory, the Yugoslav military going so 
far as to shoot down two US aircraft in the summer of 1946. He also intervened 
in the Greek Civil War, providing training facilities and logistical support to the 
Communist National Popular Liberation Army (Ethnikos Laikos Apeleftherotikos 
                                                
86 The Comintern, its predecessor, was closed in 1943 in a Soviet gesture of 
good will towards its western Allies. The Cominform was opened as a Soviet 
response to deteriorating relations with the United States, particularly the Truman 
Doctrine of March 12, 1947. Reflecting Yugoslavia’s prestige in the Soviet Block, 
the new organization was headquartered in Belgrade. It was subsequently 
moved to Bucharest in 1948 where it was used as a forum to attack Yugoslav 
deviation. In a gesture of Soviet reconciliation towards Yugoslavia, it was closed 
in 1956. 
87 On Yugoslavia’s confrontations with the United States and Italy, see Lampe, 
Yugoslavia, 240-241; on Tito’s policy towards the Cominform, see Geoffrey 
Swain, “The Cominform: Tito’s International?” The Historical Journal 35:3 (1992), 
652.  
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Stratos, or ELAS).88 In 1948 Tito moved Yugoslav troops into Albanian territory, 
suggesting that he was planning to widen the scope of the Greek war in defiance 
of Stalin’s wishes.89  
In ideological terms, Tito publicly rejected the Soviet strategy of taking 
power through “top-down” popular fronts in which local Communist parties 
worked in coalition with non-Communist political parties to take power gradually. 
Instead, he used Yugoslavia’s membership in the new Cominform to encourage 
Communist parties in other states to work “from below,” taking control of local 
organizations and broadening a mass base to gain enough strength to take 
power.90 Such a policy not only would lead to further confrontation with the West, 
but could potentially diminish Soviet control over Communist movements outside 
of the Soviet Union.  
Stalin himself moreover disliked and mistrusted leaders like Tito who were 
drawn from the local party apparatus. He preferred established loyalists bound to 
Soviet interests and its intelligence service during exile in the Soviet Union during 
the 1930s-1940s. From the Yugoslav point of view, Stalin and the Soviet 
leadership were increasingly overbearing in their determination to control internal 
Yugoslav policy as well as international Communist policy. Soviet pressure to 
create joint economic ventures set up in Yugoslavia, such as the JUSTA airline 
                                                
88 On the Macedonian dimension of the Greek Civil War, see Koliopoulos, 221-
266; a broader view on Yugoslavia is Kofos, 166-188 and Amikam Nachmani, 
“Civil War and Foreign Intervention in Greece,” Journal of Contemporary History 
25:4 (1990), 510-512. 
89 Ivo Banac, With Stalin Against Tito (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 37-
41. 
90 Swain, 643-645.  
 307 
and JUSPAD Danubian shipping company, were seen with justification as efforts 
to control internal services and as a means for Moscow to siphon off capital for 
its own purposes.91 
Stalin extended his criticism of Tito to include Yugoslavia’s leading role in 
forging a Balkan federation. Stalin rebuked both Dimitrov and Tito for the early 
negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. He privately and publicly 
chastised Dimitrov, in particular, with regards to the Bled Agreement of 1947.92 
Criticism of any possible federation outside of Soviet control increased in early 
1948 as tensions between the Soviet and Yugoslav leadership grew.93 The Bled 
Agreement was negotiated independently of Soviet direction, and was suspect as 
one of Tito’s “independently-minded” policies.94 The Greek historian Evangelos 
Kofos suggests that the Bulgarians were unaware of the break until June, but 
opportunistically took advantage of it afterwards to oppose Yugoslav designs on 
Pirin.95 In fact, a break seems to have been developing for some time on the 
Bulgarian side. Already in April 1948, Dimitrov told members of the Central 
                                                
91
 On Soviet-Yugoslav relations, see Vladimir Dedijer, The Battle Stalin Lost: 
Memoirs of Yugoslavia, 1948-53 (New York: Viking Press, 1971), 73-93. On 
JUSTA and JUSPAD, see Lampe, Yugoslavia, 246 ; Lampe places greater 
weight on the role of Yugoslav-Soviet economic relations in worsening relations 
between the two states in the lead-up to the split.  
92 Stalin’s early criticism can be seen in the diary entry by Dimitrov for June 7, 
1946 in Banac, Dimitrov, 405-406; on Bled, see Dimitrov’s diary entries from 
August 8, 1947 and Stalin’s letter of August 12, 1947 in Banac, Dimitrov, 421-
423.  
93 Note Dimitrov’s diary entries for January 24, 1948 and February 10, 1948, 
which show Stalin’s increasingly hostile view of a “Balkan federation” and 
concerns over how federation would effect Soviet foreign policy. Banac, Dimitrov, 
435, 436-444.  
94 Lampe, Yugoslavia, 247;  
95 Kofos, 188-189. 
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Committee that: “Pirin is no longer just a Macedonian question, but a question of 
Bulgarian-Yugoslav relationships and of the federation.”96 In light of Soviet-
Yugoslav tensions, Dimitrov took an increasingly critical line toward the 
Macedonianization campaign. On June 14, two weeks before the formal split, he 
had already  “prepared a letter to the party committee in the Pirin region 
concerning the speech of the Macedonian prime minister [Lazar Kolishevski].”97  
On June 28, 1948, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was formally expelled 
from the Cominform.  
The result was an immediate reshaping of cultural politics regarding Pirin. 
Sofia now ended any activities that favored the “Macedonianization” as directed 
from the People’s Republic of Macedonia. The new line was spelled out at the 
Fifth Congress of the BKP in December 1948, when Georgi Dimitrov stated that: 
The people of the Pirin district for centuries [have] felt themselves tied 
economically, politically and culturally to the Bulgarian people and do not 
desire their separation before the realization of a federation between 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.98 
 
Bulgaria’s accommodation with Yugoslavia was now finished, and the Central 
Committee undertook a new course:  the elimination of dissidence. The Tito-
Stalin split raised the specter that other Communist leaders might deviate from 
the acceptable line. The Central Committee now undertook to eliminate Yugoslav 
influence within the country, particularly in Pirin. And chief among those judged 
                                                
96 TsDA Fond 216b, opis 1, a.e. 56. 
97 Dimtrov, diary entry of June 14, 1948 in Banac, Dimitrov, 448. 
98 Georgi Dimitrov, Political Report to the Fifth Congress, 62, quoted in Kofos, 
191. 
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as sympathetic to Tito were the Bulgarian Communist officials who had carried 
out the Macedonianization campaign, on Dimitrov’s orders.  
 
The Kostov Trial and the Purges 
 The Tito-Stalin split formed the background for vicious internal purges in 
both Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc.99 In Bulgaria, the purges marked the 
transfer of power away from the post-war “triumvirate” of Georgi Dimitrov (prime-
minister and president of the Central Committee of the BKP), Traicho Kostov 
(first deputy prime-minister and political secretary of the Central Committee) and 
Vasil Kolarov (president from 1946-1947, deputy prime minister and minister of 
internal affairs after 1947). The purges targeted both the policies supporting the 
Macedonianization campaigns and the individuals who carried them out.  
 Kostov, the only “non-Muscovite,” was the only one of the triumvirate 
purged. Dimitrov, now terminally ill, publicly accused Kostov of nationalism in 
January 1949, a charge probably inspired by Soviet criticism of Tito. A series of 
speeches by Dimitrov and others questioned Kostov’s past actions as a member 
without portfolio in the Bulgarian cabinet from 1945 to 1947 and as a still-sitting 
member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. In June 1949 State 
Security (Durzhavna Sigurnost) agents of the Interior Ministry formally detained 
and then imprisoned Kostov until his trial in November.100 As noted above, he 
was executed in December, ostentatiously for his role in carrying out policies, 
such as in Pirin, the BKP had formally approved.  
                                                
99 For the Yugoslav purges, see Banac, With Stalin Against Tito, passim.  
100 On the Kostov trial, see Bell, 103-107 and Kalinova, 113-116. 
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 The Kostov trial reflected the transfer of power to a new generation of 
Bulgarian Communists seen as loyal to Stalin. Kostov’s chief crime was that he 
had been a “home communist” who had remained in Bulgaria during the 1930s 
and Second World War and not one of the Muscovite exiles. The latter now 
stepped in to ensure that Kostov would not, as had seemed likely until even the 
previous year, succeed Georgi Dimitrov as head of the Bulgarian Communist 
Party.101 Dimitrov for his part died before Kostov, on July 2, 1949. Vasil Kolarov, 
the last member of the triumvirate, briefly succeeded him as prime minister but 
was himself terminally ill and died in February 1950. Power passed to Vulko 
Chervenkov, a Stalinist with long years in the Soviet Union. Chervenkov now 
replaced most of the senior party officials under Dimitrov with individuals loyal to 
him, generally party members who had spent the 1930s in exile in the Soviet 
Union.102  
 Kostov’s trial was merely the most prominent in a purge that now raged 
on. 100,000 of the BKP’s 500,000 registered members in 1948 lost their party 
membership by the end of 1951.103 The new leadership sought not only to 
remove supporters of their internal rivals, but also to “ideologically cleanse” the 
party. The influence of now-banned Bulgarian political parties would be 
eliminated, and any members who displayed the “taint of Tito” would be 
removed. At the upper levels of the party, involvement in the Macedonianization 
campaign meant the danger of being accused of “Kolishevism,” loyalty to Lazar 
                                                
101 The Bulgarian Worker’s Party merged with the Bulgarian Social Democratic 
Party in 1948, and the original name was restored.  
102 Bell, 106. 
103 Oren, 113.  
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Kolishevski, who remained Secretary of the Macedonian Communist Party and 
Premier of the Yugoslav People’s republic of Macedonia. Krustio Stoichev, a 
candidate-member of the Central Committee, was removed on such a charge.104  
Within Pirin, the local bodies that had carried out the Macedonianization 
campaign were systematically targeted. The provincial committee of the BKP and 
specific members were criticized as having been “permissive to [the] 
Mihailovists,” in other words insufficiently dedicated to eradicating any lingering 
VMRO circles in the province.105 A detailed internal evaluation followed in 1950 
of 430 “administrative members” of the provincial BKP, including the district 
committee, county committee, military membership and leaders of student 
organizations. This report stated each member’s positions on the 
Macedonianization campaign.106 Much of the recent membership carried the 
additional risk of being labeled “opportunistic” for joining the Party once it was in 
power, and thus being dismissed. In 1951, 1,390 ‘candidate members” and party 
members in Pirin were so rejected. This figure compares to 1,748 in Sofia and 
1,733 in Burgas, provinces which had well over double the population of the Pirin 
district.107  Local county committees provided a series of reports to the Central 
                                                
104 “Reshenia na plenum na TsK na BKP za izmeneniia v sustava na Politbiuro I 
Tsentralniia komitet,” January 16-17, 1950, 213-214, Borbi i chistki v BKP. 
105 “Reshenie No 51 na Politbiuro na TsK na BKP po proverkata na rukovodnite 
kadri v Sandanska okoliia.” 232-23, Borbi i chistki v BKP 
106 ODAB, Fond 2b, opis 1, a.e. 5, l. 15-70. 
107“Iz pretsenkata na otdel “Partiini, profsuiuzni i mladezhki organi” na TsK na 
BKP za rezultatite ot prochistvaneto na selskite partiini organizatsii i na 
purvichnite partiini organizatsni v granichnite okolii na Blagovgradski, Burgarski, 
Vrachanski, Plovdivski i Sofiiski okruzi,” Nov 26, 1951, Borbi i Chistki na BKP, 
384-387. See also “Reshenie No 38 na Politbiuro na TsK na BKOP vuv vruzka s 
obsledvaneto na rukovodnite kadri I metodite na rabota v okruzhnata partiina 
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Committee on “unprofitable party activities” of local comrades, playing out the 
vicious party in-fighting of the purges on a local scale.108 In the process, the 
remnants of VMRO were reduced as well. Two party members in Blagoevgrad 
(Ivan Bashilev and Petur Deredzhiev) were found guilty in 1953 of having been 
members of VMRO before 1934, and were purged from the party.109  
 
Reclaiming Pirin 
 Just as the Tito-Stalin Split was to frame the internal purge of BKP 
members, the policies of the “Macedonianization campaign” were to be purged 
as well. Vladimir Poptomov (born in the village of Belitsa, near Razlog), a BKP 
leader in the Gorna Dzhumaia provincial leadership, had questioned the wisdom 
of the campaign in the past. He was now promoted into the national 
leadership.110 He framed the new Bulgarian policy in a circular of July 8, 1948: 
Our party however cannot approve the dictates of Greater-
Macedonian nationalist ambitious propaganda, which spurs the 
present directives of the People’s Republic of Macedonia for the 
unification of the Pirin region with the NRM. 111 
 
                                                                                                                                            
organizatsiia – Blagoevgrad,” February 28, 1952, 397-399, for an additional list of 
individuals dismissed in 1952. 
108“Dokladna zapiska ot otdel “partiini, profsuiuzni i mladezhki organi” do 
Sekretariata na TsK na BKP za obsledvane na rukovodnite kadri v 
Blagoevgradski okrug,” April 13, 1951, Borbi i Chistki na BKP, 335-336.  
109 “Resheniia na Kontrolnata komisiia pri TsK na BKOP vuv vruzka s 
vuzrazheniia na izkliucheni chlenove ot BKP, Feb 10, 1953,” Borbi i Chistki. Ivan 
Ivanov Bashilev is number 56 on the list of decisions, Petur Deredzhiev is 
number 58. Number 78 explains that Petur Pristov is removed from the party for 
being a police officer in the interwar period; servants of the old regime were 
being purged as well.   
110 In April 1949, Poptomov would become the Foreign Minister, in part for his 
activist line in 1948-1949 with respect to Yugoslavia.  
111 TsDA, Fond 214b, opis 1, a.e. 69, l 1. 
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The Sixteenth Plenum of the BKP’s Central Committee met in July and discussed 
the party’s policies in Pirin. Much of the existing policy was subject to internal 
criticism and repudiated.112 Instructions were sent to the provincial party Central 
Committee in Gorna Dzhumaia and to county committees on the immediate 
policies to take with regards on the Macedonianization campaign and on the 
NRM’s past involvement in the campaign.113  
 On July 21, 1948 the Central Committee approved an 18-page 
denunciation of the Yugoslav “Macedonian policies” regarding Pirin and the 
errors in local policy created through foreign influence.114 Institutions and 
directives inspired by the People’s Republic of Macedonia were to end. This 
included the return of Yugoslav Macedonian teachers, the closure of the 
Provincial Macedonian National Theater (which reemerged as a Provincial 
Bulgarian Theater) and the end of Macedonian-language articles in Pirinsko 
Delo. The resolution specifically addressed the question of autonomy in Pirin. 
While admitting that cultural autonomy had been allowed, the resolution sharply 
denied that the province had enjoyed any separate administrative authority:  
[In this case] cultural autonomy was given without territorial-political 
autonomy. … Through every instruction of the government and state 
organs from above and in every report of the state organs from within the 
Pirin region was that it was a regular administrative province, as are 
Plovdiv, Pleven, Burgas and other provinces in Bulgaria.”115 
 
The intent of the Central Committee was to eliminate foreign influence in the 
cultural campaign, which in fact would continue into the early 1950s. Sofia’s 
                                                
112 TsDA, Fond 146b, opis 2, a.e. 247, l.106-108. 
113 TsDA, Fond 216b, opis 1, a.e. 570, l. 181-183.  
114 TsDA, Fond 214b, opis 1, a.e. 490.  
115 TsDA, Fond 214b, opis 1, a.e. 490, l. 8.   
 314 
concern focused on continued Yugoslav claims to Pirin, not unsurprisingly, given 
the rapidly escalating “cold war” between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. A three-page 
article published in Skopje’s Nova Makedonija at the beginning of September 
1948 criticized the new policies in Pirin and accused the Bulgarian government of 
breaking past agreements on the status of the province.116 In November, it 
explicitly compared the current policies in Pirin to Ivan Mihailov’s “fascist” rule in 
the 1920s and 1930s.117 This would set the tone for an ongoing exchange of 
denunciatory articles centered around periodicals in Skopje and Gorna 
Dzhumaia, now renamed Blagoevgrad in honor of the Pirin origins of the founder 
of the Bulgaria Communist Party. The BKP accused Macedonia of creating a 
“terror campaign” to spread Macedonian culture, forcing “Bulgarian” inhabitants 
in Vardar Macedonia to adopt a new “Serbianizing” language and culture.118 The 
NRM counter-charged that Bulgaria was suppressing the national liberation of 
Pirin Macedonia by orchestrating its own “terror campaign” to prevent locals from 
using their Macedonian language or expressing their Macedonian national 
consciousness .119 
While requiring an end to foreign influence, the BKP did not determine that 
all aspects of the cultural campaign would cease, simply that the “mistaken” 
policies would. A report from the Razlog district committee in July 1948 stated 
that the party would still continue the “heroic Macedonian liberation struggle” in 
                                                
116 Nova Makedonija, September 2, 1948, 1-4. 
117 Nova Makedonija, November 26, 1948, 3. 
118 Pirinsko Delo, February 11, 1951, 3. 
119 The first charge is made in Nova Makedonija, May 21, 1950, 1. The second is 
made in Nova Makedonija, June 1, 1953, 2. 
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the “spirit of Gotse and Yane.”120  But a “Bulgarian line” was now to be asserted 
within the cultural campaign. A Macedonian ethnic identity remained tolerated, as 
long as it did not originate in Skopje. Although teachers from the NRM had been 
deported, the Macedonian language classes were allowed to continue — 
although no longer as compulsory subjects. Topics in Macedonian history (such 
as the nineteenth century “liberation struggle”) could be taught, but not the 
“Yugoslav” version prevailing over 1947-48. Materials that deviated from the new 
line were eliminated.121 What would be stressed now was the linkage of the 
Macedonian liberation struggle to the Bulgarian liberation struggle, and the 
appropriation of Macedonian symbols and history within a Communist expression 
of Bulgarian national consciousness. Pirin’s experience was seen as an integral 
part of a Bulgarian revolutionary tradition. The pivot of this new cultural campaign 
can be summarized in a slogan used in 1952: 
Pirin Macedonia, the only free part of Macedonia, must be a militant 
base for the struggle for peace, democracy, the indivisibility of 
Macedonia and the unity of the Macedonian people.122  
 
Correspondingly, new Bulgarian policies stressed both the historical and the 
progressive aspects of Macedonian identity but rejected the Yugoslav People’s 
Republic of Macedonia’s version of unification.123 
                                                
120 ODAB, Fond 4b, opis 1, a.e. 2, l. 64a/15-64a/18. 
121 Kofos, 190, notes that the Macedonian texts imported over 1946-1948 were 
burned; the BKP at the same time withdrew questionable material — including 
interwar newspaper collections and issues of Pirinsko Delo from 1944-1948 — 
from provincial libraries, maintaining copies only at the Natsionalna biblioteka in 
Sofia.  
122 TsDA, Fond 1b, opis 64, a.e. 160, l. 22-23.  
123 Along these lines, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) allied with the BKP 
in 1949 during the last phases of the Greek Civil War. The KKE line was that the 
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Pirin’s heritage was now recast to create a rival tradition. This initially took 
the form of common references in Pirinsko Delo to the deeds of Damian Gruev, 
Gotse Delchev, Yane Sandanski and to key events in Macedonian history such 
as the Ilinden Uprising.124 Occasional articles in national publications such as 
Rabotnichesko Delo followed as well.125 Such articles were linked to regular 
features on the deeds of Bulgarian liberation heroes of the nineteenth century 
such as Vasil Levski and the Communist leaders of the twentieth century such as 
Dimitur Blagoev and Georgi Dimitrov.  
More dramatic public efforts were to follow. Renaming campaigns over 
1949-1951 changed Sveti Vrach to Sandanski in 1949, Nevrokop to Gotse 
Delchev and, in 1950 as already mentioned, Gorna Dzhumaia as Blagoevgrad. 
The village of Belitsa became Ilindentsi in 1951. A plethora of streets, plazas, 
industrial works and schools were named after Sandanski, Delchev and other 
historical Macedonian figures of suitable ideological pedigree. Prominent 
monuments were built to commemorate individuals, Partisans and the “national 
liberation struggles” against the Ottomans and Fascists.126 The program’s 
purpose was to link the history of the Macedonian revolutionary organizations to 
the Bulgarian revolutionary tradition. This arguably was why Gorna Dzhumaia, 
                                                                                                                                            
Macedonian people of Greece were allied with the Greek people in resisting 
imperialism, and that Yugoslav policies were attempts to “divide” this alliance. 
See Barker, 128-129; Koliopoulos, 238-239. 
124 Generally, such articles were run on the anniversaries of these figures’ birth 
and death, and Ilinden was commemorated annually on August 2. 
125 For example, the article “Makedonskiiat narod naslednik poucheniiata na 
Gotse Delchev i Yane Sandanski,” Rabotnichesko Delo, May 6, 1951, 9. 
126 This included the monument referenced in the introduction. Gotse Delchev’s 
statue in Blagoevgrad was sculpted by Krum Dermendzhiev and erected in 1955.  
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the largest town in the region and the provincial capital, was renamed not for a 
member of VMRO but for Dimitur Blagoev. When the provincial governments 
were restored in 1949, a “Gorna Dhzumaia” (soon Blagoevgrad) oblast was 
created but under the firm control of the central government.  
 
Figure 21  
Bulgarian Administrative Borders,1949 
The oblasti are restored in 1949, including the Gorna Dzhumaia (Pirin) oblast; 
these boundaries remain to the present.  
  
Based on Bulgarskata akademia na naukite: Geografski institut, Atlas Narodna Republika Bulgariia (Sofia: 
Glavno upravlenie po geodeziia i kartografiia pri ministerstvoto na akrhitektura i blagoustroistvoto, 1973), 7. 
 
A history that stressed broad revolutionary themes meant increasing 
marginalization of the role of the Macedonian movement, particularly those 
elements (such as the post-war VMRO) that did not fit the new historiography. As 
such, little of this new Bulgarian history of Macedonia was incorporated into the 
Communist national history of Bulgaria as a whole. While the Central Committee 
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of the Poliburo officially recognized the fiftieth anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising 
in 1953, no member of VMRO was considered significant enough to list in the 
related announcement that commemorated and listed the national “revolutionary 
fighters against Turkish slavery, fascism and imperialism.”127 The state’s new 
historical policy was intended less to foster a new Macedonian historiography as 
it was to provide ammunition to criticize the historical approach promulgated in 
Yugoslavia.128   
 The other element in the BKP’s retrenching of its Macedonian policy in 
Pirin was to emphasize new economic development there. This was an early 
priority of the local postwar Party organs but had soon been eclipsed by the 
cultural campaigns. 129 The pace of investment now accelerated after 1950. 
Electrification was extended to the large villages. Industrialization advanced in 
the region, with a number of state-funded and managed facilities built over 1949-
1952. The actual economic advance can be overstated. Despite state 
encouragement and investment in infrastructure and enterprises, centrally 
planned development in Pirin met with only mixed success. The increase of the 
postwar urban population by 4 percent (as shown in the censuses of 1946-1956) 
barely matched Bulgaria’s overall urban growth.130 Only Blagoevgrad, which 
                                                
127 TsDA, Fond 1b, opis 6, a.e. 1801, l. 15-16 (on Ilinden), 5-13 (list of national 
heroes). Ilinden was noted on other occasions as well, e.g., a.e. 472, l 10-11; a.e. 
5102, l. 73. 
128 See, for example, the article “Kak se falshifitsira istoriiata” (“How to falsify 
history”) in Pirinsko Delo, January 8, 1958, 3-4. 
129 Georgi V. Dimitrov, “Za taka narechenata ‘kulturna avtonomiia’…,” 77. 
130 Also note that “village,” “town” and “city” were and remain administrative terms 
in Bulgaria, not designations of size. Pirin’s towns were usually smaller than 
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grew to 21,833 inhabitants in the 1956 census, could be justifiably be called a 
town of reasonable size. Melnik was also considered a town but possessed a 
mere 522 inhabitants that same year. The five “towns” did increase their size by 
35 percent, and Blagoevgrad grew by 54 percent as the oblast capital, but this 




Urban Growth in Pirin, 1934-1956131 
 Urban area  Population 
  1920 1926 1934 1946 1956 
 Bansko 4,532 5,062 5,540 6,161 6,805 
 Gorna Dzhumaia 7,009 9,384 9,974  14,190  21,833 
 Melnik       721    722    521    472    522 
 Nevrokop 6,156 7,165 8,767  11,115   12,577 
 Petrich 7,169 8,380  10,120   13,493   16,401 
 Sv. Vrach 1,533 2,780 4,703 7,447  10,630  
 Yakoruda    3,800 4,150 4,572 5,291 5,507 
 
 
The state’s management of economic affairs now defined “Macedonian 
policy” in Pirin. Regional organs of the BKP stressed the modernization and 
future of the province, even when setting forth the new historical line. The BKP 
and the KPM now both used measures of industrialization and economic 
development to criticize each other. Skopje highlighted its own economic 
progress and criticized the Bulgarian administration of Pirin as backward and 
regressive; officials in Blagoevgrad and Sofia would reverse these charges. Both 
Nova Makedonija and Pirinsko Delo engaged in regular exchanges over the 
                                                                                                                                            
towns elsewhere in Bulgaria, so that a 4 percent growth rate could be achieved 
by urbanizing hundreds or thousands rather than tens of thousands.  
131 Figures derived from TsDA Fond 453K, opis 2, passim and the respective 
volumes of the Statisticheski godishnik na Bulgarskoto Tsarstvo.  
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status of development in Pirin, but these became almost ritualistic events with the 
same charges routinely brought forth by both sides.132 
In 1952, the Macedonianization campaign was effectively finished. Party 
and state support ended for any remaining separate Macedonian local 
consciousness in the region. Remaining elements, such as the “Macedonian” 
ethnic category remaining on Bulgarian census forms, were considered 
sufficiently non-controversial enough that the party did not act to eliminate them 
for another decade. Macedonian symbols were now considered synonymous 
with Bulgarian symbols; its revolutionary heroes a minor but still valued part of 
Bulgarian history. With a Stalinist regime at its height in that year, the Central 
Committee felt secure in that it had definitively imposed its centralizing model of 
both state and nation on Pirin. From now on, state policy decreed that the people 
of Pirin would be Bulgarians from Macedonia rather than the reverse. 
                                                
132 For example, see Pirinsko Delo, “Vardar makedoniia e nai-bednata chast na 
Yugoslaviia,” (“Vardar Macedonia is the poorest part of Yugoslavia”), December 
12, 1951, 3. A more detailed Macedonian critique of development in Pirin is 





Creating Bulgaria’s Macedonia 
 
 
The leaders and founders of the Internal Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary 
Organization … launched the slogan for autonomy[,] ‘Macedonia for the Macedonians’  
… not as a Macedonian national community but as a slogan for struggle, for equal rights 
and freedoms … I speak of the left democratic current in the Macedonian revolutionary 
movement, whose main founder, as is well-known, was Gotse Delchev.”  
— Todor Zhivkov1 
 
The Macedonians fight 
for their own rights!
 
… 
Macedonia is liberated  
and liberated it lives!” 
— Third and sixth stanzas of “Today over Macedonia,” 2 
anthem of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
 
When the Bulgarian census of 1966 was taken in Pirin, “Macedonian” was 
no longer an acceptable option to enter under “nationality.” Although Bulgarian 
encouragement of any Macedonian ethnic group had already effectively ended in 
1952, the category had remained on the census of 1956. The change in census-
taking a decade later set off a diplomatic furor between Belgrade and Skopje on 
the one hand and Sofia and Blagoevgrad on the other.3 Each side accused the 
other of attempting to spread a false national consciousness in Pirin and distort 
the true identity of the region’s inhabitants. As this study shows, such nationalist 
                                                
1 Speech by Premier Todor Zhivkov to the Central Committee, March 11-12 
1963, in TsDA fond 1b, opis 5, a.e. 567, l 274-289. 
2
 Written by Vlado Maleski in 1943 or 1944, “Denes nad Makedonija” was 
adopted in 1944 by the People’s Republic of Macedonia in Yugoslavia and 
maintained after independence in 1991. 
3 “Macedonian” remained acceptable in the 1956 census, but as an empty 
gesture endorsed by the Soviet Union as part of Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev’s 
attempts to reconcile the Soviet-Yugoslav split. Language and education policy in 
Pirin remained unchanged. On the post-1966 furor, see Stefan Troebst, Die 
bulgarisch-jugoslawische Kontroverse um Makedonien, 1967-1982 (Munich: 
Südost-Institut, 1983), 1-53. 
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rhetoric is misleading. There were multiple, competing identities in Pirin before 
these Communist governments began their rivalry over the “true” national 
consciousness of Pirin.  
Group identity was not a novel concept in Ottoman Pirin, where 
confessional and regional consciousnesses were well established. But 
instabilities within the Empire and the influence of the spreading national 
awakenings prompted the Slavs of Pirin to reconsider established boundaries. 
The transition into nationhood began through a cultural, then paramilitary 
mobilization largely organized by local elites, but influenced by the evolution of 
Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian national movements outside the vilayets. Ottoman 
traditions of provincial autonomy led local elites to expect similar autonomy, first 
as a Macedonian component in the Slavic-language movement and then as part 
of the guerilla struggle against the Ottoman Empire. 
 State-building and nation-building were intertwined in Pirin, and 
sometimes competed one with the other across the first half of the twentieth 
century as this study shows. The goal of this cultural, then paramilitary, 
mobilization for a new group identity as a nation was to create a new state. But 
national consciousness in Pirin remained unclear in the late nineteenth century, 
as did the ultimate form of the state that educated elites, then armed bands, 
fought for. Historiography in Macedonia and Bulgaria has argued that VMRO and 
the Supremacists fought over issues of nationalism. The Marxist framework of 
the Communist era depicted the two groups as driven by a conflict between 
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Communist and bourgeois ideology.4 This study argues that these groups were 
divided, between each other and internally, over the question of not just “Who 
were the Macedonians,” but “Who should rule in Macedonia?” Having enjoyed 
long autonomy under the Ottoman Empire, local elites were of no mind to 
relinquish it. They sought to retain and hold power, the “administrative 
mobilization” of state making, even when their national sympathies remained 
unclear.  
These local elites were unusually successful in retaining autonomy, 
challenging assumptions about any smooth and steady increase in state power 
through the twentieth century. Struggles between the province and central 
government over autonomy and centralization impacted successive mobilizing 
events that shaped national consciousness. Under the military demands of the 
First World War and the state’s near-collapse in 1918-9, attempts to integrate 
Pirin began in 1912 but faltered and the Macedonian paramilitary re-emerged. 
While VMRO’s Central Committee was arguably uncertain as to the ultimate 
identity of Pirin’s inhabitants as Macedonians, “Bulgaro-Macedonians” or 
(unhyphenated) Bulgarians, its leadership was not ambivalent in seeking as 
much practical autonomy from the government as possible. The Zveno and royal 
dictatorships of the 1930s did succeed in dismantling VMRO’s administrative 
framework but had only a foreshortened opportunity to establish firm control of 
                                                
4 Historiography explicitly linked historical events in relation to contemporary 
Communism. For example, Hristo Andonov-Poljanski, ed., Documents on the 
Struggle of the Macedonian People for Independence and a Nation-State, 2 vol. 
(Skopje: Kultura, 1985), includes the memorable chapter title “The People’s Anti-
Feudal Liberation Struggle against Byzantium.”  
 323 
the state over Pirin. The stresses of the Second World War undermined the 
enterprise and gave local autonomy a new lease on life. Its last years and the 
longer period of autonomy before and after the First World War preserved, even 
strengthened feelings of a local consciousness long after every other province of 
Bulgaria had been brought under the firm control of the centralizing ministries of 
Sofia.  
It was the Communist regime’s assumption of power within the Fatherland 
Front of 1944 that would establish a clear national ideology in the province. In 
Pirin, there is a clear affinity between the centralizing dictatorships of the 1930s 
and the new Communist regime: both sought to establish the rule of the central 
government in the region, and both saw defining and controlling local national 
consciousness as one aspect of this rule. The front page of Pirinski glas regularly 
featured Tsar Boris’ portrait to 1944; Georgi Dimitrov’s portrait would continually 
dominate the cover of Pirinsko delo after 1944. What appears as a discontinuity 
in histories when the focus is on Sofia appears as continuity when viewed from 
Pirin.  
Facing domestic weakness, the Bulgarian Worker’s Party was forced to 
concede to the local Communist committees’ desire for autonomy. At a 
diplomatic disadvantage, the BRP conceded as well to new Yugoslav 
formulations of Macedonian national consciousness. But this was a response to 
the Party’s post-war weakness, and the BRP sought to take back these 
concessions. The Skopje-inspired “Macedonianization” campaigns of 1946-1948 
were the vehicle by which the BKP re-established its control over local 
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Communist committees, many of whom protested against the campaign and the 
encouragement of a Macedonian national consciousness. Successful in re-
establishing central control, the Central Committee of the BKP was then able to 
use the opportunity of the Tito-Stalin split to turn a course away from the new 
Macedonian nation, arguing for a “Bulgaro-Macedonian” consciousness in Pirin.  
By 1952, the key elements of the identity campaign had been eliminated 
as part of Bulgaria’s transformation to Stalinism. For the BKP, establishing the 
“proper” identity and past for Pirin reflected a broad concern with using history to 
justify the Communist regime. Bulgarian scholars now offered proofs that Gotse 
Delchev and Yane Sandanski were socialist heroes favoring the respective 
national identity and state project. At the same time, they sought to disprove 
similar Macedonian claims.5 Establishing a Bulgarian national consciousness in 
Pirin tied the region into the necessary myths of Bulgaria’s revolutionary past.6  
The diplomatic disputes that began in 1967 and lasted through the Cold 
War were pro forma defenses of this established narrative. Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia would seek to outrival each other throughout the Communist era in 
turning their respective portions of geographic Macedonia into showpieces. 
Blagoevgrad’s city center was rebuilt in the 1980s to demonstrate (particularly to 
Skopje, across the western border) not just the region’s economic progress but 
                                                
5 This theme is explored further in James Frusetta, “Divided Heroes, Common 
Claims: IMRO Between Macedonia and Bulgaria,” in John Lampe and Mark 
Mazower, eds., Ideologies and National Identities: the Case of Twentieth-Century 
Southeastern Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2003. 
6
 On Communist national ideology’s relationship to the writing of history, see 
Katherine Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism: Identity and Cultural 
Politics in Ceausescu’s Romania (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 
particularly 76, 237-239. 
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also the inhabitants’ acceptance of state authority and a Bulgarian national 
consciousness.  
Bulgaria’s transition from Communism in 1989 and the Republic of 
Macedonia’s independence in 1991 ended the almost ritualistic exchanges 
between Sofia and Belgrade. Fear and uncertainly in the two capital cities over 
Pirin re-entered common political discourse, as government officials in the new 
independent Macedonia talked wistfully of “re-unification” and nationalist groups 
in Bulgaria denounced the “falsified” Macedonian language and history. But 
questions of national consciousness in Pirin itself have largely faded, the legacy 
of 40 years of firm centralized state control that continues in the post-Communist 
period. The national party that assumed VMRO’s name after 1989 polls better 
outside of Pirin than within it.  
 As I write, both Kaufland and METRO — German hyper-market chains — 
are preparing to open large stores in Blagoevgrad, not only to serve the market in 
the province but to attract shoppers from across the Macedonian and Greek 
borders. Local storeowners fear this will result in the elimination of local 
business. Growing concerns about globalization and Westernization are voiced in 
local politics and the pages of Struma, the region’s most popular newspaper. 
After 1952, Sofia has successfully asserted the state and a Bulgarian national 
consciousness in Pirin. The next round in the contest between centralization and 
autonomy, however, awaits as Bulgaria prepares to join the European Union in 
January 2007 and local elites in Pirin question whether the benefit to the region 
will outweigh the inherent loss of control. 
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Glossary of Foreign Terms 
 
andartes Greek term for guerilla fighters. 
boiar Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Romanian term for a noble.  
cheta Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian and Macedonia term for an armed band. Plural, cheti. 
chetnik Serbo-Croatian and Bulgarian term for a guerilla fighter. 
chiflik Turkish term for a large hereditary agricultural estate.  
chorbadzhiia “Provider of soup;” Bulgarian (from Turkish) term for a local notable.   
Durzhavna “State Security;” Communist secret police and internal security militia. 
   Sigurnost   
Exarchate Bulgarian Exarchate Church, founded in 1870.  
haiduk Bulgarian term for a bandit (although without pejorative connotations).  
kaza Ottoman sub-district following administrative reforms of 1864. 
komitadzhi Bulgarian term for a guerilla fighter (“committee-man”).  
kurdzhaliistvo  “Time of the Kurdhzhali;” Bulgarian term for the instability of the 1790s-1820s 
   caused by mutiny in the Ottoman army by irregular soldiers.  
millet Ottoman administrative term for a confessional group.  
Narodno “National Awakening;” Bulgarian term for the nineteenth century Bulgarian 
   Vuzrazhdane    national movement.  
obshtina Bulgarian term for province. 
okoliia Bulgarian term for district.  
okrug Bulgarian term for province. 
Phanariot Term referring to Greek commercial elites from the Phanar quarter of Istanbul, 
    Who rose to prominence in the Orthodox Church and Ottoman administration. 
sanjak Ottoman district following administrative reforms of 1864. 
Sublime Porte The Ottoman government, referring to the Bab-ı Ali, the open court in the  
    Topkapı Palace where administrative issues were decided.  
Vurhovist “Supremacist;” Bulgarian term for members of the SMC (above). 
vilayet Ottoman province following administrative reforms of 1864. 
voivoid Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian; the leader of a cheta. 
Vuzrazhdane “Awakening;” Bulgarian term for the nineteenth century national movement. 
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Glossary of Individuals 
 
Alexandrov, Todor (1881-1924). Born in geographic Macedonia. Member of VMRO, 1904-1913. 
Organized VMRO bands to cooperate with the Bulgarian Army in the Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. 
Served in the general staff of the Bulgarian Ninth Army, 1915-1919, with the rank of general. Re-
founded VMRO in 1919. Member of VMRO’s Central Committee, 1919-1924. Participated in the 
coup of 1923.   
 
Boris III (1894-1943). King of Bulgaria, 1919-1943. Accepted, but did not take a direct role in the 
coups of 1923 and 1934. Took control of the Bulgarian government through a royalist dictatorship 
in 1935.   
 
Chento, Metodija (1902-1957). Member of the Yugoslav Communist Party. President of the 
Presidium of ASNOM, 1943. President of the Republic of Macedonia, 1946-1948.  
 
Chervenkov, Vulko (1900-1980). Member of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Minister of Culture 
1947-1949, Deputy Prime Minister 1949-1961, General Secretary of the Communist Party 1949-
1956, Premier 1950-1956. 
 
Delchev, Gotse (1872-1903). Born in geographic Macedonia. Member and leader of the Internal 
Macedonain Reovlutionary Organization, 1894-1903.  
 
Dimitrov, Georgi. (1882-1949). Born in Bulgaria to parents from geographic Macedonia.  
Member of the Bulgarian Communist Party. President of the Communist International, 1934-1943. 
General Secretary of the Communist Party 1944-1949. Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 1946-1949.   
 
Gruev, Dame (1871-1906). Born in geographic Macedonia. One of the original founders of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. Member and leader of IMRO, 1893-1906. 
Member of the Central Committee, 1893-1898. Fought in the Ilinden Uprising, 1903.  
 
Kolarov, Vasil (1887-1950). Member of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Member of the postwar 
Central Committee. President of Bulgaria from 1946-1947, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Internal Affairs, 1947-1949. Prime Minister 1949-1950.  
 
Kolishevski, Lazar (1914-2002). Born in geographic Macedonia. Member of the Macedonian 
Communist Party. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Macedonia, 
1941-1963.. Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of Macedonia, 1945-1974. 1974-1979, 
Macedonian representative to the Yugoslav Presidency. 1979, Vice President of Yugoslavia. 
1980, President of Yugoslavia.  
 
Kostov, Traicho (1897-1949). Member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1920-1949. Member 
of the postwar Central Committee, 1944-1949; First Deputy Prime Minister and Political Secretary 
of the Central Committee, 1946-1947).  
 
Liapchev, Andrei (1866-1933). Born in geographic Macedonia. Member of the Democratic Party. 
Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 1926-1931.  
 
Matov, Hristo (1869-1922). Member of the Central Commmittee of the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization, 1896-1901, member from 1901-1913. Led a VMRO cheta in the 
Balkan Wars, 1912-1913. Served on the staff of the Bulgarian army in Skopje during the First 
World War.  
 
Mihailov, Ivan (1896-1990). Member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization. 
Secretary to Todor Aleksandrov, 1919-1924. Member of the Central Committee, 1924-1934. 
Leader of the Central Committee, 1925-1934. In exile after 1934.  
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Protogerov, Aleksandur (1867-1928). Member of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization, 1902-1913. Led a cheta in the Ilinden Uprising, 1903. Member of the Central 
Committee, 1911-1913. Served as commander of Bulgarian occupation forces in Moravsko, 
Serbia, 1915-1918, with the rank of general. Re-founded VMRO in 1919, and served on its 
central committee to 1925. Led a faction of VMRO in opposition to Ivan Miahilov, 1925-1928. 
 
Sandanski, Yane (1872-1915). Born in geographic Macedonia. Member and leader of the 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 1895-1915. Leader of the Serres region. Fought 
in the Ilinden Uprising, 1903. Founder and leader of the People’s Federative Party (Bulgarian), 
1909-1910 in the Ottoman Parliament.  
 
Sharlo, Metodija (1897-1944). Member of the Bulgarian Communist Party, 1920-1935. Member 
of VMRO(Obedineta), 1935-1941. Political Secreatry of the Central Committee of the KPJ for 
Macedonia, 1940-1941.  
 
Stamboliiski, Aleksandar (1879-1923). Member of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union. 
Leader of BANU, 1911-1923. Participated in the Radomir Rebellion of 1918. Prime Minister of 
Bulgaria, 1919-1923.  
 
Stoianov, Kimon (1882-1969). Member of the Zveno movement. Participated in the coup of June 
1934. Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 1934-1935 as leader of Zveno. Joined the Fatherland Front in 
1943, and ruled as Prime Minister leading a Fatherland Front coalition from 1944-1946.  
 
Tempo, Svetozar Vukmanovi! (1912-2000). Montenegrin Communist. Member of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), 1937-2000. Member of the Central Committee of the KPJ, 
1940-1970. Served on the General Staff of the Partisans, 1941-1945.  
 
Tito, Josip Broz (1892-1980). Member of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ), 1919-1980. 
Central Committee of the KPJ, 1934-1980. General Secretary of the KPJ, 1940-1963. Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 1945-1946. Minister of Defense, 1945-1953. Chairman of the Presidium of the 
Central Committee of the League of Yugoslav Communists, 1963-1980.  President of Yugoslavia, 
1953-1980.  
 
Tsankov, Aleksandar (1879-1959). Participated in coup of 1923. Prime Minister of Bulgaria, 






Archival Holdings, Bulgaria 
Tsentralen Durzhaven Arhiv, Sofia. (TsDA). The Central State Archive is central 
archive for government records; the former Central Party Archive was merged 
into the TsDA in the 1990s. Not only are the records of the central government 
housed there, but extensive fonds (record groups) of confiscated records of 
VMRO are housed there as well. Materials from the former Central Party Archive 
(TsPA) are indicated by a ‘b.” Record collections used in this study include: 
Fond 1b Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party 
Fond 177 Ministry of Education 
Fond 178 Post, Telephone and Telegraph 
Fond 216b Vladimir Tomov Poptomov  
Fond 370 Macedonian Emigrant Organizations 
Fond 396 Ministry of Internal Affairs and National Health 
Fond 403 Emigrant Societies 
Fond 496 VMRO 
Fond 1073 Macedonian Scientific Institute 
Fond 1909 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 
Fond 1932 Macedonian Societies 
 
Okruzhen Durzhaven Arhiv, Blagoevgrad. (ODAB). The District State Archive of 
Blagoevgrad houses municipal and provincial records from the period of 
incorporation into Bulgaria through the present. Records of the provincial 
government are housed in Blagoevgrad, as are directions from and 
correspondence with the ministries in Sofia, and the records of local 
organizations. Record collections used in this study include: 
Fond 1b Central Committee of the Provincial Communist Party  
Fond 21K District Records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National 
Health, Petrich 
Fond 26K City Municipal Government, Bansko 
Fond 28K City Municipal Government, Nevrokop 
Fond 31K City Municipal Government, Razlog 
Fond 32K City Municipal Government, Petrich 
Fond 61K Regional Directives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
National Health 
Fond 63K District Records of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and National 
Health, Gorna Dzhumaia 
Fond 108K Regional Fatherland Front Committee, Gorna Dzhumaia 
Fond 109K Local Fatherland Front Committee, Gorna Dzhumaia) 
Fond 123K Macedonian Emigrant Organizations 
Fond 125K City Municipal Government Gorna Dzhumaia 
Fond 131K City Municipal Government, Cveti Vrach 
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Fond 136K Provincial Court, Gorna Dzhumaia 
Fond 281K Inspectorate, Ministry of Education  
Fond 757K Macedonian-Adrianople Fraternal Societies 
 
Archival Holdings, United States 
National Archives and Records Administration, NARA II. Records of the 
American legation to Bulgaria are kept in NARA II on microfilm, and include semi-
weekly dispatches to the State Department on internal and foreign affairs of 
Bulgaria. Particularly key records collections include: 
RG 59, U.S. Department of State. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Bulgaria, 1910 - 1944.  
 
The NARA records involving Yugoslavia were drawn upon in more limited 
fashion. The record groups include:  
RG 59, U.S. Department of State. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Yugoslavia, 1910 - 1929. 
RG 59, U.S. Department of State. Records Relating to the Internal Affairs 
of Yugoslavia, 1930 - 1944. 
 
Newspapers 
Makedonsko Zname (Sofia: 1932-1934) 
Nova Makedonija (Skopje: 1944-1956) 
Pirinski Vesti (Gorna Dzhumaia: 1934-1936) 
Pirinski Glas (Gorna Dzhumaiia: 1937-1940)  
Pirinsko Delo (Gorna Dzhumaiia/Blagoevgrad: 1945-1956) 
Rabotnichesko Delo (Sofia: 1944-1952)  
Revoliutsionen list (Sofia: 1934-1936) 
Svoboda ili smurt (Sofia: 1922-1934) 
 
Published Primary Material Collections and Memoirs 
Several collections of documents and memoirs relating to Macedonia were 
published over 1944-1989; these included 1-volume and 2-volume sets released 
in Bulgaria and Macedonia (specifically) with documents supporting each 
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country’s historiographical position on Macedonia. Since 1989, a number of new 
memoirs and collections have been released as well.   
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Centralization. Ithaca: Cornell Univeristy Press, 1997. 
Biliarski, Tsocho and Valentin Radev, Dr. Hristo Tatarchev: Makedonskiia 
vupros, Bulgariia, Balkanite I Obshtnostta na Narodite Sofia: 
Universitetsko Izdatelstvo "Sv. Kliment Ohridski,“ 1996.  
Boll, Michael., ed. The American Military Mission in the Allied Control 
Commission for Bulgaria, 1944-1947: History and Transcripts. Boulder: 
East European Monographs, 1985.  
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Institute of History. Documents and Materials on 
the History of the Bulgarian People. Sofia: Bulgarian Academy of 
Sciences, 1969. 
Burilkova, Iva and Tsocho Biliarski, eds. Makedoniia v plamutsi: Osvoboditelnite 
borbi na bulgarite ot Makedoniia v spomeni na deitsi na Vutreshnata 
makedono-odrinska revoliutsionna organizatsiia. Sofia: IK "Sineva,“ 2003.  
Dallin, Alexander and F.I. Firsov., eds., Dimitrov and Stalin, 1934-1943: Letters 
from the Soviet Archives. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 
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Haven: Yale University Press, 2003. 
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